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Since World War II, unilateral economic sanctions, mainly in the form of trade
embargoes, have been increasingly used to serve various purposes. Most of them
have been imposed to seek changes of national policy on international security and
human rights issues. The linkage of trade to the international environment, by
contrast, is a relatively recent phenomenon. This dissertation is an analysis of the
legality of such unilateral measures under international law.
One specific incident will serve as a detailed case study: the US's import ban against
wildlife products of Taiwan authorised by the Pelly Amendment in 1994. This action
constituted an unprecedented imposition of unilateral trade sanctions to pursue an
environmental object, the preservation of endangered species. There will first be a
discussion of the facts and background relevant to the case at the preliminary stage.
The research will then assess the legality of this measure from several standpoints:
third-State countermeasures, general rules of international law, international trade law,
and international environmental law. This study will proceed to explore the legal
implications of individual applicable law over the environmental trade sanctions.
Finally, in each of these areas, the lawfulness of the Pelly sanctions will be assessed
by applying the pertinent rules to the dispute.
The assessment of the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan leads to the following
conclusions:
(1) It seems difficult to decide whether the Pelly sanctions were legal
countermeasures, mainly because the uncertainly regarding the violation of customary
law by Taiwan's conservative policy; (2) No definite rules have yet emerged to
proscribe the use of economic sanctions in the context of general international law.
Nevertheless, the study indicates that the use of Pelly sanctions, such as the case of
Taiwan, is likely to constitute impermissible intervention; (3) Although the Pelly
sanctions had not violated the US's obligations under the GATT/ WTO regime
because of the non-member status of Taiwan, a hypothetical study shows that the
sanctions, under the current WTO/GATT jurisprudence, probably would have been
inconsistent with the GATT mandate if Taiwan had been a member; (4) In terms of
the FCN treaty between the two countries, US could meet substantial difficulty in
justifying the trade measure; (5) The linkage of the Pelly action with CITES's
recommendation is clear. But, it remains uncertain whether the such connection may
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"He who, using force, makes a pretence to benevolence in the leader of the princes. A leader of the
princes requires a large kingdom. He who, using virtue, practises benevolence is the sovereign of the
kingdom. To become the sovereign ofthe kingdom, a prince need not wait for a large kingdom"
Mencius
With the advance of technology and the development of commerce and trade, it
has been increasingly recognised that injuring another country's economy is a means
of exerting pressure upon it.1 When resort to war was justified to settle international
disputes, blockade was the most radical method of economic sanctions, aiming at the
interruption of the flow by sea of vital goods to enemy. In the two World Wars, the
Allied blockades of Germany were undoubtedly instrumental in weakening the
nation's fighting capacity, and contributed to her eventual defeat.3 Even without
engaging in warfare against target nations, strong countries' deployment of so called
"pacific blockades" has proved to be an effective coercion.4 The most noted case was
the action exercised by Britain, Germany and Italy to force Venezuela to pay its debts
in 1902.5
The original belligerent role of economic sanctions in serving as a supplemental
tool to achieve the end of war has diminished. Instead, it has evolved into a relatively
independent regime within contemporary international society. Following the two
World Wars, the authorised enforcement system created in the League of Nations and
the United Nations (UN) has provided the basis for the collective operation of
international sanctions, primarily relying on economic measures to enforce
compliance with international standards.6 On the other hand, the emergence of
1 See Doxey, Economic Sanctions, at 10, 11.
2 Before economic blockade incurred in the last two world wars in twentieth century, evidence shows
that States' inclination to deploy blockade had been prominent. The pre-World War I episodes of
economic sanctions for foreign policy goals see Hufbauer and Schott, Economic Sanctions, at 28-31.
3
Doxey, Economic sanctions, at 11-14.
4 See Starke, Introduction to International Law, at 523-24.
5 See Oppenheim, International Law, Vol II, at 146, n. 1. CJ One author contends that the blockade
against Venezuela was almost certainly a war blockade. See Brownlie, Use ofForce, at 35-6, 39.
6 Art. 41, the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco 26 June 1945; entered into force
24 Oct. 1945 [hereinafter UN Charter].
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superpowers with mighty cconomie weapons heralds the frequent demonstration of
economic measures on a unilateral basis. Their power to influence the policy of other
countries would seem hard to counter. According to Hufbaucr and Schott, among the
116 eases of economic sanctions documented from World War I to 1990, the United
States, either alone or in concert with its allies, has deployed sanctions 77 times; the
United Kingdom 22 times, often in co-operation with the League of Nations and later
the United Nations; the former Soviet Union used them 10 times, usually against
recalcitrant satellites.7
Several factors favour the use of economic sanctions. First of all, the justification
of a military action against States has become relatively unattainable under modern
public international law. Considering the irreversible damage and human cost
incurred under two World Wars, international society has been committed to
resolving international conflicts through the mechanism of a collective security
regime undertaken by the Security Council within the UN, instead of allowing its
members to invoke the use of force. Accordingly, member States are prohibited
from using force to settle disputes, except in case of self-defence, or when authorised
by the Security Council.9 In contrast, countries imposing economic sanctions, the
non-violent measures, generally face less of a challenge from the international
executive or judicial arena.10
Secondly, while the global economy marches toward integration, greater
international trade will contribute to national development and interests. It is
indisputable that absolute self-sufficiency is becoming ever less feasible, and any
forms of interruption of business transactions will certainly cause economic loss to a
country. Therefore, countries are increasingly convinced that the use of economic
7 Hufbauer and Schott, Economic Sanctions, at 8, 9.
8
According to Art. 24 of the UN Charter, the Security Council is conferred the primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security. To fulfil these duties, some specific powers
also are granted to the organ. See the chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter.
9 See UN Charter, Art. 2(4) and the context in the Chapter VII.
10
Among the hundreds of economic sanctions imposed since the World War I, the complaint presented
by Nicaragua against the United States's economic coercion before the World Court in 1986 seemed to
be the first case judged concerning the legality of the use of economic sanctions under the customary
international law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.A.),
ICJ Rep. 1986, at 14, 126 [hereinafter Nicaragua Case], The powerful States' veto privilege accorded
by the UN Charter used to deter the enforcement of the ICJ's judgement probably would frustrate




weapons, less costly than war, could be more effective and therefore preferable,
particularly when diverse economic means designed to pressurise the target to
conform to certain standards arc available." That is the reason why Hufbauer and
Schott concluded that: "A diplomatic slap on the wrist may not hit where it hurts, but
more extreme measures, such as covert action or military measures, may be excessive.
Sanctions provide a popular middle road: they add teeth to international diplomacy,
12
even when the bark is worse than the bite."
For the purpose of this thesis, the term, "economic sanctions", or "economic
coercion" means any economic measures of a coercive nature, taken unilaterally
against an alleged violator in order to enforce compliance with international norms.
In practice, similar terms, such as "boycott"13, "embargoes"14 or "countermeasures"15
have often been employed to describe the exercise of economic sanctions.
The term "sanctions", in its general meaning, refers to a penalty inflicted upon a
State for disobeying a law or rule. 16 In accordance with this definition, not
surprisingly, some international lawyers argue that economic measures not designed
to punish a violation of international law should not be classified as sanctions.17
Accordingly, some foreign practices might be excluded from the pool of economic
sanctions. For instance, western strategic embargoes against the former Soviet Union
and the Arab League boycotts of Israel and its allies and trading partners perhaps
would not constitute sanctions. Therefore, some authors prefer the term "economic
coercion" to "economic sanctions" in depicting this kind of action. On the other
" See Doxey, Economic Sanctions, at 10,11; Doxey, International Sanctions, at 8, 9; Hufbauer and
Schott, Economic Sanctions, at 11, 13.
12 Hufbauer and Schott, id. at 11. See also Carter, Economic Sanctions, at 12.
13 The boycott originally refers to a refusal to buy particular goods from a target country. The study
focuses on the boycott taken by the State authority. The boycott initiated by consumers unofficially is
not covered by the study.
14 The embargoes usually involve the control of imports from or export to the target State.
15 Countermeasures refer to an action taken by an injured State in response to a prior unlawful offence.
Subject to certain limitation, the action could be justified under international law. See chapter two of
the thesis.
16 See The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, at 1221. The traditional implication of
sanctions has similar function of criminal law—to punish, to deter, and to rehabilitate. See Hufbauer
and Schott, Economic Sanctions, at 11.
17 See Doxey, Economic Sanctions, at 4, 5.
18 See Boorman III, "Economic Coercion", at 205-31; Bowett, "Economic Coercion", at 1-12; Farer,
"Political and Economic Coercion", at 405-13.; Lillich, "Economic Coercion", at 233-44; Partridge,
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hand, Schermers and Blokkor distinguish between sanctions against individuals and
sanctions against an entity such as a State. In effect, the latter, they argue, "[are] not
meant to be punitive in the sense that 'crime should be revenged'."19 Rather, "Their
only purpose is to exert sufficient pressure to induce addressees not to violate the
rules in the future (the preventive function), or to stop current violations (the
repressive function)."20
Regardless of the lack of uniformity in the term's usage, for the purpose of this
research, the emphasis will be placed primarily on the study of the intent of senders
and the character of measures unilaterally imposed in an attempt to assess the legality
of the actions, rather than on whether or not the target's behaviour deserves the
imposition of sanctions. In fact, some practices indicate that sanctions are often
imposed against countries that are not necessarily engaged in activities which
contravene international law. In this regard, the research would not agree that the
employment of the term "sanctions" by States to describe economic measures
necessarily implies a genuine violation of international law by the target.21
Countries imposing the sanctions are referred as the "acting State" or "senders",
and nations under the sanctions are usually termed the "target" or "victim States".
Regarding the content of the sanctions, the economic means generally encompass two
primary types of sanctions: trade interruption; and financial impediment.22 The former
mainly focuses on export control and import restriction. The latter involves the
withdrawal of official economic and technical assistance, especially, to developing
countries, and may extend to a freeze of foreign assets owned by the target country in
the sender country.
Although economic measures have frequently been used since the Second World
War to seek changes of national behaviour regarding the international security, human
23 •
rights, and other foreign policy issues, the use of trade embargoes in an
environmental context is quite a modem development. As the preservation of the
global environment becomes increasingly significant, the use of trade restrictions has
been taken as a tool to promote environment awareness, featuring a relatively new
pattern of transboundary influence. For instance, in response to the depletion of
"Political and Economic Coercion", at 755-69.
19 Schermers and Blokker, International Institution, at 902 [emphasis added].
20 Id.
21 See Doxey, Economic Sanctions, at 6, 7.
22 The detail content of these two catalogues is illustrated in Doxey's work. See Doxey, id. at 11, 12.
23 Hufbaucr and Schott, Economic Sanctions, at 4, 28.
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world natural resources, over the past two decades, a number of US statutes have been
enacted to mandate trade embargoes against foreign nations' conservation practices,
especially for fisheries and marine species.24 The imposition of trade restrictions,
however, has not been common until recently. Several authors attempt to justify
unilateral trade sanctions for environmental purposes largely on the basis of their
effectiveness in implementing international standards. It is argued that the measure
can be used to force a non-party State to become party to international agreements.
Also, it may put pressure on parties to observe the standards prescribed by the
environmental regimes.26 It has been observed, in contrast, that "an unbridled
unilateralism would reduce international trade to a power-based regime that would
27have no stability or rationality."
Some of the statutes are designed purely to enforce US national standards. For
instance, the amendment to the Marine Mammal Protective Act (MMPA) in 1988
forbids the importation of tuna from countries which fail to comply with the US
o
regulatory programme on incidental dolphin taking. As a result, several tuna
9Q
exporting countries have suffered trade embargoes. In addition, other legislation
with lofty ambition seeks to enforce international conservation agreements.30
The focus of the present discussion is the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's
Protective Act,31 enacted by the US in 1971. It authorises an import ban to advance
compliance with international environmental standards on fisheries and endangered
species. In 1994, triggered by Taiwan's insufficient progress in halting illegal trade in
tiger and rhinoceros parts, the Clinton Administration invoked the Pelly Amendment,
prohibiting the importation of certain wildlife products from Taiwan. The
implementation of the Pelly trade embargo against Taiwan highlighted an
unprecedented imposition of unilateral trade sanctions in the pursuit of international
environmental objectives.32 The sanctions were also the first-ever imposed under the
24 See generally McDorman, "Fish Embargo", at 477-507; McLaughlin, "Trade Sanctions", at 7-8, 20-
25
25 See McLaughlin, id. at 8.
26 See Weiss, "Trade and Environment", at 732. Southworth III, "GATT and the Environment", at 1011.
27 Schoenbaum, "Trade and Environment", at 723.
28 16 U.S.C. 1371 (a) (2) (B) (1988).
29
McDorman, "Fish Embargo", at 494-95.
30 The statutes see McLaughlin, "Trade Sanctions", at 17-19.
31 22 U:S.C. 1978.
32 Friedman, "US Puts Sanctions on Taiwan, N. Y. Times," 4 Apr. 1994, at Dl. Press release from the
White House, President Lifts Trade Sanctions against Taiwan: Welcomes Major Steps Taken to Protect
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statute since its enactment, although the US has regularly threatened to employ the
measure in the past few decades.33 For example, in response to the whaling practice
conducted by Japan, the US President Reagan denied fishing privileges to Japan in the
US exclusive economic zone under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment.34 This
action also constituted, according to the Amendment, a certification under the Pelly
Amendment (i.e. a statement that Japan could potentially be exposed to a trade
embargo in addition to the denial of fishing rights).35 In the event, however, Pelly
t/r
sanctions were not actually implemented against Japan.
This environment-oriented measure aroused different reactions and remained
controversial. Environmentalists, generally speaking, approved of the enforcement
measures. The Earth Island Institute (EII) praised the sanctions as "perhaps the most
significant event for species protection to occur in 20 years."37 Diana McMeekin,
head of the African Wildlife Foundation said "[t]he US has taken the lead in this
worldwide battle to save the rhinoceros and tiger before it is too late. It is as if the
government has issued a last-minute stay of execution for those magnificent creatures
10
on the edge of extinction." The environmental sanctions, by contrast, drew harsh
criticism from others who argued the "use of American economic might to impose our
environmental values on Taiwan's culture . . . tantamount to "eco-imperialism."
Taiwan's eventual submission to the pressure of US to some extent echoed the
conviction that the use of trade sanctions can be an effective measure in the protection
of the environment. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a fruitful result brought by
the measure does not necessarily ensure the consistency of the action with
Endangered Species (30 June 1995)[hereinafter President lifts sanctions],
33 Prior to sanctioning Taiwan, the US has threatened to impose the Pelly sanctions for fourteen times.
See Appendix B, Table 1. The brief history of the Pelly episodes before 1994 see Charnovitz, "Pelly
Amendment", at 763-72.
34 16 U.S.C. 1821 (e)(2)( 1985).
35 16 U.S.C. 1821(e)(2)(A)(i) (1985).
16 See Charnovitz, id. at 761,765.
37
Gerstenzang, "US Will Impose Trade Sanctions Against Taiwan to Protect Wildlife," L.A. Times, 12
Apr. 1994, at A7.
38 Friedman, "US Puts Sanctions On Taiwan", N. Y. Times," 12 Apr. 1994, at Dl.
39 J. Sheehan, "Most Favored Fauna Treatment," Wash. Times, 31 May 1994, at A12. The term eco-
imperialism refers to the situation that powerful and wealthy countries will impose their own views
regarding environment or other social or welfare standards on other parts of the world. See Jackson,
"World Trade", at 1241. See also DeVries, "Eco-Imperialism", J. Com., 30 Apr. 1992, at 8A;




The sanctions imposed by the US against Taiwan provide an excellent
opportunity to conduct an assessment on its legality under international law,
notwithstanding the fact that no legal claim was made by Taiwan against the US. As
the US has continued to threaten a number of countries by invoking the Pclly
Amendment,40 the likelihood is that similar sanctions will be imposed in the future.
Also, it is quite feasible that the target country may wish to refer the dispute to an
international tribunal. The necessity of exploring the legality of the action thus
remains. Further, the analysis of the applicable regimes may contribute to the
understanding of how modern international law deals with unilateral environmental
sanctions so as to assist some relevant research regarding the general topic.
To date, the legality of Pelly type trade sanctions under modern international
law has not been challenged in international tribunals, although some useful
references have been made in recent disputes, especially in the trade regime.41 The
WTO/GATT system, however, has not yet addressed the use of trade sanctions in the
advancement of international environmental standards. Economic sanctions were
considered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua case. However,
in this case, they were not launched for environmental purposes. The lawfulness of
unilateral environmental sanctions, therefore, has not yet been adequately and
comprehensively analysed under international law. In this research, I hope to
contribute to the clarification of this problem.
The principal objective of the thesis is to explore the legality of environmentally-
motivated unilateral sanctions through a consideration of the US Pelly sanctions under
international law. Surely, the case represents the only example of use of the Pelly
sanctions since its enactment, although a number of countries have been under the
threat of the sanctions (see Appendix B ). The author senses the limitations of the
discussion partly due to the unique status of Taiwan.42 But, the status of the target
40 For instance, in 1995, Japan was certified for its whaling policy. Both Canada and Norway were
certified for their whaling practices in 1996. None of these certifications so far has led to an imposition
of a Pelly trade sanction.
41 For instance, the most similar and noted events have been the Tuna/Dolphin dispute between the US
and Mexico in 1991, as well as an analogous case between the US and several European countries in
1994, all relating to the process and production method (PPM). Also, the 1998 Shrimp/Turtle case
featured the most recent use of the environmental trade measures.
42 Because of the political reason, Taiwan is not allowed to accede to most environmental treaties. See




nations is merely one of the faetors affecting the assessment. In sum, it is believed
that the study may contribute to the clarification on the legitimacy of such action,
irrespective ofwhich country is being sanctioned, by exploring the legal implications
of applicable law regarding the sanctions and simulating possible arguments raised by
the disputant parties.
It should be noted that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to cope with
procedural matters, such as which tribunal or whether a specific dispute settlement
body is institutionally appropriate in dealing with the issue.43
Before making any judgement, one needs to understand how the dispute
between Taiwan and the US arose. Part One (i.e. Chapter 1) relates the history of the
dispute between Taiwan and the US, leading to the Pelly Amendment sanctions. It
will first address the background under which the Pelly sanctions were imposed,
featuring the international environmental problem of conserving endangered rhinos
and tiger and the response of the international competent regime of the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)44 as well. The chapter, then,
explains the application of the sanctions against Taiwan. It will examine the origin
and legislation of the US Pelly Amendment which provides the material and
procedural basis for directing the implementation of the enforcement measure.
Subsequently, the episode of the sanctions will be analysed, from their initial
imposition to their cessation.
Part Two explores what general substantive international norms may be
applicable to the governance of the use of unilateral economic embargoes for specific
purposes. Chapter Two will turn to a remedial issue: law of countermeasures. It has
been recognised that, under certain circumstances, an individual State is permitted to
enforce compliance with international law without having to show a material injury.
Thus, it is interesting to discuss whether the sanctions imposed by the US, which
suffered no direct damage, may be justified under the regime of countermeasures. The
draft articles on State responsibility formulated by the International Law Commission
(ILC) provide some provisions relevant to the assessment. Chapter Two will first
address the current rule regarding countermeasures taken by third-state party. It
mainly attempts to analyse the circumstances entailing a State to impose
countermeasures, even where they are not directly injured by the offence. In order to
43 Some authors question whether a GATT/WTO dispute settlement regime is a adequate forum in
dealing with the dispute arising from the use of environmental trade measures. See generally
Houseman and Zaelke, "Trade and Environmental Policies", at 568-69.
44 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species in Fauna and Flora, 3 Mar. 1973, in
force 1 July 1975, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
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determine whether the Pelly sanetions were a justified environmental countermeasure,
it is essential first to examine whether Taiwan had violated international law in
relation to the protection of endangered species, followed by an analysis as to whether
the rule of protecting species can be enforceable by any State
Chapter Three will analyse three categories of norms of general international
law that may constrain the sovereign use of economic measures so as to support
Taiwan's claim against the US sanctions: use of force, non-intervention, and abuse of
rights. After examining the applicability of respective norms to the dispute, the
chapter continues to determine whether the trade embargoes against Taiwan were in
violation of any of these rules. The analysis in this area will necessarily be highly
concerned with the specific facts of the Taiwan situation, particularly in the sphere of
non-intervention.
V//Part Three analyses the consistency of the Pelly sanctions with special regimes,
particularly those concerning trade and environmental agreements. Chapter Four
explores the legality of the Pelly sanctions under the multilateral and bilateral trade
regimes the World Trade Organisation (WTO)4;>/General Agreement on Tariff and
Trade (GATT) 199446 and the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty (FCN).
As to the former, it seeks to examine how the WTO/GATT has dealt with the trade
measures for environmental purpose in the past decade, then discusses the consistency
of the Pelly-type sanctions with the WTO jurisprudence. Given Taiwan's non-
membership of the WTO, the trade sanctions essentially violated no US obligation
under GATT 1994. Nevertheless, other WTO members that could be targets of the
Pelly Amendment sanctions would have been entitled to resort the dispute to the
WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Therefore, for the sake of completeness, the
analysis of the US action against Taiwan as a "hypothetical" WTO case will be
presented. The application of the WTO norms to the US action against Taiwan will
be discussed.
Chapter Four will then deal with FCN treaties. The Republic of China
(Taiwan)47 is one of the countries with which the US concluded a FCN treaty48 after
45 The WTO was created according to the Marrakesh Agreement in 1st January of 1995, succeeding the
General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT).
46 GATT 1994 was adopted at the Marrakesh Conference, incorporating the original 1947 GATT with
certain amendment. See The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The
Legal Texts.
47 The terms, the Republic of China and Taiwan are interchangeable in this thesis.
48
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the US and the Republic of China (ROC),
63 U.S.T. 1299, TIAS 1871, signed at Nanking in 4 Nov. 1946; entered into force in 30 Nov. 1948.
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World War II. The treaty was principally concluded to regulate bilateral commercial
intercourse. It accords both parties most-favourcd-nation status with regard to imports
and exports, access to ports, and generally guarantees freedom of commerce and
navigation between these two countries. In particular, like the rules of GATT, the
treaty includes several provisions by which certain trade measures may be justified.
The chapter will determine whether the Pelly trade restrictions against Taiwan were in
breach of US's obligation under the bilateral commercial agreement.
Chapter Five explores the consistency of unilateral environmental sanctions with
international environmental law. Ostensibly, there seems no conflict between the
regime and unilateral environmental enforcement actions. Yet, in fact, some special
constraints by international environmental law have been imposed on the unilateral
measures, mainly referring to Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development.49 The principle addresses the interrelationship between trade and
environment, apparently favouring collective efforts rather than unilateral actions to
the extent that it discourages States from employing unilateral measures to deal with
international environmental issues. As the principle, even in the form of soft-law, has
already been hardened by the relevant decisions of international tribunals, it is
interesting to examine the consistency of the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan with the
mandate embodied in the principle.
At the end, general conclusions will be offered.
49
Adopted 14 June 1992, at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/5Rev. 1.
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PART ONE: THE DISPUTE BETWEEN TAIWAN AND
THE US ARISING FROM THE PELLY SANCTIONS
The Imposition of the Pelly Sanctions against Taiwan
Chapter I
The Imposition ofthe Pelly Sanctions against Taiwan
Prior to assessing the legality of the Pelly environmental sanctions against
Taiwan under respective international regimes and applicable norms, it is imperative
to set out the background under which the sanctions were imposed. The first section
of chapter one examines the issue of the preservation of endangered species: rhinos
and tigers, and the response of the international competent regime, mainly the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES).1
The chapter in the second section first seeks to study the legislation of the Pelly
Amendment so as to locate the function and operation of the US conservation statute,
which authorises the US president to implement the trade ban against offending
nations. The whole episode of the Pelly sanctions upon Taiwan will then be reviewed
chronologically, starting from the decision to invoke the unilateral sanctions against
Taiwan to the eventual lifting of the trade embargo.
A The background
1 The problem: conservation of tigers and rhinoceros
Since the late 1980s, the saving of species of rhinoceros and tiger from extinction
has become an increasingly urgent issue of global wildlife protection, due to their
drastic decline in populations.2 In 1994, it was estimated that the numbers of
rhinoceroses had declined 90% over the previous 23 years to around 10,000,3 and the
tiger population had reduced 95% in this century to present levels of 5,000.4 Not
1 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species in Fauna and Flora, 3 Mar. 1973, in
force 1 July 1975, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
2 See e.g. US President's Message to Congress on Rhinoceros and Tiger Trade by China and Taiwan
(Nov. 8, 1993)[hereinafter 1993 President's message to Congress]; Linden, "Tigers on the Brink", at 51.
3 There are five species of rhinoceros: the African Black, the African White, the Javan, the Sumatran,
and the Great One-Florned Rhinoceros. The surveyed number of respective species see CITES
Secretariat Report, Trade in Rhinoceros specimens, Proceedings of the Ninth Meeting of the
Conference of the Parties, at I, UN/CITES Doc. 9.28 (7-18 Nov. 1994) [hereinafter 1994 CITES
Secretariat Report].
4 While there were once eight species of tiger, presently only five of them are remaining, which include:
the Siberian Tiger for 150-200; the South China Tiger with less than 50 remaining; the Indian or
Bengal Tiger with approximately 4,500; the Indo-Chinese Tiger with 800-1200; and the Sumatran
Tiger with up to 400 remaining. See The Trade Records Analysis of Fauna and Flora in Commerce
(TRAFFIC) (USA), TIGER TRADE 1 (Mar. 1994).
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surprisingly, there was a alarm that "unless something dramatic is done to reverse the
trend, tigers will be seen only in captivity, prowling in zoos or performing in
circuses."5
Environmentalists believed that habitat loss resulting from the expansion of
human activities and illegal poaching threatened the survival of these endangered
species/' In particular, they claimed that illegal hunting, driven by the market
demand for their medicinal use, had played a decisive role in causing the rapid decline
of both species.7 Furthermore, it had been predicted that these endangered
populations would become extinct within two to five years, unless the trade in their
body parts was immediately eradicated/ They were convinced that strict control on
the trade in the species would be a necessary and effective method of reducing the
incentive for poaching. Encouraged by the previous experience that the persistent
suppression of the demand for animal parts could effectively halt the decline of
threatened species,9 environmental groups in the early 1990s therefore began an
intense international campaign against those countries who continued to allow people
to use tiger and rhino parts. Apart from condemning countries for tolerating their
nationals' exploitation of those species, the organisations made complaints to the
international wildlife regime, CITES10 and some countries, notably the US," urging
that coercive measures be imposed against the consumer countries. Curiously, in
contrast to the consumer countries, the nations where these species inhabit received
relatively minor censure regarding their failure to conserve the animals, stop the
poaching, and prohibit exports of these wildlife products, all of which equally
12
hampered the international effort for rhinos and tiger conservation.
5 Linden, "Tigers on the Brink", at 52.
6
(TRAFFIC) (USA), TIGERS TRADE 1 (Mar. 1994), at 1. See also Vulpio, "Rhinos and Tigers", at
472.
1 See Patel, "Endangered Species", at 193, 200; Cheung, "Tiger and Rhinoceros", at 131-35. See also
1993 President's message to Congress.
8 See 1993 President's Message to Congress.
9 It was argued that, "Pressure on the fashion industry in the West helped halt precipitous declines in
spotted-cat populations during the 1970s, and international condemnation of ivory-consuming nations
has granted the elephant at least a temporary reprieve." Linden, "Tigers on the Brink", at 53.
10
Eighty-Six environmental groups led by the Earth Island Institute (Ell)and Britain's Tiger Trust
appealed strongly against China and Taiwan to the meeting of the Standing Committee of CITES held
in Mar. 1993. See Linden, "Tigers on the Brink", at 55.
" In November 1992, some environmental groups petitioned the US Department of Interior, Fish and
Wildlife Service to invoke the Pelly Amendment actions against China, Taiwan, South Korea and
Yemen. See Administration Moves to Halt International Trade in Tiger and Rhino Parts, Department of
the Interior News Release, 9 June 1993.
12 Take tigers for example, environmental groups seek to cooperate with nations, like India and Russia
where the species dwell rather than exert pressure on their governments [emphasis added]. See Patel,
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It was evident that the demand for tiger or rhino parts for medical purposes or
consumption primarily originated from Asian nations, such as China, Hong Kong,
South Korea and Taiwan.1"1 Using the animal's parts for medicinal practice has long
been rooted in Chinese culture, and accordingly has influenced the custom of other
Asian countries.14 For Chinese society, the rhino horn has been used as an effective
medicine in blood-cooling, fever-reducing and detoxification for thousands of years.13
It is appraised as a "magic remedy and a precious heritage left over by ancestors from
the treasure house of traditional Chinese medicine."16 In addition, despite a lack of
scientific evidence,17 Asian people have never doubted the benefits of tiger specimens,
especially tiger bones, to human health for their effect in relieving a variety of
ailments, such as rheumatic pain, sexual dysfunction and other physical and mental
complaints.18 From their perspective, consumption of animal parts simply is a normal
exploitation of natural resources rather than punishable conduct. Moreover, their
domestic medical sectors even feared that the traditional culture of medicine is likely
to vanish with the absolute ban on the use of those animals' remains.19 While certain
90
alternative remedies have been developing, apparently, much effort needs to be
made to persuade people to change such customs. It should be noted that, given the
powerful cultural tradition underling this usage, adjustment of the custom to a degree
that may meet prevailing standards of international conservation is unlikely to be
achieved in the short term. The long-term solution, it is suggested, cannot rely on
external coercive measures, such as trade sanctions. Instead, international cooperation
and education21 that normally take into account cultural differences are better to
address the issue more effectively.
Another critical factor that may affect the degree of success in eradicating the
alleged illicit commercial conduct is the attitude of the majority of Asian officials
"Endangered Species", at 196-97.
13 Linden, "Tigers on the Brink", at 54; Cheung, "Tiger and Rhinoceros", at 136. See also Judy Mills,
Market under Cover: The Rhinoceros Horn Trade in South Korea, TRAFFIC Network Report 1 (1993)
(TRAFFIC Int'l, Cambridge, UK).
14
Cheung, "Tiger and Rhinoceros", at 131.
15
Wang, "Implementation of CITES", at 208. See also 1994 CITES Secretariat Report.
16
Wang, id.
17 See Burns, "Medicinal Potions May Doom Tiger to Extinction," N.Y. Time, 15 Mar. 1994, at C 2.
18
Wang, "Implementation of CITES", at 207.
19 See id. at 207-8.
20 See id. at 207; The World Wildlife Fund (WWF), a NGO, has committed itself to working with the
Asian people and their governments for the purpose of introducing alternative medicines. See Patel,
"Endangered Species", at 209.
21 Public education is a powerful mechanism that may help reduce the demand for the animals' parts.
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towards the trade in these species. Unlike the smuggling of drugs and weapons, which
undoubtedly draws universal condemnation, the use of animal parts, in their view,
should not amount to a crime.22 This is, probably, the primary reason for their
hesitance in tightening the enforcement of halting the trade of tiger and rhino parts.
Moreover, faced with the growing intensity of the international campaign against
utilisation of the animals' parts, Asian officials tended to resist an external pressure
that paid scant regard to cultural differences.23 They even regarded the pressure
simply as motivated by the desire to impose western environmental values on Asian
countries in a form of imperialism.24
Indeed, conservation of endangered species requires global effort: it cannot be
effectively achieved without cooperation from all relevant countries, whether
producer or consumer states. Although market demand from Asia constituted a direct
force leading to the decrease of rhinos and tiger numbers, those consumer nations
should not be blamed solely for the near extinction of the species. Quoting the words
ofGeoffrey Ward, author of The Tiger-Wallahs: "Poaching is murder, but crowding is
slow strangulation.", Linden thus correctly observed that "Even if international
pressure eliminated poaching, the tiger would still be in trouble. Its habitat is
shrinking, and its food supply is dwindling as the territory claimed by humans
inexorably expands."25
2 Response of the competent international institution: CITES
In spite of several structural shortcomings,26 CITES generally is regarded as the
most significant and successful multilateral treaty for wild fauna and flora
conservation.27 Its widespread acceptance has been proven due to the ratification of
the treaty by most countries in the world.28 Recognising that certain species may be
See Patel, "Endangered Species", at 207-9; Bums, "CITES", at 222-23.
22 See China Times (Taipei), 27 Mar. 1994, at 6lh edition. Cf. Seeing the close connection between
wildlife and drug smuggling, one commentator urges that international community should treat illegal
wildlife trade as seriously as drug and weapon smuggling that are considered as universal crimes. See
Patel, "Endangered Species", at 201-03.
23 See China Times (Taipei), id.
24 Id.
25 Linden, "Tigers on the Brink", at 58.
26 It has been observed that the CITES regime has several inherent weakness, such as the failure of
addressing the critical issue of habitat destruction, the stipulation of exceptions to its genera! rules and
the permission of a party to enter reservations to the treaty. See generally Southworth III, "GATT and
the Environment", at 1005.
27
Lyster, International Wildlife Law, at 240; Favrc, Endangered Species, at xvii.
28 As of January 1998, 145 countries have ratified the treaty. See Vice, "Biodiversity Treaties", at 635-
39 and n. 94.
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threatened by over-exploitation through international trade,29 CITES focuses mainly
on the regulation of international trade in those species and their products. It is one of
the typical regimes applying trade measures to achieve the aim of the treaty.30
To categorise species that need preservation, CITES lists those species in three
appendices based on their degree of endangerment. Appendix I lists all species
threatened with extinction, whose trade "must be subject to particularly strict
regulation," and "only be authorised in exceptional circumstance."31 Species listed in
Appendix II are not necessarily endangered but may become so without strict
regulation.32 Finally, CITES allows a Party to identify and regulate species not in
Appendix I or II, but which may be listed in Appendix III according to its own
legislation, requiring international cooperation in enforcing the national law.33 It
should be noted that the listing of species in Appendix I or II is not inflexible. It may
be adjusted so as to add, remove, uplist or downlist a species if the specific
requirements are met.34
The CITES's control of trade in listed species functions by ways of a permit
system. The export and import of specimens of species included in any Appendix
cannot proceed without the prior grant of a permit.35 The agreement also spells out
certain conditions that must be met for a permit to be granted.36 Certain competent
domestic organs are assigned the authority to decide whether the conditions have been
satisfied.37
The conservation of rhinoceros and tigers had been brought to CITES's attention
at an early stage. All tiger subspecies were listed as an Appendix I species at the very
inception of CITES, except for the Siberian subspecies.38 The rhinoceros species
have been listed in Appendix I catalogue for twenty years.39 In 1987, responding to
29 See CITES Preamble.
30
Apart from CITES, some other MEAs using the trade measures to fulfill the treaty's mandate include
the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste (into force, 5 May 1992)
and Montreal Protocal on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (into force, 1 Jan. 1991).
31 CITES, Art. II, para. 1.
32 Id. Art. II, para. 2.
33 Id. Art. II, para. 3.
34 The provisions regarding amendments to Appendices I and II see id. art. XV (1).
35 Id. Art. Ill, IV, V.
36 Id.
37Id.
38 The Siberian tiger, Pantera tigris altaica, was listed in Appendix I in 1987. The Ninth Conference of
the Parties, Report of the Secretariat, Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention: Trade in
Tiger Specimens, Doc. 9.29, at 1 (1994).
39 In 1977, CITES resolved to list rhinoceros in Appendix I. The Ninth Conference of the Parties,
Report of the Secretariat, Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention: Trade in Rhinoceros
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the threat to the survival of rhinos, which was considered to be attributable to
continuous trading activities, the COP of CITES adopted a resolution urging all
parties to ban all trading of rhinoceros parts and destroy all government stocks of
rhinoceros horn.40 To secure compliance with the resolutions, it further recommended
that the parties "use all appropriate means (including economic, political and
diplomatic) to exert pressure on countries continuing to allow trade in rhinoceros
horn. . ."41
The CITES institutions, particularly the Standing Committee, were keen to put
more pressure on consumer countries, especially China and Taiwan, than on producer
nations. The wave of condemnation on Asian countries' failure to control illegal trade
in tiger and rhinoceros parts effectively reached its climax in early 1990s. The
Committee, in response, subsequently passed several decisions and recommendations
concerning the enforcement measures. In March 1993, the 29th Meeting of the
Committee recommended a period of six months during which the two countries were
requested to crack down on the activities of illegal trade.42 Examining the
implementation of CITES's requirements by China and Taiwan, in September 1993,
the Committee determined that the enforcement measures taken by the countries were
"not adequate to sufficiently control illegal trade in rhinoceros horn and tiger parts,
including failure to comply with measures outlined in Resolution Conf. 6.10."43
Simultaneously, it recommended that parties consider the prohibition of wildlife trade
against China and Taiwan.44 Moreover, it set the minimum criteria to be met within
the consumer countries. These include:
1. identification and marking of stocks of rhinoceros hom;
2. consolidation of both rhinoceros hom and tiger bone stocks and their adequate
control by the States;
3. adoption and implementation of adequate legislative measures; and
Specimens, Doc. 9.28, at 1 (1994).
40 The Sixth Conference of the Parties in Resolution CONF. 6.10 (1987).
41 Id.
42 See Linden, "Tigers on the Brink", at 55; Shih, "Multilateralism", at 121.
43 The Decisions of the Standing Committee on Trade in Rhinoceros Horn and Tiger Specimens,
Brussels, Sept. 1993, at para. 6 [hereinafter Brussels's Decision],
44 Id. According to the decision, it was contended that the committee has set the stage for trade
sanctions to be imposed against China and Taiwan. See Blank, "Environmental Trade Measures", at 70.
Yet, strictly speaking, the vagueness of the paragraph makes it difficult to claim that sanctions against
these countries have been explicitly urged by the decision.
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4. provision for adequate enforcement of the above measures;45
Nevertheless, it recognised the difficulty of eliminating such illegal trade in a short
time and decided to give the governments more time to reach CITES requirements
before adopting more coercive resolutions against them.46 In addition, it should be
noted that, apart from China and Taiwan, a number of countries, like Russia, Hong
Kong, Yemen, and some African States also were urged to strengthen their control of
the illegal trade, or halt poaching of the species.47 Interestingly, no recommendation
has been made on a using trade ban to counter their violations. Meanwhile, various
CITES delegations visited the consumer nations between November 1993 and January
1994 to provide advice and assistance to those countries and to monitor their
48
progress.
Subsequently, in March 1994, the Committee reconvened in Geneva to review
the progress of countries which were responsible for the decline of the animals'
population. Although the progress of China was still criticised severely by
environmental groups,49 the Committee determined that China had met the minimum
criteria put forth in the previous decision, while stating that further actions by China
were still needed.50 With respect to Taiwan, the Committee was more critical. In its
draft decision, it stated that Taiwan had not yet implemented the minimum
requirements. Then, a draft resolution proposing a wildlife product embargo against
the country was put forward.51 In the event, however, the embargo proposal was not
adopted.52 The resolution, as enacted, merely recommended that "further clear
progress be demonstrated by the time of the next meeting of the Conference of the
45 Brussels's Decision, at para. 7.
46 Id.
47 Id. at paras. 11, 13, and 14.
48 The Ninth Conference of the Parties, Report of the Secretariat, Interpretation and Implementation of
the Convention: Trade in Rhinoceros Specimens, Doc. 9.28, at 2 (1994).
49 See China Times (Taipei), 26 Mar. 1994, at Is1 edition. A letter from a number of the US Congress
members urging the President to take action against both China and Taiwan indicated that China's
progress was no better than that of Taiwan. See Gerstenzang, "US Will Impose Trade Sanctions
Against Taiwan to Protect Wildlife", L.A. TIMES, 12 Apr. 1994, at A7.
50 The Decisions of the Standing Committee on Trade in Rhinoceros Horn and tiger Specimens,
Geneva, Mar. 1994, at para. 7 [hereinafter Geneva's Decision],
51 China Times (Taipei), 25 Mar. 1994, at 1st ed. The draft decision specifies: The Standing Committee
"expresses concern that the actions agreed by the authorities in Taipei towards meeting the criteria have
not been implemented in an expedient manner and agrees to recommend that Parties implement stricter
domestic measures including prohibition of trade in wildlife species now."
52 The move of the Standing Committee can be interpreted to the acknowledgement of the progress
made by Taiwan. See China Times (Taipei), 26 Mar. 1994, at Is' ed. Cf. One possible reason why the
March Decision made no express reference to a trade embargo was that the original Standing
Committee recommendation to that effect (and the Pelly certification) was still operative. See Crawford,
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Parties," 55 which might be interpreted to grant Taiwan an eight-month of
observation.54 Meanwhile, a number of other countries, including Russia, Vict Nam,
Zambia and the Lao Peoples' Democratic Republic, were also required to undertake
further actions for the conservation of rhinos and tigers.55
The Ninth CITES COP held in Florida, US, in November of 1994 was the
subsequent event where conservation of rhinos and tigers was dealt with in depth. In
contrast to the previous decisions made by the Standing Committee, the COP seemed
convinced that international cooperation and public education rather than trade
sanctions were more effective in addressing the issue. Accordingly, no trade
sanctions were proposed against any specific country, including Taiwan. Instead of
resolving enforcement measures, the meeting adopted a recommendation urging:
(1) adequate legislation implementation; (2) law enforcement cooperation; (3)
strategic innovations for replacing items made with tiger and rhinos part; (4) funding
for conservation plans; and (5) educational programs aimed at reducing the demand.56
B The application of the US Pelly Amendment sanctions against Taiwan
1 The US Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act
(a) The enactment and revision of the law
The 1971 Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act57 was initially
enacted to express US serious concern over the salmon depletion in the Atlantic
Ocean. In 1969, the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
(ICNAF)59 decided to ban salmon fishing on the high seas. Three of the contracting
parties to the agreement (Denmark, Norway, and West Germany) resisted the proposal
by invoking the objection procedures of the ICNAF,60 which allows them not to be
bound by the ICNAF's fishing ban. In response to the situation, the US House
Representative Thomas Pelly advocated legislation, as an amendment to the
"Rhinoceros and Tiger" at 565.
53 Geneva's Decision, at para. 8.
54 China Times (Taipei), 26 Mar. 1994, at 1st ed.
55 Geneva's Decision, at para. 10.
56 See The Ninth Conference of the Parties in Resolution CONF. 9.13, 9.14 (1994).
57 Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. 1978).
58 H. R. Rep. No. 468, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1971 US Code Cong. & Admin. News, at
2410 [hereinafter Pelly Report],
59 The ICNAF was created "for the investigation, protection and conservation of the fisheries of the
Northwest Atlantic Ocean." International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 8 Feb. 1949,
Preamble, 1 U.S.T. 477 T.I.A.S. No. 2089, 157 U.N.T.S. 158.
60 The fishing conservation regime allows parties to object to regulatory measures adopted by it. See
the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Relating to Entry Into Force of
Proposals Adopted by the Commission. 29 Nov. 1965, Protocol, 21 U.S.T. 567, 568-69, T.I.A.S. No.
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Fishermen's Protective Act, aimed at enforcing the conservation measures required by
the international fishery regimes61 to which the US is a contracting party.62 To fulfill
the goal, the law mandates a prohibition on the importation of fishery products from
the alleged offending country whose policy is deemed against the agreements.
The law thus formed a typical example of the wielding of economic leverage to
impose a restriction on assess to the US markets in an attempt to reach the goal of
conservation of fishing resources.63 In practice, the dominant intention was to force
compliance with the international whale regime.64
In 1978, the scope of the law was expanded to the extent that the protection of
endangered or threatened species became an additional main concern. In the wake of
the US ratification of CITES at the time, the introduction of the bill (H.R. 10878)
reflected US strong willingness to give effect to the agreement.63 On the other hand,
of course, the successful use of the statute in the conservation of whales in the early
stage of the legislation had encouraged the inclusion of the species conservation in the
Pelly Amendment.66 Moreover, the inclusion also demonstrated the US's commitment
to protect whales due to the fact that the original provision did not cover the activity
of trade in whale.67 But, the prescribed embargoed products were limited only to
wildlife products exported from the target country. The Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries explained that "H.R. 10878 would provide the President with
the authority to embargo only wildlife products from the offending nation. He could
not decide to embargo other products even if the Secretary found that the offending
country was diminishing the effectiveness of the Convention."68
Later, in 1992, the act was further revised to expand the range of banned
products to the extent that the importation of any products from the target country
6840, 756 U.N.T.S. 220.
61
Pelly Report, at 2411-13.
62 22 U.S.C. 1978, (h) (3).
63 See McLaughlin, "Trade Sanctions", at 16; Caron, "Fishery Sanctions", at 318.
64 See Martine Jr. and Brennan, "Whaling", at 295; Caron, id. at 317-26; Chayes and Chayes, New
Sovereignty, at 94-96. As of 1996, the US has threatened to impose Pelly sanctions to preserve whale
for eleven times. See Appendix B, Table 1.
65
Zoller, Enforcing International Law, at 94.
66 Id. In 1974, US successfully pressured Japan and USSR to adhere to the whaling quota prescribed by
the International Whale Commission. Then, in 1978, Chile, Peru, and South Korea, under the threat of
the Pelly sanctions, decided to join the whale convention. See Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 763-
64. Chayes and Chayes, New Sovereignty, at 94.
bl Martine Jr. and Brennan, "Whaling", at 296.
68 H. R. Rept. 95-1029, 95lh Congress, 2d sess. (1978), at 11; [1978] US Code Cong, and Adm. News,
Vol. 3 (1979), at 1775.
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could be prohibited.64 Accordingly, the resultant impact from the use of general trade
sanctions upon an embargoed nation could be huge, particularly where exports to the
US amounted to a substantial portion of its total trade.70 The modification was based
on the belief, according to the US Congress, that the original law was "drawn so
narrowly that an embargo under it could quite likely harm the United States more than
the embargoed nation."71
In conclusion, the enactment and revision of the Pelly legislation manifests the
US's ambition to advance the effectiveness of international conservation regimes,
particularly for living species, so long as it becomes bound by the agreements.72 The
implementation of a Pelly sanction, therefore, can be defined as a national
enforcement of environmental standards by imposing trade measures operated in the
form of an import ban.
(b) The operation of the Pelly enforcement action
The enforcement process provided in the Pelly Amendment is divided into two
stages, which are considered to be "fairly straightforward". The initial one is the
procedure of certification. Regarding fish, the law requires the Secretary of
Commerce to determine the situation whether a fishing practice conducted by the
nationals of a country will "diminish the effectiveness of an international fishery
conservation program."74 Likewise, regarding endangered species, the Secretary of
Commerce or the Secretary of the Interior is responsible for identifying the nationals
that "are engaging in trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness of any
international program for endangered species."75 Further, in implementing such a
broad measure effectively, the Secretaries are required to (a) periodically monitor the
activities of foreign nationals that may affect the international program; (b) promptly
investigate any activities that may amount to such offence mentioned; (c) promptly
conclude and reach a decision.76 Ultimately, following a positive finding, the officials
77
must make a "certification" of the fact to the President.
69
High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, 201 (a)(1), 106 Stat. 4900, 4904 (1992) (to be
codified at 22 U.S.C. 1978(a)(4)).
70
Chamovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 761.
71 H.R. Rep. No. 580, 101st Cong., pt 1, at 4.
72 2 2 U.S.C. 1978, (h)(3) and (4).
73 Baker, "Non-Party Compliance", at 351.
74 22 U.S.C. 1978, (a)(1).
75 Id. (a)(2).
76 Id. (a)(3)(A)(B)(C).
77 Id. (a)(l)(2) [emphasis added].
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On the other hand, apart from the law of the Pclly Amendment, a number of US
conservation statues for living species, covering marine mammals, African elephants,
driftnet fishing, also provide Pelly-typc certification and may result in an imposition
of trade sanctions.78 In effect, the official determinations made under individual
legislation regarding foreign offenses are "deemed" a certification for the purpose of
the Pelly Amendment. By means of this interconnection, the Pelly certification may
generate broader influence and thus, as McLaughlin maintained, "[serve] as a
supplemental procedural mechanism to enforce the substantive requirements of other
marine [living species] conservation statutes."79
It should be noted that the identification of "diminishing of effectiveness" is
made on a solely unilateral basis, despite the fact that the Pelly legislation is designed
to enforce multilateral agreements.80 Further, as observed by Charnovitz, the test of
diminishing the effectiveness is rather vague and subject to various factors,
"[including] non-ratification of a treaty, non-observance of a treaty, or even actions
unrelated to a treaty such as domestic sales of an endangered species."81 Thus, a Pelly
certification may still be launched regardless of whether or not a violation of
• R9
international law has occurred. For instance, the fact that Japan and the Soviet
Union's objection to the measures adopted by the Whaling Convention83 has been
legally sanctioned did not prevent them from being certified under the Pelly
Amendment in 1974.84 Similarly, in 1978, the US launched the Pelly certification
against the whaling practices of Chile, Peru, and South Korea,83 which had not been
in breach of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) due to their non-member
status.
78 Those statues, inter alia, include the 1976 Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, 16 U.S.C.
1821 (e)(2)( 1988); 1987 Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment and Control Act, 16 U.S.C. 1822 note
(1988); 1988 African Elephant Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 4201-45; 1988 Amendment to the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. 1371(a)(2)(D); 1990 Driftnet Act Amendments, 16 U.S.C. 1826
(Supp. IV 1992); 1990 Driftnet Amendments to the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.
1371(a)(2)(E) (Supp. IV 1992); 1992 International Dolphin Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 1411-18
(Supp. IV 1992); 1992 High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, 16 U.S.C. 1826(a)(b)(l) (Supp.
1993). See also Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 761-62; McLaughlin, "Trade Sanctions", at 17-19.
79
McLaughlin, id., at 16.
80 Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 760 [emphasis added].
81 Id.
82 Id. See also McDorman, "Fish Import Embargoes", at 484-85. Cf Zoller, Enforcing International
Law, at 85.
83 International Convention for the Regulation ofWhaling (1CRW), 2 Dec. 1946, in force 10 Nov. 1948,
61 Stat. 1761, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72. The treaty permits parties to avoid being bound by a
quota by entering an objection to it. Id. art. V(3).
84 See Letter from Secretary of Commerce Frederick Dent to President Gerald Ford (12 Nov. 1974).
85 See Letter from Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps to President Jimmy Carter (14 Dec. 1977).
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The second stage of the Pelly actions rests on the discretion of the President in
implementing trade embargoes. Although Pclly certifications are, in principle,
mandatory, whether a sanction will be invoked is entirely subject to the judgement of
the President. Upon receipt of any certification, the President has a period of sixty
days to decide whether an import ban will be authorised before notifying the Congress
of any action taken by him. Meanwhile, a diplomatic consultation might be
undertaken. As Zoiler remarked, "[t]he foreign state is served a warning, i.e.,
diplomatic representations are made to make it aware of the threat that is hanging
over . . . The offending state is thus given a chance to mend its way."S6 Their
operation in practice had showed that some certified countries' deference to the US's
pressure did defuse the use of trade sanctions. The two certifications for whaling
0"7
conservation discussed above provide good examples. But, on other hand,
continued resistance to the US dictation may not necessarily lead to a sanction. For
instance, since 1990, Norway has been certified four times for its whale hunting
oo
policy. None of these certifications has been able to force the country to abide by
the US command, and no sanctions have actually been taken against Norway.
• ... . 8Q
Evidence suggests that political considerations often influenced such decision.
If no import ban is imposed, the President is required to explain this decision to
Congress.90 If the President decides to impose trade sanctions, he also may exercise
discretion with respect to the duration and extent of such a ban.91 Interestingly, the
Pelly law requires the President's discretion to be consistent with the General
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). Yet, arguably, the institutional constraint
does not warrant the eventual legitimacy under the GATT regime. Zoller thus rightly
observed that "The lip-service paid by the Pelly Amendment to the General
92 n •
Agreement on Tariff and Trade does not clear this vivid inconsistency." Since no
case has yet raised this issue of the consistency between a Pelly sanction and the
GATT mandate, the legal implication of the arrangement remains uncertain.
86
Zoller, Enforcing International Law, at 90.
87 See n. 66 above.
88 The Pelly certifications were made against Norway in 1990, 1992, 1993, and 1996. See Charnovitz,
"Pelly Amendment", at 766, 768-69. See also Appendix B, Table 1.
89 It was reported that Norway's role in the Middle East peace process enabled it to escape the sanctions.
See "Is This Really a Good Time to Punish Norway?" WASH. Times, 23 Sept. 1993, at A22. The Bush
and Clinton Administrations' response to Noway's resuming the whaling see Caron, "Whaling", at 166-
68.
90 22 U.S.C. 1978 (b).
91 22 U.S.C. 1978 (a)(4).
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After a periodical review of the activities of the nationals of the offending
country, the Secretary concerned shall terminate the certification based on the
determination that "the reasons for which the certification was made no longer
prevail."93 The decision of termination, together with a statement of the relevant facts,
shall be published in the Federal Register.94
2 The decision to launch the Pelly environmental trade embargo
With respect to the protection of endangered species, the US appeared the most
aggressive State upholding the use of economic pressure to force the consumer
nations to cease trade in these animals' parts. In late 1992, the US placed Taiwan,
China, South Korea and the Republic of Yemen on the list of potential targets of Pelly
sanctions.93 Following discussion with the US, both Korea and Yemen agreed to
accede to CITES and to close down their domestic rhino trade. Then, satisfied with
their efforts, the Interior Department withheld the Pelly Amendment certification.96
At the 30th Standing Committee's meeting in September 1993, the US delegates
led by the Interior Secretary, Bruce Babbit, consistently took a strong stand against
consumer countries, particularly China and Taiwan, by advocating coercive measures
to secure compliance with CITES standards.97 Concurrently with the CITES meeting,
which called for a wildlife trade ban against both China and Taiwan, the US
Department of the Interior soon certified to President Clinton under the Pelly
Amendment that both China and Taiwan were diminishing the effectiveness of
QO
CITES. Although the US recognised that "some progress has been made" by them, it
determined that "they fall short of the international conservation standards of
CITES."99
In response, upon receipt of the certification, President Clinton, in a letter to
Congress in November 1993, suggested that trade sanctions be imposed against both
countries unless they could "demonstrate measurable, verifiable, and substantial
92
Zoller, Enforcing International Law, at 87, n. 78; McLaughlin, "Trade Sanctions", at 16, n. 76.
93 22 U.S.C. 1978 (d).
94 Id.
95 "Administration Moves to Halt International Trade in Tiger and Rhino Parts", Department of the
Interior News Release, 9 June 1993.
96 See id.
97 It was observed that Bruce Babbitt, an ardent environmentalist, played a major role in the effort to
nut pressure on China and Taiwan. See Linden, "Tigers on the Brink", at 58.
s Letter from Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt to President William Clinton (7 Sep. 1993).
99 Id.
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progress" by March 1994.100 Meanwhile, the administration also formulated concrete
criteria that those nations would be compelled to meet, if China and Taiwan were to,
"demonstrate their commitment to the elimination of trade in rhinoceros and tiger
parts and products."101 These included as a minimum:102
1. Consolidation and Control of Stockpiles;
2. Formation of a Permanent Wildlife or Conservation Law Enforcement Unit with
Specialised Training;
3. Development and Implementation of a Comprehensive Law Enforcement and
Education Action Plan;
4. Increased Enforcement Penalties;
5. Prompt Termination of Amnesty Periods for Illegal Holding and
Commercialisation ofWildlife or their Products; and
6. Establishment ofRegional Law Enforcement Arrangements;
It is worth noting that, in contrast to the CITES's standards, the US deliberately
imposed additional criteria on the targets. Clearly, the deadline set by the Clinton
Administration was intended to coincide with the next meeting of the Standing
Committee.103 It was revealed that the US intended to "encourage delegates to renew
their September [1993] call to action," remaining firm on its position favouring the
use of trade sanctions.104 Secretary Babbitt, on the eve of the Geneva meeting,
remarked that "[a]ll the CITES members will be taking signals from this meeting.
There may not be another chance to save the tiger."105 Upon the release of the CITES
meeting's decision, which evaluated the progress of Taiwan and China with
differential judgement, President Clinton, soon thereafter, announced a ban on the
importation of certain wildlife products from Taiwan because of "its lack ofprogress
in eliminating its illegal trade in tigers and rhinoceroses."106 In his letter to Congress,
President Clinton stated that the Administration would "follow the recommendation
of the CITES Standing Committee and direct that imports of wildlife specimens and
products from Taiwan be prohibited. . . 1,107 The President acknowledged that the
100 1993 President's Message to Congress.
,0' Id.
102 Id.
11)3 Blank, "Environmental Trade Measures", at 70-71.
104 Linden, "Tigers on the Brink", at 56.
105 Id.
106 See President's Message to Congress on Rhinoceros and Tiger by China and Taiwan (11 Apr.
1994)[hcreinafter 1994 President's Message to Congress].
107 Id.
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Pclly Amendment granted him authority to impose a broader range of sanetions, but
decided that the sanctions imposed against Taiwan was appropriate at that time.108
The trade embargo, in effect, came into force in August 1994.109
Actually, the US desire to select Taiwan as the only eventual target of the Pclly
sanctions was revealed at the CITES meeting in Geneva, where it openly and
vigorously attacked Taiwan's efforts as insufficient. 110 If CITES could provide
President Clinton with more substantial diplomatic cover for imposing sanctions,1"
obviously it would make the trade embargo against Taiwan more credible and
justifiable. Certainly, the pressure from environmental groups pressing for coercive
measures to be taken against Taiwan seemed to be irresistible."2
It is interesting, however, to note that the US's action on Taiwan, to some extent,
was a reflection of its own policy-making,113 although the sanctions carried the
intention to enforce compliance with the CITES mandate. In response to the Geneva
meeting, which made no express reference to a trade embargo against Taiwan, the US
delegate to the CITES Standing Committee remarked that "the decision regarding
whether Taiwan will be sanctioned under the Pelly Amendment will be made subject
to the US's own judgement independent of the CITES influence."114 Thus, it is
observed that although the US's decision "might be influenced by the CITES
recommendation, it would not depend on the Committee's recommendations."115
3 Taiwan's initial reaction toward the sanctions
Because Taiwan was convinced that substantial progress had been made in
improving the enforcement measures regarding illegal rhinos and tiger trade,116 it is
108 Id.
109
Imposition of Prohibitions Pursuant to Section 8 (a)(4) of the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967, as
Amended, 59 Fed. Reg. 40, 463 (1994).
110 See United Daily News (Taipei), 28 Mar. 1994, at 6th edition.
11' See Linden, "Tigers on the Brink", at 56.
112 Given that Taiwan and China have "been tried and convicted by CITES and the US," the EII
stressed that "A judgement of guilty with no penalty imposed hardly represents any deterrent."
Likewise, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) maintained that "It is time for us to make it
plain that we are not going to stand by and watch the last tiger disappear." See Linden, id.
113 See The Ninth Conference of the Parties, Report of the Secretariat, Interpretation and
Implementation of the Convention: Trade in Rhinoceros Specimens, Doc. 9.28, at 4 (1994). It specifies
that "... Following the assessment by the Standing Committee at its 31s1 meeting, and also
independently by the Government of the United States ofAmerica, in April the President of the United
States of America announced an embargo on Trade with the province of Taiwan in wildlife specimens
and products,..." [emphasis added].
"'4 United Daily News, 26 March 1994, at 4lh edition.
115 Crawford, "Rhinoceros and Tiger", at 568, n.106.
116 The remark by the vice chairman of the Council of Agriculture, Lin Shiang-nung, against
environmental group's attacking Taiwan's insufficient progress was quoted by Linden that "We feel so
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not surprising that Taiwan felt extremely disappointed and discontent at the US's first
ever implementation of the Pelly sanctions against it. The action sparked strong
criticism in Taiwan partly because the action seemed akin to verdict of 'guilty' in a
controversial case.
Other than delivering a moderate protest to the US government,"7 the Taiwanese
Administration simply declared such action as unjust and unfair, and a deeply
regrettable decision.118 In contrast, the reaction of Taiwan's congressmen to the Pelly
sanctions was relatively vigorous. Broadly speaking, they regarded that the
Administration's reaction confined to oral protest was insufficient to express Taiwan's
disapproval of the trade embargo."9 To counterbalance the economic loss resulting
from the import ban, several legislators suggested that a score of anti-sanctions
measures be taken against the US, such as the revocation of contracts for American
agricultural products.120
Taiwan's failure to amend the conservation law to increase penalties against the
illegal trade was believed to be one of the major reasons that triggered the embargo.121
The message contained in the 1994 President Clinton's letter to the US Congress
clearly indicated that the enactment of appropriate law by Taiwan would constitute a
ground for the sanctions to be adjusted accordingly. What annoyed Taiwan most
appears to be that it was forced to pass the amendment of Wildlife Protection Law so
hastily that careful examination of the whole text of the law became unattainable.
Congressmen in Taiwan were very aware of the urgency of amending the law in order
to end the trade ban. Most of them, however, were reluctant to pass the law merely
because of US pressure.123 Some also deemed the hasty legislation to be irresponsible.
In addition, they complained that their discretion over legislation would be in danger
of being subordinated by US coercion.124 Overall, they stressed that more time should
be allocated regarding the modification of the critical law in order to adequately
disappointed that we are doing so much and getting so little credit for it." Linden, "Tigers on the Brink",
at 57.
117 See United Evening News (Taipei), 1 Apr. 1994, at 1st edition; Kenworthy, "President Imposes
Sanctions on Taiwan", Wash. Post, 12 Apr. 1994, at CI.
118 See general report from China Econ. News Serv. (Taipei), 13 Apr. 1994; S. China Morn. Post (Hong
Kong), 9 Apr. 1994, at 8; Kenworthy, id.
119 Central Daily News (Taipei), 11 Aug. 1994, at 3rd edition.
120 China Times (Taipei), 12 Aug. 1994, at 6th edition.
121 See 1994 President's Message to Congress.
122 Id.
123
Independence Evening News (Taipei), 14 Apr. 1994, at 4th edition.
124 Commons Daily News (Taipei), 14 July 1994, at 6'1' edition.
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accommodate the particular situation in Taiwan as well as the international
requirement.
4 Taiwan's increased efforts at conservation
Although Taiwan declared that its conservation tasks on protecting endangered
species would not be affected by the US unilateral coercion,1""6 in reality, Taiwan
proved incapable of ignoring the adverse effects caused by the sanctions, such as the
economic loss and the tarnished reputation mentioned above. In an attempt to remove
the sanctions, the measures adopted by Taiwan included enhancement of mutual
consultation with the US and adjustment of its national policy to be in conformity
with the US's requirements.
Shortly after the imposition of the sanctions, Taiwan started to engage in an
intense dialogue and frequent contact with the competent US authority.126 The task
aimed to ensure that Taiwan's recent progress could be entirely known to the US and
allow the former to perceive instantly the response of the latter.12' In order to further
their mutual communication, Taiwan decided to send delegates to the US to explain
its observance of the required standards.128 Meanwhile, US officials were invited to
Taiwan to effect a close investigation of Taiwan's progress.129
In addition, the Amendment to Wildlife Conservation Law (WCL) was given
priority in the Taiwan Congress's legislation schedule,130 notwithstanding its initial
resistance. Eventually, on October 29, 1994, prior to the Ninth CITES's COP in
November, the legislative authority approved the amendments. The law significantly
toughened the penalties against illegal trade in endangered species to a maximum of
131
seven years in prison and a fine equaling $94,339 in US dollars. It was observed
125 See the statement by the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affair, United Daily News (Taipei), 13 Apr. 1994,
at 3rd edition.
126 It is the US Fish and Wildlife Service, the Department of the Interior, responsible for reviewing
Taiwan's progress on wildlife protection.
127 For instance, soon after Taiwan passed the amendments to its Wildlife Conservation Law, it
immediately notified US the result via its representative in the US. The US replied that that was an
encouraging result, and suggested that enforcement measures still be enhanced. See United Daily News
(Taipei), 29 Oct. 1994, at 6th edition. Also, after the critical law was amended, the US requested
Taiwan to finish the Implementing Regulations of the Law. It was believed that the document was very
helpful in assisting US to review Taiwan's progress. See United Daily News (Taipei), 4 May 1995, at
6lh edition.
128 Central Daily News (Taipei), 5 May 1995, at 3rd edition.
I2'' The work was conducted by a US interagency delegation to Taiwan in Mar. 1995. (The US officials
concluded that compared with the work of last year, Taiwan has made apparent progress, despite some
relevant tasks, like personnel training and law enforcement still have a few rooms to be improved.) See
United Daily News (Taipei), 18 Mar. 1995, at 6171 edition.
130 China Times (Taipei), 11 Aug. 1994, at 6lh edition [emphasis added].
131 The Wildlife Conservation Law, Art. 40, Section 2.
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that penalties under the WCL were now among the stitTcst in Asia.112 Moreover,
pursuant to the new law, holders of protected wildlife products are required to report
their possession to the authorities.13"1 In addition, the law authorises the establishment
of a new Nature Conseiration Police, which is designed to crack down effectively on
the wildlife crime.134
With respect to the progress of the law enforcement, after the imposition of
sanctions, Taiwan strengthened the investigation and punishment of violations of the
law. It was estimated that 49 cases of tiger-bone and 23 cases of rhino-horn illegal
trade were uncovered.1"" Meanwhile, Taiwan had effectively controlled the stocks of
rhino horn and tiger bone by accomplishing registration of all relevant animal
products.136
On educating people to understand the urgency and importance of preserving
endangered species, all relevant government agencies and private conservation groups
have been deeply involved in launching a massive educational campaign aimed at
creating a better conservation ethic in Taiwan.137
In addition to economic pressure, the US also provided a "carrot" to encourage
cooperation between two countries on critical conservation work. Following the
imposition of sanctions, both sides had signed the Agreement on Technical
Cooperation in Conservation of Flora and Fauna. The agreement covers the elements
1 TR
relating to the full criteria required by the US outlined in previous statements.
Indeed, the assistance offered by the US generated substantial effect in helping
Taiwan make significant progress in enforcing its WCL.lj9
5 Removal of the sanctions and termination of the Pelly certification
In March 1995, a US interagency delegation visited Taiwan to make a direct
assessment on whether Taiwan's recent efforts had fulfilled the US criteria. The
132 See the report of the Department of the Interior: Taiwan: CITES Implementation Status Report
Pursuant to Pelly Certification for the Period 30 June 1995 to 30 June 1996 [hereinafter Taiwan's
Implementation Report],
133 The Wildlife Conservation Law, art. 31.
134 Id. art. 22 [emphasis added],
135
Liberty Times (Taipei), July 2, 1995, 3rd at edition.
136 See Trade in Rhino Specimens, at 4.
137 These tasks see The 1996 ROC Yearbook, at 203.
I3H The content includes: law enforcement cooperation, management of stocks of endangered species
products, cooperation and exchange of information regarding wildlife forensics, training,
communication on permits, and an exchange of information on public education and outreach.
m See News release from the US Fish and Wildlife Service, Taiwan helps protect endangered species:
Interior Secretary Removes Certification (11 Sept. 1996)[hercinafter Taiwan helps protect endangered
species].
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delegation found that Taiwan had "largely satisfied" the criteria, and made
recommendations for improvement. 140 Afterwards, in May 1995, a US
interdepartmental panel consisting of officials from the Departments of the Interior,
Justice and State as well as the US Trade Representative Office was held to decide
whether the lifting of sanctions should be proposed to the President. They recognised
Taiwan's efforts to curb the illegal trade of tiger bones and rhino horns and thus
proposed to the Clinton Administration that the Pelly Amendment sanctions should be
dropped.141
In June 1995, President Clinton announced that major steps had been taken by
Taiwan and thus directed that the sanctions be lifted to end the trade embargo against
147
Taiwan, which had roughly lasted for one year. " In the statement, the President, in
saying that "Our willingness to take strong action to back that concern was
instrumental in bring about this change," 143 attributed Taiwan's progress to the
invocation of the trade sanctions. To justify the first ever Pelly sanctions, the
statement further stressed that "[Tjaiwan's prompt response demonstrates the
importance of taking strong action to protect the earth's natural heritage."144 Though
the sanctions were removed, the certification remained in effect, and the President
ordered the competent agency to continue monitoring Taiwan's ongoing progress and
report to him within one year.143
Eventually, impressed with the Taiwan's continuing progress identified in his
report to President Clinton,146 Interior Secretary Babbitt, in his letter to the President
in September 1996, recommended termination of the Pelly certification against
Taiwan.147 In amplifying the success of the Pelly actions, the Secretary particularly
called the official lifting of the certification "the end of a historic first chapter in the
protection of globally important endangered species."148
140 The details of the delegation's recommendations and Taiwan's implementation of the
recommendation see Taiwan Implementation Report.
141 "US Wildlife Trade Sanctions Expected to End in Two Weeks," Reuters News Service, 4 May 1995.
142 See Press release from the White House, President lifts Trade Sanctions Against Taiwan: Welcome
Major Steps Taken to Protect Endangered Species (30 June 1995).
143 Id [emphasis added],
144 Id.
145 Id. .
146 See Taiwan Implementation Report.
147 Bruce Babbitt's Letter to President Clinton Regarding the Termination of the Certification of
Taiwan (10 Sept. 10, 1996).
148 See Taiwan helps protect endangered species.
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Conclusion
Among the various international pressures aimed at forcing Taiwan to improve
its control of the illegal trade, the Pelly sanctions proved the most detrimental and
coercive. Given the fact that Taiwan almost entirely deferred to the US's dictate on the
conservation of rhinos and tigers, the economic tool authorised by the Pelly
Amendment seemed to be productive. It has thus been overwhelmingly recognised
that trade sanctions can run successfully and effectively in achieving environmental
goals.149 Moreover, the Pelly practice displayed a typical model of playing a "sticks
and carrots" strategy in inducing Taiwan to change its conservation policy.130 Such
effectiveness, while highly praised, does not, however, necessarily guarantee the
eventual legitimacy of the sanctions.
The experience of invoking the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan suggests that
whether a Pelly sanction will be triggered is largely dominated by political factors
rather than pure legal considerations. It was evident that China merited no less an
international reprimand than Taiwan,1"1 as did various other countries which were
required by CITES to improve their conservation and law enforcement measures. But
only Taiwan was deliberately selected as the target. In determining whether China
and/or Taiwan should be sanctioned, it appears that the US government chose the
152latter for reason of simplicity. Moreover, the fundamental conflict of visions,
particularly on human rights issue between China and the US, make it difficult to
sanction China.153 It thus may be concluded that China's evasion of the Pelly
149
E.g Blank, "Environmental Trade Measures", at 67, 76; Patel, "Endangered Species", at 196, 207
and n. 309. In response to the eventual lift of the sanctions, WWF commented that "The experience
with Taiwan shows trade sanctions to be effective tool in helping curb the deadly commerce in
endangered species." Press Release from the World Wildlife Fund, World Wildlife Fund Statement on
US Government Decision to Lift Pelly Amendment Sanctions Against Taiwan (30 June 1995).
Likewise, American officials marked that "This is an excellent example of how properly designed trade
measures can be an effective tool in enforcing international environmental agreements." Also, to
highlight the effectiveness of the Pelly sanctions, Interior Secretary Babbitt remarked that "[w]e now
know trade sanctions imposed on behalf of endangered species work. Thanks to the President's decisive
move, Taiwan has now taken a number of steps to become part of an international effort to save these
magnificent creatures from an irreversible and tragic loss." See Taiwan helps protect endangered
species.
150 Martin, Jr. and Brennan, "Pelly Amendment", at 314. The policy of "sticks and carrots" is
commonly employed in promoting compliance with the prescribed international environmental
standards. See generally Sand, "International Economic Instruments", at 2-13; Housman and Zaelke,
"Competitive Sustainability", at 561-63; Charnovitz, "Environmental Cooperation", at 6-8.
151 See Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 771.
152 Because Taiwan is not a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the US trade sanctions against Taiwan violated no US obligations under the trade regime. See also
Crawford, "Rhinoceros and Tiger", at 569-70.
133 A writer observes that "[hjaving chosen not to impose sanctions on China for its persistent
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sanctions is a clear indication that the operation of Pelly sanctions is usually entangled
with political and diplomatic considerations.
Unlike previous Pelly actions, the US's sanctioning of Taiwan appeared linked
with the CITES enforcement decision. The implementation of the Pelly Amendment
coinciding with the operation of the CITES Standing Committee showed the US's
intention to bring its national policy closer to the international standard. Nonetheless,
in the light of the above observation, a certain degree of discrepancy between CITES
and the US Pelly Amendment practice remained undeniable. For instance, it may be
complained that the US's decision to impose trade embargoes against Taiwan, to some
extent, did not entirely echo the CITES's latest recommendation (Geneva meeting,
March 1994) regarding the enforcement action upon Taiwan, which did not explicitly
call for trade embargo against Taiwan, but only for an eight-month period of
observation. Further, it set the standard beyond that of CITES, which Taiwan should
apply, namely the increase of penalty against violations in domestic legislation;
judging whether Taiwan have met that standard; and determining what penalty should
be imposed. On the other hand, of course, it is in the US's discretion to determine
whether the sanctions should be lifted, regardless of external influence. Thus, even
though the Pelly Amendment is designed to enforce international conservation
agreements, McLaughlin correctly maintained that: "Relating trade restrictions to an
international agreement does not diminish the unilateral character of the sanctions
imposed. . . . While clearly related to international agreements, the U.S. laws in this
category use the threat of trade restrictions to increase greatly unilateral U.S.
influence over other nations' environmental practices."154 Overall, the practice of Pelly
sanctions against Taiwan reflected the inherently unilateral character of the US
legislation, in spite of its possible multilateral character.
violations of human rights, . . . , the Administration may find it hard to explain why it is acting now
because of environmental wrongs." See Linden, "Tigers on the Brink", at 58. It was also observed that:
One hypothesis for why President did not impose sanctions on both countries is that he was
facing an impending, controversial decision as to whether to reextend most-favored-nation
privileges to China. If he imposed Pelly sanctions, that could make it harder to renew China's
most-favorcd-nations status. Critics would say that the Clinton Administration cared more
about tiger rights than about human rights.
See Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 771-72.
154
McLaughlin, "Trade Sanctions", at 19; Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 714 [emphasis added].
32
PART TWO: THE PELLY SANCTIONS AND GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW
33
The Pelly Sanctions as Countenncasiires
Chapter 2
The Pelly Sanations as Countermeasures
Introduction
The concept of "countermeasures", in a broad sense, extends to all forms of
responsive actions taken by an injured State against the author State.' This term may
refer to several specific actions within inter-State relationships, such as reprisals,2
reciprocal measures,3 and retortion.4 For the purpose of this study, countermeasures,
as defined in the Draft articles on State responsibility of the International Law
Commission (ILC),5 mean measures taken against the offender by a State whose legal
rights are injured by an internationally wrongful act. Even where such a measure is
unlawful in principle, its wrongfulness is precluded by the existence of the prior
unlawful act.6
The requirement that legitimate reprisal requires the existence of an injured
subject was confirmed in the Naulilaa dispute between Portugal and Germany in
1920s.7 The contemporary practice includes, for example, measures against nations
that nationalise foreign assets without adequate compensation. The US's trade
embargoes against Cuba provide a vivid case. In the Tehran Hostages case,8 the
World Court never condemned the US's remedial actions of economic pressure in
response to the Iranians' seizure and detention of US diplomats.9 Conversely, if a
prior international delinquency against the claimant did not occur and thus damage its
rights, then the measures taken by the State will not be regarded as legal
1 See Elagab, Non-forcible Counter-Measures, at 3. Zoller, Unilateral Remedies, at 45.
2 Reprisals are means that would be unlawful unless they are taken against the prior illegal act of the
author State. The term has often been associated with measures involving the use of force. Zoller, id. at
35-44.
3 The measures refer to "nonperformance by the injured State of its obligations toward the offending
state when such obligations correspond to or are directly connected with the obligations breached. "See
Henkin, International Law, at 570. Zoller, id. at 14-27.
4 Retortion is defined as an unfriendly, but lawful act taken against generally permissible measures, like
suspending diplomatic relations. Zoller, id. at 5-13.
5 See the ILC's Draft articles on State Responsibility, Art. 47 (1) [hereinafter the ILC Draft articles],
adopted by the International Law Commission on first reading. See The Report of the Commission on
the work of its forty-eighth session, 1996, (Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth-first
Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/51/10)), at 144 [hereinafter 1996 ILC Rep.].
6 See the ILC Draft articles, Art. 30.
7 Nauliaa case (Portugal v. Germany), 1928, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards
(UNRIAA), Vol. II, 1011 [hereinafter Nauliaa case}.
8 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, (US v. Iran), ICJ Rep.
1980, at 3.
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countcrmeasurcs.10 For instance, the act of reprisal by Libya against the United
Kingdom (UK) in 1971 should be classified as unlawful because the UK's failure to
prevent Iranian occupation of the islands in the Persian Gulf was not a breach of
international law and not a delict against Libya."
Yet the use of bilateral remedies to enforce rules of law seems insufficient to
accommodate the needs of the modem international society. The breach of certain
international norms might be so comprehensive as to not only damage individual
State, but also endanger the basic interests of the whole human community, such as
grave violations of human rights. Therefore, there is an increasing demand for the
recognition of a third State remedy, which, inter alia, may entitle every State to take
countermeasures to secure the enforcement of the law, even if no tangible damage has
been inflicted on the party seeking to take countermeasures.'2 The International Court
of Justice (ICJ) in the Barcelona Traction case13 has confirmed the existence of
certain global obligations erga omnes in which all States have a legal interest.
Moreover, the ILC has been making a great effort to codify the law on
countermeasures, which particularly covers third State enforcement by expanding the
concept of an alleged "injured State".14
As indicated, the Pelly Amendment is enacted to enforce international
environmental standards, especially those pertaining to the preservation of living
resources. As the US had not been directly injured by Taiwan's insufficient progress
on the protection of rhinos and tigers, it is interesting to explore whether the Pelly
environmental embargo can be justified by the modem regime of third State
countermeasures.
Firstly, there will be a basic discussion on the regime of third State
countermeasures in order to identify its current status, possible scope and limitations.
These general considerations are applicable to any situation in which a State that has
not suffered a material injury nevertheless imposes countermeasures against a country
that has allegedly breached international law. The chapter then explores the specific
question, applicable in the Taiwan case, in which the alleged violation of law
9 Id. at 17-18, 28-29.
10 Bowett, "Economic Coercion", at 13; Schachter, International Law, at 171.
" See Bowett, id. at 9 and n. 37.
12 See Charncy, "Third State Remedies", at 59, 60-85.
13 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Case, (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Rep. 1970, at 3 [hereinafter
Barcelona Traction case],
14 See the ILC's Draft articles, Art. 40
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comprised a failure by a country to provide adequate protection to endangered
species.
A The pros and cons of third state countermeasures
1 Arguments in favour of unilateral countermeasures
The following rationales have been advanced to support the right of third States
to resort to countermeasures whenever an international offense damaging the
common interests takes place.
(a) The reality oforga onines obligations owed to the international community
The existence of several categories of fundamental international norms was
strikingly endorsed in the Barcelona Traction case. The World Court explicitly
distinguished "the obligations of the State towards the international community as a
whole" from others, like norms of diplomatic protection by ruling that:
By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are
obligations erga omnes.
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of
acts ofaggression, and ofgenocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic
rights ofthe human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of
the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international
law . . . ; others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal
character.15
The doctrine of erga omnes16 then has been further illuminated in the recent ICJ's
decisions, mainly on the protection of human rights. In the East Timor case17, the
Court endorsed Portugal's assertion that the right of peoples to self-determination is
an integral part of erga omnes norms, elaborating the scope of the doctrine.18 Also,
the mandate of preventing and punishing the crime of genocide was affirmed as an
erga omnes obligation in the Bosnia case.19
Although protection of the environment has not been explicitly referred as erga
omnes obligations by the World Court, there is a general agreement among scholars
15ICJ Rep. 1970, at 33 [emphasis added].
16 For a thorough analysis of the principle, see Ragazzi, International Obligations Erga Omnes.
17 Case Concerning East Timor, (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Rep. 1995, at 90 [emphasis added].
'"Id. at 102, para. 29.
19Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime ofGenocide, (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Rep. 1996, at 595, para. 31.
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that the doctrine should cover the protection of areas beyond national jurisdiction or
global common spaces.20 Further, on reviewing the separate opinion of Judge
Weeramantry in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case,21 some argued that the
concept of "sustainable development" might have achieved the status of an erga
omnes obligation.22
The recognition of erga omnes obligations could reasonably lead to certain legal
consequences, mainly concerning the interest and standing of each State.23 It has been
proposed that the doctrine may have the possible implication of allowing any State to
seek redress in judicial proceedings, analogous in effect to the actio popularis.2A On
the matter of securing effective enforcement, to some extent, the decision in the
Barcelona Traction case may be reasonably read as allowing all States to take
remedial action to enforce observance with certain fundamental norms.25 Such an
extended concept of "victim of the violation"26 would automatically warrant every
State's resorting to unilateral remedies, including countermeasures against offending
States, even where the country acting has not sustained a direct injury. It might be
20 E.g. Brownlie, "Environmental Protection", at 5; Schachter, International Law, at 381; Charney,
"Environmental Damage", at 157, 166. Handl, "Territorial Sovereignty", at 58-72. Spinedi,
"Convergences and Divergencies", at 248. See also Arangio-Ruiz, Fouth Report on State Responsibility
Add. 1-3, Yb. Of the ILC, Vol. II, Part One (1992), at 44. Actually, the assertion that erga omnes
obligations should extend to global common echoes the widely accepted principle that States have the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their control do not cause damage to the areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction. See The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment,
Principle 21; The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 2.
21 Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, (Slovakia Vs. Hungray), ICJ Rep. 1997, at 1.
22 See Boyle and Freestone, "Introduction", at 6.
23 The recent ILC's discussion regarding erga omnes obligations indicated that the legal consequence of
the doctrine may cover the right of any State: (a) to bring an action to protect a public or collective
interest of the community which could result in a proliferation of legal actions and increase State
reluctance to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice; (b) to assert a legal interest in
vindicating the community or collective interest outside the judicial arena, for instance, in international
forums; (c) to take countermeasures, unilaterally or jointly, against what they perceived to be the
offending State or States; (d) in the absence of judicial control, to become a self-appointed policemen
of international community; (e) to assert a claim for compensation without having suffered any material
damage. See Report of the Commission on the work of its fifty session, 1998, Official Records of the
General Assembly, Fifty-third Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/53/10), para. 280 [hereinafter 1998 ILC
Rep.].
24 The notion of the actio popularis originates from Roman law, which enables any member to take
legal action to protect a public or collective interest of the community, irrespective of being injured
directly. See Schachter, International Law, at 209; Henkin, International Law, at 556-57. Charney,
"Third States Remedy", at 66-75. But, it remains to be seen whether the acceptance of erga omnes
norms must implies the recognisition of a right of the actio popularis. See Schachter, id.] Henkin, id.
The discussion of the origins of the doctrine see Meron, Human Rights, at 188-93. But, in the South
West Africa case, the World Court tended to resist the application of this concept to international
dispute. It noted that it "was not known to international law as it stands at present" and could not be
deemed as "imported" by the general principles of law referred to in Art. 38 (1) (c). See ICJ Rep. 1966,
at 47.
25 See Charney, "Environmental Damage", at 154; Henkin et al, International Law, at 557.
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argued that the concept of erga ornncs obligations, without simultaneously according
all States the right to vindicate serious offences, would fail to give effect to the legal
principle embodied in the judgement of the Court.
(b) The insufficiency ofbilateral and collective enforcement regime
Clearly, there is much evidence to indicate that the violations of erga omnes
duties occasionally run beyond the domain of current bilateral and collective
enforcement regimes. To enforce the common interests effectively, the unilateral
remedy of countermeasure thus is able to fill the vacuum left by the above remedy
regimes.
It is clear that some breaches of erga omnes obligations, such as genocide, do
not necessarily inflict direct or tangible damage on any particular State. Moreover,
the inability of an injured one to take remedial action may render the bilateral
enforcement ineffective. Charney generally specifies three situations that may justify
a third State remedy, whenever the remedy taken by a directly injured State proves
unattainable:
One type of situation in which the need may arise is when no directly injured state would have
traditional standing to seek a remedy. For example, this may be presented when a government
commits genocide against its own nationals, or when damages are caused to common spaces
outside of the jurisdiction of any state.
A second situation may be found even when there is a directly and severely injured state with a
legal injury, but that state is incapable of seeking a remedy due to reasons beyond its control.
This may take place, for example, in the case of aggression against a state which places the target
state under the effective control of the aggressor.
In a third situation there may be directly injured states with the interest and ability to seek a
remedy, but blatant and widespread violations of the law committed by a powerful state or group
of states may have created a situation such that the injured states alone are not able to effectuate a
remedy.27
On the other hand, still, an accountable centralised authority has not yet been
created in international society. It is also true that the present collective enforcement
regime is not always satisfactory and effective, notwithstanding its generally impartial
determination of an offence. The United Nations (UN) is the most prominent
international institution concerned with the enforcement of international law. Yet its
26 Schachter, International Law, at 196.
27 Charney, "Third States Remedy", at 95-96 [emphasis added].
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competence delegated by the UN Charter, even broad, is still limited/8 Under the UN
Charter, the violations of law to which it has authority to respond are confined to
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression/9 Admittedly, the
recent practices of the UN have demonstrated its tendency to view gross violations of
human rights, like genocide, a clear violation of erga omnes principle, as a threat to
international peace and security, which may warrant enforcement by the institution.30
The extensive interpretation of the UN mandate, however, cannot presently preserve
all fields of essential interests of the international community.31 As a result, along
with the continuing evolution of the fundamental community obligations, the limited
function of the UN on the critical matters becomes even more apparent. To sum up,
the inability of the UN system to address offences against the fundamental interests of
international society strengthens the argument for resorting to unilateral
countermeasures.
(c) Neighbourhood andfriendship
Referring to the historical development of international society, Zoller maintains
that the institutional attempt to limit the right of States to resort to unilateral
countermeasures is inconsistent with one of the best-established principles of human
society, namely friendship and neighbourhood.32 She stresses that States normally
should be ready to help one another if external assistance is needed. The contention is
based on the following observation:
In primitive society and thereafter in every form of civilization, it was widely recognized that on
special occasions, during social emergencies, natural calamities or in case of urgent need, the
individual household was assisted by the neighborhood. The neighbor is the typical helper. Hence
neighborhood is brotherhood and friendship.33
28 See 1962 ICJ's advisory opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations. The Court states that
"the purposes of the Organization are board indeed, but neither they nor the powers conferred to
effectuate them are limited. Save as they have entrusted the Organization with the attainment of these
common ends, the Member States retain their freedom of action." ICJ Rep. 1962, at 168.
29 The UN Charter, article 39.
30 During the past decades, there have been several UN Security Council resolutions responding to
crimes against humanity. Responding to South Africa's policy of apartheid, since 1962, the UN organs
had resolved to request trade embargo against the former. See UN G. A. Res. 1761 (1962); UN S.C.
Res. 181 (1963), 182 (1963), 418 (1977). When genocide happened in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
the Security Council also launched several enforcement actions, including economic sanctions against
those countries. See UN S.C. Res. 808 (1993), 827 (1993) and 955 (1994).
31 See Zoller, Unilateral Remedies, at 111.
32 Zoller, Unilateral Remedies, at 114.
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As a result, the acceptance of the legal capacity of a third State to resort to
countermeasures certainly may facilitate and promote the requirement of
neighbourhood. By the same token, it has been further argued by her that "[a]s long
as countermeasures are primarily measures of law enforcement, it would be illogical
to prevent a state from answering the call for help of a friend in need."34
2 Arguments against unilateral countermeasures
Even accepting the basic concept of erga omnes obligations, there remains
several hurdles that may prevent the regime, under the present legal wisdom, from
achieving a well-accepted status.
(a) The danger of the abuse of rights
It is a common concern that unilateral taking of countermeasures with a view to
enforcing erga omnes obligations by indirectly injured States is likely to be abused.33
Given the indefinite content of erga omnes obligations,36 some unilateral enforcement
could be easily taken under the guise of preserving erga omnes value. Weil assumes
that those fundamental interests of human society, though by quantity shall be small
according to the World Court's contemplation, by nature may not be limited to the
examples given by the Court.37 He is concerned that "[w]e are once more faced with
a category capable of an expansion all too likely to get out of hand."38 As a result, a
third State itself could interpret the concept deliberately in order to enforce the law in
own interests.39
Secondly, indeed, adequate control of international judicial or political organs
over the third State enforcement has yet to be established either by treaty or
customary law. If an impartial determination of the violations of erga ommes is
unavailable, there is an inherent risk that the enforcement tool against grave breaches
of common interests is likely to be randomly dominated by several powerful States
33 Id.
34 Id. at 115.
35 Charney, "Third States Remedy", at 87; Zoller, Unilateral Remedies, at 117; Schachter, International
Law, at 212.
36 Schachter admits that "[i]ts precise scope and significance are still uncertain in State practice or
judicial application," although he largely supports the remedy of third State aimed at promoting
obedience to the important norms. See Schachter, International law, at 208-13.
37 Weil, "Relative Normativity", at 432.
38 Id.
3<; See Charney, "Third States Remedy", at 86; Zoller, Unilateral Remedies, at 115-16. Henkin el al,
International law, at 578.
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who tend to play the role of world police or prosecutors.40 They may feel free to use
their discretion to select the offending target. They also can determine what measures
should be taken as well as whether the enforcement measures should be suspended.
As Weil observes:
"[t]hat would mean that any state, in the name of higher values as determined by itself, could
appoint itself the avenger of the international community. Thus, under the banner of law, chaos
and violence would come to reign among states, and international law would trun on and rend
itself with of loftiest of intentions."41
(b) The conflict with the existing enforcement regime
It is admitted that some international offences that result in direct damage to
victim States may also constitute a violation of common interests and thus justify the
third State remedy. The examples include acts of aggression or massive pollution of
the atmosphere or of the sea. To a State which suffers tangible injury, the remedial
actions taken by a third State may not be always supportive and welcome.42 As
Charney concludes, "[tjhird state involvement may limit the directly injured state's
options."43 Furthermore, the bilateral remedy could be sufficient in redressing the
offence without resorting to third State enforcement. That may thus render the third
State remedy excessive.
The international institution's role in the enforcement of law, even if not
exclusive, complete or always effective, is becoming increasingly important and
aggressive. For example, in practice, the UN's collective enforcement has operated
against acts of aggression, gross violations of human rights, like apartheid, and
genocide, which literally amount to the violations of erga omnes obligations. If a
third State remedy and a collective enforcement mechanism coexist,44 the potential
conflict between those enforcement regimes cannot be ignored. The unilateral one
might also impede multilateral action. Therefore, it is highly desirable that some
device be created aimed at harmonising the two systems.
40 Henkin, id.
41 Weil, "Relative Normativity", at 433.
42 See Charney, "Third States Remedy", at 89-90.
43 Id. at 90.
44 Zoller, Unilateral Remedy, at 110. Under certain arrangement of treaty law, indeed, unilateral remedy
is absorbed by legal competence of the institution. For instance, according to Art. 113 of the European
Economic Community Treaty (1957), construed by the Court of Justice of the European Communities,
the commercial policy as a whole has been transferred to the Community, which is now exclusively
responsible for its implementation. See C.J.E.C. Aff. No. 41-76.
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3 Concluding remarks
The existence of erga omnes obligations confirmed in the Barcelona case
signifies the necessity of enforcing some inviolable norms by all States in the world.
Theoretically, it is illogical to contend that the mandate does not have the effect of
justifying the remedial actions taken unilaterally by all States. Although international
institutions has already governed certain enforcement of law, it would seem that, as
Zoller claims "there is no sound legal basis to systematically depriving third parties of
a legal capacity to resort to measures . . ,"45 Moreover, there is much evidence to
support third State remedy in law, practice, and the literature.46
However, it is beyond doubt that the negative side effects and evident flaws
embodied in current third State enforcement are indicative of the immaturity of the
regime. In particular, it should be noted that no actual dispute concerning the
unilateral action taken purporting to enforce erga omnes obligations has been brought
before an international tribunal.47 So, it remains to be seen whether international
tribunals will readily uphold the third State enforcement.48 To ensure the lawfulness
of resorting to countermeasures by a third State, it becomes not only desirable but
essential to foster favourable substantive and procedural limitations on the regime. In
this regard, Riphagen pointed out the necessity of undertaking such measures by
urging that the ILC should "take the greatest care, in devising the conditions of lawful
resort to such actions, to ensure that the factual inequalities among States do not
unduly operate to the advantage of the strong and rich over the weak and needy."49
Recently, the Special Rapporteur of the ILC has noted the problem of taking
unilateral countermeasures without any form of control, mentioning the necessity of
finding a solution to the massive procedural difficulties.50
B The limitations on the application of third State enforcement
1 The proposal of collective enforcement actions
As mentioned, there is an inherent danger that unilateral remedial actions will
be abused in the absence of proper institutional control. To thwart such undesirable
45 Zoller, id, at 117.
46 See generally Charney, "Third States Remedy", at 59-86.
47 See Henkin et al, International Law, at 556; Schachter, International Law, at 197.
4li Charney, "Third States Remedy", at 75.
1991 ILC Rep. at 327; A writer also shares the same concern. See Charney, id. at 59.
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effect, it may be argued that the enforcement of erga omnes obligations be performed
within the framework of international institutions rather than unilaterally.51 In effect,
States should refrain from resorting to countcrmeasures unless a collective decision
by the international community to authorise the third State actions has been made in
response to an international offence.52 The proposition is based on the belief that the
regime, as Schachter perceives, if functioning well, may produce "a well-founded
judgement based on a full and unbiased inquiry into the alleged violation", which
"could provide a credible basis for third States to take supportive action."53
Indeed, the proposal had been considered in the previous ILC's work on the
draft of State Responsibility. It was argued there that the violation of erga omnes
obligations, which is deemed "an offence against all the members of the international
community. . .", has led the latter:
[t]o turn towards a system which vests in international institutions other than States exclusive
responsibility, first, for determining the existence of a breach of an obligation of basic importance
to the international community as a whole, and, thereafter, for deciding what measures are to be
taken in response and how they are to be implemented.54
As a result, collective decision had been considered a condition for taking unilateral
countermeasures in the ILC's Draft articles where international crimes, violations of
multilateral treaties, and objective regimes are committed.55
Unfortunately, the proposal to allow the international institutions to govern the
third State remedy completely proves impractical and not feasible under the current
international legal regimes. Ideally, effective collective enforcement must rely on
centralised efficient international institutions vested with comprehensive authority to
deter all potential offences against the fundamental interests of human society. In
short, only a form of world government can possibly achieve such a goal.56 The
reality is, however, at present, that such a forum has not yet been created. For
instance, it is true the competence of bodies within the UN to address the violation of
important norms appears broad. Yet, as indicated, they have not yet been vested with
50 1998 ILC Rep. at 324.
51 See Henkin et al, International Law, at 559; Charney, "Third States Remedy", at 91.
52 See Charney, id. at 91.
53 Schachter, International Law, at 197.
54 Y. B. of ILC 1979, Vol. II, Part 2, sub-paras. (12), at 119.
"See 1985 Draft articles on State Responsibility, Art. 10 and 11; Y. B. of ILC 1976, Part 2, sub-para.
115, at 22.
5(' See Zoller, Unilateral Remedy, at 118 [emphasis added].
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the prerogative to respond to all the breaches of orga omnes obligations. Their powers
are limited by the mandate of the UN Charter and not exclusive. In addition, their
performance is not always satisfactory. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether a
powerful central authority is likely to be entirely acceptable to the international
community.5.
Actually, the proposal that third State remedies should be confined to a
collective regime was not adopted in the present 1LC draft. The arrangement does not
imply that any States may feel free to resort to unilateral countermeasures without
incurring the consequence that their actions could be unlawful. Rather, as the
commentary of the draft states:
While this does not necessarily require a definitive third party determination of the existence of
such an act, a mere good faith belief on the part of the injured State which turns out not to be
well-founded would not be sufficient to justify the taking of countermeasures. Thus, an injured
State which resorts to countermeasures based on its unilateral assessment of the situation does so
at its own risk and may incur responsibility for an unlawful act in the event of an incorrect
assessment.58
Although the proposal of collective enforcement seems not so prevalent and
achievable at the present stage of development of international law, international
society should not relinquish any efforts to eliminate the flaws resulting from the
deliberate use of the third State remedy. It is not unlikely that the UN may eventually
turn out to be a centralised institution, which is able to coordinate and control third
State enforcement actions, if a consensus to that effect on the revision of the Charter
is reached. Until then, third State remedies may still be permitted to run
independently of the collective one.
2 The relationship between third State and existing collective enforcement
As individual remedies for securing compliance with international law run
parallel with those of the collective regime, the necessity of reconciling the possible
conflict between their respective operation increases especially where the latter has
been positively involved in enforcement action.
One solution is to confirm the superior status of the collective enforcement. As
an international offence arises, normally, a collective determination of the breach of
57 Sehachter, International Law, at 167.
58 1996 ILC Rep. at 155 [emphasis added].
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an obligation is fairer and more creditable than individual judgement. Support for the
superiority of collective enforcement is argued on the basis that the former may
incline to produce a better outcome and may deter abuses of third State remedies as
well. It has been observed that:
International organizations may, however, exert significant and desirable influence on a violator
and may help to shape the remedial efforts even in the absence of the authority to issue
compelling orders. In general, a Jirst resort to an appropriate international forum places
community restraints on abuses of significant third state remedies and on potential violators when
a remedy by the directly injured state is unavailable.59
But, it remains controversial whether the requirement that a third State seeking to
apply a remedy should seek a collective enforcement mechanism as a first resort has
been well established under customary international law.60 The support for according
international institutions superior status regarding law enforcement, however, can be
found in the relevant judgements. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ dealt with whether
Nicaragua's human rights record might legally warrant countermeasures by the US.61
On the enforcement of human rights compliance, the Court obviously preferred the
collective enforcement embodied in the competent international institution to the
unilateral one. The Court noted that the Organisation of American States (OAS) is
entitled to monitor Nicaragua's observance of the human rights convention binding on
it.62 In particular, it stressed that the mechanisms in the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights havefunctioned, because the Commission:
[i]n fact took action and compiled two reports (OEA/Ser.L/V/11.53 and 62)following visits by
the Commission to Nicaragua at the Government's invitation. Consequently, the Organization
was in a position, if it so wished, to take a decision on the basis of these reports.63
As a result, it considered that those measures taken by the US, such as the mining of
ports, the destruction of oil installations, were not the appropriate methods to monitor
or ensure respect for human rights in Nicaragua.64 The ruling has therefore confirmed
the priority of relying on collective efforts for law enforcement. Moreover, in the light
59 Chamey, "Third States Remedy", at 97 [emphasis added].
60 One opposes a first resort to international institutions as a precondition for third State remedy. See,
Zoller, Unilateral Remedy, at 119.
61 ICJ Rep. 1986, at 130, para. 257.
62 Id. at 134, para. 267. The convention ratified by Nicaragua is the "American Convention on Human
Rights" (the Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica).
63 Id. at 134, para. 267 [emphasis added]
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of the Court's decision, the characterisation of the unilateral remedy as a last resort
probably would not be an unreasonable conclusion. It thus suggests that individual
actions only are permissible if a competent international mechanism is unavailable, or
if it is functioning ineffectively.65 Admittedly, however, the requirement that a third
State should honour collective regimes as the first resort still needs further
confirmation by subsequent legislative and judicial efforts.
In fact, the ILC is aware of the potential conflict between the draft articles on
State Responsibility and the UN Charter. Pursuant to the mandate of the Charter, the
provisions of the Charter prevail over any other international agreements.66 As a
result, once an offence that may trigger a third State remedy in accordance with the
draft convention and the Security Council enforcement measures as well,
theoretically, the former could be overridden by decisions of the Council.67
Reflecting the concern on the relationship between the draft treaty with the Charter,
the ILC draft simply provides:
The legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act of a State set out in the provisions of
this Part are subject, as appropriate, to the provisions and procedure of the Charter of the United
Nations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.68
However, the provision seems unable to provide a sound basis on which to solve
the conflict between the two international regimes. It is doubtful whether the Security
Council has the prerogative to deny a State's right to take countermeasures.69
Actually, it has been argued that there is no legal basis in the Charter to deprive a
State of its fundamental legal rights, such as remedial actions.70 Nevertheless, it may
be justified if the Council might call on a suspension of the exercise of the rights as a
provisional measure authorised by Article 40 of the Charter.71 In contrast, in the
ILC's community, a different view was presented in order to preserve the integrity of
the right of the State, considering the above approach "as too restrictive, too
"legalistic", and as minimizing the overriding interest of the entire community of the
64 Id. at 134, para. 268.
65 See Zoller, Unilateral Remedy, at 72.
66 The UN Charter, Art. 103.
67 1996 ILC Rep. at 139.
68 The ILC Draft articles, Art. 39.
6'; 1996 ILC Rep. at 139.
70 Id. See also Zoller, Unilateral Remedy, at 117.
71 1996 ILC Rep. at 139, n.226 [emphasis added].
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Slates in preserving international peaee.'":
Faeed with this dilemma, the 1LC noted that such provision in the draft could
not resolve this question thoroughly, and decided that it would consider the issue in
the light of comments by States.73 Moreover, in recent 1LC discussions, a view has
been put forward in favour of a more constrained role for unilateral actions taken
against grave offences of community interests, wherever a comprehensive special
regime governing the specified violations is available.74 The ILC was therefore urged
to "adopt a cautious approach that would ensure the residual or supplementary nature
of the future system of legal consequence to breaches of community obligations that
were covered by specific regimes."75
Overall, the increasing trend is to uphold the supremacy of collective
enforcement regimes over the individual third State remedy, even though it has not
yet been totally confirmed in international law. Perhaps nations who uphold the
integrity of unilateral enforcement will continue to resist such arrangement.
3 Material limitation on unilateral countermeasures
There is general consensus that principles of necessity and proportionality are
essential criteria designed to limit countermeasures.76 In fact, the ILC draft article has
largely codified such principles to circumscribe the use of countermeasures.
(a) Necessity
Admittedly, a violation of law could be excused if it was committed within the
motive of self-preservation, like self-defence or self-help. But, it has also been
required that such countermeasures be necessary.77 Consequently, an act of reprisal,
an inherently wrongful act, which is based on the principle of self-help, must meet the
criterion of necessity to be lawful.
In practice, then, the criterion of necessity is required before an action can be
classified as a legal countermeasure. For instance, the law formulated by the
American Law Institute refers to "unilateral remedies" as "measures [are] necessary
to terminate the violation or prevent further violation, or to remedy the violation. . ,"78
12 Id.
73 Id.
74 1998 ILC Rep. at 287.
75 Id.
76 Bowett, "Economic Coercion," at 9-10.
77 Oppenheim, International Law, at 298-90; ICJ Rep. 1986, at 122, paras. 237.
78
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 905 Unilateral remedies (1)
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Similarly, the 1LC draft aims to codify the concept of necessity to circumscribe
the entitlement of the injured State to take countermcasures. It requires that measures
be necessary to induce the compliance of the violator with its obligations, namely
cessation of the wrongful conduct and reparation™ Those drafters believe that the
term "as necessary" performs a dual function:
It makes it clear that countermeasures may be applied only as a last resort where other means
not involving non-compliance with the injured State's obligations have failed or would clearly be
ineffective in inducing the wrongdoing State to comply with its obligations. It also indicates that
the decision of the injured State to resort to countermeasures is to be made reasonably and in
goodfaitli, and its own risk.*0
Moreover, the draft provides that the measures must be taken as necessary in the
light of the violator's response to the demands of the injured State.81 It has been
stressed that "it is reasonable to expect that in devising its reaction the injured State
should take account of the manner in which the wrongdoing State is responding to the
injured State's demands for cessation and reparation."82 In short, the device of the
draft compels the acting State to undertake the risk that the means used might be
illegal if the reaction of the target has not been considered carefully. According to the
commentary of the ILC Report, the requirement is devised to strike a proper balance
between the position of the injured State and that of the wrongdoing State and is
based on that the necessity of countermeasures diminishes in inverse proportion to the
achievement of their legitimate aims. Thus, the draft demands that it be incumbent on
the injured State to assess the continuing necessity of the countermeasures in the light
of the wrongdoing State's response to its demands.83
The dynamic requirement of obliging the injured State to be cautious and ready
to abort or adjust the means, depending on the response of the violator, seems a novel
idea. As a mechanism to constrain the deliberate use of unilateral remedies, the
principle of necessity should also apply to third State's countermeasures. Nonetheless,
the difficulty of assessing accurately whether necessity is present in the changing and
unpredictable international relationships remains. It is desirable that certain detailed
(a) [hereinafter US Restatement (Third)][emphasis added],
79 The ILC Draft articles, Art. 47 (1).
80 1996 ILC Rep. at 156 [emphasis added],
81 The ILC Draft articles, Art. 47 (1).
82 1996 ILC Rep. at 157.
83 See id. at 157-58.
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standards should be developed in dealing with the use of the third State remedy.
(b) Proportionality
The principle of proportionality originates from European administration law. It
was initially designed to ensure that the restrictions imposed by police authorities on
civil rights were not disproportionate to the purpose ofmaintaining public order.84 In
the international arena, the principle was first introduced into the dispute involving
acts of reprisals by Germany in the Nauliaa Incident case, which required a
proportionate response to the alleged wrongful act.85 The need for proportionality
between the prior breach and the latter measure of response has been further
elaborated in the US/France Air Service Agreement dispute.S6 In this case, where the
term, "countermeasures", was first used, proportionality was interpreted and applied
to secure equivalence between the offender and the injured party. The Arbitral
Tribunal remarked that:
It is generally agreed that all counter-measures must, in the first instance, have some degree of
equivalence with the alleged breach; it is a well-known rule. . .[i]t is necessary to carefully to
assess the meaning of counter-measures in the framework of proportionality. Their aim is to
restore equality between the Parties and to encourage them to continue negotiations with mutual
87
desire to reach an acceptable solution.
Inspired by the ruling, Zoller emphasised that the principle not only aims at pursuing
the re-establishment of "equivalence between parties", but should also operate
primarily between the effect of countermeasures and the purpose aimed to reach (the
compliance with international obligations).88
In practice, the difficulty may arise in the precise evaluation of the alleged
equivalence of countermeasures with a wrongful act. Qualitative as well as
quantitative criteria have been often employed.89 For example, the ILC's draft on
State responsibility regarding the principle of proportionality incorporates both
quantitative standards (the effects of the breach) and qualitative ones (the gravity of
84 See Zoller, Unilateral Remedies, at 134-35; id. Enforcing Law, at 147-48.
85 Naulilaa case, LTNRIAA, Vol. II, 1025-26.
86 Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of27 March 1946 between the United States ofAmerica
and France, 9 Dec. 1978, UNRIAA, Vol. XVIII, at 443.
87 Id. at 443-46.
88 Zoller, Enforcing Law, at 60.
89 See Annackcr, "State Responsibility", at 244-45; Chazournes, "Economic Countermeasures", at 339.
49
The Felly Sanctions as Countermeasures
the wrongful act). In a negative formulation of the principle,90 Article 49 of the draft
reads as: "Countermeasures taken by an injured State shall not be out of proportion to
the degree ofgravity of the internationally wrongful act and the effects thereofon the
injured State." The US Restatement took a similar approach, requiring a legal
countermeasure not to be out of proportion to the violation and the injury sufferedf
As a result, this approach has influenced some judgements in international tribunals.
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project case, the ICJ took the quantitative criteria in
considering whether the countermeasure taken by Czechoslovakia (unilaterally
assuming control of a shared water resource) met the requirement of proportionality.
The Court found that the measures failed to do so mainly because the effects of the
countermeasures (depriving Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share
of the natural resources of the Danube) cannot be commensurate with the injury
Czechoslovakia suffered.92
While the test of proportionality specified by the ILC proves increasingly
dominant, it can be difficult to apply to the countermeasures invoked by third State
against the violations of fundamental community interests, because the responders
arguably suffer no material damage. Thus, the test of seeking equivalence between
parties could hardy be applicable to the enforcement of common value.
Zoller's classification of the proportionality on the relations between ends and
means may probably provide a solution.93 What is required is that remedial actions
should not bring about disproportionate effects with respect to the purpose pursued,
namely to halt the violation or deter future offences. Moreover, since each State is
presumably entitled to resort unilaterally to countermeasures in response to the breach
of erga omnes obligations, it has been observed that only one single reaction
qualifying the proportionality criteria indicated above is not enough. Rather, all
reactions taken together must not be disproportionate to the offence.94 As a result, as
Annacker concludes, "Unilateral reactions are only permissible as long as and to the
extent that preceding reactions still allow proportionate reactions."95
It remains to be seen whether the above approaches, although theoretically
feasible, would win universal support. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the current
90 Annacker, id. at 245.
91 US Restatement (Third), at 905 (1) (b).
92 ICJ Rep. 1997, at 46-48, para. 85.
93 Zoller, Enforcing Law, at 60.
94
Arangio-Ruiz, Fourth Report, A/CN, 4/444, 25 May 1992, Add. 1,31 para. 93.
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ILC's draft regarding proportionality is not satisfactory in dealing with third-State
counternieasures. Perhaps the work needs to be further elaborated in a way that may
effectively cope with the particular situation of the unilateral enforcement of
fundamental international norms.
(c) Other constraints on unilateral countermeasures
There are certain essential values in international society that are considered
inviolable, such as sovereignty, human rights, and the prerogative of diplomacy.
Accordingly, it is increasingly demanded that the injured State refrain from resorting
to certain undesirable measures, even if the actions meet the above requirements. The
ILC draft establishes several categories of unlawful countermeasures. They include:
(a) the threat or use of force as prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) extreme economic or political coercion designed to endanger the territorial integrity or political
independence of the State which has committed the internationally wrongful act;
(c) any conduct which infringes the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives
and documents,
(d) any other conduct in contravention of a peremptory norm of general international law96
The draft's designated requirements aim at deterring the abuse of the right to take
countermeasures. It has been seriously questioned, however, whether the approach
entirely reflects customary international law.97 Perhaps one of the most problematical
restraints is sub-paragraph (b). The prohibition leaves much room for debate. First of
all, the text draws much criticism because of the vagueness of its terms. The words
"extreme" and "economic or political coercion" are not well defined. Secondly, there
is a concern that extensive application of the provision is likely to render virtually all
the countermeasures impermissible.98
Indeed, the provision largely echoes the principle of sovereignty and non¬
intervention as enunciated in numerous UN Declarations and Resolutions.99 The
inclusion of the general concern about the frequent use of non-military coercion in the
draft is an indication of the ILC's intention to reconcile the conflict between the
principle of non-intervention and the entitlement of taking countermeasures.
Acknowledging the admissibility of taking countermeasures against international
95 Annackcr, "State Responsibility", at 245.
96 The ILC Draft articles, Art. 50.
97 The USs comment, at 474.
98 In Henkin's words, the device probably would "effectively eliminate virtually all countermeasures.
Henkin et al, International law, at 572.
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wrongful acts, Arangio-Ruiz, the former ILC's Special Rapporteur, nevertheless
observes:
Although the State practice considered does not appear to warrant the conclusion that certain
fomis of economic and/or political coercion are equivalent to forms of armed aggression, such
practice none the less reveals a trend towards the prohibition of economic or political measures
which jeopardize the territorial integrity or the political independence of the State against which
they are taken.100
As far as enforcement against violations of erga omnes obligations is concerned,
the aim of taking a countermeasure is largely to bring the offence to an end. As a
result, it becomes an inevitable effect that, by and large, it will affect the alleged
"political independence" of the violators. So, the above requirement seems to be
paradoxical. On the other hand, however, it should be noted that, as indicated in the
latter chapter, intervention may be justified, if the matters intervened fall outside of
national discretion. In a sense, a lawful third State's countermeasure will not violate
the principle of non-intervention, because that principle is not designed to permit
States to violate erga omnes obligations. It is true that the World Court, in the
Nicaragua case, has, to some degree, contributed to the reconciliation between two
regimes. Nonetheless, it remains too soon to say that the ILC article constitutes an
excessive prohibition. It is uncertain to what extent the provision would be
eventually accepted, modified, or rejected. However, the device has shown the
necessity to strike a balance between the sovereign right to decide national conduct
freely and the right to enforce important norms by taking countermeasures.
C The enforcement of environmental obligations by third States
The role of erga omnes obligations in the protection of the international
environment has become increasingly significant because certain serious
environmental offenses by nature would not cause direct injury to a particular State,
such as massive pollution to the areas of international common space beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.101 Thus, as observed, in this situation, "If a particular
injury were required, no State would have standing to remedy the violation."102
99 See the discussion in chapter three.
100 Arangio-Ruiz, "Fourth Report on State Responsibility Add. 1-3", Y.B. of the ILC, Vol. II, Part One
(1992), at 30.
101 See id. at 157.
102 Id.
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It is admitted that the overall pattern of how the erga omncs doctrine is applied
to the enforcement of international environmental norms is far from clear. As a
result, it remains disputable what violations of environmental obligations may entitle
every State, whether or not directly injured, to take remedial action, including
unilateral sanctions of countermeasures in vindication of the offence.103 This section
aims to examine what sort of circumstances are currently likely to justify third State
countermeasures employed to protect the general community interests concerning the
global environment. The work mainly seeks to reveal the implications of the ILC's
Draft on State responsibility with respect to the unilateral enforcement of
environmental norms, and the following discussion perhaps may help clarify the
unsettled issues.
1 The nuclear tests cases
In the 1974 Nuclear Tests cases,'04 the complaints made by Australia and New
Zealand against French atmospheric nuclear testing in the South Pacific might have
been an occasion on which the ICJ could apply the concept of erga omnes to the
dispute triggered by environmental concern.
It is true that the conduct of the French did not breach international treaty law
on the ban on nuclear tests, because France was not a contracting party to the 1963
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and arguably the prohibition of nuclear test emanating from
that treaty did not constitute a customary rule binding all States.105 Nonetheless, it
aroused debate as to whether France was permitted to perform nuclear tests on the
high seas, which could presumably cause environmental damage to alleged global
commons. In other words, it is interesting to explore whether the French conduct was
contrary to erga omnes obligations to the extent that Australia and New Zealand, inter
alia, were entitled to bring a claim to the Court on behalf of the international
community, acting as actio popularis.
Australia and New Zealand both argued that the duty to refrain from conducting
atmospheric nuclear tests was owed erga omnes.106 In particular, New Zealand
claimed: (a) that the examples of circumstances in which erga omnes obligations
Wi See Bilder, "Unilateral State Action", at 73; Sands, Principles, at 151.
104 Nuclear Tests case (Australia v. France); (New Zealand v. France), ICJ Rep. 1974.
105 See Shaw, International Law, at 419.
106 See Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France) I ICJ Pleadings, at 326-35.
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existed, given in the Barcelona Traction ease, were not exhaustive;107 (b) that
customary international law, as well as treaty law, might give rise to obligations erga
omnes\m (e) that a fundamental characteristic of erga onirics obligations is that - their
violation "can fairly be said to be an affront to the conscience of mankind".109
Regrettably, the World Court overlooked the substantive legal issue raised by
the plaintiffs concerning the violation of freedom of the high seas by the nuclear
testing. Rather, it decided not to judge the claims on the ground that a French
undertaking to discontinue any further atmospheric nuclear tests in a form of
unilateral statement was binding."0 The Court thereby missed a chance to clarify the
implication of erga omnes for the protection of common areas, such as the high seas.
As Birnie and Boyle indicate, "[t]he ICJ was unsympathetic to the notion of an actio
popularis allowing high seas freedom to be enforced as obligations 'erga omnes', and
it did not follow its earlier dicta.""1
It is important to note, however, that the Joint Dissenting Opinion in the Nuclear
Tests cases recognised, by referring to the Barcelona Traction case, the specific value
in considering the legal argument in the present dispute. Judges Onyeama, Dillard,
Jimenez de Arechega and Sir Humphrey Waldock contended:
If the materials adduced by Australia were to convince the Court of the existence of a general rule
of international law, prohibiting atmospheric nuclear tests [in the common areas], the Court
would at the same time have to determine what is the precise character and content of that rule
and, in particular, whether it confers a right on every state individually to prosecute a claim to
secure respect for the rule. In short, the question of 'legal interest' cannot be separated from the
substantive legal issue of the existence and scope of the alleged rule of customary international
law. Although we recognise that the existence of a so-called actio popularis is a matter of
controversy, the observations of this Court in the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited Case suffice to show that the question is one that may be considered as
capable of rational legal argument and a proper subject of litigation before this Court."2
107 Nuclear Tests cases (New Zealand v. France) II ICJ Pleadings, at 207.
108 Id. at 207-8.
m Id. at 208.
110 ICJ Rep. 1974, at 253, 305-06.
111 Birnie and Boyle, International Law and Environment, at 155. Although the Court did not confirm
the standing of State to bring claims in the name of protecting community interests, Birnie and Boyle
seem to suggest that the Court would allow States to engage in diplomatic protects and to apply
countermeasures. They mentioned that ". . . in some cases the protection of community interests will
involve no more than the right to make diplomatic protects and apply lawful sanctions, such as a refusal
of assess to fish stocks or an embargo on trade. See id. at 157.
112 ICJ Rep. 1974, at 369-70.
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In short, despite the Court's hesitation to incorporate essential environmental
concern into the category of erga oinnes obligations, undoubtedly, the initial effort
made by the ICJ in defining the concept shall not become the final chapter for the
Court to pay due regard to the increasing importance of protecting the common values
of the international community.
2 The ILC's position on the unilateral enforcement of environmental obligations
(a) Basic provision
This section focuses mainly on the Draft articles on State responsibility
articulated by the ILC,113 because the draft appears to be the most extensive and
supportive work on the elaboration of third State remedies put into the context of
countermeasures. In an effort to assimilate the concept of third State enforcement
into the regime of State responsibility, the draft adopts an extensive definition of
"injured State"."4 In this regard, any State or States whose rights or interests are
infringed by the breach of obligations specified in the draft may be deemed an
"injured" State, and be thus entitled to claim remedies by taking countermeasures,
whether or not direct injury is sustained. The formulation is designed to make the
third State enforcement regime consistent with the conventional mandate requiring a
display of injury in order to vindicate the offence unilaterally."5
Article 40 of the draft defines the meaning of "injured State" in a very broad
sense. It specifies a number of categories in which certain violations of norms may
allow some subjects or States to be legally regarded as an "injured" State or States."5
In the beginning, the draft defines the "injured State" as one party to a bilateral
treaty,"7 party or parties to binding decisions of a international court or tribunal and
of international institutions,"8 as well as a third party that enjoys the benefit arising
113 Since 1949, the ILC has been working on the codification of "State Responsibility", including
countermeasures for decades. At its 2473rd meeting, on 26 July 1996, the ILC decided to transmit the
"Draft articles on State responsibility", through the Secretary-General, to Governments for comments
and observations, with the request that such comments and observations be submitted to the Secretary-
General by 1 January 1998. See 1996 ILC Rep. at 121, 124.
114 See Schachter, International Law, at 196; Henkin et al, International Law, at 557.
115 Some writers strongly advocate the requirement of injury as the very basis for seeking redress. E.g.
see Dc Arechaga and Tanzi, "International State Responsibility", at 349.
116 Y.B. of ILC 1985, Vol. II (Part Two), at 26.
117 The ILC Draft articles, Art. 40 (2) (a).
118 Id. Art. 40 (2) (b) (c).
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from a treaty."9 The strueturc of those provisions simply is in conformity with the
strict concept of injured State arising from the bilateral legal relationship. Hence, little
doubt has been raised upon this arrangement.
(b) Enforcement of general multilateral treaty
However, in subsequent paragraphs, the article's intention of expanding third
State remedies to cover the enforcement of multilateral treaties and customary
international law proves an innovative work and consequently draws intense debate.
The article specifies that "the infringement of the right necessarily affects the
enjoyment of the rights or the performance of the obligations. . ." entails that the
remedial actions be taken by any State which is party to the treaty or bound by the
relevant rule of customary law.120 Since the obligations in a multilateral treaty subsist
in all parties, Schachter favours the provision, arguing that every party may have a
legal interest in their compliance.121 Although the adoption of the ILC provision may,
at least theoretically, further the effective implementation of the law, it seems that the
category does not necessarily carry the implication of erga omnes.122 Besides, the
drafter of the article had noted that, within the context of the provision, no substantive
right under customary law may permit a third State to enforce a rule erga omnes.123
Accordingly, it may be concluded that the provision is merely a matter of treaty norm
as formulated by the ILC.
In addition to the provision's departure from the erga omnes obligations, it is
doubtful in practice that such a broad recognition of third State enforcement of the
treaty regime would be widely accepted. First of all, it is necessary to clarify its
relation to the similar device in the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties.124
The Convention does stipulate certain rules regarding the consequences of "a material
breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties."125 Some countries criticise the
failure of the ILC draft to decide whether such "infringements of right" are identical
119 Id. Art. 40 (2) (d).
120 Id. Art. 40 (2) (e) (ii).
121 Schachter, International Law, at 209-10.
122 E.g. Henkin et al, International Law, at 557. Cf. Annacker, "State Responsibility", at 214.
123 The Special Rapporteur stated that "[l]t would seem that, beyond the case of international crimes,
there are no internationally wrongful acts having an erga omnes character." See Fourth Report on the
Content Forms and Degrees of International Responsibility (Part 2 of the Draft Articles), Y.B. of ILC
1985, Vol. II (Part Two), at 13.
124 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 336, signed at Vienna 23 May 1969; entered into
force 27 Jan. 1980 [hereinafter Vienna Convention],
125 Article 60(2)(c) of the Vienna Convention.
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to "material breaches" of a treaty.126 Where the concepts of "infringed right" and
"material breach" overlap, it has been suggested that the draft should add "the Vienna
Convention would govern interpretations of specific treaty regimes injured therein."127
Yet, despite the potential conflict between these two regimes, it needs to be borne in
mind that they actually operate with different purposes. The provision of the ILC
draft is concerned with the implementation of State responsibility by recognising the
right of a third State to seek a remedy, which mainly aims to deter the breach of
norms. On the other hand, as observed, "measures (termination or suspension of the
operation of a treaty) under Article 60 (Vienna Convention) are intended to protect a
State from the disadvantages of non-fulfilment by the other party."12!> Overall, in order
to ensure the compatibility of the draft with the other regimes, it is highly desirable
for the ILC to commit itself to the further elaboration of this issue.
On the enforcement of international environmental agreements and rules, the
ILC's draft article indicated above, will undoubtedly help to promote compliance with
environmental obligations by granting those "injured States" the right to respond to
such offense.
(c) Enforcement of collective interests
In addition, the following categories of the ILC draft article may be deemed
consistent with the erga omnes obligations concerning environmental matters. The
draft article 40(2)(f) specifically deals with the safeguard of certain regimes designed
to secure "collective interests." It considers that all parties to a multilateral treaty are
injured if a breach of the treaty affects the "collective interest," which has been
expressly stipulated in that treaty.129 Accordingly, third State enforcement in this area
is designed to deal with a regime of multilateral treaties where an explicit stipulation
for the protection of collective interests emerges.130 Though the rule is ostensibly
confined to treaty regime, it should be noted that the configuration shall not be read as
excluding the rules of customary international law which also achieve the same
effect.131 In short, the provision may be deemed to be a sub-category of the
126 "The United States' comment on the draft articles on State Responsibility", 22 Oct. 1997, 37 ILM
483 (1998)[hereinafter the US comment].
127 Id.
1211 Annacker, "State Responsibility," at 215.
129 See the ILC Draft articles, Art. 40(2)(f) [emphasis added].
130 Id
131 See Y. B. of ILC 1985, Vol. II, Part 2, sub-para. (25), at 27.
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enforcement of the general multilateral treaty.132 But, on the other hand, its genuine
advocacy of remedy for violation of well-defined common interests renders it
coherent with the doctrine of erga oinnes obligations, and thus more acceptable to the
international community.133
As tar as the scope of the term "collective interests" in Article 40 (2) is
concerned, the drafters of the ILC noted that, in the present stage of development of
the international community, the application of such a mandate is still limited.134 The
doctrine of the "common heritage ofmankind" applied to depict the legal status of the
mineral resources of the deep sea-bed and subsoil beyond national jurisdictions in the
Law of Sea Convention has been generally regarded as a right model for the
protection of collective interests.135 Other regimes for the candidate have been
considered by the ILC, but the records show that no agreement has been reached with
respect to their precise application.136
Apart from the deep sea bed regime, there seems no definite answer regarding
which environmental regimes may fit the definition of collective interests. In recent
decades, however, a growing number of multilateral treaties have emerged aimed at
protecting the global environment and areas of common interests or concern, which,
inter alia, cover the areas of ozone, global climate, sea area, Antarctica, movement of
hazardous wastes, and world heritage.137 Birnie and Boyle consider that all parties to
those multilateral treaties have "collective interests" in their enforcement.138 The
problem is that the concept of "common concern" and related terms, which imply the
protection of collective interests, has not generally been explicitly specified in those
treaties, but simply mentioned in the preamble of them.139 As a result, applying the
132 See Annacker, "State Responsibility", at 215.
133 See Henkin et al, International Law, at 557.
134 See Y. B. of ILC 1985, Vol. II, Part 2, sub-para. (24), at 27.
135 See Y. B. of ILC 1985, Vol. II, Part 2, sub-para. (23), at 27. The Convention provides that "the Area
and its resources are the Common Heritage of Mankind," and that "all rights in the resources of the
Area are vested in mankind as a whole. . The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 Dec. 1982,
in force 16 Nov. 1994. See UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, part XI, Art. 137, 137(2).
136 Charney, "Third States Remedy", at 81.
137 For instance, the Ozone Convention, the London Dumping Convention, the Antarctic Mineral
Resources Convention, the Convention for Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes, the World Heritage Convention. See Birnie and Boyle, International law and Environment, at
156; Sands, Principles, 153, 218-19.
I3" Birnie and Boyle, id. at 156.
139 Sands, Principles, at 218 and n. 224-32. Generally speaking, the legal function of preambles is to
serve an interpretative guideline for the provisions of the agreement. See Asylum, I.C.J. Rep. 1950, at
282; Rights of Nationals of the United States ofAmerican in Morocco, I.C.J. Rep. 1952, at 196; The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31 (2).
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sense of the draft article strictly, most violations of those global environmental
treaties cannot entitle any other State party to seek remedies individually. Not
surprisingly, the arrangement has been criticised as "unduly narrow."140
(d) Enforcement of international crimes
General discussion on the ILC's work on international crimes ofState
Finally, the ILC draft seeks to broaden further the concept of "injured State" by
formulating a controversial concept of "international crimes" as serious breaches of
the obligations owed to all countries in the world.141 In effect, all States except the
violator are deemed injured if the internationally recognised wrongful act constitutes
an international crime and thus become entitled to invoke the responsibility of the
"author" State.142 In an effort to define the ambit of international crimes, in article
19, paragraph 2, the draft firstly characterises the general concept of the crime as
"[t]he breach by a State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of
fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a
crime by that community as a whole. . ,"143 Then, paragraph 3 also provides several
sub-categories of international crime to define the specified pattern of serious
violations of community interests, which are commonly denounced by international
society.144
It may be true that, to a certain degree, the concept of international crime may
largely reflect the character and range of erga omnes obligations with a sort of
elaboration and modification.145 The concept of international crimes specified in
Article 19 of the ILC draft article on State responsibility nevertheless has been one of
the most controversial provisions, since it was formulated in 1976.146 While the draft
marches toward a final conclusion, it still remains highly uncertain whether the
alleged "State crimes" provision will eventually be retained. Indeed, no consensus
140 Birnie and Boyle, International Law and Environment, at 156, n. 99. Cf. SS Wimbledon, PCIJ , Ser.
A, No. 1 (1923), 20; Gray, Judicial Remedies, at 211; Hutchinson, "Solidarity and Breaches", at 151.
141 The ILC Draft articles, Art. 40 (3).
142 Id.
143 The ILC Draft articles, Art. 19 (2).
144 It has been observed that international crimes may occur while they are against the non-use of force,
or the prohibition of genocide and apartheid. It actually matches the concept of peremptory rules of
international law from which no derogation is permitted. See Spinendi, "International Crimes", at 22
[emphasis added].
145 But, the two concepts are not definitely identical, even certain overlap will happen. See Spinedi, id.
at 136-38. In the ILC community, there was general consensus that the notion of erga omnes
obligations is wider than that of State crimes. See 1998 ILC Rep. at 293.
146 Gilbert, "Criminal Responsibility", at 357.
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has been reached during the recent lLC's discussion.147 Actually, among the ILC
members, there was increasingly intense debate regarding the propriety of including
such a notion in the context of State responsibility.
Some members remain persistent in holding that State responsibility, by nature,
is confined to civil responsibility, maintaining that a State is incapable of being the
subject of criminal responsibility. 14S Further, it was observed that since the
incorporation of article 19 in 1976, no international practice, such as treaties, judicial
decisions or Security Council practices, has ever endorsed the view that a State may
bear alleged criminal responsibility.149 Also, the present device has been criticised as
being insufficient because it fails to develop the procedural implications or the actual
consequences of crimes,'40 and the language embodied in paragraph 2 and 3 in that
article has been deemed defective.141
In contrast, some views defending the value of retaining the notion of "State
crimes" were expressed. Although the device, strictly speaking, has not yet become a
part of existing international law, it is believed that the work represents a progressive
development and forms part of the evolutionary process of international law.152 It is
stressed that the article is designed to preserve the fundamental interests of the
international community by employing the concept of "State crimes", which refers to
grave breaches of essential international obligations.153 Furthermore, the recognition
of erga omnes obligations in the Barcelona case and other related concepts, such as
jus cogens154 and international solidarity were cited to justify the proposition of
formulating the concept of "State crimes" in addressing serious offences committed
147 The 1998 ILC Rep. at 331.
148 Id. at 250, 284.
149 Id. at 249, 250, 273.
150 Id at 245, 246, 298-301. See also id at 309-11.
151 Given the unsatisfactory arrangement in Art. 19, para. 2, the provision was suggested to be amended
as follows: "An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an obligation
that is essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community as a whole
has specific legal effects." See 1998 ILC Rep. at 289. Besides, the view was expressed that para. 3
should simply be deleted. Because the inherently serious nature of the crimes listed in para. 2, the
additional requirement of gravity (a serious breach) in para. 3 was considered to be unjustified. See id.
at 290, 327.
t52 Id. at 265, 318.
153 Id. at 303.
154 According to Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the term refers to "[a]
peremptory norm of general international law [that] is a norm accepted and recognised by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character."
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by States.'55 On the other hand, some eonsidered that the choiee of the expression
"State crimes" does not necessarily imply the notion of penalty as it would in the field
of domestic criminal responsibility.156 Thus, notwithstanding the controversial use of
the term, the notion could be retained without criminalising international
responsibility.157
Despite the unsettled issue of "State crimes",158 the ILC, after a full-scale
discussion, did reach certain consensus relevant to third States' enforcement of
community interests. First, the ILC members generally agreed "the existence of
obligations to the international community which should be duly reflected in the draft
articles."159 That agreement was thus indicative of the need to further the clarification
between the cognate concepts, like erga ommes obligations, jus cogens norms and
alleged State crimes the function of each of which is to preserve fundamental
international interests. There was general agreement that "these notions were not
coextensive and should receive separate consideration to avoid any confusion."160
Since the violation of these norms might justify third State countermeasures, the ILC
agreed to "give further consideration to the definition of an injured State contained in
article 40, particularly in relation to erga omnes obligations, jus cogens and possibly
State crimes or exceptionally serious wrongful acts."161
Moreover, the ILC has generally taken a relatively cautious view towards the
approach adopted in article 40, paragraph 3, which entitles any other State, deemed an
injured State, to take countermeasures without reasonable constraints whenever an
international crime occurs.162 The present device of "injured State", as observed, will
render "the danger of abuse particularly great."163 Hence it has been urged that "a
differentiated schema of responses available to different States based on their
'proximity' to the breach should be introduced."164
In short, there was general agreement that draft article 40 does not, as it
155 Id.
156 The ILC in its previous Report had emphasised that "alternative phrases such as "an international
wrongful act of a serious nature" or "an exceptionally serious wrongful act" could be substituted for the
term "crime", thus, inter alia, avoiding the penal implication of the term." See 1996 ILC Report, at 141.
157 Id. at 303.
158 According to the recent ILC's conclusion , the ILC decided to put draft Art. 19 to one side for the
time being. See the 1998 ILC Rep. at 331.
159 Id. at 324.
160 Id. at 296.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 324.
163 Id. at 297.
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presently stands, do suffieient justice to certain fundamental concepts, and that is
likely to be redrafted.165
Environmental crimes
The draft article 19, paragraph 3 (d) specifies that an international crime may
result from "a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for
the safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such as those
prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the sea."166 The concern for
serious damage to global common has to some degree reflected the general view that
erga omnes obligations towards the environment should extend to the protection of
areas beyond national jurisdiction, like global common spaces. Charney particularly
refers to the protection of the world's common spaces—the high seas, outer space, and
Antarctica as the subjects in which the entire community has an interest. The term,
"community interests," is employed to underline the significance in the protection of
those areas.167
Apart from the global commons defined geographically, questions will be raised
whether the term "environmental crimes" may be applied to the other dimensions of
environmental violations, such as destruction of natural resources. Based on an
extensive view, it has been argued that the rubric of the provision should not only be
limited to common spaces but also cover the preservation of natural resources. It has
been maintained that "The definition is not meant to be exhaustive; it might
reasonably extend to species or ecosystem destruction, or tropical deforestation with
serious atmospheric consequences."168
Despite the express inclusion of serious damage to the environment as
constituting an international crime, it is uncertain whether the formulation may obtain
universal endorsement. Some doubt if the current development of international
environmental law is ready to embrace the existence of "environmental crimes of
States", which may criminalise international responsibility on environmental issues.
Gilbert was particularly skeptical about whether the customary norms from the
decision in the Trail Smelter Arbitration can give rise to general criminal
164 Id.
165 Id. at 297, 327.
"* The ILC Daft articles, Art. 19 (3) (d).
167 Charney, "Environmental Damage", at 161.
I6S Birnie and Boyle, International Law and Environment, at 155-56.
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responsibility.169 He further argued that "[the decision] was based on a specific
United States-Canadian agreement and on United States inter-state laws: hardly a
strong foundation for even a customary norm of an international tort of nuisance let
alone a crime."170 Moreover, it should be noted that, in contrast to the enforcement of
gross violations of human rights obligations,1,1 international enforcement against
human damage to the environment remains comparatively weak.172 In addition, the
configuration of the provision seems to leave some questions unsolved. For instance,
it is far from clear whether such crimes require intention or negligence.173 Further, the
wording used to describe an alleged "environmental crime", like "massive" pollution,
is quite ambiguous and subject to deliberate interpretation. Hence, it is doubtful that
the specification of such offences as international crimes really reflects the current
customary rule of law.174
(e) Summary
The ILC work on the formulation of the law of State responsibility appears to be
the most relevant, supportive, and ambitious attempt to codify the third State remedy
in the framework of countermeasures regime. Much evidence suggests that its device
goes beyond the original rubric of erga omnes. Thus, not surprisingly, the draft has
been considered not to codify the norms but rather to formulate new substantive
rules. 175 In particular, the extensive application of third-State remedies, by
substantially enlarging the concept of the "injured State" without any form of control,
will be opposed by nations who fear that such broad discretion may be easily abused.
Given certain defects contained in the draft, it is problematic whether it could remain
intact until its eventual ratification. It is believed, however, that the regime of the
third State remedies will certainly reach full maturity through constant international
efforts. Therefore, despite certain deficiency in this draft article, its contribution to
the legal development of third States' enforcement capacities is quite remarkable.
169 Gilbert, "Criminal Responsibility", at 364-65.
170 Id. at 365.
171 See n. 30 above.
172 The UN had ever censured Iraq's wanton destruction of Kuwaiti oil field in 1991 and reaffirmed
Iraq's responsibility for environment damage. See Security Council Res. 687, para. 16. However, it is
not clear whether such environmental crime was severe enough to trigger the UN's enforcement
actions.
173 Some contend that "A preferable approach would limit the category to violations of applicable
international rules intended to cause serious harm to the natural environment." See Birnie and Boyle,
International Law and Environment, at 210.
174 Much skepticism was cast into the inclusion of environmental obligation in the content of
international crimes. See Spinedi, "International Crimes", at 61-62.
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Overall, the ILC's Draft Articles on State responsibility with respect to the
situations justifying countermeasures do establish a substantive link between erga
ornnes obligations and global environmental concern mainly by illuminating the
regimes designed to protect "collective interests and curb international crimes of the
environment as well. However, given the un-testcd definition and contentious
character of its articles, the practical application of those provisions remains to be
seen. On the other hand, as the ILC has decided to distinguish the special regime of
erga omnes obligations from "State crimes", it may be interesting to see to what
extent essential environmental obligations could be characterised as a part of that
norm.
3 The US's Restatement on environmental enforcement
The work of the American Law Institute reflects the American lawyers' own
concept of general norms of international law, instituting several provisions with
respect to the third State enforcement of international law. The Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law specifies "a State may bring a claim against another State for a
violation of an international obligation owed to the claimant State or to States
generally . . 176 As a result, pursuant to a comment to Section 902 of the
Restatement, "When a State has violated an obligation owed to the international
community as a whole, any State may bring a claim in accordance with this section
without showing that it has suffered a particular injury."111
In particular, the Restatement addresses the international remedy against the
violations of human rights178 and environmental obligations. Responding to the
increasing concern relating to the deterioration of global environment, the
Restatement provides:
A State responsible to another State for violation of Section 601 [i.e., 'injury to the environment
of another State or areas beyond the limits ofnationaljurisdiction'] is subject to general interstate
remedies (Section 902) to prevent, reduce, or terminate the activity threatening or causing the
violation, and to pay reparation for injury caused.179
175 The US comment, at 468.
176 US Restatement (Third), at 902 (1) [emphasis added].
177 Id. Comment a [emphasis added],
178 The human rights violations specified by the Institute include: "genocide; murder or causing the
disappearance of individuals; torture or other inhuman treatment; slavery or slave trade; systematic
racial discrimination; prolonged arbitrary detention; consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights." See US Restatement (Third), at 702, 703.
179 hi. at 602 (1).
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As to what scope of environmental obligations may be enforceable by all States, it
merely extends the obligations to the outlawing of pollution of the high seas and
damage to the common environment.180 Yet, it does not relate such obligations to the
conservation of natural resources, like wildlife protection. As numerous treaties and
documents have addressed the environmental issues beyond the traditional problems
of transfrontier pollution,181 the Restatement's limited environmental concern is open
to being construed as a narrow application.182 Caron speculates:
[A]s humanity believes increasingly that in a theoretical sense the planet belongs to all , the
notions of legitimate interests seems to extend far beyond traditional notions of harm.
Consequently, there is a perception that all have an interest in preventing the loss of a species,
the destruction ofcultural heritage, and the waste ofnatural resources,I!>J
4 Concluding remarks
It may be safe to conclude that erga omnes obligations apply to environmental
matters, in spite of their unsettled scope. In the light of the above discussion,
however, there is a general agreement that certain breaches of environmental
obligations which cause significant damage or deterioration to global common in the
geographic sense may entitle all States to redress the violations without showing
material injury.184
As to the conservation of natural resources, the conclusion of a number of
international legal documents have suggested their increasing importance for
international community. Although mankind has a common interest in the
preservation of natural resources, it is unclear whether all States are subject to
common obligations for their protection.185 Unlike incidental or intentional massive
pollution to common areas causing clear and immediate damage to the global
180 Id. at 602,612.
181
Apart from the prevention of pollution on global common, a number of environmental treaties have
been developed in dealing with conservation of natural resources and Cultural Heritage. Those treaties
mainly include the 1972 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, 1992 Convention on Biological
Diversity, 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and Lakes,
1994 International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1979 Berne Convention on the Conservation of
European Wildlife, 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature, and the 1985 ASEAN
Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.
182 Caron, "Law of the Environment", at 528-29.
183 Id. [emphasis added],
184 See Charney, "Environmental Damage", at 157; Handl, "Transnational Pollution", at 58-72; Spincdi,
"Convergences and Divercncies", at 248. Springer, Pollution, at 158-61.
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environment, the exploitation of natural resourees, in most eases, is a gradual process
where it seems difficult to identify the points at which the severity of damage to the
global environment occurs. Furthermore, arguably, within the framework of
international law regarding the preservation of natural resources, the device remains
generally a matter of distribution of rights to exploit or equitable utilisation,186 and
largely affirms the sovereign rights over natural resources.187 Also, international
management regimes for natural resources in the relevant treaties do not as yet
function well.188
In contrast, however, much literature has attempted to classify resources as a
new kind of "international property", which requires a new definition of sovereignty
and cooperation for the good of the international community.189 In particular, some
disagree that any grave damage inflicted on natural resources constituting
indispensable elements to the ecosystem, like tropical forests, could not absolutely
survive the test of erga omnes doctrine.190
To sum up, it is still dubious whether certain breaches of obligations to protect
natural resources may definitely be enforced by third States on behalf of the
international community. The Pelly unilateral enforcement actions implemented in
the protection of endangered species provides a good opportunity to examine the
issue. The question may rise as to whether the erga omnes mandate for the global
environment has already been applicable to the situation where any undesirable
conduct endangering natural resources take place.
D The assessment of the legality of the Pelly sanctions in the context of
environmental countermeasures
As indicated in the CITES resolutions and the US's public statement, Taiwan
had been blamed for its lack of progress in halting illegal trade in tiger and rhinos
185 Birnie and Boyle, International law and Environment, at 448.
186 Id. at 112-19, 126,420-21.
187 See 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Principle 21; 1992 Rio Declaration, Principle 2. There are
numerous multilateral treaties affirming the sovereign rights of State over the natural resources within
its jurisdiction, such as art. 9 (6) of the 1933 London Convention, art. 2 (3) of the 1971 Ramsar
Convention, art. 1 of the 1983 International Tropicai Timber Agreement and the Preamble to the 1989
Basle Convention and the 1992 Climate Change Convention.
188 Birnie and Boyle, International law and Environment, at 450-52.
189 Handl, "Environmental Security", at 32. See also generally Schachter, Sharing the World's
Resources.
190 Such conducts are likely to constitute an international crime under the ILC's Draft article on State
Responsibility. See the ILC Draft articles, Art. 19, para. 3 (d).
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products. Yet it seems that the continuous consumption of those commodities may not
necessarily do any direct damage to States. As far as this section is concerned, it is
essential to decide whether Taiwan's conduct may entitle all States, even where they
do not suffer material injury, including the US, to take countermeasures in the form of
trade sanctions in vindicating the alleged offence. In terms of the ILC's Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, the US must be an "injured State" in a broad sense in order to
justify its remedial actions in the first place. In other words, it has to determine if
Taiwan's conservation policy constituted a prior breach of international obligations,
which has infringed the US's interests, irrespective of whether it is material or
intangible.191 In doing so, most importantly, it is imperative to reveal whether any
substantive law, treaty or customary law had been violated by Taiwan's allowing its
people to utilise endangered species' products and its failure to adopt effective
measures to crack down on the illegal trade in those species. If the violations of
environmental obligations did occur, it then must decide whether the offences are
enforceable by a third State.
1 Treaty law—CITES
Given Taiwan's special status in international law,192 it is relevant first to address
Taiwan's position in the international environmental regime in order to illuminate the
relationship between Taiwan and the international environmental regimes,
particularly CITES.
In 1949, the Nationalist government of the Republic of China (ROC) retreated to
Taiwan after losing a civil war with the Communists, who thereafter established the
People's Republic of China (PRC) on mainland China. Until 1971, the ROC
(Taiwan) held China's seat in the UN and was recognised as the sole legitimate
government of China. But, the situation has been entirely modified since the UN, in
October 1971, adopted resolution 2758 ordering the seat of China occupied by
Taiwan to be given to the PRC.193 As a result, the ROC (Taiwan) withdrew from the
191 It has been generally agreed that "In the absence of a violation, international law may not permit
remedial actions." See Charney, "Third States Remedy", at 89, n. 159.
192 See generally Henckaert (ed.), Taiwan Status; Crawford, Creation ofStates, at 142-52.
193 The context of the resolution generally reads as follows:
The General Assembly . . . Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the
People's Republic ofChina are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations and
that the People's Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security
Counsel, Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to recognize the
representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United
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UN. Also, nearly all the UN affiliated agencies and related organisations following
the command of Resolution 396 and 2758 soon replaced the ROC (Taiwan)
representative with that of the PRC.W4
A great number of contemporary environmental treaties were concluded under
the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).m Because
UNEP functioned after the withdrawal of the ROC (Taiwan) from the UN, Taiwan
has been continuously blocked from participating in the formation of international
environmental agreements within the UN system. Faced with the increasing
importance of preserving the global environment, Taiwan has been aware of the
necessity and importance of joining relevant UN environmental treaties, particularly
those multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Thus, recently, it has
repeatedly expressed its willingness to accede to the relevant environmental
agreements.196 Regrettably, UNEP rejected Taiwan's request because of the alleged
ineligibility of Taiwan for the membership of those institutions. The UN organisation
has persistently maintained that Taiwan is not permitted to enter into any MEAs on
the ground that "ratification to these treaties is mainly limited to sovereign states and
regional organizations . . . [T]he United Nations recognizes the Government of China
as the sole representative of the People's Republic of China, including Taiwan."197 In
short, given the view of the UN system, which has officially considered Taiwan as
part of China with no separate statehood, Taiwan will find it extremely difficult to
join the relevant UN environmental agreements. At present, thus, Taiwan is only
granted with observer status as that of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in
some international environmental regimes.
nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they
unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the orgainizations related to it.
G.A. Res. 2758, UN GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 2, UN Doc. A/8429 (1971).
194 Chou, "ROC's Membership Problems", at 18-26.
195 UNEP was established by the UN General Assembly based on the consensus of the 1972 UN
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. See Report of the UN Conference on the Human
Environment, 1972, at 29, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1, UN Sales No. E.73.II.A.14 (1972). Since
its inception, UNEP has remarkably contributed to the negotiation of nearly thirty multilateral treaties
by 1990. See Petsonk, "UNEP", at 351.
1,6 For instance, the Taiwan officials repeatedly stated that "Taiwan is willing to join the Montreal
Protocol at any time if given the opportunity." See Republic Battles 'Environmental Mess' with Far-
Reaching Programs, New Laws, 13 lnt'1 Envtl Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 5 (Jan. 10, 1990).
197 Letter from A. Timoshenko, Officer-in-Charge, Environmental Law and Institutions, UNEP, to
Dennis T.C. Tang, Director of the Law Section, Institute of Social Sciences and Philosophy, Academia
Sinica, and Professor Daniel C. K. Chow, The Ohio State University College of Law (23 Mar. 1993).
See also Chow, "Recognising Taiwan", at 276-77, n. 125.
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Furthermore, an extensive interpretation of the UN position toward Taiwan in
the context of the relationship between Taiwan and MEAs may be likely to put
Taiwan into an unjustifiably disadvantaged position. Even though Taiwan is
ineligible to accede to MEAs, an UNEP official claimed that Taiwan is legally bound
by those treaties to which China is a party.198 Admittedly, it remains to be seen
whether this view will prevail. Yet, some flaws in this view appear undeniable. Chow
strongly denounces the UNEP's legal opinion, arguing that "This position is
incoherent and legally questionable; more importantly, it is practically untenable and
poses a number of puzzling legal problems for Taiwan."I9J
First, Chow argues that, from a purely legal point of view, the UNEP's position
will run foul of the basic rule of the law of the treaty. According to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the binding force of a treaty is based on the
consent of a state.200 Because, from all practical aspects, China and Taiwan has been
two separate political entities for almost half century, he pointed that the UN's
assumption that the ratification of the treaty by China may include Taiwan over which
the former has no de facto control may be inconsistent with the principle of
consent.201
Secondly, he uses the Montreal Protocol,202 for example, claiming that the UN
view will affect Taiwan's effective compliance with environmental standards. The
Montreal Protocol has set different standards between developing and developed
countries. 203 Taiwan actually falls within the Protocol's definition for developed
countries. China, in contrast, should be considered as a developing country.204
Treating China and Taiwan altogether, the UN's position, Chow says, "results in the
application of the less rigorous developing country standard to Taiwan, a result that
undermines the UNEP's own efforts to promote effective environmental standards."205
198 Statement by L. Campbell, Deputy Coordinator, Legal Division, Ozone Secretariat, UNEP
Headquarter in Nairobi, Kenya (18 May 1993). See Chow, id. at 277, n. 127.
199 Chow, id. at 260-61.
200 Vienna Convention, Art. 35-37.
201 Chow, "Recognizing Taiwan", at 282 and n. 155.
202 Montreal Protocol on Substance That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 Sep. 1987, entered into force 1
Jan. 1991.
203 The Montreal Protocol defines developing countries as those with an annual per capita consumption
of CFCs of less than 0.3 kilograms as of the date the countries ratified the Treaty. Developed countries
are defined as those who are over the standard. See Art. 5 and 10 of the Protocol.
204 Taiwan's per capita consumption rate in 1986 was 0.5 kilograms. The per capita consumption in
China was just 0.04 kilograms. See Shen, "Taiwan: Taiwan to Develop CFC Substitutes", Bus. Taiwan,
14 Sept. 1992.
205 Chow, "Recognizing Taiwan", at 285-86.
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Thirdly, the UN's insistence that Taiwan is bound by China's accession to the
Montreal Protocol will produce some obstacle for international supervision. As China
is required to report statistical data regarding the control of the ozone-depletion
substance, China actually is unable to obtain the relevant statistics and information
from Taiwan. Furthermore, Chow observes that the UNEP's dismissal of Taiwan's
submission of such data independently and on its own initiative prevents the organ
from effectively assessing Taiwan's compliance with the agreement.206
Fourth, deeming Taiwan and China to be one entity will exclude international
regimes from monitoring the activities between these two countries. Following the
UN's position, the transaction between China and Taiwan is classified as an
intranational transfer. As a result, Taiwan's shipping of hazardous wastes to China
and the trade in endangered species between these two countries cannot be subject to
international regulation.
Apart from the above theoretical and practical defects in the UN's position, the
relevant practices have not been actually consistent with the UNEP's contention. For
instance, some contracting parties of the Montreal Protocol, including the US,
Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore have declared that they do not consider
Taiwan to be bound by China's accession to the Montreal Protocol.207 Other regime of
MEAs, such as CITES, has never endorsed the UNEP's argument. Rather, the
organisation has acknowledged that Taiwan is not currently bound by CITES, since
Taiwan is not permitted to join CITES.208 Also, as mentioned above, the enforcement
action of the CITES Standing Committee that treated Taiwan and China separately on
protecting endangered species of rhinos and tiger further demonstrates that the
UNEP's insistence that Taiwan is part of China simply is incorrect. As a
commentator observed, "By listing China and Taiwan separately, the Committee and
Secretariat, to some extent, recognize that China does not have effective control over
Taiwan and that "the Authority in Taipei" has full jurisdiction over its internal
matters."209
In the light of the above discussion, the UNEP's stand over Taiwan's relationship
with MEAs is a fallacy. In conclusion, China is legally and practically unable to act
206 Id. at 287.
207 See "Five Nations Acknowledge Taiwan's Efforts to Cut CFC Use," China Econ. News Serv., 13
Aug. 1994.
208 See "Taiwan Bows Out of CITES Standing Committee Meeting," Central News Agency, 21 Mar.
1994, at C3.
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on behalf of Taiwan in the international arena, particularly in MEAs. Taiwan, thus,
should not be bound by any agreements ratified by China.
•/Whilst the Pelly sanctions were being implemented, Taiwan was not a
contracting party to CITES.210 Pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a treaty cannot bind a non-party without its consent.2" In this regard, there
is no basis to assert that Taiwan was in breach of the obligations toward the CITES's
mandate on protecting tiger and rhinos. As Charnovitz observes, "Because Taiwan
has no role insetting CITES standards, it is problematic for the United States to insist
that Taiwan honor them."212 Hence, in the context of treaty regime, given no prior
breaches of international obligations by Taiwan, the US seems not entitled to take
countermeasures in the form of trade embargoes.
Nevertheless, since most countries are members of CITES, it is interesting to
consider a hypothetical case in which the Pelly sanctions would have targeted at any
parties of CITES, like the PRC or South Korea, which both had also been censured by
the CITES's Standing Committee. Although they might be presumably in breach of
the CITES obligation, it remains uncertain if such an offence may be necessarily
enforced by any other States.
The US may rely on some provisions of the ILC's Draft articles on State
Responsibility to justify its unilateral remedy against those violators of CITES. First
of all, it could invoke Article 40 (2) (e), claiming its right arising from CITES, a
multilateral treaty, has been infringed by the act of China or South Korea. But,
according to the requirements of the provision, the US must prove first what sort of
"right" bestowed by CITES has been infringed by the conservation practice of those
countries. Further, it also has to demonstrate that such infringement "necessarily
affects the enjoyment of the rights or the performance of the obligations" of the US.213
The fulfilment of the task seems unattainable partly because it is hard to establish the
linkage between China and Korea's own breach of the CITES obligations by failing to
tighten its enforcement and the infringement of US's enjoyment of the alleged rights
from CITES.
2m Shih, "Multilateralism", at 122. See also Chow, "Recognizing Taiwan", at 284.
210 See http://www.cites.org./CITES/common/parties.shtml. Taiwan is also not a signatory State to
CITES. Ireland, Kuwait and Lesotho are the only three countries who are signatory States, but have not
ratified the Convention.
See http://www.cites.org./CITES/common/parties/signator.shtml, visited on 27 August 2000.
211 See the Vienna Convention, Art. 34-37.
212 Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment," at 801.
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Secondly, Article 40 provides that a treaty regime's mandate may be enforceable
by a third State if it is designed to protect the "collective interests" expressly specified
in that treaty regime. CITES seems an unqualified candidate, mainly because the
treaty falls short of any substantive provisions explicitly identifying the conservation
of living species as collective interests, although, in its preamble, the treaty docs
stress the significance of promoting community interests.21,4
Nevertheless, it is worth examining whether the treaty per se is a treaty regime
designed for the protection of collective interests. If the concept of 'collective
interests', as indicated above, is confined to 'common heritage', strictly speaking,
CITES does not qualify, mainly because the regime has not yet acquired the same
status as the deep sea-bed regime, which has been well confirmed as a typical model
of protecting "common heritage of mankind". It is true that the UNEP Council in
1974 viewed certain species as "the common heritage of mankind,"215 but, the
discrepancy between CITES-like conventions and the regime controlling the deep
sea-bed remains. It has been observed that "the concept of 'common heritage', though
it has generated influence on the instruments of living resources, has not been
incorporated into the substantive provisions of conventions, but only reflected in the
preambular level."216 Furthermore, no international management institutions for those
treaties, like sea-bed authority, have been established.217
Nevertheless, in another sense, the test of common heritage should not be
considered as the only candidate for the category of'collective interests'. The idea of
collective interests may be open to further elaboration and expansion in the future in
order to accommodate the increasing importance of preserving the global
environment. In particular, the preservation of species to some extent has been seen
as being of essential importance to human society. The threats to wildlife are now
regarded "not only as threats to the existence of individual species or habitats but also
to biodiversity represented by such species, which provides, inter alia, a gene pool of
immense present and future value to humankind as well as having value for its own
213 The 1LC Draft articles, Art. 40 (2) (e) (ii).
214 CITES, like other international instruments concluded for the preservation of living resources, docs
in its Preamble recognise that "wild fauna and flora ... are an irreplaceable part of the natural systems
of the earth which must be protected for this and the generations to come."
213 See Nanda and Ris, "Public Trust Doctrine", at 291, 294.
216 Birnie and Boyle, International law and Environment, at 448-49.
217 Id. at 450-52.
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sake."215 Thus, although the permanent sovereignty of States over their natural
resources continues to prevail,219 this has not deterred the international community
from introducing concepts, such as 'common concern', 'common interests' and 'inter-
generational rights', in an attempt to express the legitimate interests of the
international community over it.220
In most occasions, such devices are incorporated in the Preambles of
conservation treaties. For instance, the Preamble to the 1946 Whaling Convention221
declares 'the interest of the nations of the world in safeguarding for future generations
the great natural resources represented by the whale stocks'. The 1968 African
Convention222 regards soil, water, and faunal resources as constituting 'a capital of
vital importance for mankind'. The 1985 ASEAN Agreement's 223 preamble
recognises 'the importance of natural resources for present and future generations'.
The Preamble to CITES itself refers to wild fauna and flora as 'an irreplaceable part
of the natural systems of the earth which must be protected for this and future
r generations to come'. The 1992 Biodiversity Convention224 in its preamble affirms
that 'the conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of humankind'.
To sum up, as observed, those conventions "do recognize in their Preambles the
moral force of this concept and treat living resources as, at the least, matters of
community interests."225 It should be noted that the legal status and consequence of
each formulation carrying the community interests remain unclear and need further
clarification.226 But, at least, as far as the concept of common concern is concerned,
while reaffirming the existing sovereign rights of States over their own resources,
"[i]ts main impact appears to be that it gives the international community of states
both a legitimate interest in resources of global significance and a common
218 Birnie and Boyle, International Law and Environment, at 420; Sands, Principles, at 368-69.
m See Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration; Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration; Article 3 of the
Biological Diversity Convention.
2:0 Birnie and Boyle, International Law and Environment, at 114, 448.
221 International Convention for Regulating Whaling, 2 Dec. 1946, in force 10 Nov. 1948, 62 Stat.
1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.
222 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 15 Sep. 1968, in force 9
Oct. 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 4.
223 Association of South East Asian Nations Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Nature
Resources, 9 July 1985, not in force.
224 Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, in force 29 Dec. 1993. See generally Bowman and
Redgwell (cd.), International Law and the Conservation ofBiological Diversity.
225 Birnie and Boyle, International Law and Environment, at 449.
226 Birnie and Boyle, id. at 448; Sands, Principles, at 218.
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responsibility to assist in their sustainable development.""
Overall, it is a quite sensible contention that the preservation of living species is
a matter of 'collective interests' in its common sense. Thus, it seems reasonable to
claim that CITES, by nature, is an environmental treaty set for the protection of
'collective interests'. However, in terms of enforcement, it remains to be seen
whether the international community at this stage is willing to broaden the scope of
individual countermeasures so as to allow those living resources conventions to be
enforced by third States.
2 Customary law
As mentioned above, Taiwan's non-membership of CITES makes it free from
being bound by the mandate of the treaty. The policy of Taiwan relating to the
preservation of tigers and rhinos, however, might possibly be claimed to violate
international law on the ground that customary international rules oblige States to
protect endangered species.
While, undoubtedly, it is a difficult task to identify whether a custom amounts
to international law, 228 there is no consensus regarding the legal status of rules
governing endangered species. It appears a rather controversial issue splitting legal
thought.
Glennon holds an extensive and positive view toward the prevalence of
international wildlife law, particularly based on CITES's widespread acceptance. He
claims that "It is now possible to conclude that customary international law requires
states to take appropriate steps to protect endangered species."229 This conclusion is
based on several rationales. First of all, "State practice"230 is assumed to provide the
evidence because:
Like highly codified humanitarian law norms that have come to bind even states that are not
parties to the instruments promulgating them, wildlife protection norms also have become
binding on nonparties as customary law.231
227 Bimie and Boyle, id. (2nd ed., to be published in 2001) at 21. See also UNEP, Report of the Group of
Legal Experts to Examine the Concept of the Common Concern of Mankind in Relation to Global
Environmental Issues (1990); Kirgis, at 525.
228 Birnieand Boyle, International Law and Environment, at 15; Brownlie, International Law, at 4-11.
229 Glennon, "Elephant", at 30.
230 The Art. 38 (l)(b) of the ICJ Statute refers "international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law" as applicable law.
231 Glennon, "Elephant", at 30.
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Secondly, inferring from the American Law Institute's Third Restatement of US
Foreign Relations Law, 232 customary norms, Glennon contends, "are created by
international agreements 'when such agreements arc intended for adherence by states
generally and are in fact widely accepted'." 233 CITES thus may largely tit this
category due to the observation that CITES is intended for adherence by States
generally and is widely accepted by most countries as parties.234 Moreover, Glennon
points out that the norms are created by "the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations."233 Because CITES is seen to be broadly incorporated into domestic
law, it has been suggested that "the general principles embodied in states' domestic
endangered species laws may be relied upon as another source of customary law."236
Finally, Glennon observes that the documents of the UN General Assembly and
international conferences delivering firm support on the matter of endangered species
protection as opinio juris highlight the binding character of this obligation.237
In contrast to Glennon's broad approach to the legal status of the norms of
protecting endangered species, Birnie and Boyle draw an opposite conclusion, mainly
based on a cautious survey of the implementation of the relevant treaties, and of State
practice as well. They admit that customary law can emerge from conventions and
thus bind non-party States. But, by examining the finding in the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases, 238 they argue that such norms in issue must be "of a
fundamentally norm-creating character, both generalizable and applied in state
practice with the sense of obligation necessary to establish custom."
Birnie and Boyle maintain that mere adoption of treaties and enactment of
national legislation are not conclusive evidence of this obligation.239 Rather, they say,
"it is necessary to ascertain whether the norm or treaty embodying it is applied and
enforced and whether or not the state against whom it is applied persistently
objects."240 Echoing their view, it has been perceived that the growing membership in
CITES is not a guarantee for effective enforcement. In this regard, Patel remarks:
[t]he substantial increase in CITES membership over the years indicates a significant
232 US Restatement (Third), at 102 (3).
233 Glennon, "Elephant", at 30.
234 Id. at 31. As of 1997, there are 144 contacting parties of CITES. See Vice, "Biodiversity Treaties", at
639.
235 See Art. 38 (1 )(c) of the 1CJ Statute.
236 Glennon, "Elephant", at 31.
237 Id.
238ICJ Rep. 1969, at 41-42.
23'; Birnie and Boyle, International law and Environment, at 487.
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international movement towards conservation. The simple act of joining CITES, however, is
insufficient compared to demonstrating an actual intent to preserve. Without genuine attempts at
enforcement, demonstrated by enacting and administrating strong legislation at the national
level, the philosophy behind CITES is nothing more than meaningless words.241
In fact, the recent reports by NGOs and the CITES institutions suggest that the
enforcement of wildlife conventions, particularly CITES, is relatively poor. For
instance, according to a survey of 81 CITES parties conducted by the International
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Environmental Law Centre in 1993-94,
only 12 of them had completed the full range of legislative and administrative
measures needed to give effect to all aspects of the Convention and related decisions
of the COP.242 Similarly, assessing the work of enacting proper national law, the
CITES Secretariat at the Ninth Conference of the Parties in November 1994
announced that the legislation of 27 parties out of the 81 surveyed was severely
inadequate in implementing CITES, and only 15 members met CITES
implementation requirements.243 There also occur continuous cases of evasion of
CITES reported by NGOs, like the Trade Records Analysis of Fauna and Flora in
Commerce (TRAFFIC).244 In addition, unsatisfactory enforcement progress plagued
by ineffective communication, like the inadequate submission of national reports,245 a
general lack of resources, and insufficient training underline the absence of universal
and substantial compliance with the CITES mandate.246
Apart from looking at the insufficient implementation of CITES obligations,
Birnie and Boyle also point out other factors which may hinder the widespread
recognition of a duty to preserve species. First, as the limited function of CITES is
clear, there is no comprehensive regime responsible for protection of species. They
say "...one of the most widely ratified, CITES, deals only with threats represented by
trade, not with habitat disturbance, over-exploitation, or the problems of migration,"
240 Id. at 487-88 [emphasis added].
241 Patel, "Endangered Species", at 185 [emphasis added].
242 See Sand, "Trade and Environment", at 47-48.
243 See CITES Secretariat, National Laws for Implementation of the Convention, Proceedings of the
Ninth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, at 2-3, UN/CITES Doc. 9.24 (Nov. 7-18, 1994).
244 See Birnie and Boyle, International law and Environment, at 488.
245 Pantel, "Endangered Species", at 188-89. It was estimated that 45 countries did not submit 1991
and/or 1992 reports as required. See CITES Secretariat, Review of Alleged Infractions and Other
Problems of Implementation of the Convention, Proceedings of the Ninth Meeting of the Conference of
the Parties, at 14-15, UN/CITES Doc. 9.22 (Nov. 7-18, 1994).
246 See Pantel, id. at 190-92.
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and "that wildlife conventions in general arc poorly related to or co-ordinated with
those dealing with the activities and sources of pollution most threatening to
wildlife.'047 Further, unlike the deep seabed regime's status as part of the common
heritage of mankind, they observe . .no internationalization of such living resources
has yet occurred."248 Bimie and Boyle therefore conclude that the general policy of
States toward the preservation of living species "does not suggest that protection of
endangered species is a requirement of customary law, however desirable it is that it
should be."249
Regardless of whether there is a requirement of customary law to preserve
endangered species, Glennon's argument that the protection of endangered species
"take[s] on the character of an obligation erga omnes"2M may possibly justify the US
sanctions against Taiwan. Thus, he maintains that "their breach is actionable by any
state."251 In elaborating the above contention, he further articulates the concept of a
"global environmental right", which entitles "all states to expect that the resource will
be protected by the state in which it is found."252 Therefore, it has been maintained
that:
States are trustees, responsible for the preservation of species within their territories. That
obligation runs to the international community as a whole: any state should be regarded as
253
suffering legally cognizable injury when that obligation is breached by another state.
Based on Glennon's relatively extensive argument, any State presumably could
be accorded the right to enforce the violation of the obligation to protect endangered
species against countries inhabited by such species. It is unclear, however, whether
this contention also implies that such third State enforcement may be invoked against
the consumer nation of the species, like Taiwan. Nevertheless, given his conviction
that the preservation of endangered species has an erga omnes character,
theoretically, it could become a feasible inference that the US was entitled to
vindicate the alleged conservation offence committed by Taiwan.
By contrast, even if a duty of species protection has an erga omnes nature, there
247 Bimie and Boyle, International law and Environment, at 489.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 488.
250 Glennon, "Elephant", at 33.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 34.
253 Id. [emphasis added).
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seems no consistent contention regarding the real consequence of violations of that
duty. While recognising the erga oninas character of the concept of 'common
concern', which refers to climate change, biological diversity, ozone layer and the
marine environment (but not mentioning living species explicitly), Birnie and Boyle
seem only to confine the right of all States to have standing to complain. They
specify:
What gives these obligations a real erga omnes character is not that all states have standing
before the ICJ in the event of breach, but that the international community can hold individual
states accountable for compliance with their obligations through institutions such as the
Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change Convention, or the Commission on Sustainable
Development, or other comparable bodies endowed, whether by treaty or General Assembly
resolution, with supervisory powers. The Ozone Convention and Protocol provide perhaps the
best developed examples of the exercise of erga omnes accountability by the international
community through the institutions set up by those agreements."'4
In the light of the conflicting arguments, it seems that there still remains a
considerable gap to fill between current legal development of protecting endangered
species and its final achieving the status of customary law.
3 International crimes of State
It may be interesting to discuss whether it is possible to say that Taiwan's
conduct constitutes an international crime as defined by the ILC's draft mentioned
above. Even if an environmental crime may be extensively interpreted to cover
undesirable policies undermining the protection of species, Taiwan's conduct hardly
met the requirement for such allegation. It may be true that the global effort to
preserve the endangered species of tigers and rhinos is hindered in one way or the
other by Taiwan's failure to carry out the effective crackdown on illegal trade in those
species. As observed, however, Taiwan arguably has not yet breached any substantive
international obligations, which is a basic condition for committing an alleged
international crime. Hence, the US's Pelly sanctions were perhaps unjustified as a
countermeasure in the framework of countering an alleged international crime.
Suppose the Pelly sanctions had targeted members of CITES, like the PRC or
South Korea, it would still be difficult to claim that their conduct could have been
classified as a crime. It is simply because both countries who were mainly blamed for
lacking satisfactory measures on the efficient control of imports of tiger and rhinos
254 Bimic and Boyle, International law and Environment, (2"d ed., to be published 2001), at
23[emphasis added].
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had not directly contributed to the pending extinction of those species. As a result,
they may argue that such violations of CITES do not amount to a state of
"seriousness" required by the ILC's draft article.
As to producing countries who were accused of managing the species poorly,
such as Russia and some African nations, they may also use the excuse of lacking
sufficient financial and technological support to justify their inadequate effort. They
may contend that their conduct was far from a serious breach of obligation because of
the absence of intention.
In short, given the vague language and incomplete configuration embodied in
the provisions of international crimes in the ILC's draft, people will find it difficult to
apply the norm accurately to the violations of international environmental obligations.
The assumed breach of the CITES's norm may cast doubt on the propriety of invoking
the theory of international crime in an attempt to ensure adherence to the treaty's
mandate.
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Conclusion
According to conventional wisdom, remedies for international offences ean only
be taken by States that have suffered a direct injury. But, this traditional view has
proved insufficient to meet the contemporary challenge posed by certain violations of
community interests, which arguably merit redress by any State—even one which has
suffered no tangible damage.25" The confirmation of erga omnes obligations vested in
all States in the Barcelona case thus reflects such a trend, heralding the possible
permissibility of enforcement by a third State. The examples of erga omnes
obligations given by the World Court in the Barcelona judgement do not constitute a
definitive list of duties owed to international community. In the future, this category
may continue to evolve and expand in order to fit the needs of world concern. Yet it
does not suggest that any other undesirable behaviour can always justify a third
State's enforcement actions.
Although the third State remedy has possibly become attainable, the use of such
a remedy should be subject to legal constraints. Otherwise the action will inevitably
lead to undesirable consequence.236 Generally speaking, it is desirable that a unilateral
remedy should be circumscribed by a collective enforcement mechanism that is
competent to deal with the same offence. It is thus imperative to clarify the
relationship between an individual remedy and a collective regime governing
identical enforcement. Moreover, in substance, a proper device to limit the use of
unilateral countermeasures may effectively prevent powerful States from deliberately
wielding their might to achieve their own foreign policy under the guise of enforcing
international law.
The legality of the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan under the norms of
environmental countermeasures involves two propositions. First of all, there must be
a prior breach of environmental obligations. Without violations, there will be no
justified unilateral countermeasures. Secondly, even though such a violation does
happen, the remedy action pursuant to the Pelly Amendment when no material injury
has been suffered should not be regarded as legal unless the wrongful act is
enforceable by all States.
Given its non-membership in CITES, Taiwan violated no treaty law with respect
to endangered species protection. It is difficult to claim that Taiwan's policy
255 See Charncy, "Environmental Damage", at 156.
256 See id. at 157-58.
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committed an alleged international crime, which would be likely to warrant unilateral
remedial actions. But, it appears a quite controversial issue relating to whether
customary law has obliged all States to protect endangered species, irrespective of
whether they are contracting parties to species conventions. Thus, it is uncertain
whether Taiwan's slow progress on halting the illegal trade in tiger and rhinos
products breached customary law. Further, even if such violation happened, it is
unknown whether the breach is enforceable by individual actions. The uncertainty is
all the greater in the absence of a consensus on whether species protection has an erga
omnes character. As a result, under the present jurisprudence, it appears difficult to
decide whether the 1994 Pelly sanctions imposed in order to further the protection of
endangered species can be justified under the rules of countermeasures at the first
stage.
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Chapter 3
The Pelly Trade Embargoes as an Exercise ofSovereign
Rights: possible limitations
Introduction
It has been generally accepted that international law allows States to conduct
their economic affairs freely without substantial restrictions.1 The use of economic
measures, like trade embargoes, however, may be so coercive as to endanger the
target's political independence and sovereignty. In particular, during the past few
decades, a number of resolutions passed by the General Assembly of the United
Nations (UN) have explicitly disapproved of the use of economic coercion that
produces some impermissible effects. In the Nicaragua case,2 complaints were also
raised regarding whether economic sanctions could have violated customary
international law.3
Therefore, apart from specific legal regimes discussed in latter chapters, general
rules of international law might be applicable to such measures. The US's trade
embargo against Taiwan authorised by the Pelly Amendment was a typical
application of economic coercion. Generally speaking, from the prospect of
preserving the sovereign integrity and interests of the target, such a unilateral measure
might be restrained by several international principles. In particular, three
possibilities will be discussed: prohibition of the use of force, non-intervention, and
abuse of rights. It must be stressed that a determination of whether the US's Pelly
sanctions against Taiwan breached any of these principles can only be decided after a
careful examination of the facts of the particular case at hand (that of Taiwan). This
chapter will undertake that analysis.
A Trade policy as a sovereign right
1 See generally Hyde and Wehle, "Boycott", at 1-10; Lauterpacht, "Boycott", at 123, 130.
2 Military and Para-military Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), ICJ Rep. 1986, at 14
[hereinafter Nicaragua case].
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There was a general agreement that it is the freedom of States to conduct their
economic affairs, including trade policy.4 Nations, therefore, in general sense, are not
required to maintain trade relations with unfriendly or even hostile countries, subject
to specified legal obligations. In terms of trade restrictions, such as import ban or
export control,5 Muir particularly elaborates this sort of sovereign right, strongly
supporting the legitimacy of applying trade measures. He remarks:
That the regulation of foreign trade is normally a right within the sovereign prerogatives of an
independent country is too well established to permit disagreement in the context of existing
international law. Individual nations have historically regulated imports by imposing tariffs,
inspections, quantitative and qualitative restrictions, and numerous other conditions and
barriers to international trade. They have frequently regulated exports as well, including,
recently, complete cut-offs where deemed necessary to retain adequate domestic supply
without inflation.6
In line with the contention, in the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) largely endorsed the right of a State. The Court found that "A State is not
bound to continue particular trade relations longer than it sees fit to do so, in the
absence of a treaty commitment or other specific legal obligation."7
It seems, not until the conclusion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)8 in twentieth century was the appliance of trade measures institutionally
regulated on the global arena. On the other hand, currently, no consensus has been
reached with respect to whether general norms, particularly the duty not to intervene,
have been crystallised to proscribe economic coercion that usually serves as an
instrument for foreign policy.9 Accordingly, while the GATT proves a relatively
realistic and applicable rule to evaluate such measures, some authors question
earnestly the appropriateness of relying on the general uncertain rules in assessing the
crucial issue.10
Moreover, as the world turns out to be closer and smaller by the influence of
3 Id. at 126.
4 See Elagab, Non-Forcible Counter-Measures, at 201, 203; id. "Coercive Economic Measures", at 691;
Parry, "Economic Coercion", at 1-2; Muir, "Boycott", at 188, 192, 200, 202.
5 The historical practices of using the trade tool for political purposes by States see Muir, "Boycott", at
188-90.
6 Id. at 188,192, 200 and 202.
7 Nicaragua case, at 138, para. 276.
8 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 Oct. 1947, in force 1 Mar. 1969, 61 Stat. (5), (6),
T.l.A.S. No. 1700, 4 Bcvans 639, 55-62 U.N.T.S. [hereinafter GATT].
9 See n. 99 below.
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mass telecommunication, tourism, trade, cultural exchange and other forms of free
intercourse across the borders, the domestic or international effort to control the
transboundary influence becomes increasingly difficult. As a result, mutual influence
in foreign relationships cannot be avoided. It will become a tough task for
international law to distinguish the impermissible use of unilateral economic pressure
from the school of mutual influence in which some patterns of acts should be
tolerated, even encouraged." Furthermore, the efforts to prohibit all kinds of external
involvement in internal political affairs appear increasingly impractical and legally
unnecessary.12
In spite of the above legal and practical impediment in applying general
international rules to economic coercion, particularly trade embargoes, it remains
worth examining if any general norms have put a constraint on such measures.
B Use of force
Unlike unlawful military actions that obviously contradict the purpose and
principle of the UN Charter, economic coercion is not expressly prohibited by the
Charter. It is, however, inadequate to jump to the conclusion that the Charter may
legitimise any deliberate imposition of economic sanctions.
One possible argument by Taiwan is that the imposition of economic measures
may amount to a use of force. The issue here turns on whether the action may be in
violation of article 2(4) of the Charter that prohibits the use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State.13
In an effort to locate a principle that counters the use of economic coercion,
some arguments in support of a broad interpretation of article 2(4) of the Charter were
put forward.14 It has been maintained that "force", apart from referring to the
traditional concept of military action, should be read to encompass any form of
coercion, such as political or economic coercion that seriously endangers fundamental
national interests.15 The oil embargo launched by the Arab allies against countries of
10 See Muir, "Boycott", at 204. See also Elagab, Non-Forcible Counter-Measures, at 212-13.
" See Damrosch, "Nonintervention", at 5. Damrosch addressed a lot of nonforcible means States use to
affect the national policy of another State, such as lobbying, propaganda, direct satellite broadcasting
and economic aides and cooperation etc.. See id. at 6, 28-31.
12 Id. at 5.
13 Shihata, "Destination Embargo", at 591; Paust and Blaustein, "Oil Weapon", at 410; Boorman III,
"Economic Coercion", at 205; Farer, "Economic Coercion", at 405 [emphasis added],
14 Brosche, "Oil Embargo", at 18-30; Paust and Blausten, id. at 410.
15 Id.
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pro-Israel in 1973-1974, primarily the US, has been invoked as a respeetable model."'
As petroleum has become one of the most important resources of energy in the world,
not surprisingly, the natural resource can be manipulated by oil-exporting nations as a
powerful tool to serve foreign policy. In particular, one of the commentators further
argues that the 1973 Arab embargo "substantially impaired the goals of international
community as articulated in the Charter, not counterbalanced by complementary
policies relating to legitimate self-defence or the sanctioning of UN decisions,
constitutes a violation of Article 2(4).1,17
Certainly, the term "force", in a wide sense, as Schachter observes, may
"embrace all types of coercion: economic, political and psychological as well as
physical."18 Much evidence and many legal arguments, nevertheless, take a restrictive
approach, holding that article 2 (4) of the Charter does not encompass economic
coercion. It has been observed that law-making history regarding article 2(4)
continued to frustrate the attempt to expand the concept of "force" to include
economic pressure. During the UN San Francisco Conference in 1945, the Latin
American States put forward a proposal that aimed to extend the scope of such
provision to the condemnation of economic and political force. The proposal was
eventually rejected.19
Latterly, in the resolutions of the UN General Assembly, considerable efforts,
mainly made by the developing countries, to comprise economic coercion within the
scope of prohibition on the use of force were also defeated. For instance, in the 1970
UN Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
(1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations),20 article 2(4) was interpreted and elaborated
substantially. But, none of its context relates the principle to the use of economic
means.21 In addition, during the labourious process undertaken by the General
Assembly to spawn a definition of aggression,22 the concept of economic aggression
16Id.
17 Paust and Blausten, id. at 415. Cf Farer, "Economic Coercion," at 409-12.
18 Schachter, International law, at 110.
19 The proposal was rejected by vote 26 to 2. See Doc. 784, 1/1/27,6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 331, 334-35
(1945).
20 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (1970).
21 See Neff, Economic Liberalism, at 133.
22 On Oct. 3, 1952, the Secretary-General, acting in compliance with G. A. Res. 599, submitted a
comprehensive report on the question of defining aggression. UN Doc. A/2211. See generally Stone,
Aggression and World Order, at 50-77. In 1967, the General Assembly decided to expedite the efforts
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eventually was not included in the 1974 Resolution on the Definition of Aggression.23
Moreover, the whole structure of the Charter tends to reject a broad reading of
article 2(4). The exercise of the right of self-defence by States specified in article 51
of the Charter is inherently designed to respond to an armed attack rather than
economic pressure. The inclusion of economic pressure as a type of "force"
theoretically would lead to textual inconsistency between article 2(4) and article 51.24
Also, it seems that the fundamental mandate of the Charter is to preserve peace and
security by checking the unlawful use of armed force. It has not yet gone so far to
directly deal with economic coercion. Farer's analysis clearly underline such
rationale:
What I find preeminent in the travaax preparaloires for the United Nations Charter is a desire
quite simply to outlaw war as an instrument of state policy or self-help. The Parties to the
Charter were clearly concerned about the use of military force.. . . Moreover, the whole
emphasis of the purposes and principles of the Charter is on peace, the prevention of armed
conflict. Furthermore, it is suggestive that the United Nations has never been thought to have
chapter VII jurisdiction in cases not involving a military threat by one state against
another. . . .it may be concluded that Article 2(4) was concerned with violence, with military
-)5
force, not with economic coercion."
Therefore, it may be concluded that the original implication of the principle against
use of force does not extend to economic pressure. Also, strictly speaking, the rule
has not yet been elaborated as to expressly forbid the use of economic power.
In addition, aside from the UN law regime, attempts to equate economic
coercion with the use of force in other contexts have proved unsuccessful. For
instance, in the negotiation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,26 the
invalidity of treaties resulting from coercion of a State was generally accepted, but
there was disagreement as to the scope of alleged "coercion." Communists and certain
to define aggression, and established a Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. See
G.A. Res. 2330. The Committee finally adopted a definition by consensus in 1974 and recommended it
for adoption by the General Assembly.
23 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX). The scope of an act of aggression sees Art. 1 and 3 of the Resolution. In
1952, Bolivia proposed that "unilateral action to deprive a State of the economic resources derived
from the fair practice of international trade, or to endanger its economy, thus jeopardizing the security
of that State or rendering it incapable of acting in its own defence and cooperating in the collective
defence of peace" should have been considered an act of aggression. See UN Doc. A/2211 at 58
[emphasis added],
24 Joyner, "Transnational Boycott", at 241.
25 Farcr, "Economic Coercion", at 410.
2ft UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/27; signed at Vienna 23 May, 1909; entered into force 27 Jan. 1980.
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Third World countries argued that economic and political pressures, just as much as
the use of force, constituted a form of coercion.27 As a result, the Vienna Conference
echoed such demand by adopting a Declaration on the Prohibition of Military,
Political or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties, which condemned the
use of economic pressure to procure the formation of a treaty.28 This approach,
however, was not included in the final context of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
Article 52 of the Convention simply provides: "A treaty is void if its conclusion has
been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations."
A similar debate was triggered again when the International Law Commission
(ILC) drafted the law of treaties between States and international organisations.29 The
Commission decided not to change the formulation enunciated in the 1969 Vienna
Convention, but this time to incorporate the text directly as an article of the new draft
treaty.30 Ultimately, the provision became an integral part of the 1986 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or
between International Organisations.31
In spite of the distinction between economic coercion and use of force that
remains, international community must not ignore the extreme cases in which severe
economic coercion may cause irrecoverable damage to target nation. Neff,
accordingly, argues that, in exceptional circumstances, economic pressure of
particular severity should be covered by the principle against the use of force.32 Under
the prevailing understanding of the UN Charter, indeed, there is no explicit
prohibition of economic coercion. Nevertheless, since, as observed, "the Charter is no
historical monument, but a living instrument which continues to expand due to the
dynamic and progressive nature of our international society . . ,,"33 it is highly
desirable to collaborate in universal efforts to amend the Charter or in the negotiation
of relevant multilateral treaties to deal with the caustic economic coercion.
Therefore, a feasible solution is to revise the Charter instead of introducing an
21 See Shaw, International Law, at 664.
28 UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/26, annex.
r> See 1982 Y.B. of ILC, Vol. II, Part 2, at 55.
30 Id.
31 UN Doc. A/CONF. 129/15; signed at Vienna 20 Mar. 1986.
32 See Neff, Economic Liberalism, at 133-34. See also Brosche, "Oil Embargo", at 34; Muir, "Boycott",
at 202-4; and Farer, "Economic Coercion", at 411-13.
33 Brosche, id. at 23.
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extensive interpretation of article 2(4).
In the light of the above analysis, general speaking, the Pelly sanctions against
Taiwan in the form of economic measures, based on the dominant wisdom, would not
violate the principle against the use of force enunciated in the UN Charter.
C Non-intervention
1 The legal implication of the non-intervention principle on economic coercion
(a) General Discussion
A second possibility is that the use of economic coercion may violate the general
principle of non-intervention. The doctrine of non-intervention has evolved for
centuries from historical and political aspirations34 to becoming a legal principle of
international law.35 The doctrine primarily aims to protect the sovereign integrity and
political independence of a State from external interference, despite the fact that the
notion of complete independence always seems a remote and impractical objective36
and the concept of inviolability of sovereignty has been the subject of much
challenge.37 From the point of view of likely target States, the rule, according to the
World Court's decision, is considered to safeguard the right of a State to conduct its
affairs and choose its own systems freely without outside interference.38
Under contemporary international law, much evidence indicates that the doctrine
against intervention has merged with other legal formulations, instead of merely
serving as an individual rule.39 This evolution can best be reflected on several main
principles in the UN Charter, which contain the implication of non-intervention
designed to preserve sovereign freedom.40 For instance, articles 1(2) and 55 of the
Charter advocate the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.41
34 See Conforti, "Non-Intervention", at 467-68.
35 The World Court decided that "The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every
sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference, ... the Court considers that it is part
and parcel of customary international law." See Nicaragua case, at 106. para. 202.
36 As a writer observes, "Independence cannot imply that every state, no matter how small, is immune
from the political and economic influence of other States, for such influence is a fact of international
life." See O'Connell, International Law, at 298.
37 Seeing that most States are increasingly incorporated into a world system, which would limit States'
autonomy, the author observes that "[tjhe sovereignty of a State means the residuum of power, which it
possesses within the confines laid down by international law." See Stark, International Law, at 100.
38 See Nicaragua case, at 106, para. 202 [emphasis added].
39 See Conforiti, "Non-Intervention", at 468-71.
40 See Damrosch, "Nonintervention", at 8.
41 The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples elaborated in the 1970 UN
Declaration on Principles of International Law provides "all peoples have the right freely to determine,
without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
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Moreover, Article 2(1) of the Charter provides that the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its members is the foundation of the Organisation.4: The World Court,
ruling on the linkage between these two principles, decides that the non-intervention
is "a corollary of the principle of the sovereign equality of States."4''
As it has generally become a well-recognised rule that States are prohibited from
using force to interfere in the national affairs of other nations,44 the legality of non-
forcible coercion under the doctrine of non-intervention remains quite a controversial
topic.4"' It may be contended, on one hand, that such actions by nature generate more
or less impact on the political operation of the target country, and, generally, are
launched in an attempt to seek change in national behaviour. As the economy has
played an increasingly vital role in political stability, it is unpersuasive to contend that
any exercise of non-forcible measures, particularly economic pressure, will definitely
not lead to an encroachment of the political independence of a sovereign State. Thus,
such external influence is likely to contradict the rule against intervention. On the
other hand, it still has been strongly argued that nations are not legally required to
continue trade relations with unfriendly States.46 This argument will certainly thwart
the applicability of the norm to the use of economic measures.
To explore the contemporary significance of the principle of non-intervention in
disputes arising from the use of economic measures, emphasis should be placed first
on whether the rule has been well developed to be a feasible law to limit such action.
The effort will largely rest on the analysis of relevant UN Resolutions on non¬
intervention because those documents offer substantial evidence that links the
principle to economic coercion. Of course, it is also important to examine the
decision of the ICJ on the 1986 Nicaragua case, which particularly addressed the
consistency of economic measures with principle of non-intervention, in spite of
development, and every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter."
42 The principle of sovereign equality of States in the 1970 UN Declaration provides the relevant
elements:
"(c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States; (d) The territorial integrity and
political independence of the state are inviolable; (e) Each State has the right freely to choose and
develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems."
43 Nicaragua case, at 106, para. 202. See also Cassese, International Law, at 143-44.
44 Cassese, id. at 145.
45 See Bowett, "Economic Coercion", at 1, 3-5; Bowett, "International Law", at 246; Conforti, Non-
Intervention", at 471-72; Elagab, Non-forcible Counter-Measures, at 208; Farer, "Economic Coercion",
at 406, 411; Damrosch, "Nonintervention", at 1-2, 5-13, 28-34, 45-47; Lillich, "Economic Coercion", at
236-38 and Nicaragua case, at 126. para. 245.
46 See Nicaragua case, at 138, para. 275.
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insufficient elaboration on the topic. While economic measures are alternatively and
frequently used as an instrument to change behaviour of another State, it also merits
discussion to what extent should the norm prohibit States from resorting to economic
pressure for a political purpose? It seems clear that not all the trade measures are so
influential as to affect the freedom of sovereign States to conduct their affairs. Thus,
it is essential to discuss what criteria should be introduced or elaborated in order to
decide which economic coercion constitutes intervention.
(b) The UN Resolutions
Since 1950s, the UN General Assembly has endeavoured to respond to
undesirable external interference by means of declaring a number of significant
documents carrying certain normative implication against any forms of intervention
regardless of whether being forcible or non-forcible.47 The 1965 "Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of
Their Independence and Sovereignty" (1965 Declaration)44 explicitly denounced "the
use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in
order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to
secure from it advantages of any kind." In 1970, the General Assembly adopted, by
consensus,49 the Declaration on Friendly Relations. Reaffirming the mandate against
any form of intervention solemnly advocated in the 1965 Declaration on Intervention,
the document, in the principle of "the duty not to intervene in matters within the
domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter," addressing
economic coercion, reads as:
No State or group States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention
and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic and cultural elements are in violation of international law.
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to
coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.
Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural
systems, without interference in any form by another State.
47 The demands for the prohibition of other forms of intervention was initiated by mainly Latin-
American and socialist countries, then joined by most African and Asian nations. See Cassese,
International Law, at 145.
4sG.A. Res. 2131 (XX) (1965).
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In addition, other subsequent resolutions adopted by the Assembly persistently
take a strong stand against economie as well as other forms of coercion. For instance,
the 1973 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources deplored "acts
of State which involve force, armed aggression, economic coercion and other illegal
or improper means of resolving disputes" and emphasised the duty of all states to
refrain in their international relations from military, political, economic and any other
form of coercion.50 Article 32 of the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States provides: "No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any
other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights."51 Moreover, the 1981 UN
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal
Affairs of States (1981 Declaration), which aims to elaborate the previous document
concerning the duty of non-intervention, stresses:
The duty of a State, in the conduct of its international relations in the economic, social, technical
and trade field, to refrain from measures which would constitute interference or intervention in
the internal or external affairs of another State, thus preventing it from determining freely its
political, economic and social development; this includes, inter alia, the duty of a State not to use
its external economic assistance programme or adopt any multilateral or unilateral economic
reprisal or blockade and to prevent the use of transnational and multinational corporations
under its jurisdiction and control as instruments ofpolitical pressure or coercion against another
State, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.52
Notwithstanding the clear prohibition on economic coercion announced by the
Resolutions, much doubt was raised to challenge the legal implication of such
documents. In order to reach a consensus, it is true, the high degree of political
conflict53 during the negotiation process made the resolutions, particularly the 1965
and 1970 Declarations, a product of compromise, carrying imprecise text. Therefore,
a lot of criticism was expressed on the vague provisions of those documents. Most of
them refer to the context regarding unlawful non-violent coercive measures, which
requires the establishment of an intention of dominating the sovereign will of another
49 No vote had been held on the adoption of the resolution.
50 G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII).
51 G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX).
52 G. A. Res. 36/ 103, Part II, para, (k), (9 Dec. 1981).
53 See Damrosch, "Nonintervention", at 11; Elagab, Non-forcible Counter-Measures, at 208.
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country and obtaining advantage front the exercise of the measures.54 Undoubtedly,
the requirement is likely to allow certain economic sanctions to be legal, because
some of them may not meet the exact definition of an illicit coercion under the
Resolutions. It is also true that, in exchange for unanimity on wording of the
Resolutions, the provisions relating to economic coercion were purposely couched in
broad terms rather than precise ones.55 Consequently, some countries regarded the
arrangement as an effect of attempting to minimise the legal significance of it.55
However, it should be recalled that the ambiguity regarding the definition of
intervention in above documents has been largely alleviated by subsequent UN
Resolutions. For instance, unlike the adoption of the predominating requirement in
the previous documents, the 1981 Declaration lays more stresses on the impact of
measures. It generates a relatively precise definition of economic intervention, which
simply underlines that States refrain from economic measures which would constitute
intervention to the effect that the intervened States' freedom to decide its political,
economic and social development would be infringed.
It is strongly argued that the rules formulated by the resolutions have a close
linkage with the UN Charter and constitute an authoritative interpretation of the
principles embodied in the Charter.57 In contrast, observing that the text of the
Charter does not explicitly preclude economic coercion, Elagab dismissed the idea
that the principle of non-intervention articulated in the resolutions regarding
economic coercion was a product of interpretation of the Charter.58 Therefore, it
might be interesting to explore which school of knowledge can best meet the real
need of the modern world.
It seems reasonable that, to preserve the political independence of sovereign
States, any form of coercive actions against the sovereign integrity should be a main
concern of the UN Charter. While the imposition of economic measures by powerful
54 See Acevedo, "US Measures", at 334; Bowett, "International Law", at 248; Elagab, Non-forcible
Counter-Measures, at 206-07, 208-09.
55 See Elagab, id. at 208.
56 See O'Connell, International Law, at 314.
57 Lillich, "Economic Coercion", at 237; Schachter, International Law, at 361, n. 189; Rosenstock,
"Friendly Relations", at 713. Many delegates expressed the similar view. For example, Yaseen stated:
"the content of the draft Declaration derived its value from its very source. Since its formulations
constituted an attempt to clarify and interpret the fundamental principles of the Charter, they should be
regarded as having binding force, to the same extent as the latter, and as forming part of positive
international law." In the words ofMaiga of Mali, "the declaration was an interpretation of the Charter,
and consequently no State which adopted it could evade its responsibilities." See Summary Records of
Meeting of Sixth Committee (A/C.6/SR), UNGAOR, 25ths""'
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States to serve distinct political purpose becomes more frequent and intensive, armed
intervention excepted, other non-violent measures arc also likely to be sufficiently
detrimental as to violate the political independence of sovereign States, a right
preserved by the Charter. It will be timely and appropriate to extend the rule of non¬
intervention to limit certain acts of economic coercion that may produce
impermissible consequences, Thus, in the present writer's view, the proposition that
the work of the UN documents on principle of non-intervention is a creative and
extensive interpretation of the Charter merits support.
In addition, those documents were accused of lacking any accompanying State
practice. In Elagab's argument, this insufficient practice suggests that "it is not
indicative of emergent rules."39 Such inference, to a great extent, relies on the
practice of the United States, a primary economic sanctions user after World War II.60
While employment of economic coercion is persistently believed by powerful States
to be an effective means of attaining foreign policy goals, not surprisingly, those
nations will try desperately to defend the legality of applying economic sanctions and
resist any legal effect produced by the Resolutions. It is doubtful that such particular
national practice can win universal support. In actual fact, as specified in the
preamble of the Declaration on Intervention, the UN Resolutions were virtually
created to confirm much of the existing practices in the world. It states:
The Genera] Assembly, reaffirming the principle of non-intervention, proclaimed in the charters
of the Organisation of American States, the League of Arab States and of the Organisation of
African Unity and affirmed at the Conferences of Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Chapultepec and
Bogota, as well as in the decisions of the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, the First
Conference of Heads of State or government of Non-Alligned Countries at Belgrade, in the
Programme for Peace and International Co-operation adopted at the end of the Second
Conference of Heads of state or Government ofNon-aligned Countries at Cairo, and in the
declaration on subversion adopted in Accra by the Heads of State and Government of the African
states."
Hence, all these documents, to certain degree, have reflected the general aspiration of
the majority of the countries against diverse form of intervention.
58 See Elagab, Non-J'orcible Counter-Measures, at 206.
59 See id. at 206-7.
60 According to Hulbauer and Scott's survey, of the 116 cases of economic sanctions documented from
World War I to 1990, the United States, either alone or in concert with its allies, has deployed sanctions
77 times. See Hufbauer and Scott, Economic Sanctions, at 8-9.
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In the light of the above analysis, it is contended that the documents articulated
by the General Assembly have created a specific legal effect regarding the current
implications of the norm of non-intervention, even though they do not have formal
binding force as do those international treaties. It is worth upholding that, as Salmon
maintains, "If states agree by consensus to the approval by the General Assembly of a
text whereby the Assembly 'solemnly proclaims the following principles', this means
that those States in the exercise of their full sovereignty certify the existence of such
principles, irrespective of their formal source (interpretation of the Charter, custom,
resolutions accepted, etc.)."61 Therefore, if the documents are interpreted and applied
properly, it is not unreasonable to qualify the declarations as a plausible evidence of
law62 regarding the limitation of economic coercion, despite the fact that the scope of
its application still needs elaboration. The ICJ case, discussed below, to some degree,
reflected such trend.
(c) Judicial precedent: The Nicaragua case
In the 1986 Nicaragua case, the Court has made a lot of efforts to clarify the
interpretation and application of the non-intervention doctrine in the contemporary
international community. To confirm the existence of customary law of non¬
intervention, the Court regarded the relevant declarations of the UN as evidence of
opinio juris, which reflects the principle of non-intervention.63 Also, the Court,
stressing the significance of the Resolutions, mentioned "... resolution 2625 (XXV),
which set out principles which the General Assembly declared to be "basic principles"
of international law."64 As Boyle observes, the ICJ case law indicates that "soft law
instruments (the resolutions of the General Assembly) may operate in conjunction
with a treaty (the UN Charter) to provide evidence of opinio juris for the possible
emergence of a rule of customary international law."65
Moreover, as to the scope of intervention, it considered that prohibited
intervention should no longer be confined to armed intervention. The Court
pronounced: "Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to
such choices, which must remain free ones. The element of coercion, which defines,
61 Salmon, "Friendly Relations", at 421.
62 E.g. Janis, International Law, at 50.
63 Nicaragua case, at 106, 107, paras. 202, 203.
64 Id. at 107, para. 203.
',3 Boyle, "Reflections on Treaties and Soft Law", at 906.
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and indeed forms the very cssenee of prohibited intervention . . ,"M Sueh timely and
adequate interpretation of the doetrine of non-intervention has largely mirrored the
formulation contained in the relevant UN resolutions. In other words, the Court
considered that intervention is wrongful as long as it is carried out by coercive
methods regardless of being forcible or non-forcible.67 The assumption implies that
even non-forcible (i.e., non-military) acts, if proved coercive, like funding the rebels
within another State,68 are likely to constitute an unlawful intervention. Overall, in the
1986 Nicaragua case, the Court largely adopted the implication of non-intervention
contained in the UN Declarations, particularly, Resolution 2625. to deal with the
legality of the US's coercive actions against Nicaragua.69
In addition to the judgement on forcible intervention, the Court dealt with the
legality of unilateral economic coercion under the principle of non-intervention.
Actually, the ICJ was accorded the unprecedented chance to adjudicate on the issue.
Yet it did not spawn a satisfactory result and missed the opportunity to clarify the
relations between economic coercion and non-intervention principle. With respect to
the US economic sanctions against Nicaragua, the Court held that the US's measures
did not fall into this category. It merely concluded that "it is unable to regard such
action on the economic plane as is here complained of as a breach of the customary-
law principle of non-intervention."70
This decision regarding the US's economic measures proved unsatisfactory, not
because the Court did not cite the relevant UN Resolutions on the limitation of
economic coercion as a source of applicable law, but because, chiefly, it failed to
deliver any rationale to sustain such a conclusion. It should be recalled that the ICJ
did admit that the prohibited intervention is not limited to the form of use of force. It
also ruled that certain non-forcible measures, like funding of rebels, may amount to
unlawful intervention.71 If the US economic measures proved so coercive as to
interfere in Nicaraguan domestic affairs, under the Court's own definition of an
66 Id. at 108, para. 205 [emphasis added],
67 Nicaragua case, at 108, para. 205.
68 Id. at 124, para. 242.
69 Most coercive measures of the US against Nicaragua were found as a breach of customary law of
non-intervention in 1986 ICJ decision. It is convinced that the adjudication actually reflects the
mandate of the UN Resolutions 2625 concerning the principle of non-intervention, which provides: "No
State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities
directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in
another State."
70 Nicaragua case, at 126, para. 245.
95
The Pelly Trade Embargoes as an Exercise ofSovereign Rights: Possible Limitations
alleged intervention, those notions should have eonstituted intervention.72 As Teson
observes, "the presumption should be that the most powerful nation in the world has
coereive economic power over a country like Nicaragua. In short, if the economic
sanctions were coercive and that coercion was exerted on which Nicaragua was
legally free to act, those sanctions, under the Court's definition, ought to violate the
principle of non-intervention."73 Therefore, it is difficult to contemplate how the
Court arrived at the conclusion that the US's embargo against Nicaragua was not a
violation of the principle of non-intervention.
Some writers, however, have attempted to explain why the Court refused to
extend the rules against intervention to the use of economic coercion in the present
dispute. Damrosch observes that "possibly it was mindful that a contrary holding
would in effect have obligated donor states or trading partners to continue pre¬
existing aid or trade relations even with a state whose government had taken an
unfriendly turn."74 Also, Teson assumes that: "The Court's holding can be perhaps
explained by the fact that economic sanctions are not directly related to the support
for rebels. They are not strictly linked to the United States' participation in Nicaragua
civil war. Therefore, it seems, they do not exhibit the degree of coercion entailed by
such participation."75 The assumption hidden in the decision, however, cannot justify
the Court's failure to provide sufficient grounds to sustain its judgement.
By the criteria proposed in the subsequent section, the Court should first have
detected the intention of the US Reagan Administration in imposing the
comprehensive trade embargo against the government of Nicaragua. It appears
pertinent to distinguish between measures applied simply to discontinue trade
relations with an unfriendly regime the US dislikes'6 and those carrying a clear
motivation of interfering in another nation's policy that legally subjects to the
discretion of target State.
Secondly, to determine whether the economic measures launched by the US
were so coercive as to be objectively capable of subordinating the exercise of
Nicaragua's sovereign right, the Court should have weighed different factors that
might influence the impact of economic coercion upon the target. Indeed, the court
71 Nicaragua case, at 124, para. 242.
72 See Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, at 299.
73 Id.
74 See Damrosch, "Nonintervention", at 34.
75 Teson, Humanitarian Intervention, at 299.
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had classified the intention of the US in providing substantial support for the rebels as
one aiming to achieve a change of government in Nicaragua by coercive methods.77
But, regrettably, the Court did not elaborate the relevant criteria to further a more
thorough evaluation of the legality of such economic measures.7s
To sum up, the ICJ has not yet formulated a substantial rationale concerning the
determination of the legality of taking economic sanctions unilaterally. Although the
Court's judgement has been repeatedly cited by writers to justify the use of trade
sanctions,'9 it is wrong to conclude that the decision has established solid ground on
which any trade embargo, under principle of non-intervention, is legitimated. It
remains possible that the UN Resolutions in respect of the limitations on economic
coercion are still likely to be applied and elaborated by international tribunals, if
similar disputes arise.
(d) The criteria for unlawful intervention
If the mandate that non-intervention principle has evolved to forbid certain
impermissible economic coercion can be accepted, the crucial work for the
international community then is to formulate proper criteria in determining which
economic sanctions would be evaluated as unlawful. The subjective and objective
test perhaps provide a basic framework for the study.
(i) Subjective test
One approach holds that the predominant purpose of a coercive action is the
criterion for determining unlawful intervention. It seems not difficult to find the
theoretical basis for such an approach. Inspired by the rule of English common law,80
Bowett vigorously upholds the subjective criterion by arguing that unlawful coercion
should be characterised by the intent or purpose of the State that applies the measure
rather than by the effect caused by the action.81 The criterion of "effect" of the
economic conduct, in his view, imposing on a complaining state the burden of proof
76 See Damrosch, "Nonintervention", at 47.
77
Nicaragua case, at 124, para. 241.
78 The purpose of the US's economic sanctions against Nicaragua was believed to seek the change of
Nicaragua's national policy as well as serve a complemented role to the package deal that aims to
destablise the Nicaragua regime. See Henderson, "Economic Sanctions", at 192-94; Carter, Economic
Sanctions, at 13.
77 E.g. Carter, id. at 5, n. 6; Warbrick, "Sovereign Equality", at 208.
80 As one author stated, "For example, the tort of conspiracy evolved to cover the situation in which two
or more persons conspire to commit acts which are lawful per se but are motivated predominantly by
the desire to injure the economic interests of the plaintiff rather than to protect the interests of the
defendants." See Bowett, "Economic Coercion", at 5.
81Id.
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scorns less valuable.82 Bowett further contends that the predominant purpose test
"would probably provide a more effective criterion for defining illegal economic
coercion than the notion of "subordination of sovereign rights" or "securing
advantages" used in the General Assembly Declaration."83 By Bowett's argument, it
seems to suggest that the intent to intervene in national affairs alone is sufficient to
define an illegal economic coercion.
However, much doubt is cast to the difficulty of identifying the real intention of
a State, whenever economic coercion is being launched. Acevedo argues: "The real
difficulty, however, is how to make an objective determination of a notion as
subjective as the 'actual' or 'real' intention or purpose of a state."84 Parry quoting
Judge Hudson further claims: "if, as the old judge said, the thought of man is not
triable, for the Devil himself knoweth not the thought of man, how much more
difficult is it to ascertain with certainty the thought or motive and intent of a state."85
Moreover, in practice, if an action of economic conduct is invoked with multi-
purposes or mixed intention, it may create additional obstacles in evaluating the
intention of a State. In contrast, irrespective of the obstacle in finding the real
intention of an acting State, Acevedo, citing the decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear
Test case,86 assumes: "it is often possible to establish the real motives or purposes of a
state's economic or political conduct on the basis of its own statements."87 As a result,
it is not impossible that public statements or official documents of government may
assist the finding of a real intention of an action.
Overall, it seems that the use of economic coercion, even carrying the clear
intention to intervene in national affairs, is not always able to lead to the actual
infringement on the freedom of conducting internal or external affairs of a sovereign
State. In determining whether a certain economic measure violates the principle of
non-intervention, apart from the subjective test, introduction of a relatively tangible
criterion appears essential for a thorough and fair judgement of the action.
(ii) Objective test
Other writers favour looking to the effect on the victim State as a more reliable
82 See Bowctt, "International Law", at 248.
83 See Bowett, "Economic Coercion", at 5.
84 Acevedo, "US Measures", at 335.
85 Parry, "Economic Coercion", at 4.
86 The Nuclear Test cases, (Australia v. France) (New Zealand v. France), ICJ Rep. 1974, at 253, 269.
87 Acevedo, "US Measures", at 335.
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criterion than the predominant purpose test.The approach is concerned with
whether the use of a particular economic measure is objectively able to cause the
effect to the extent that the sovereign rights to choose its system would be
substantially interfered with.
The objective test, as noted, has been reflected in the 1981 UN Declaration.
Also, the criterion is largely consistent with the requirement adopted by the ICJ for
the alleged "intervention". As indicated, the World Court's ruling in the Nicaragua
case suggests that only coercive measures, notwithstanding whether being forcible or
non-forcible, may constitute intervention. Thus, non-coercive conduct is permissible.
With respect to what economic measures amount to the effect of coercion, some
proposals possibly facilitate the understanding. As Conforti maintains:
[w]hen it is possible to say that there has effectively been illicit interference in the political,
economic, social and cultural choices of a State? We believe that this occurs when the
measures used by the State which is intervening are objectively capable of modifying these
^9
choices in the particular circumstances?
A supportive example would be the practice, asserted by Damrosch, that "sanctions so
crippling as to undermine the economic foundations for the exercise of political
freedom."90 In addition, the concept of the intensity of the action was referred by Muir
as an "essential element in such a judgement."91 Such a claim simply suggests that the
means and content of the embargo imposed by the sender is critical to the assessment.
For instance, it is evident that the comprehensive interruption of a commercial
relationship appears quite coercive, and usually may generate considerably
destructive economic loss on the target. In contrast, damage by a mere ban on a
proportion of imports form the victim State is relatively minor. Besides, trade
restrictions, such as export control, on different products have unequal significance on
the target country. It is clear that a country under sanctions will suffer more from the
termination of food stuff or energy supply than the other products.
Yet, it also true that even the same methods imposed on the different target may
have a different impact. One straw can break a camel, if the latter is in a critical
88 See id.
89 Conforti, "Non-Intervention", at 471-2. One assumes: "some economic sanctions programs might in
fact prevent the people of the target from exercising free political choice." See Damrosch,
"Nonintervention", at 47
90 Damrosch, id. [emphasis added].
See Muir, "Boycott", at 203. See also Buchheit, "Nonviolent Coercion", at 50 [emphasis added].
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situation. Accordingly, it is suggested that several factors concerning the target's
situation deserve further examination. Hutbauer and Schott propose the alleged
political and economic variables that may influence the outcome of sanctions. Those
elements probably may assist.93 The first factor proposed is the situation of "political
stability and economic health of the target country."93 A relatively strong and stable
country might have more strength to endure the impact of economic sanctions. Under
the oil embargo applied by Arab States in 1970, the US proved, of course, strong
enough to undertake the economic loss better than the other embargoed countries.
Secondly, the "relationship between sender and target country,"0" in particular, the
commercial aspect, may serve as an important element in such an evaluation. Clearly,
it is quite difficult for a State whose economic activities heavily rest on the export to
or import from the sender to resist the pressure of interruption of regular commerce.
Similarly, a nation that is used to depending on economic or financial aid might suffer
seriously from the sudden termination of this sort of support. 93 Moreover, "the
presence of international assistance to the target country"99 could help to alleviate the
damage caused by the economic sanctions. Of course, additionally, the shortage of
mechanism of dispute settlement for the target nations also could reduce its ability to
defy the sanctions. For example, a nation without GATT/WTO membership is unable
to resort to the dispute settlement mechanism provided in the trade regime. It may be
concluded that the determination of the occurrence of an economic coercion largely
ought to depend on whether, under normal circumstance, a target is able to resist the
pressure from the particular economic measure.
Overall, the objective test actually seems as sophisticated as the subjective
criterion. It is obvious that any modification of the critical elements will lead to a
differing judgment. The fair judgement on an economic action, thus, should be based
on an impartial fact-finding. As Acevedo observes, the question "that perhaps would
be best resolved by a case-by-case approach."97
It should be noted that, however, the tests formulated above only represent a
92 See Hufbauer and Schott, Economic Sanctions, at 20.
93 Id.
94 Id.
93 See Conforti, "Non-Intervention", at 472. Cf. Some author wonders that "[t]he unilateral suspension
of economic assistance by the granting state be categorised as illegal when, in principle, states are not
legally obliged to provide economic aid to other states." See Aceveo, "US Measures", at 337;
Damrosch, "Nonintervention", at 47.
96 See Hufbautcr and Scott, Economic Sanctions, at 20.
97 See Accvedo, "US Measures", at 337.
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rudimentary experiment,% and need to be elaborated further by more wisdom,
irrespective of legislative or judicial effort of international law.
(e) Summary and Remarks
It is true that States are not, in general, required to continue trade relations with
unfriendly nations. But, while imposing economic sanctions, States run the risk of
committing an illegal intervention. The wisdom of striking a balance between the
maintenance of national discretion to use economic means for political purposes and
the safeguard of sovereign freedom is always a necessity. In the light of the above
analysis, it may be concluded that:
(1) The rule that non-intervention may forbid the means of economic pressure has not
yet been widely accepted." It is believed, however, that certain types of economic
coercion could operate to the extent that constitutes an impermissible intervention,
which is evidenced in a number of the UN Declarations, bilateral and regional
agreements. Although the proposition has not yet been confirmed by international
tribunals, a careful observation of the Nicaragua case indicates that unlawful
intervention shall include certain type of economic coercion.
(2) The ICJ's ruling in the Nicaragua case, which has largely reflected the
formulation of the UN instruments on non-intervention principle, suggests that the
test for intervention hinges on whether the measure is coercive or not, rather than
forcible or non-forcible (military or non-military). The tendency of the Court
demonstrates that economic measures may be unlawful if they prove to be a
method of coercion. In contrast, non-coercive economic means do not violate the
rule of non-intervention. Accordingly, the Court's contribution to the definition of
intervention highlights the importance of distinguishing between economic
coercion with coercive nature and minor economic measures without coercive
character.
(3) It is admitted that the criterion to distinguish between permissible and
98 See Lillich, "Economic Coercion", at 240.
99 It has been strongly proposed that non-intervention principle has proscribed certain economic
coercion. See e.g. Lillich, id. at 238; Damrosch, "Nonintervention", at 5; Farer, "Economic Coercion,"
at 411. By contrast, some commentators deny that customay law has evolved to prohibit the use of
economic sanctions. See Elagab, Non-forcible Counter-Measures, at 212; id. "Coercive Economic
Measures", at 692. McLaughlin, "Trade Sanctions", at 65. Neff takes a cautious position, being
sceptical about the contention that there is now a rule of customary law forbidding the waging of
economic warfare. See Neff, "Boycott", at 147. But, on the other hand, he admits that the norm of
general customary law prohibiting economic warfare is an emerging one, if not definitive. See Neff,
"Economic Warfare", at 90.
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impermissible non-forcible measures under the rule of non-intervention has not
yet been settled. The subjective and objective criteria proposed above only
represent a rudimentary attempt aimed at deciding which use of economic
pressure constitutes alleged "intervention". Satisfactory criteria deserve further
effort and elaboration by subsequent decision and practice in similar cases in order
to achieve a better result. It is conceded that the task appears quite complicated,
since many factors need to be considered.
2 The assessment of Pelly sanctions against Taiwan under the principle of non¬
intervention
Assuming non-intervention principle might have applied to the use of trade
sanctions, the section seeks to determine whether the imposition of the Pelly trade
embargo against Taiwan was in breach of non-intervention by examining the criteria
specified above.
(a) Subjective test
The intention of US's invocation of the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan can be
largely seen from every stage of performing the Pelly sanctions, ranging from the
imposition to lift of the sanctions. Upon the announcement of the sanctions against
Taiwan, the US boldly set a timetable to pressure Taiwan to abide by certain
requirements specified in the previous President's Message to the Congress. In doing
so, it stated that Taiwan's subsequent progress would be closely reviewed in
December of that year, and then a proper response would be made.100 Furthermore,
after the imposition of the sanctions, US officials continued to highlight those
standards with which Taiwan was required to comply and declared that the sanctions
could be lifted, maintained, or expanded according to Taiwan's subsequent
response.101 Regarding the standards, the US, particularly, demanded that Taiwan
amend its conservation law and strengthen enforcement actions.102 The US's dictation
was rooted in the belief that Taiwan's penalty against the illegal trade was not tight
enough to deter people from being engaged in trade of rhinos and tiger parts. It
therefore requested a speedy passage of the amendment.103 Moreover, as to the
100See President's Message to the Congress on Rhinoceros and Tiger by China and Taiwan (11 Apr.
1994) [hereinafter 1994 President's Message to Congress],
101 Id. See also Central Daily News (Taipei), 13 Apr. 1994, 3rJ edition.
102 1994 President's Message to Congress.
103 See id.
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enforcement's effectiveness, the US had the total discretion to decide whether
Taiwan's subsequent effort is satisfactory enough to lift the sanctions.
The US's trade embargo on Taiwan did, admittedly, have variable purposes. Of
course, the Pelly actions, as observed, were "to send a message to other countries that
the United States wants them to take international conservation issues seriously."104
More importantly, it was launched to penalise Taiwan for its environmental practices
inconsistent with the US and CITES standards. Serving a preventive function, it also
attempted to deter Taiwan's continuous failure to adopt crucial measures against
illegal trade in the animal parts and products.'05 Overall, the sanctions aimed to
coerce Taiwan into changing its national policy ofwildlife conservation in conformity
with the US's standards. On this basis, Taiwan may contend that the US's trade
embargo carried with it the intention to interfere in the political operation of Taiwan.
By contrast, the US could argue that its actions were launched simply to follow
the CITES's recommendation and enforce international environmental standards
rather than intervene Taiwan's domestic affairs on the ground that the standards it
highlighted was in consistent with those of the Standing Committee of CITES.
Nevertheless, Taiwan may argue that, first, it was, strictly speaking, not bound
by the CITES's mandate.106 Taiwan thus remains free to decide its conservation
policy on rhinos and tiger species. The US intention's, even under the name of
enforcing international law, still targeted the choices on which Taiwan has the
freedom to decide. Secondly, even if Taiwan was subjected to the CITES's standards,
the standards set by the US regarding the increase of penalty against offense went
beyond those of CITES. As a result, the US actions at least seemed to reveal its
intention to infringe Taiwan's national freedom on the sphere of legislation.
(b) Objective test
The assessment of the coercive nature of the Pelly sanctions upon Taiwan
104 Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 795 [emphasis added]. See also Kenworthy, "China and Taiwan
Warned on Endangered Species," Wash. Post. 8 Sept. 1993, at A 21; One commentator regarded that
"In issuing the embargo against Taiwan, the United States demonstrated to Taiwan, as well as the entire
international community, that wildlife protection and control of trade in wildlife and wildlife products
is an international responsibility." See Patel, "Endangered Species", at 198, n. 267. Moreover, since the
imposition of the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan, it was observed that a number of Asian countries,
including China, Singapore, South Korea, Japan and Hong Kong tightened their enforcement actions
by, inter alia, enacting tougher legislation and stiffer penalities against offences. See Cheung, "Tiger
and Rhinoceros", at 138.
105 See Schermers and Blokker, International Institution Law, at 1446; Zoller, Unilateral Remedies, at
106-7.
106 See chapter two of the thesis.
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probably may involve the following factors:
(i) The damage inflicted on Taiwan
The damage inflicted on Taiwan by the trade embargo is mainly related to real
economic loss. The 1994 Pelly sanctions were imposed merely against the
importation of selective wildlife products from Taiwan, covering tropical fish, edible
frog legs, bird feathers and specimens, leather goods and decorations made of coral,
shells and fish bones.107 It was estimated that this action would cost Taiwan
enterprises around US$ 20 million a year.108 As Taiwan's export to the US valued
$25.1 billion in 1993,109 the trade measures affected less than 0.1% of the export.
Admittedly, from a purely economic view, this was a tiny fraction of Taiwan's overall
trade with the US,"0 and the economic loss resulted from the trade sanctions seems
quite minor.1" Nevertheless, it should be noted that the import ban could be enlarged
if Taiwan fails to match US's requirements in a specified period as indicated above.
Since the US is the largest export market for Taiwan, roughly taking 30% of whole
Taiwan exports value in 1993,112 it is quite inconceivable that Taiwan could have
endured the economic loss if a comprehensive import restriction against Taiwan had
been imposed by the US, as the Pelly Amendment allows. Moreover, Taiwan
officials feared that other States might be induced to adopt similar measures against
Taiwan. Given its heavily trade-oriented economic strategy, Taiwan could find it
difficult to resist the chain-reaction that definitely would jeopardise Taiwan's
economy seriously.113
(ii) Bilateral relationship between Taiwan and the US
On the other hand, Taiwan may claim that a thorough determination of the coercive
character of the Pelly sanctions should not only be limited to the scale of economic
damage, but also should take broader contextual considerations into account. In
Taiwan's case, there is a distinctive relationship between it and the US. Such factors
to some extent may make a moderate trade damage turn to be coercion. Taiwan
107 See United Evening News (Taipei), 10 Aug. 1994, 3rd edition.
108 The 1996 Republic ofChina Yearbook, at 105.
109 The N. Y. Times, 12 Apr. 1994, at D1.
110 Id.
111 In 1993, the total exports of Taiwan amount to $85 billion. See 1995 Statistical Yearbook of the
Republic ofChina, at 241 [hereinafter Statistical Yearbook],
112 Id.
'"Taiwan Daily News (Taipei), 18 Aug. 1994, 2ndedition.
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could cite the political and economic interaction between it and the US to
demonstrate how Taiwan has relied on the US to sustain and promote its
development.
a. General development of the bilateral relations
In 1950, the outbreak of Korean War convinced the US that defending Taiwan
constitutes an essential strategy to contain the expansion of communism in Asia. As a
result, in the same year, US navy fleets were sent into the Taiwan Strait and the
defense treaty between America and the ROC (Taiwan) was signed. Since then, they
have worked as partners and allies to resist the possible invasion of communists as an
effort to maintain the peace and security in the Western Pacific."4
For a long time, the US has been a firm proponent of Taiwan, both on security as
well as economic sector. For instance, in international sphere, US supported Taiwan's
holding the seat of China in the UN until 1971. To restore and strengthen Taiwan's
capacity to defend itself, America had provided massive economic and military aids
to Taiwan for decades."5 Under the imminent military threat of China communists,
admittedly, Taiwan's incessant survival and development partly should be attributed
to the security promised and substantial assistance warranted by the US.
Consequently, of course, America has become the most influential nation to
Taiwan."6
The official relations of Taiwan and the US had been maintained till America
terminated the foreign relationship with Taiwan, and acknowledged the People's
Republic of China (PRC) as the only legitimate representative of China in 1979.117
Therefore, the defense treaty was abrogated, and, certainly the US's "derecognition
caused a temporary psychological shock" to Taiwan's people. "8 Nevertheless,
responding to the necessity and importance of making new arrangements to fill the
vacuum left by the severance of official relations between two countries, the US
Congress soon passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).119 Serving a national legal
basis for the US foreign policy toward Taiwan, the law declares US's commitment to
114 Chow, "ROC-USA Relationship", at 10.
115 See Clough, "US/Taiwan Relations", at 9.
116 See Chen, "Relationship of the USA and Taiwan", at 20.
117 The Background for the US to decide to recognise the PRC see Chow, "ROC-USA Relationship", at
11.
118 Simon, "Taiwan Relations Act", at 94.
119 This Act shall be effective as of 1 Jan. 1979. 22 U.S.C. 3301 (note).
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preserve peace, security and stability in the Western Pacific area120 and promote
unofficial relations between the US and Taiwan.121
Overall, it proves that the absence of US-Taiwan diplomatic relationship has not
hindered the advance of their bilateral relations, particularly in commercial,122
cultural,123 and technological124 exchange. Instead, their substantial linkage becomes
even closer and more cordial. Further evidence of such phenomena will be developed
in the following sections.
b. Economic section
The commercial intercourse has never ceased to be the most substantial and
tangible indication of bilateral connection between Taiwan and the US irrespective of
the existence of an official relationship. In the early 1950s, the Taiwanese regime
began to receive massive economic aids from the US. It helped the country shake off
poverty and lay a basis for subsequent economic development.125 Over the last few
decades, foreign trade, in particular export activities, has played a vital role in
Taiwan's economy. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Taiwan ran huge trade surpluses
that swelled the island's foreign exchange reserves to among the one of the largest in
the world.126 It is evident that American's constant absorption of the significant
portion of Taiwan's product has been contributing to that effect.127 At the climax of
such a trend, in 1983, over forty-eight percent of Taiwan's exports in value went to
the US.128 Even though Taiwan has endeavoured to diversify markets and reduce its
trade dependency on the American market,129 the US remains as Taiwan's largest
export market.130 On the other hand, American products are the second largest source
of Taiwan's imports second to Japan.131 Overall, the US is the Taiwan's single largest
trading partner, while Taiwan presently ranks sixth largest among US trading
120 See 22 U.S.C 3301.
121 Id.
122 See The 1998 ROC Yearbook, at 153.
123 Id.
124 Taiwan and the US, via unofficial institutions, namely American Institution in Taiwan (AIT) and
Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) (now it has been changed to Taipei
Economic and Cultural Representative Office), have signed about 40 scientific and technological
(S&T) agreements during 1979 to October 1990. See Bcllocchi, "Taiwan-US Relationship", at 4.
125 See Bellocchi, id.
126 The 1995 ROC Yearbook, at 165.
127 See Statistical Yearbook, at 240-41.
128 Id. at 240.
I2<; See The 1996 ROC Yearbook, at 166.
130 Id.
131 See Statistical Yearbook, at 239.
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partners.1'1* It is predictable that the situation seems hard to be modified in a short
term. Indeed, both countries have established solid economic connection, which
makes the bilateral interdependence on trade become increasingly prominent. Yet,
obviously, Taiwan's economy has more reliance on the health of the US economy
than the latter on the former, despite Taiwan does retain some relatively weak
economic bargaining powers against the US.
c. Security section
Since China was separated into two regimes, the PRC on Mainland China and
the ROC on Taiwan in 1949, the hostility between the two sides has never ceased. To
forge a friendly atmosphere in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan had already proclaimed that
military actions against China communists in an attempt to reclaim Mainland China
be abolished.Ij3 In contrast, PRC has not yet renounced the option of resorting to
force to achieve unity.134 Faced with the security threat from the PRC, Taiwan's
continuous reliance on US's military support against China communists marks the
close connection between the two countries in the security affairs.
Before the US switched recognition from Taiwan to the PRC, it was the Sino-
US defense treaty which assured the peace and security of Taiwan. Since 1979, the
US's commitment to protect Taiwan's peace and security has been transformed from
the treaty's obligation into the implications embodied in its national law, the TRA.
The US policy declared by the law on the security issue comprises:
1. to declare that peace and stability in the Western Pacific are in the political,
security and economic interests of the United States;
2. to make clear that the US decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC
rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by
peaceful means;
3. to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful
means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security in
the western Pacific and of grave concern to the US;
4. to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;
5. to maintain the capacity of the US to resist any resort to force or other forms of
132 See The 1996 ROC Yearbook, at 165-66.
133 In 1991, President Lee declared the termination of the Period of National Mobilisation for
Suppression ofCommunist Rebellion, effective on 1 May 1991.
I3'1 Paying his recent state visit to the US in 1997, the PRC President, Jiang Zemin still stuck to the
dogged policy ofmaintaining the use of force to unify China. See Time, 10 Nov. 1997, at 64.
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coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of
the people on Taiwan.IJ5
While the law demonstrates US's overwhelming and sincere concern on the security
of Taiwan, the ceaseless supply of defensive arms to assist Taiwan to exercise self-
defense is the most tangible and pragmatic promise made by the US. Moreover, it
should be noted that the US must take appropriate action if any threat to Taiwan
occurs according to the section 3 of the TRA. The following presents the details of
the US's fulfillment of the security commitment toward Taiwan under the TRA.
Arms sale to Taiwan
Based on the Taiwan's actual needs solely, the arms sale under the TRA is
confined to the extent that it may enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability.136 Therefore, it sends at least two primary messages. Firstly, offensive
weapons may not be included in the arms sale list. Also, the judgement of Taiwan's
needs has to take into account the relative advance of the PRC's force and be
dominated by the mandate that a balance of military force on both sides can be
achieved. Generally speaking, the US has been fulfilling its policy of selling
defensive arms to Taiwan in despite of repeatedly vigorous protest launched by the
PRC.137 Although the Taiwan government has devoted itself to procuring weapons
from other countries, the result seems unsatisfactory.138 Much evidence indicates that
most countries' incapability of resisting the pressure from the PRC has thwarted the
deal. In contrast, upheld by the US's promise in the domestic law and foreign policy,
undoubtedly, arms supplied by the US have become the most reliable and predictable
source to meet Taiwan's security needs.
The US's security commitment to the Taiwan while the threat to Taiwan occurs
It is admitted that by equipping Taiwan with necessary defensive arms, the TRA
security framework centers on the assurance of Taiwan's having enough self-defense
ability to counter any security threat.139 It is also designed to curb the attempt of the
m See 22 U.S.C. 3301.
136 See 22 U.S.C. 3302.
137 Based on the PRC-US join communique on 17 Aug. 1982, PRC insists that the present practice of
US arms sale to Taiwan has violated the spirit of the communique, which underlines the US's intention
to reduce the amount and quality of arms supply to Taiwan.
138 Until now, on advanced arms articles, Taiwan has only purchased submarines from Holland and jet
fighters and war ships from France except the US. But, currently, under the pressure of the PRC, these
two nations have decided not to have further arms deal with Taiwan.
139 See Sun, "Taiwan Strait's Security", at 57.
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PRC to take military actions against Taiwan.'40 In addition, in order to preserve
Taiwan's security thoroughly and cope with any unpredictable situation that will
threaten the security of Taiwan, the TRA does provide another device to further the
objectives of the law. Unlike the revoked defense treaty, the TRA does not explicitly
demand that the US be required to use its military force to defend Taiwan once any
military attack occurs. Instead, it commits the US to adopt measures appropriate in
response to any threat to Taiwan to ensure peace and security of the area.141 The
mechanism allows the US to retain more flexibility in handling crisis in the Taiwan
Strait, which varies according to the exact conditions and its own discretion.142
Moreover, it expands the range to which the US has to respond from military attack
to "any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on
Taiwan"143 caused by non-peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes.144 Thus,
not surprisingly, some may contend that the security guarantee provided by the TRA
to Taiwan theoretically might be no less than the previous defense treaty.145
Probably, it is unrealistic for Taiwan people to anticipate US's involvement in
Chinese military conflict by sending armed forces to defend Taiwan.146 But, it seems
conceivable that under the mandate of the TRA, the US administration is required to
respond to any critical situation threatening Taiwan's security whenever the law is
valid. To most people in Taiwan, therefore, it makes sense that Taiwan's eventual
safety to some extent depends on the US's strong support regardless of what sort of
form. The following incident that happened recently can best illuminate the
phenomenon.
The US's involvement in 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis
In 1996, the PRC launched several ballistic missiles into seas off Taiwan and
held massive naval and air manoeuvres with live ammunition in the Taiwan Strait,
which aimed to intimidate Taiwan's first presidential elections and thwart its
140 Id. at 59.
141 See Section 3 of the TRA, 22 U.S.C 3302; The measures are assumed to include forcible and non-
forcible actions, such as revoke of recognition on the PRC, economic sanctions and military actions.
See Id. at 60.
142 See Sun, "Taiwan Strait's Security", at 60.
143 Section 3 of the TRA, 22 U.S.C. 3302.
144 Section 2 of the TRA, 22 U.S.C. 3301.
145 See Sun, "Taiwan Strait's Security", at 61-3.
146 CJ'. President Lee of the ROC (Taiwan), in recent interview with The Times, believes "if China
attacked, he would expect America to defend Taiwan." See The TIMES, 10 Nov. 1997, at 14.
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increasing movement to seek wider international recognition.147 Even though there
was no evidence that the PRC would invade Taiwan at that moment,148 this otYensivc
and risky action soon aroused much international concern.144 While most countries'
reaction was merely confined to oral protest, America presented itself as a unique
nation who meddled in the situation directly and aggressively. The US's resolve in
this crisis gives an excellent opportunity to examine how it fulfills the promise
proclaimed in the TRA.
As the military exercise of the PRC became intensified, the US Clinton
Administration dispatched a powerful naval force to this critical region to express
Washington's grave concern about the risky situation. The US force sent to the waters
off Taiwan was estimated to be the largest force assembly in the region since the
Vietnam War.130 With the PRC's growing force demonstration, it was believed that
the risk of an escalating tension probably leading to a military confrontation could not
be ruled out.'51 A tough question was raised as to whether the US would use its force
to defend Taiwan. Stressing battle groups would be in "a position to be helpful",152
the US Administration "remained deliberately vague about the depth of its
commitment to the defense of Taiwan,"133 and declined to specify what exact actions
it will take once Taiwan is under attack. Actually, this policy of "strategic ambiguity"
appears embodied in the TRA, which, as mentioned, gives the US flexibility to deal
with any security crisis on Taiwan. The US Congressmen, however, adopted more
explicit and definite stance upon the crisis. They passed a non-binding resolution to
urge the Clinton Administration to defend the island if it is attacked, stating the US
"should assist in defending [the Taiwan Government and people] against invasion,
missile attack or blockade by China". 154 It seems clear no matter the US
147 See Pringle, "Chinese missiles target elections in fearful Taiwan", The TIMES, 9 Mar. 1996, at 14.
148 See Pringle, "Second US carrier sails for Taiwan", The TIMES, 12 Mar. 1996, at 1
149 See id.
150 At the climax of the PRC military exercise, there were two aircraft carriers battle groups with ten
warships and a submarine escorting them, totaling at least 10,000 men, 140 aircraft and 200 Tomahawk
cruise missiles. See Pringle, "Second US carrier sails for Taiwan", The TIMES, 12 Mar. 1996, at 1.
151 According to Western intelligence sources, China intensive military exercises might turn out to be
four offensive actions, including a naval blockade, an amphibious landing on one of the offshore
islands of Taiwan, a missile attack on key targets in Taiwan, and a full invasion of Taiwan. See Evans,
"China offensive cannot be ruled out, experts say", The TIMES, 15 Mar. 1996, at 14.
152 See the remark by Warren Christopher, American Secretary of State. Pringle, "China warns US of
'wrong signal1 with big naval build-up", The TIMES, 13 Mar. 1996, at 13.
153 Rhodes, "Chorus grows on Capitol Hill for clear commitment to Taipei", The TIMES, 13 Mar. 1996,
at 13.
154 Evans, "China offensive cannot be ruled out, experts say", "China offensive cannot be ruled out,
experts say", The TIMES, 15 Mar. 1996, at 14.
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Administration's vague policy or Congress's firm declaration has entirely guaranteed
its substantial involvement in any issue relating to the security of Taiwan.
Under the threat of China's military exercise, Taiwan greatly suffered from
psychological stress.155 While no international mechanism of settling the dispute
proves available to the island, it is undoubted that Taiwan shall welcome US's
concern exposed by deploying its force in the critical area.155 The incident simply
discloses that Taiwan's security inherently and greatly relies on the US's commitment
to safeguard the island as long as the PRC's resolution to unify China by force
remains as one of the options.
d. Remark
In conclusion, it is clear that Taiwan remains substantially dependent on the
support of US to sustain its development. Of course, Taiwan is not entirely
dominated by the US. It is true, however, that Taiwan's constant and heavy reliance
on the US, particularly in economic, security and psychological matter, leaves it, in
most circumstances, fundamentally unable and unwilling to resist any coercive
measures imposed by the latter. Therefore, Taiwan may contend that the sanctions
with tremendous impact appear so penetrating and coercive as to be objectively
capable ofmodifying its sovereign freedom.
(c) Concluding remarks
It is true that the ICJ, in the Nicaragua case, denied the illegality of the US's
economic sanctions against Nicaragua under the principle of non-intervention. If the
Court were inclined to make constant reference to its own judgement in the
Nicaragua case,157 the claim against economic sanctions based on the principle might
be rejected. Nevertheless, it should be bome in mind that the Nicaragua decision did
not lay down an absolute rule that the use of economic sanctions would never violate
155 The impact of the PRC military exercise against Taiwan can be best shown in a considerable plunge
of Taiwan financial markets. The stock index and foreign currency reserves fell drastically when the
provocative actions became intense. See Pringle, "Second US carrier sails for Taiwan", The TIMES, 12
Mar. 1996, at 1.
156 A Foreign Office spokesman remarked: "We support the sensible precautions being taken by the
United States in this dangerous situation." See Pringle, "China fires missile", The TIMES, 13 Mar.
1996, at 1.
157 Actually, in practice, the precedent of international judicial decision obtains considerable weight. It
is admitted the World Court, like the other tribunals, does rely on the judicial view of the precedent. In
this respect, some writers note that "[Ijike many civil law courts, the International Court follows a
doctrine known in France as a jurisprudence constante, rendering decisions that are sequentially
consistent." See Janis, International Law, at 82, 141.
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the doctrine of non-intervention. Thus, it is not impossible that the Court could look
to special circumstances of particular cases to find that economic measures could
amount to intervention. It is possible—though of course far from certain—that the
American Pelly sanctions against Taiwan might constitute such a special
circumstance.
In sum, whether the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan constituted impermissible
intervention largely depends on whether the trade embargo amounted to coercion. If
the Court only considers the factor of actual economic loss, the US Pelly trade
embargo might not constitute a measure of coercion due to the relatively small scale
of trade damage in the overall context of trade between Taiwan and the US. As a
result, the US action would not be prohibited intervention. On the other hand, if the
Court takes a variety of elements into its assessment, including bilateral relationship,
it might reach an opposite conclusion. Given the rather insufficient elaboration of
'coercion' in the context of intervention and of economic sanctions, the approach
indicated above represents a legal theoretical analysis.
D Abuse of rights
1 The notion of the principle
The third general principle which might be relevant to unilateral economic
coercion is abuse of rights. The principle derives from municipal legal systems,
mainly the French civil law, under the rubric of abus de droit, and the German civil
law as Rechtsmissbrauch. The principle seeks to outlaw the exercise of a right that
carries the intention to "inflict harm on another," or enable the acting State to "seize
unjustifiable interest."158 It is true that there has been but a short period of promoting
the incorporation of the principles of national law into that of international law.159 In
practice, however, the notion of abuse of rights has been involved in the
determination of State responsibility by international tribunals.160 As Lauterpacht
observed, "the Court has not hesitated to associate itself—although not conspicuously
158 See McWhinney, "Co-operation", at 428.
159 The Greek Professor Politis in French Universities is believed to pioneer the study of promoting the
notion of abuse of rights as source of international law. See McWhinney, id. at 428-29.
160 As a writer observed, the international responsibility "occurs when a State avails itself of its right in
an arbitrary manner in such a way as to inflict upon another State an injury which cannot be justified by
a legitimate consideration of its own advantage." Oppenheim, International Law, at 345. The relevant
international judicial decisions referring to the principle cover variable range of national discretion. See
e.g. Lautcrpacht, International Law, at 162-65; Oppenheim, id. at 345-46; Brownlie, International Law,
at 444-46.
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or directly —with the doctrine of abuse of rights."161 With respect to its legal status,
the majority ofwriters agree that it is one of the "general principles of law recognised
by civilised nations," which serves a secondary source of international law
according to the Statute of ICJ.163
Yet several doubts remain concerning the applicability of the rule. There is no
fixed definition as to what sort of conduct constitutes an abuse that should be
denounced by international law.164 Neither does international law reveal the exact
scope and extent of its application.165 Thus, not surprisingly, to preserve the integrity
of existing rules of law, several writers tend to reject the adoption of such an abstract
and vague notion.166 Further, as far as the protection of international environment is
concerned, it is contended that the initial thought of connecting the prohibition of
abuse of rights with liability for transboundary pollution has diminished.167
Nevertheless, its function to fill the legislative vacuum in international law
remains.I6S As Janis comments: "As gap filler, general principles of law are more a
feature of court cases than of other kinds of international legal process."169 Thus, it
appears unnecessary and impractical to make every effort to formulate the normative
rules for the principle of abuse of rights in the regular legislative process, such as its
definition, extent and effect etc. Instead, this should be left to the courts. The
observation by Lauterpacht has generally underlined the search for a real application
of the doctrine:
The determination of the point at which the exercise of a legal right has degenerated into abuse
of a right is a question which cannot be decided by an abstract legislative rule, but only by the
activity of courts drawing the line in each particular case. The exercise of such activity—
which, in relation to any new set of circumstances, may assume the complexion of judicial
legislation—is particularly important in the international society in which the legislative
161 See Lauterpacht, id. at 162.
162 See Oppenheim, International Law, at 346-47; Brownlie, International Law, at 445; Henkin et al,
International Law, at 115; Cf. Some conclude that "In view of the diversity on this subject in the
municipal laws of civilised countries, it would also be difficult to accept the proposition that the
prohibition of the abuse of rights is a general principle of law recognised by civilised nations." See
Schwarzenberger and Brown, International Law, at 85.
163 ICJ Statute, Art. 38 (l)(c).
164 See Schwarzenberger and Brown, International Law, at 84.
165 See Oppenheim, International Law, at 347; Schwarzenberger, International law and Order, at 84-
85.
166 E.g. Schwarzenberger, id. at 99-100; Henkin et al, International Law, at 553.
167 See Henkin, id.
"* See Janis, International Law, at 55-58.
169 hi. at 57.
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process by regular organ is practically non-existent.171'
For the purpose of the study, it is required to explore how the rule would be
properly applied to the exercise of unilateral economic sanctions that inevitably will
inflict damage on the target State. In the case of 1926 Certain German Interests in
Polish Upper Silesia,171 the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) rejected
the Polish contention that there had taken place an abuse of right by Germany's
disposition of a State's property in the area where the sovereignty would be
transferred. It found that the German acts of alienation did not overstep the limits of
the normal administration of public property, and that they were not designed to
procure for Germany an illicit advantage and to deprive Poland of a right to which
she was entitled.l72 On this basis, the general imposition of economic sanctions might
not be in breach of the principle. That is because, in most circumstances, the
unilateral use of economic sanctions is not necessarily motivated by the desire to
damage or deprive the targeted country of a right or interest. Rather, in most cases, it
was launched to change the behaviour of the target. Besides, the coercive measures
normally would not bring any benefits to the acting State.
But, it should be noted that the imposition of economic pressure might be so
detrimental as to lead to unacceptable impacts upon the target nation. Therefore, it is
extremely desirable that the contemporary appliance of the rule of abuse of rights
should extend to the limitation on the deliberate use of economic means whenever a
large disparity of power among nations prevails. Such necessity increases especially
if economic sanctions were launched by the powerful State who is capable of
enduring the economic loss, and the action consequently caused immense damage to
the victim State suffering the irrecoverable loss. In effect, it may be suggested that an
effect test alone should determine the existence of the abuse of rights, even though the
sanctions fall short of a clear intention of impairing the interests of the target country.
To attain a modest revision of the original requirements of the doctrine, a further
condition may be added to the extent that the acting State must be capable of
foreseeing the result caused by its action under normal situations. In the current
170 Lauterpacht, International Law, at 162. It has been stressed that [t] he extent of the application of the
still controversial doctrine of the prohibition of abuse of rights is not at all certain. It is of recent origin
in the literature and practice of international law, and it must be left to international tribunals to apply
and develop it by reference to individual situations." Oppcnheim, International Law, at 347.
171 PCIJ Rep. 1926, Scr. A, no. 7, at 30.
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atmosphere, it is probably not easy for international tribunals to aecept such an
innovation. It is always, however, desirable for the international community to
modify the principle in order to accommodate any new emerging circumstances with
which traditional concept of abuse of rights cannot deal.
2 The Pelly sanctions against Taiwan under the principle
A tribunal may be unable to support Taiwan's contention that there had occurred
the offence of an abuse of right committed by the US's environmental sanctions. This
is mainly because that the principle traditionally requires a primary intention to
damage the interests of another State. Of course, the US may claim the use of
economic pressure was not primarily designed to inflict damage upon Taiwan, but to
force Taiwan to advance its environmental practice of protecting endangered species.
So, the US considers any economic injury inflicted on Taiwan only as a means to
achieve the goal rather than the objective of the action. Indeed, given that the Pelly
legislation is explicitly enacted to promote international conservation programme,
such as CITES,173 Taiwan will find it difficult to persuade the Court that the
imposition of Pelly sanctions were driven by the intention to impair the interests of
Taiwan, regardless of certain material damage inflicted on Taiwan by the sanctions.
Even assuming that an effect test is the way to determine the existence of abuse
of rights, a tribunal still probably would not favour Taiwan's claim after taking into
account the actual loss inflicted on Taiwan. Unlike the imposition of general trade
embargoes, the actual damage of Pelly sanctions against Taiwan appeared quite
modest and did not cause irrecoverable economic loss to Taiwan. At the present stage,
it may be concluded that the Pelly sanctions upon Taiwan hardly constituted an abuse
of rights.
It is true that conventional scholarship or judicial decision barely address the
relevance of the principle to the unilateral use of economic sanctions. Due to the
absence of a sufficient and widely recognised legal basis for applying such a norm to
economic coercive measures, it is admitted that the principle may not offer a feasible
basis for Taiwan to seek justice and a suitable remedy. Nonetheless, at least,
currently, the necessity of studying this issue remains unless the international society
is willing to tolerate any undesirable abuses of national rights in conducting its
172 Id. at 38 [emphasis added].
173 22 U.S.C. 978 (a)(2).
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economic affairs.174
174 One concludes that States are legally precluded from taking measures that would otherwise be
permitted if such measures would inflict upon another State an injury which cannot be justified by a
legitimate consideration of its own advantage. See Oppenheim, International Law, at 345.
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Conclusion
On the basis of general rules of international law, it seems that Taiwan may
encounter substantial hurdles in challenging the Pclly sanctions successfully. The
prohibition against use of force was, in all likelihood, not breached by the US's Pelly
action against Taiwan. Further, the ICJ has not yet confirmed the possibility that
economic sanctions could amount to unlawful intervention. However, according to
the criteria established by the World Court for determining a prohibited intervention,
an argument can be advanced that, in the particular case of application of Pelly
sanctions by the US, there might be a breach of the non-intervention principle.
Certainly, the Pelly sanctions infringed Taiwan's freedom, particularly regarding its
sovereign discretion over domestic legislation on conservation.
The crucial issue is whether the US's Pelly action amounted to coercion. If the
Court inclines to confine the fulfillment of coercion to real economic loss inflicted on
target, then the US's action could probably not be held to be coercive. If, however,
other factors than material economic loss were taken into account, such as general
bilateral relations, it perhaps may be concluded that the Pelly sanctions were coercive
because the unique relations between Taiwan and the US make the former unable to
resist any pressure from the US, irrespective of the material magnitude of sanctions
being imposed. The difficulty of conducting a precise and objective appraisal of the
overall bilateral relations, admittedly, remains. This difficulty might dissuade
tribunals from embarking upon such an analysis. It is submitted, however, that the
legality of economic pressure cannot be assessed thoroughly without carefully taking
into account all the relevant factors surrounding the matter.
In addition, the determination of abuse of rights is also highly reliant on the
relevant facts of each particular case. In Taiwan's case, it seemed difficult to maintain
that the US action breached the norm. It should be noted that, however, by the
exercise of the Pelly Amendment, a trade embargo could become extremely
detrimental to the target nation whenever it operates to an imposition of a total import
ban.175 Hypothetically, if a nation has long relied on its exports to the US to sustain
its economy, an abrupt termination of all imports against the former should be
considered as an abuse of rights. The particular situation suggests that, ultimately, the
use of Pelly sanctions could be in danger of being accused of constituting abuse of
175 22 U.S.C. 1978 (a)(4).
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rights as long as the discretion of the US President to expand any kinds of trade
sanctions to a comprehensive import ban remains.
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PART THREE: THE PELLY SANCTIONS AND SPECIAL
REGIMES
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Chapter 4
The Implication ofInternational Trade Law
Introduction
During the past decade, trade measures have been frequently used to counteract
national policies that may have adverse impact on the international environment.
Anderson and Blackhurst made a distinction between trade restrictions and trade
sanctions, which were imposed for environmental purposes.1 In effect, the 1991 and
1994 US prohibition on imports of tuna products and its recent shrimp embargo could
be largely classified as "trade restrictions," which responded to the harvesting process
endangering marine species of dolphins and sea turtles. The Pelly Amendment trade
embargo imposed against Taiwan's insufficient efforts to protect endangered species
in 1994 was a typical model of "trade sanctions". The main difference between the
tuna and shrimp embargoes, on one hand, and the Pelly sanctions, on the other,
concerns the measures on the embargoed products themselves. The tuna and shrimp
restrictions affected products whose production and processing methods are
environmentally harmful. The Pelly sanctions, in contrast, targeted unrelated
products. The latter, in other words, may be said to have been "purely an exercise of
power and leverage."2
In contrast to other general international rules, contemporary trade law has
formulated some relatively specific rules designed to directly regulate the national use
of trade measures. Two regimes of trade agreement—multilateral and bilateral—may
be relevant to the current study. As to the former, along with the creation of the
World Trade Organisation (WTO),3 the trade measures adopted by its members
certainly are subject to the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) 1994.4 Indeed, the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan could not have been a
violation of the GATT provisions due to the non-GATT/WTO membership of
' See Anderson and Blackhurst (ed.), Greening World Trade, at 18, 140, 261; Esty, Greening GATT, at
103.
2 Esty, id. at 103.
3After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, the World Trade Organisation
succeeding the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established on 1 Jan. 1995. The
legal framework of the WTO can be located in The Results ofthe Uruguay Round ofMultilateral Trade
Negotiations: The Legal Texts [hereinafter Uruguay Text],
4 GATT 1994 was formally adopted at the 1994 Marrakesh Conference creating the WTO. The
agreement incorporated the original 1947 GATT with certain amendment. See Uruguay Text, id. at 486.
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Taiwan. Nevertheless, the problem of potential conflicts between the multilateral
trade rules and the sanctions is an important one. China and Taiwan will join the
WTO in the near future. As observed, "[tjheir wildlife trade, whether in rhino horn
and tiger bone or other species, will continue to be a concern long after they accede to
the WTO."5 Further, it should be noted that, as indicated, a number of the WTO
members, like Japan, South Korea and Norway, have been repeatedly threatened by
the sanctions, since the Pelly legislation came into force. In the foreseeable future, a
Pelly sanction may still be imposed against a WTO member. Thus, it is rightly
remarked that "trade sanctions had never been imposed under the Pelly Amendment
until the recent sanctioning of Taiwan. Therefore, the conflict between Pelly and the
GATT is less remote than previously contemplated, when the Pelly Amendment had
not been invoked."6 As a result, it is worth assessing the legality of the hypothetical
case of the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan under the WTO/GATT rule.
As to bilateral treaty, prior to the 1950s, the Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation (FCN) treaties were the most significant bilateral agreements governing
mutual economic relations.7 These agreements aim at promoting and safeguarding
the mutual intercourse of commerce. Restrictions on trade measures constitute one of
the principal premises embodied in the FCN treaties. The 1946 FCN treaty between
the United States and the Republic of China (Taiwan)8 was one of the same school of
the bilateral commercial agreements concluded by the US with its commercial
partners.9 Thus, Taiwan perhaps may seek a remedy by claiming that the Pelly trade
embargo violated the US's treaty commitment towards Taiwan.
With regard to trade rules, the common structure and features shared by the
multilateral and bilateral regimes are apparent. In terms of structure, they both
address the basic principles limiting national trade policy at the primary stage and,
5 Crawford, "Rhinoceros and Tiger Trade", at 578.
6 Id.
7 See Jackson, World trading System, at 34. In addition to the FCN treaties, other bilateral agi cements
have been developed to facilitate mutual economic intercourse, generally including sectoral trade
agreements, investment promotion and protection treaties, and industrial, scientific/technical, and
economic cooperation agreements. See Herrmann, Commercial Treaties, at 89-91.
8 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America (US) and the
Republic of China (ROC), 63 U.S.T. 1299, TIAS 1871, signed at Nanking in 4 Nov. 1946; entered into
force in 30 Nov. 1948 [hereinafer FCN treaty between the US and The ROC], It should be noted that
the term of "the Republic of China" and "Taiwan" are interchangeable in this study.
9 The early effort for the US to conclude the FCN treaties could be dated from the late eighteenth
century, namely the 1794 Jay Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, which was originally
negotiated with England and still binds the US and Canada. See Janis, International Law, at 281. As
of 1990, the US has entered into the FCN treaties with over 40 countries. See US Department of State,
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then, specify exceptional clauses under which inconsistent measures may be justified.
In substance, most-favoured-nation (MFN) and national treatment principles heralded
by the FCN treaties have been effectively incorporated into the WTO/GATT mandate,
which, as remarked, "became pillars of the GATT structure."10 Several decisions
delivered by the WTO/GATT, as mentioned, have contributed to clarification and
elaboration of the GATT rules regarding the use of environmental trade measures. In
contrast, very few cases, apart from the Nicaragua case, have been brought to
international tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ)," concerning
the legality of trade embargoes under bilateral FCN treaties, let alone measures
imposed for environmental purposes. The scant jurisprudence, therefore, constrains
the extent of the current research. Also, the lack of substantial precedents will
increase the difficulty in assessing the consistency of the Pelly-type sanctions with the
bilateral agreement properly. Nevertheless, given the similar legal formation between
the FCN treaties and the GATT rules on trade issues, it seems that, to some extent,
certain jurisprudence of the latter may assist the interpretation and application of the
rules of the former upon the use of environmental trade measures. Accordingly, for
the sake of expedience, this chapter will discuss the multilateral GATT/WTO rule
first, followed by the FCN treaty.
Multilateral Agreement-WTO/GA TT
Treaties in Force 1990, 1-275.
10 Jackon, World Trading System, at 35.
" Pursuant to Article 28 of the FCN treaty between the US and the ROC, the ICJ shall govern the
dispute settlement unless the contracting parties agree to settlement by other pacific means. The Court
had dealt with the assertion of the violation of FCN obligations in the Hostage and Platform cases. But,
none of them involved with the use of trade measures.
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Although the use of trade sanctions had been brought to the GATT's attention,12
the WTO/GATT regime has not yet squarely addressed the legality of environmental
trade sanctions. Nonetheless, in reality, the use of "trade restrictions" had been under
scrutiny of its rules in the past decade. The two Tuna/Dolphin cases,13 as well as the
Shrimp/Turtle case, 14 represent the most notable decisions. Regardless of the
distinction between "trade restrictions" and "trade sanctions," they share a common
nature of economic embargoes designed to force a change of national environmental
conduct. 15 The GATT/WTO jurisprudence enunciated from the above cases,
therefore, might facilitate the assessment of the consistency of an environmental
sanction with the GATT rules.
The section first focuses on the examination of the applicable WTO/GATT rules
to the dispute. The tasks begin with the study of the basic trade principles that may
be applicable to the dispute aroused by environmental trade embargo, normally in the
form of imports ban. Then it will proceed to analyse the provisions of general
exception that may serve a basis to justify those trade measures that have been in
breach of the WTO/GATT's primary obligations. Finally, for a hypothetical study,
the consistency of the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan with the WTO/GATT will be
assessed.
A The fundamental principles of the WTO/GATT
1 Non-discrimination principles of Article I and III
12 Trade embargoes strikingly used for national security reason had been brought to the GATT's
attention in the 1980's Nicaragua case. See United States—Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, the Panel
Report, adopted on 13 March 1984, BISD/31S/67.
13 United States—Restrictions on Import of Tuna, the Panel Report, 3 Sep. 1991, GATT, DS21/R, not
adopted [hereinafter Tuna /]; United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, the Panel Report, 16 June
1994, DS29/R, not adopted [hereinafter Tuna II].
14 United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, the Panel Report, 15 May
1998, WT/DS58/R [hereinafter Shrimp Panel]; United States—Imports Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, the Appellate Body Report, 12 Oct. 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R [hereinafter Shrimp
App.].
15 The Appellate Body observed that the US shrimp embargo "is designed to influence countries to
adopt national regulatory programs . . .by their shrimp fishermen." See the Shrimp App., para. 138.
Further, emphasizing "its intended and actual coercive effect on the specific policy decisions made by
foreign government, the tribunal noted that the measure "[i]s, in effect, an economic embargo . . ." Id.
para. 161. Similarly, according to the Japan's submission to the Tuna I case, the US tuna embargo was
regarded as a sanctions mechanism to force other countries to adopt policies set by the US. See the
Tuna I, at para. 4.19.
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The elimination of discriminatory treatment is the core mandate of the
VVTO/GATT regime embodied in GATT 1994. 16 The document specifies two
fundamental non-discrimination principles. Article I, the most-favoured-nation
(MFN) principle, requires equal treatment between like products originating in or
destined for the territories of all other contracting parties. The national treatment
principle of Article III prohibits discrimination between imported products and the
like domestic products. It is clear that the discrimination prohibited by these articles
is between "like products." Thus, discrimination may be permissible if products are
not alike.
As the economic and development discrepancy between countries remains, the
same products may be produced by different methods causing various environmental
impact.17 The problem thus may be raised as to whether production process or
method is able to affect the likeness of a product. If the method of production may be
allowed to make the essentially same products legally not like, it implies, under
GATT 1994, the products produced by an environment-unfriendly method may be
treated differently without violating Article I or Article III.18
The GATT/WTO practice, however, indicates that the trade regime have not yet
endorsed such broad view. The prevailing view of the trade regime discloses that the
concept of "like product" is still confined to the physical characteristics of the
products themselves rather than their method of production. A 1971 GATT study
remarked that the low price of goods produced by a country without sufficient
environmental regulations is simply that country's competitive advantage, and may
not be deemed unfair.19 Further, the approach was confirmed by the Tuna/Dolphin
case. The panel concluded that the tuna harvested by Mexican vessels was "like" tuna
harvested by US vessels, despite the fact that the incidental taking of dolphins by
Mexican vessels in the production process did not correspond to that of US vessels.20
Therefore, in assessing the GATT-consistency of a trade-related environmental
measure, the measure discriminates between like products based on their method of
16 See the preamble ofGATT 1994.
17 McDonald, "Greening GATT", at 409-10; Jackson, World Trading System, at 235-36.
18 See Research and Policy Comm., Comm.. for Economic Dev., Breaking New Ground in US Trade
Policy 73 (1991).
19 Industrial pollution Control and International Trade, GATT Studies in International Trade No 1, at 23
(1971).
20 Tuna /, at para. 5.15.
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production may be in breach ofGATT's non-discrimination obligations.21
As the direct import ban against products produced by an environmentally
unfriendly method has been used to influence other nations' policy, the following
discussion attempts to reveal whether in practice those GATT principles may apply to
the trade restrictions.
(a) Most-Favoured-Nation principle
A measure discriminating between like products imported from countries using
differential environmental standards arguably could be inconsistent with MFN
requirements of Article I.22 In practice, however, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement
system has not yet provided a definite answer to whether the use of that measure was
a violation ofMFN.
In the 1991 Tuna/Dolphin dispute, Mexico did not challenge the US tuna imports
ban by claiming a MFN violation.23 Rather, it alleged a breach of Article I by US
labelling provisions of the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA),24
which allegedly discriminated against Mexico as a country fishing in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP).25 The panel noted that the DPCIA accords the right to
use the label "Dolphin Safe" for tuna harvested in the ETP without using dolphin-
harmful fishing techniques.26 The panel finally dismissed Mexico's contention, given
the acknowledgement that the labelling regulations applied to all countries whose
vessels fished in this area and thus did not distinguish between products originating in
Mexico and products from other countries.27 The panel decision, nevertheless, cannot
virtually exempt the US tuna embargo against a specified country, Mexico, from
violating the MFN principle.28
21 One assumes that those countries whose products using an environmentally sound method could take
the following measures to avoid competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other countries with relatively
lower environmental standards. They include: (1) banning goods manufactured with an
environmentally damaging process; (2) imposing an additional charge at the border equaling the
difference in cost of production as result of the regulations; or (3) imposing a tax on all goods linked to
the cost of regulation, with a rebate or subsidy for domestic producers. Those measures all may
contravene the GATT basic principles. See Jackson, World Trading System, at 236.
22 See Jackson, id. at 236.
23 Despite Mexico did not allege the violation of Article I by the tuna embargo, a third party, like
Australia maintained that "the country-specific import prohibition in the Marine Mammal Protection
Act discriminated between like tuna and tuna products in violation of Article I: 1; . . ." Tuna /, at para.
4.2.
24 Pub.L. No. 101-627, 104 Stat. 4465 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 1385)
23 Id. at para. 5.42.
26 Id. at para. 5.43.
21 Id.
2li It is predicted that a future panel would simply limit this part of the decision to the use of restrictive
product labelling. See McDonald, "Greening GATT", at 412.
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In fact, the issue became a real controversy in the recent Shrimp/Turtle dispute.
The complainants claimed that the US's import prohibition on shrimp and shrimp
products from certain countries was inconsistent with the MFN principle because the
physically identical shrimp and shrimp products from the targeted countries were
treated differently with like products from other countries.29 The US denied the
violation of Article I, contending its measure applied equally to all harvesting
Members.30 Ultimately, the tribunal decided to avoid dealing with the issue simply
because it considered that the finding on the violation of other provision by the US
shrimp embargo made it unnecessary to spend the ink to review the claim.31
Unfortunately, the tribunal missed the chance to clarify the consistency of an
imports ban against a like product whose production process causing environmental
damage with the MFN obligation. Thus, the issue perhaps would continue to be
debated.
(b) National treatment principle
Under Article III, discriminatory "internal measures," such as taxes, charges,
laws or regulations cannot be implemented between domestic products and similar
imported products. As countries tend to prohibit the importation of certain products
produced by an environmentally harmful method, the question will be raised as to
whether the national treatment norm applies to environmental measures. Strictly
speaking, Article III is not literally relevant to the direct import ban simply because
the measure targeting on imported goods would not be regarded as an internal
measure.32 Nevertheless, the argument in the 1991 Tuna case offered a good chance
to examine the applicability ofArticle III to the environmental imports ban.
In the Tuna/Dolphin dispute, the US argued that its tuna embargo constituted an
enforcement at the time or point of importation of the regulations of the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) relating to the harvesting of tuna. Thus, the actions
should be permitted by Article III: 4 and the Note Ad Article III.33 The focal point the
29 Shrimp panel, at para. 7.18.
30 Id. at para. 7.21.
31 Id. at para. 7.22. The panel regarded its avoidance of addressing the claim was in conformity with the
WTO/GATT practices among which a judgement in the Wool Shirts case mentioned that "A panel need
only address those claims which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in the
dispute." Id.
32 Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 776.
33 Tuna /, at paras. 3.19; 5.8. The Note Ad Article 111 provides that:
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Panel has to clarify is whether the tuna harvesting regulations aimed at reducing the
incidental taking of dolphins would amount to an internal measure defined in those
provisions. Examining the text of the national treatment obligation, the Panel found
that Article III: 4 and the Note Ad Article III refer solely to internal measures that
may affect products as such.34 As a result, under the Note, the panel observed that an
import ban on a product might be permissible if the action was aimed at enforcing "at
the border an internal sales prohibition applied to both imported and like domestic
products."35 The Panel then noted that the MMPA regulations concerning only
fishing technique "could not be regarded as being applied to tuna products as such
because they would not directly regulate the sale of tuna and could not possibly affect
tuna as a product."35 Therefore, the Panel concluded that the US tuna embargo
designed to enforce the MMPA requirements were not related to the GATT's national
treatment provisions.37
In the Tuna II case, the issue has been raised again. Likewise, the panel rejected
that national treatment provisions were applicable to such measure, basing on the
same reasoning as Tuna I.38 Furthermore, the non-invocation of Article III as an
applicable law in the recent Shrimp/Turtle dispute seems to signal that the
inapplicability ofArticle III to the PPM imports ban has been widely accepted.
2 General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions of Article XI
Apart from the non-discriminatory principles specified in Article I and III,
Article XI institutes another primary rule of GATT. Subject to several narrow
exceptions,39 the provision outlaws imposition of prohibitions or restrictions other
Any . . . law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 which applies to an
imported product and to the like domestic product and is . . . enforced in the case of the imported
product at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal . . . law,
regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1, and is accordingly subject to the
provisions of Article III. See GATT 1994, Annex.
34 Tuna I, at para. 5.11.
35 Id.
36 Id. at para. 5.14
37 Id. and para. 5.15. Mexico ever raised the complaint that the US MMPA requirements offered less
favorable treatment to tuna products from Mexico than that accorded to like US tuna products, which
violated GATT Article 111. In line with its previous finding, the panel dismissed the claim. See id. para.
5.16.
38 Tuna II, at paras. 5.8; 5.9.
39 Article XI: 2 lists three types of exemption from the obligation of Article XI: 1. They include: (a)
export restrictions to relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs and other products "essential" to the
exporting contracting party; (b) import or export restrictions necessary to the application of standards
for grading or classifying commodities; and (c) import restrictions on agricultural or fisheries products
that are necessary to the enforcement of certain governmental policy measures.
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than duties, taxes, or other charge on the importation, exportation or sale for export of
any product.
In contrast to the non-discriminatory principles, Article XI appears to be the
most relevant applicable law to the measure involving a direct import ban. The
GATT/WTO tribunals have constantly delivered a clear and straightforward
judgement regarding a violation of Article XI by the prohibition of imports of a
product from countries not meeting certain environmental policy. In the Tuna I case,
the panel found that the US's tuna embargo constituted a prohibition or restriction on
the importation of tuna within the meaning of Article XX.40 Like the Tuna I
judgement, the Tuna II Panel stressed the embargoes were not "duties, taxes or other
charges," thereby ruling that the US's imports ban was inconsistent with Article XI.41
Also, noting the previous tuna adjudication dealing with the similar issue, the panel,
in the recent Shrimp case, therefore found that the US prohibition on imports of
shrimp was in violation of Article XI.42 It should be noted that, in the above cases,
the country taking the measure had not substantially disputed the allegation of such
violation.43
Given that none of the exceptions in Article XI would be relevant to
environmental measure,44 it may be therefore concluded that any invocation of an
imports ban for environmental purposes would be generally deemed contrary to
Article XI. The principle thus proves to be the most plausible law to prohibit such
environmental trade measures.
B The implication of "General Exceptions" of Article XX to environmental
protection
1 General observation
Notwithstanding the obligations of non-discrimination and other principles,
WTO members are still permitted to implement trade restrictions inconsistent with
those principles if specific requirements are met. The GATT sets up a provision
entitled "General Exceptions" ofArticle XX as a basis of justifying those inconsistent
40 Tuna I, at para. 5.18.
41 Tuna II, at para. 5.10.
42 Shrimp panel, at paras. 7.16,7.17.
43 See Tuna I, para. 5.18; In the Shrimp case, because the US did not dispute that its measure amounted
to a restriction on the importation of shrimp, the panel regarded that such an admission of a particular
fact entitled the tribunal to consider such fact as accurate. See Shrimp panel, at para. 7.15.
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measures.45 The legislation is an indication that legitimate national interests may
supercede the trade liberalisation underpinned by several substantive rules.40 In other
words, the creation of Article XX represents the flexibility of the trade rule. It allows
a contracting party to adopt trade measures against the mandate of the law under
exceptional and specified circumstances.47 In particular, the provisions provide some
specific criteria allowing certain environmental trade measures to be justified,
including:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption;
In addition, some general requirements are placed in "chapeau", stating:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute
a means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party ofmeasures:
To have a better understanding of the operation and application of this provision,
several aspects need to be clarified before starting to explore the implications of
individual clause.
(a) Its interaction with other general rules of the GATT
Arguably, the applicability of this provision rests on the previous violations of
the principles of the law. Hence there is no need to apply the article if it has been
proved that no breach of the WTO/GATT's obligations occur.48
It is inconsistent to simultaneously argue the consistency of a measure with
general rules of the GATT law and justification of the measure under Article XX.
44 See Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, the Panel Report, 22
Mar. 1988, BISD/ 35S/ 98 [hereinafter Herring and Salmon].
45 In addition to the introductory note, Article XX lists ten circumstances by which trade measures may
be justified, covering the policies aimed to protect or promote public morals, environment, trade of gold
or silver, customs enforcement, monopoly laws, banning prison products. See Article XX of GATT
1994, paragraph (a) to (j).
46 The Appellate Body of the WTO, in the Gasoline case, stressed that "In enumerating the various
categories of governmental acts, laws or regulations which WTO Members may carry out or
promulgate in pursuit of differing legitimate state policies or interests outside the realm of trade
liberalization, . . ." See United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
Appellate Body Report, adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R [hereinafter Gasoline App.].
47 Id.
48 See McDonald, "Greening GATT", at 408.
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But, it should be noted that, in reality, the acting party would find it difficult to
predict whether the measure could be regarded as consistent with general principles
or not. A defendant party, thus, should be allowed to place the invocation of Article
XX as an alternative statement. In the 1991 Tuna/Dolphin case, the Panel states
accordingly:
[a] party to a dispute could argue in the alternative that Article XX might apply, without this
argument constituting ipso facto an admission that the measures in question would otherwise be
inconsistent with the General Agreement. Indeed, the efficient operation of the dispute
settlement process required that such argument in the alternative be possible.''9
Moreover, although the exceptional clauses may be invoked to override the
substantive obligations, there seems to be no inherent conflict between these two
schools of trade law. In illuminating the relationship between Article XX (g) and
GATT as a whole, in the Gasoline case, the Appellate Body remarks:
[Ajrticle XX (g) and its phrase,. . . . , need to be read in context and in such a manner as to give
effect to the purposes and objects of the General Agreement. The context of Article XX (g)
includes the provisions of the rest of the General Agreement, including in particular Articles I, III
and XI; conversely, the context of Article I and III and XI includes Article XX. Accordingly, the
phrase . . . may not be read so expansively as seriously to subvert the purpose and object of
Article III: 4. Nor may Article III: 4 be given so broad a reach as effectively to emasculate
Article XX (g) and the policies and interests it embodies.so
In short, in terms of promoting the purposes and objects of the WTO/GATT mandate,
they are considered to be mutually-supportive rather than mutually-destructive.
(b) Burden of proof
Article XX does not explicitly point out which party bears the burden of
indicating that an exception applies. The rulings of the GATT panel have tended to
place the burden upon the party seeking justification under the provision.51 As to a
complaining party, it thus only needs to prove "a prima facie breach of GATT
obligations to transfer the burden of justifying the measures to the party in breach."52
49 Tuna 7, at para. 5.22.
50 Gasoline App., at 20.
51 Canada—Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, 7 Feb. 1984, BISD/ 30S/140, 164, at
para. 5.20 [hereinafter Investment]', United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 7 Nov. 1989,
BISD/ 36S/345, 393, para. 5.27 [hereinafter Section 337]; see also Tuna I, at para. 5.22.
32 McDonald, "Greening GATT", at 418.
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Recently, the WTO Appellate Body, in the Wool Shirts case,5"1 has furthered the
clarification of the issue by stating that "the burden of proof rests on the party,
whether complaining or defending, which asserts the affirmative ofa particular claim
or defence."54 If an exceptional clause of Article XX is virtually invoked to justify the
use of certain trade measures, the action is considered to be in possession of the
nature of affirmative defence.55 Thus, "the burden of establishing such a defence
should rest on the party asserting it."56
(c) Strictness of interpretation of those exceptions
The question also arises as to what principle should govern the interpretation of
Article XX. The exceptional circumstance of Article XX had been generally
classified by the GATT Panel as "a limited and conditional exception from
obligations under other provisions."57 Thus, it has already become a long-term
practice of the panels to interpret this provision narrowly.58 The Panel, in the Tuna I
case, further observed that the Article is "not a positive rule establishing obligations
in itself. Therefore, the practice of panels has been to interpret Article XX
narrowly, . ,"59
The strictness of interpretation of Article XX virtually is in conformity with the
doctrine of "Exceptio est strictissimae interpretationis." Because the exception may
operate as to discard the application of the "principle" of the GATT, it must be subject
to rigid interpretation. Otherwise, a broad approach is likely to run the risk of
eliminating the possibility of applying the principle.60
2 Interpretation and application of Article XX
(a) The relationship between chapeau and individual exceptions
The justification of a particular trade measure under Article XX, as shown
above, has to meet the two sets of criteria. First is the chapeau. Second, the measure
53 United States —Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, the
Appellate Body Report, adopted on 23 May 1997, WT/DS33/AB/R [hereinafter Wool App.].
"Id. at 14.
"Id. at 16.
36 Id. see also Shrimp Panel, at para. 7.14, 7.30; Gasoline App., at 20.
57 See Section 337, paras. 5.9 [emphasis added].
38 Tuna II, at para. 5.26.
39 Tuna I, at para. 5.22. See also Investment, at para. 5.20.
60 Cheng, Legal Maxim, at 24.
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must satisfy a number of specific exceptions embodied in the sub-paragraphs as well.
They arc parallel requirements.
It should be noted that, regardless of the order of examining these two sets of
criteria, neither one needs to be further reviewed if the other one cannot be satisfied.
In other words, the necessity to examine the subsequent element rests on the
fulfillment of the previous category of requirement. For instance, in the Gasoline
case, due to the WTO Panel's finding that the US's baseline establishment methods
did not qualify the scope of a particular exceptional clause, Article XX (b), the Panel
decided not to "proceed to examine whether it met also the conditions in the
introductory clause to Article XX."61 Similarly, in 1998, as the WTO Panel concluded
that the US's shrimp embargo could not be justified under the chapeau of Article
XX,62 it found it unnecessary to examine whether the US measures could be covered
by the terms ofArticle XX (b) or (g).63
In the process of adjudicating whether the measure may be justified under the
provision, it is pertinent to discuss which school of requirement should be examined
first. Chamovitz seemed to favor the first reviewing of chapeau condition because
"The provisions in the headnote can be viewed as gateway requirements to gain
access to the exceptions in the Article XX subsections."64 But, on the other hand, the
WTO/GATT tribunals have not drawn a definite conclusion until the recent
judgements.
Basically, the past practices indicated the inclination to first analyse the specific
paragraphs of the Article before considering the chapeau's application to the measure
under complaint.65 In particular, the Appellate Body, in the Gasoline case, made a
firm decision with respect to the order of applying the Article XX by declaring that:
In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, the measure at issue
must not only come under one or another of the particular exceptions—paragraphs (a) to (j)—listed
under Article XX. The analysis is, in other words, two-tiered: first, provisional justification by
reason of characterization of the measure under XX (g); second further appraisal of the same
measure under the introductory clauses ofArticle XX.66
61 Gasoline Panel, at para. 6.29.
62 Shrimp Panel, at para. 7.62.
63 Id. at para. 7.63.
64 Chamovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 778.
63 Shrimp Panel, at para. 7.28.
66 Gasoline App., at 20 [emphasis added].
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It is probably the first express disclosure of the WTO/GATT's position on "the
sequence of steps"67 for examining elements contained in Article XX. Regrettably, no
reason has been formulated in support of this arrangement.
Nevertheless, such method of applying Article XX has not yet prevented the
subsequent WTO decision from taking a differential approach. The Panel report on
the US's shrimp import ban represented a novel but subversive view on this issue.
Even noting that the past practices have used to consider the particular exceptions
before the chapeau,68 the Panel seemed confident on that the practice has not become
a fixed rule. The Panel thus contemplated that it was discretionary for the dispute
settlement body to decide which criterion should be reviewed first. No wonder, the
Appellate Body, reviewing the panel report, found that "The Panel appears to suggest,
albeit indirectly, that following the indicated sequence of steps, or the inverse thereof,
does not make any difference."69
In particular, the Panel pointed out that "[a]s the conditions contained in the
introductory provision apply to any of the paragraphs of Article XX, it seems equally
appropriate to analyse first the introductory provision ofArticle XX."10 As a result,
the Panel decided to examine first whether the measures at issue satisfies the
conditions contained in the chapeau on the ground that "the chapeau determines to a
large extent the context of the specific exceptions contained in the paragraphs of
Article XX."71
Yet, the Panel's approach did not eventually win the approval of the Appellate
Body. In reviewing the findings of the Panel, the Appellate Body took a stand
contrary to that of the Panel and ruled that the interpretative analysis adopted by the
Panel "constitute error in legal interpretation and accordingly reverse them."72 More
importantly, it held that the sequence of steps specified in the Gasoline case is a right
and mandatory method of applying Article XX rather than a discretionary method.
To uphold the position, in the beginning, the Appellate Body made efforts to
defend the imperative of applying the "sequence of steps" presented in the Gasoline
case by solemnly declaring that the method "reflects, not inadvertence or random
67 The term seemed first used by the Appellate Body in the Shrimp case. See Shrimp App., at para. 117.
68 Shrimp Panel, at para. 7.28.
69 Shrimp App., at para. 119.
70 Shrimp Panel, at para. 7.28[emphasis added],
71 Id. para. 7.29.
72 Shrimp App., at para. 122.
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choice, but rather the fundamental structure and logic of Article XX."73
Moreover, the dispute settlement body enunciated the reasons why rules
governing the interpretation of Article XX demand that the chapeau conditions not be
examined ahead of the terms of the specific exceptions. Basically, the Appellate
Body's analysis rested on two arguments.
First, it considered that the nature of the chapeau makes it difficult to carry out a
direct interpretation of it without first examining the specific conditions in the sub¬
paragraphs of Article XX.74 Clearly, unlike those exceptional clauses serving
particular national interests, the chapeau language is abstract. Hence, the Appellate
Body regards that "The standards established in the chapeau are, moreover,
necessarily broad in scope and reach ..." The application of the chapeau accordingly
shall function differently and thus possess distinct implications pending on the
invocation of various exceptions. The Appellate Body correctly observed that:
When applied in a particular case, the actual contours and contents of these standards will vary
as the kind of measure under examination varies. What is appropriately characterizable as
"arbitrary discrimination" or "unjustifiable discrimination", or as a "disguised restriction on
international trade" in respect of one category ofmeasures, need not be so with respect to another
group or type of measures. The standard of "arbitrary discrimination", for example, under the
chapeau may be different for a measure that purports to be necessary to protect public morals
than for one relating to the products ofprison labourT
In the light of the above analysis, in order to have a more accurate application of the
chapeau, it appears an essential step to determine first the provisional justification of
a measure under a particular exception. Then, the chapeau should be considered
subsequently.
Secondly, the Appellate Body highlighted the undesirable consequence caused
by the Panel's interpretative approach in an attempt to prove the existence of the flaw
and inappropriateness embodied in the Panel's method. As indicated, the abstract
concept of the chapeau is highly likely to be subject to a random interpretation unless
it is confined to a certain ambit of a particular exceptional provision. The Appellate
Body thus found that the Panel's approach tends to be at the risk of overly broadening
the scope of the chapeau conditions. In reality, the Panel in the Shrimp/Turtle dispute
73 Id. at para. 119.
74 Id. at para. 120.
"Id.
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did formulate an extensive standard and a test that all are beyond "either in the text of
the chapeau or in that of either of the two specific exceptions claimed by the United
States."76 As a result, the Panel found the US's measure illegal under the chapeau
conditions on the ground that it "conditions access to the domestic shrimp market of
the United States on the adoption by exporting countries of certain conservation
policies prescribed by the United States." However, as the Appellate Body
maintained, such character embodied in any trade measure "may, to some degree, be a
common aspect of measures falling within the scope of one or another of the
exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX."1' The Appellate Body therefore concluded that
the broad interpretation of the chapeau elements "renders most, if not all, of the
specific exceptions of Article XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the principles of
interpretation we are bound to apply."78
To summarise, the Appellate Body in the Shrimp case had an in-depth
elaboration over the method of the "sequence of steps" established in the Gasoline
case. The tribunal articulated convincing grounds aimed at rejecting the liberal
approach adopted by the Panel. As Atik observes, "The 'chapeau later' approach .. .
squares nicely with the 'eminent domain' reading of Shrimp-Turtle."79 Arguably, the
model set by the Appellate Body will make it difficult for the subsequent dispute
settlement organ to resort to a different approach, such as the one favoured by the
Panel in the Shrimp case.
(b) Common issues with respect to the application of environmental
exceptions in Article XX—limitation on the geographic application of Article
(b) and (g)
As indicated above, there are two primary items related to environmental
concern listed in the exceptional clauses of Article XX, namely sub-paragraphs (b)
and (g).80 Before analysing the requirements embodied in respective clause, a
common prerequisite underlying both exceptions should be addressed. In short, it is
essential to explore the geographic scope of applying those provisions due to the fact
76 Id. at para. 121.
77 Id.
nId.
79 Atik, "Shrimp-Turtle", at 11.
80 In terms of treaty language, none of these exceptional clauses literally refer to "environment" mainly
because the GATT rules was drafted in 1940s when environmental protection has not seriously
attracted world wide attention.
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that the recent use of environmental trade measures, like tuna or shrimp embargo, was
aimed at national conduct beyond the territory of the implementing country.
Indeed, it is difficult to decide the geographic range of paragraph (b) and (g)
simply by reading the texts of them. Hence, there has long been an intense debate
over whether the objects of alleged "human, animal or plant life or health" and
"exhaustible natural resources" the two clauses set to protect and conserve should be
interpreted to cover the environmental concern beyond national border, or to only
protect national interests. The GATT/WTO has enunciated differing approaches in
the recent decade, featuring either a strict or a broad interpretation.
(i) Strict interpretation
In the 1991 tuna/dolphin dispute, the US contended that Article XX (b) or (g)
may justify its tuna embargo against Mexico whose tuna harvest process was
considered dolphin harmful, even if these measures were inconsistent with the GATT
basic principles.81 By contrast, on the basis of the letter and spirit of Article XX,
Mexico argued that those provisions are only designed to protect environmental
interests within the territory of the party taking measures.82 Otherwise, it maintained
that, if the US's claim were justified, such broad interpretation "would have the
consequence of introducing the concept of extraterritoriality into the GATT, which
would be extremely dangerous for all contracting party."83 As a result, as Mexico
worried, "one contracting party could arrogate to itself the right to protect the life or
health of humans and animals in international areas or within the territory of other
contracting parties."84
In response, citing international wildlife agreements, like the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) that obliges a party to use trade
measures to protect species outside the jurisdiction of that party, the US defended the
justification of the imports ban aimed at pursuing environmental protection beyond its
jurisdiction.85 Further, it argued that GATT provisions actually did not specify the
limitation regarding the location of those environmental objects.86 Besides, the US
highlighted the nature of trade measures, which more or less produced effects outside
81 Tuna /, at para. 3.6.
82 Id. at paras. 3.31, 3.35 and 3.48[emphasis added],
83 Id. at para. 3.31. See also para. 3.48.
84 Id. at para. 3.35.
85 Id. at para. 3.36.
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the territory of a contracting party. Overall, it argued that the trade embargo was not
an extraterritorial application of the US's legislation, but "simply specified the
products that could be marketed in the territory of the United States."87
On this critical issue, the Panel admitted that no clear answer could be found
merely by reading the text of these clauses concerning the geographic range of
applying the environmental exceptions.88 The Panel, therefore, decided to clarify the
implication of the treaty by the following criteria: the drafting history of the article,
its purpose, and the consequences resulted from applying the interpretations proposed
by the parties.
Relying on the preparatory work of drafting Article XX (b),89 the Panel observed
that the provision was originally to contain the proviso: "if corresponding domestic
safeguards under similar conditions exist in the importing country." Though this
arrangement was considered unnecessary and thus dropped eventually, the record, the
Panel concluded, "indicates that the concerns of the drafters of Article XX (b) focused
on the use of sanitary measures to safeguard life or health of humans, animals or
plants within the jurisdiction ofthe importing country. "90
The Panel further recalled the finding of a previous panel that the exceptions in
Article XX are designed to "allow parties to impose trade restrictive measures
inconsistent with the General Agreement to pursue overriding public policy goals to
the extent that such inconsistencies were unavoidable."91 It seemed to the Panel that
the policy of using trade measures for extraterritorial environmental concern was not
unavoidable. More important, it proclaimed the undesirable consequence of adopting
the US's broad interpretation of Article XX (b), which would allow each party to
dictate "the life or health protection polices from which other contracting parties
could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement."
Hence the US approach, the Panel worried, would be detrimental to the multilateral
framework of the Agreement, and "provide legal security only in respect of trade
between a limited number of contracting parties with identical internal regulations."92
86 Id. at para. 3.42.
87 Id. at para. 3.49.
88 Id. at para. 5.25.
89 The inclusion of Article XX (b) was proposed by the US and the UK, which was embodied in the
Draft Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO). See Charnovitz, "Environmental
Exceptions", at 43-45.
90 Tuna I, at para. 5.26 [emphasis added].
91 Id. at para. 5.27.
92 Id.
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As to sub-paragraph (g) of Article XX, invoking the identical reasoning as it had
used in Article XX (b), the Panel mainly spelt out the unacceptable result of applying
the exception extensively.9;< The Panel thus was in favour of limiting alleged
"exhaustible natural resources" to those situated in the territory of the party taking the
measures.
Not surprisingly, the resistance of the Panel to justify trade measures which were
imposed for global or transboundary environmental purposes aroused severe
criticism. The drafting history, critics argued, did not prevent parties from protecting
global commons by implementing trade restrictions.94 Rather, after a thorough
examination of the preparatory work of the Agreement, Chamovitz observed that
nations are permitted to take trade measures for extraterritorial environmental
concern.95 Additionally, the Panel ruling was also deemed unsympathetic to the
increasing importance of global environmental treaties that utilise a trade tool to
fulfill their goals.96
It is admitted that the reading of historical documents is likely to lead to a
differing interpretation on sub-paragraph (b) and (g) of Article XX, notwithstanding
by narrow or broad view. The Panel's comprehension of the draft history may be not
entirely accurate.97 Yet, as Jackson points out that citing preparatory work simply is
an ancillary means of interpreting treaties.98 He thus urges the shift of focus on
several decades of practice since the creation of GATT, which has been in favor of
limited application of those exceptions to national environmental concern.99 More
important, he arguably acknowledged the potential risk, as the Panel indicated above,
of applying the exceptions abroad. In short, the extraterritorial application of Article
XX (b) and (g), he concluded, would create the consequence of a "slippery slope"100
that could undermine the multilateral trading system.
To sum up, the Tuna decision shown the tendency of the Panel's rejection of
trade measures aimed at advancing the environment outside the jurisdiction of a
93 Id. at para. 5.32.
94 Dunoff, "Prosper and Protect", at 1416-17.
95 Charnovitz, "Environmental Exceptions", at 37.
96 MacDonald, "Greening GATT", at 432-33. Those environmental treaties mainly include: Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Basel Convention on Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Waste and Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Flora and Fauna.
97 See Christensen, "Environmental Regulation", at 583-85.
98 Jackson, "Congruence or Conflict", at 1241.
99 Id. at 1238-39, 1241-42.
100 Id. at 1242.
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implementing party, even though other exeeptional clauses, like measures related to
prison products,101 do have extraterritorial effect. In addition, the ruling reflected that
the Panel virtually abided by the principle requiring the rigid interpretation of
exceptional provisions. 102 Nevertheless, it remained unclear whether subsequent
tribunals would invoke the Tuna judgement partly because the GATT did not adopt
the Panel report.103
(ii) Broad interpretation
a. The second Tuna/Dolphin dispute
In 1994, the GATT Panel considered another tuna/dolphin case brought by
European Economic Community (EEC) and the Netherlands, which were under
intermediary embargo launched by the US. The issue of geographic limitation with
respect to the exceptional clauses of Article (b) and (g) remained a moot point. The
US still insisted that both paragraphs have not set a requirement for the resources or
living things, like dolphins, to be within the territorial jurisdiction of the country
taking the measures.104 The EEC and the Netherlands held the opposite opinion.105
In contrast to the narrow view adopted by the Tuna I Panel, the Tuna II Panel
arrived at a relatively broader conclusion by considering factors somewhat different
from those of the former. But, it should be born in mind, strictly speaking, the Panel,
unlike the Tuna / judgement, considered sub-paragraph (b) and sub-paragraph (g) on
different legal grounds.
(1) Article XX (g)
As to natural resources, at first, the Panel, concurring with the Tuna I, recognised
that no explicit limitation on the location of the exhaustible natural resources to be
conserved has been specified.106 The Panel then noted that two previous panels have
considered migratory species of fish were covered by Article (g), irrespective of being
101 See Article XX (e) ofGATT 1994.
102 See above discussion.
103 The unadopted panel report thus had no direct legal effect. See Kingsbury, "Tuna-Dolphin
Controversy", at 1. However, the legal opinion of the report, even not adopted, has still been cited by
the latter judgement. See Shrimp Panel, at para. 7.46.
104 Tuna II, at para. 5.11.
103 Id.
106 Id. at para. 5.15.
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caught within or outside the territorial jurisdiction of the party taking the measure.107
In order to prove extraterritorial application has not entirely been excluded in Article
XX, the Panel further pointed that measures may be permissible concerning things
located, or actions occurring, outside the border of parties, such as Article XX (e)
relating to products of prison labour.108
A number of environmental and trade treaties were presented by either party to
sustain their arguments. Examining the rules of interpretation embodied in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,109 the Panel denied the relevance of those
treaties to the interpretation of those exceptional clauses.110 The Convention specifies
that those agreements to be considered in support of the interpretation of a treaty must
be concluded after the latter and have connection with it. The Panel found that either
they were created prior to the GATT or that "no direct references were made to these
treaties in the text of the General Agreement."
Moreover, unlike the Panel Report in the Tuna I case, the Panel obviously
lessened the significance of utilising drafting history in facilitating the interpretation
of Article XX (g). It correctly observed that such materials were unable to provide
reliable and clear evidences on which either contention of the parties over the issue of
the location of the natural resources could be based.111
The Panel finally concluded that "no valid reason supporting the conclusion that
the provisions of Article XX (g) apply only to polices related to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources located within the territory of the contracting party
invoking the provision."112 In effect, in terms of Article XX (g), geographic limitation
was found baseless in this Panel report. But, on the other hand, unfortunately, apart
from citing the previous panel's decisions, it failed to elaborate the substantial reasons
to sustain its argument.
Admittedly, in contrast to the Tuna I case, the approach employed by the Panel
in the interpretation of Article XX (g) represents an improvement, which no longer
relied on the drafting history as a crucial reference. Clearly, it dropped the linkage of
such an extensive approach to the risk of "slippery slope" raised in the Tuna / dispute.
107 Id. see also Herring and Salmon; United States—Prohibition of imports of tuna and tuna products
from Canada, the Panel Report, adopted 22 February 1982, 29S/91 [hereinafer Canada Tuna].
108 Tuna II, at para. 5.16.
109 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), 1155 UNTS 336,
signed at Vienna 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980.
110 Tuna II, at paras. 5.19, 5.20.
111 Id. at para. 5.20.
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Further, it seemed to alloeate the task of preventing such risk to other conditions
provided in same article.113
(2) Article XX (b)
Basically, the Panel followed the same reasoning used in interpreting Article XX
(g) in dealing with the location of the living thing to be protected under Article XX
(b)."4 But, it did not mention whether previous panels have approved the use of trade
measures aimed to address the protection of living things outside the territory of the
party taking the measure. In fact, it has been observed that no practices of the GATT
system have ever endorsed such extensive interpretation over sub-paragraph (b).115
Ultimately, the Panel seemed hesitant to make a firm judgement on the "precise
scope of the policy area"116 for Article XX (b) as its ruling for Article XX (g). It
simply saw that there was no need to assess "whether the intent of the drafters was to
restrict measures justifiable under Article XX to sanitary measures."117 It is therefore
not clear whether the requirement of geographic limitation should be imposed on
Article XX (b).118
b. Shrimp/Turtle dispute
Again, the US's shrimp imports ban against some Asian countries aimed at the
conservation of sea turtles aroused the same issue regarding the extraterritorial
application of environmental measures. The WTO tribunals, mainly the Appellate
Body, adopted a new method to assess if sea turtles, even located outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the party taking the measures, may still be covered by Article
XX (g). In contrast to the two Tuna cases, the Appellate Body avoided directly
determining whether any geographic limitation has been imposed on the exception.
Rather, it stated: "We do not pass upon the question of whether there is an implied
jurisdictional limitation in Article XX (g), and if so, the nature or extent that
112 Id.
113 Article XX (g) ofGATT 1994 spells out several elements to be satisfied. See the discussion below.
'14 Tuna II, at paras. 5.31 to 5.33.
115 See Jackson, "Congruence or Conflict", at 1240-41.
116 See Tuna II, at para. 5.31.
117 Tuna II, at para. 5.33.
118 Cf. One commentator took an extensive view on the Tuna II Panel report, holding that the Panel has
accepted that these exceptions could apply no matter where the plants, animals were located. See
Kingsbury, "Tuna-Dolphin Controversy", at 20, n. 47.
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limitation.""0 In effect, the tribunal focused on the examination of particular
situations regarding the sea turtles case. It noted that the highly migratory and
transboundary nature of sea turtles "passing in and out of waters subject to the rights
of jurisdiction of various coastal states and high seas."121' Further, the Appellate Body
recognised that the US did exercise jurisdiction over the waters where sea turtles
occur. Given the observation of the above two critical elements, it found that " We
note only that in the specific circumstances of the case before us, there is a sufficient
nexus between the migratory and endangered marine populations involved and the
United States for purposes of Article XX (g)."m Hence, in light of the finding, the US
measures imposed for protecting sea turtles met the condition of the "conservation of
natural resources" under Article XX (g).
The ruling, surely, would provide some relief to those who support the use of
trade measures by parties for global environmental protection.122 In response to the
ruling of the Appellate Body, the US responded that: "... [t]he Appellate Body made
a number of important and positive findings that help clarify the critical relationship
between WTO rules and measures taken to protect the environment."123 Indeed, the
decision has officially opened up a gate for the extraterritorial application of
environmental measures under the WTO legal regime. Encouraged by the ruling,
Perkins contends, "[a] WTO Member may rely on Article XX (g) to justify a trade-
restrictive measure aimed at protecting environmental resources in the global
commons so long as there is at least some jurisdictional relationship between those
resource and that WTO Member."124 The statement, however, seems to be a
premature conclusion partly because the Appellate Body has already required a
"sufficient nexus" between the party taking the measure and the natural resources to
be conserved in order to ensure the fulfillment of the aim of Article XX (g). In a
sense, the application of the standard will vary pending on the distinct circumstances
surrounding the implementation of certain environmental trade measures. As the
119 Shrimp App., at para. 133[emphasis added],
120 Id.
121 A/.[emphasis added],
122 Perkins, "Shrimp Prohibition", at 119. See also Dunoff, "Border Patrol", at 25.
123 See Statement of Ambassador Rita Derrick Hayes, Permanent U.S. Trade Representative to the
World Trade Organization to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (Nov. 25, 1998).
124 Perkins, "Shrimp Prohibition", at 119.
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content of the global commons has become increasingly diverse,125 it is quite
impossible that the WTO would simply allow the measures designed to preserve such
resources to be justified without carefully taking into account respective
circumstances affecting its judgement. The WTO tribunals accordingly are highly
likely to generate differential implications about the condition of a "sufficient nexus"
whenever a similar dispute arises. Qureshi correctly observed that: "By stipulating the
need for a nexus between the State and the object of environmental concern, the
possibility of extraterritorial application of environmental measures is opened up, as
well as limited."126 The author notes that the tribunal did not define expressly the term
of a sufficient nexus. However, he seems to agree that the new formula presented by
the Appellate Body has struck a balance between members wishing to invoke one of
the exceptions and the fundamental rights under GATT 1994. He further adds that
"The balance to be struck is determined by the notion of sustainable development, and
depends on the measure at stake and the particular circumstances of the case."127
In conclusion, the WTO ruling that to some extent demonstrated its tolerance
toward certain trade restrictions imposed to achieve environmental protection outside
the border of the acting party contains several significant messages. First, in contrast
to the two Tuna panel reports considering the similar issue, it was the first case dealt
by the newly created WTO Dispute Settlement Body regarding the extraterritorial
environmental measures, whose reasoning definitely will have certain influence over
the future dispute. Second, the issue of whether there is a general limitation on the
location of the environmental objects in Article XX (b) or (g) perhaps would be
dismissed consequently. In other words, geographic borders probably would cease to
be a main focus.128 Instead, predictably, the WTO tribunals would focus on the facts
surrounding the imposition of the measure in order to decide if such objects fall into
the scope of Article XX (b) or (g).129 The new approach may enable the tribunals to
maintain flexibility in searching for the alleged "nexus" on the case by case basis.
Third, the possibility of provisionally justifying the measure to protect extraterritorial
environment makes the relatively narrow approach taken in the Tuna I case, which
125 The global commons generally refer to the common areas of international community without being
subject to certain jurisdiction, covering the high seas, ozone layer, global climate, and the Antarctic.
See Birnie and Boyle, International Law and the Environment, at 154. ; Sands, Principles, at 16.
126 Qureshi, "Extraterritorial Shrimps", at 204[emphasis added].
127 Id.
128 Dunoff, "Border Patrol", at 25.
129 See Mann, "Revolution and Result", at 31.
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literally restricts Article XX (g) to national environmental protection, obsolete.
Finally, since neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body addressed the legality of the
shrimp embargo under Article XX (b)—the protection of living things,130 it remains to
be seen whether the new approach established for Article XX (g) may also apply to
paragraph (b). Nonetheless, due to the close nature of both exceptions, it is highly
likely that the tribunals will adopt the same reasoning to decide the policy area of
Article XX (b).
(c) Protection of living things in Article XX (b)
The environmental exception clause of Article XX (b) permits a party to adopt
measures inconsistent with the treaty's obligations to serve the policy goal of
protecting human, animal or plant life or health. But the measure must meet the test of
"necessity", which also apply to other categories, like sub-paragraph (a) and (d). The
requirement, as the Appellate Body in the Gasoline case observed, underlines the
specified "degree of connection or relationship between the measure under appraisal
and the state interest or policy sought to be promoted or realized."131
Several rulings of the GATT/WTO tribunals have contributed to the clarification
of alleged "measures necessary," using a relatively narrow method of interpretation.
In the Section 337 case, the Panel interpreted the term "necessary" in the context of
Article XX (d), stating that:
[a] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provisions as
"necessary" in terms of Article XX (d) if an alternative measure which it could reasonably be
expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it.
By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions is not
reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably
available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT
130 Since the US measure was regarded by the Panel inconsistent with the requirements in the chapeau
of Article XX, the organ found it unnecessary to examine whether the US measure is covered by the
exceptional clauses. See Shrimp Panel, at paras. 7.63, 7.29. Article XX (b) had no opportunity to be
examined by the Appellate Body because as it stated that"... the United States invokes Article XX (b)
only if and to the extent that we hold that Section 609 falls outside the scope of Article XX (g). Having
found that Section 609 does come within the terms of Article XX (g), the Appellate Body, therefore,
considered it unnecessary to analyse whether the measure met the requirement of Article XX (b)."
Shrimp App., at para. 146.
131 Gasoline App., at 16. Apart from "necessity" requirement, Article XX uses other different terms to
depict such connection or relationship for various categories of exceptional clauses. For instance,
"relating to" was set up in paragraphs (c), (e) and (g); "in pursuance of' in paragraph (h); "essential" in
paragraph (j); "for the protection of1 in paragraph (f); and "involving" in paragraph (i).
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provisions.13"
Further, the Panel in the Thai Cigarette case found that the reasoning in the above
case could be largely applicable in examining a measure under Article XX (b) when
Thailand argued that its ban on the imports of cigarette was necessary to protect
health of its nationals. The panel considered that:
The import restrictions imposed by Thailand could be considered to be "necessary" in terms of
Article XX (b) only if there were no alternative measures consistent with the General Agreement,
or less inconsistent with it, which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its
health policy objectives.133
In the light of these WTO/GATT rulings, the party invoking Article XX (b) in
justification of its inconsistent measures is required to demonstrate that no other
alternative consistent or less inconsistent measures are reasonably available to it.
The least-trade-restrictive or least degree of inconsistency approach established
in the previous practices apparently remained decisive in determining the consistency
of trade measures addressing extraterritorial environmental problems with Article XX
(b). In the Tuna I case, the Panel concluded that the US's tuna imports ban aimed at
protecting dolphins life was not necessary mainly because the latter had not
"exhausted all options reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection
objectives."134 The other available options with least inconsistency with the GATT
rules, the Panel assumed, include "[i]n particular through the negotiation of
international cooperative arrangement, . . ."135 Moreover, the Panel extraordinarily
added a further implication on the requirement of necessity by incorporating the
factor of "predictability." Because the US imposed onto exporting state its own
standard of incidental dolphin taking rate which the latter cannot predict, the Panel
considered that the US's tuna ban could not meet the terms ofArticle XX (b).136
In the Tuna II case, apart from affirming the less restrictive standard,137 the Panel
sought to confine the category of "measures necessary" as ones that may not lead to
132 Section 337, at para. 5.26.
133 Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, adopted on 7 November
1990, BISD 37S/200, at para. 75.
134 Tuna I, at para. 5.28.
135 Id. It has been argued that the US's long term efforts of attaining such international arrangement was
ignored by the Panel. See Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 784.
136 Tuna I, at para. 5.28.
137 Tuna II, at para. 5.35.
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the impairment of the basic objectives and principles of the GATT. The aim of both
the primary and intermediary nation embargoes on tuna, the Panel observed, is to
"force other countries to change their policies with respect to persons and things
within their own jurisdiction, since the embargoes required such changes in order to
have any effect on the protection of the life or health of dolphins."138 As a result, the
coercive nature of the US's embargo, the Panel considered, would seriously
undermine the objectives of the General Agreement.139 Therefore, the Panel ruled that
such measures could not be considered "necessary" for the protection of dolphin in
the sense of article XX (b).140
The interpretative method adopted by those panel reports regarding the necessity
test reflects the consistently narrower view on the exceptional provisions in this trade
regime. Not surprisingly, this approach provokes serious criticism. Generally, it has
been observed that this rigid interpretation places too much constraint on national
freedom to fulfil environmental policy.141 By applying the approach, most use of
environmental trade measures would not be considered as necessary mainly because,
theoretically, other less-GATT-inconsistent alternatives shall be always
conceivable. 142 Additionally, the restrictive application of Article XX (b) was
considered unable to adequately accommodate certain emergent environmental
mishap, which may "justify the immediate imposition of trade restrictions."143 On the
other hand, two Tuna panel reports linking the predictability to the necessity
requirement and assigning the provision the duty of preserving the mandates of the
trade regime both seem to load excessive and unnecessary burdens upon Article XX
(b).'44
It is uncertain whether the new WTO system would be more willing to ease the
strictness regarding the interpretation of Article XX (b) so as to adopt a flexible
method. Yet the WTO's ruling on the Gasoline case was an indication of its
138 Id. at para.5.37.
139 Id. at para. 5.38.
140 Id. at para. 5.39.
141 See generally Schoenbaum, "Trade and Environment", at 276-77. Mann, "Revolution and Result", at
29. Schoenbaum argued that the threshold required to satisfy the exception in Article XX (b) needs to
be lowered, which may ensure parties some freedom of action. Meanwhile, the WTO is still entitled to
intervene by adequately applying the chapeau. The WTO's approach taken in the Gasoline case, he
claimed, provided a good example. Id. at 277.
142 Esty, Greening GATT, at 48-9. See also Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 784.
143 McDonald, "Greening GATT", at 435-6.
144 One writer criticises that "it is difficult to follow the panel's logic in concluding that the lack of
predictability went to the necessity of the provision itself." See McDonald, id. at 437.
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continuous embracing of the less trade restrictive interpretation to a large extent.145
As to trade measures used for the further protection of global environmental concern,
it is hard to predict whether the model of the Tuna cases on the interpretation of
necessity requirement will continue to influence the subsequent dispute. Regrettably,
Article XX (b) had no chance to be examined in the recent Shrimp/Turtle case.
Nevertheless, two factors perhaps may affect the future WTO evalution on the
requirement. First, the WTO's Shrimp decision, particularly on Article XX (g), has
suggested that a flexible attitude toward the interpretation of environmental
exceptions has been increasingly accepted. As a result, as Schoenbaum observes, The
WTO is likely to interpret the necessity test as "reasonably available and political
achievable under the particular circumstances rather than as necessary in an absolute
sense."146 Second, by contrast, the tribunals may still stick to the restrictive approach
simply because, unlike the protection of national interests of living things, the
interests of extraterritorial environment are indirect and thus "measures necessary" for
that purpose should be subject to more rigid restriction.
(d) Conservation of natural resources in Article XX (g)
Under Article XX (g), the WTO members are allowed to take measures
inconsistent with GATT norms to conserve exhaustible natural resources. In contrast
to Article XX (b) only requiring the unique "necessity" test, the GATT drafters
apparently spell out more sophisticated conditions for the fulfillment of the
environmental exception.
(i) Relationship between the measure being invoked and the policy of
conserving exhaustible natural resources
Unlike the rigid "necessary" test in Article XX (b), paragraph (g) specifies
"relating to" to underline the linkage between the measure and the conservation
objectives sought to be performed. Recognising the difference between the condition
of "necessary" and "relating to", the Herring and Salmon panel classified the phrase
by ruling:
The Panel concluded for these reasons that, while a trade measure did not have to be necessary or
essential to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, it had to be primarily aimed at
145 See Gasoline Panel, at paras. 6.24-28. Since the US did not appeal the panel's ruling regarding
Article XX (b), the Appellate Body decided to avoid judging the issue.
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the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource to be considered as "relating to" conservation
within the meaning ofArticle XX: (g).147
Clearly, this interpretation of "relating to" as "primarily aimed at" has been constantly
relied on by subsequent panel reports.148 The questions, however, would be raised as
to what constitutes a measure "primarily aimed at." The practices demonstrate that
various implications have been revealed on this term.
In the Tuna cases, to certain extent, the Panels appear to follow their reasoning
regarding the "necessary" test in Article XX (b) in deciding whether those measures
met the "primarily aimed at" test specified in paragraph (g). They denied that the US
trade measures were primarily aimed at conservation of dolphins on the ground that
either the standards to assess the US's tuna market lacked predictability149 or the
coercive nature of the embargo departing from achieving the legitimate conservation
policy.150 It is dubious that such awkward approach would influence the following
similar decisions. It has been assessed that the panels failed to interpret the element
adequately simply because it did not entirely focus on the trade restrictions itself but
on the specific circumstances surrounding the import ban.151
In the WTO period, basically, the "primarily aimed at" test has not been
fundamentally challenged but nonetheless has been modified considerably. In the
Gasoline case, the Appellate Body first confirmed the well-accepted concept that "a
measure must be "primarily aimed at" the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources in order to fall within the scope of Article XX (g).1,152 Meanwhile, it
expressed a sort of dissatisfaction for the term used to define treaty language of
"relating to" by stating that "the phrase "primarily aimed at" is not itself treaty
language and was not designed as a simple litmus test for inclusion or exclusion from
Article XX (g)."153 Further, the tribunal particularly highlighted the existence of
"substantial relationship" between the US measure under appraisal and the
146 Schoenbaum, "Shrimp-Turtle", at 38.
147 Herring and Salmon, at para. 4.6.
148 See Tuna I, at para. 5.33; Tuna II, at para. 5.22; United States—Taxes on Automobiles, DS31/R
(1994), unadopted [hereafter Automobiles]', Gasoline Panel, at para. 6.39 and; Shrimp App., at para.
136.
149 See Tuna I, at para. 5.33.
150 See Tuna II, at para. 5.27.
151 McDonald, "Greening GATT", at 446.
152 Gasoline App., at 19.
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conservation policy that the measure was taken to reach to prove that the measure was
aimed at the conservation of clean air for the purpose of Article XX (g).154
Moreover, instead of employing the test "primarily aimed at," the Shrimp/Turtle
Appellate Body shifted its focus to the elaboration of "substantial relationship" test
proposed in the Gasoline case. It straightforwardly defined the alleged substantial
relationship between the measure and the conservation objectives as "a close and
genuine relationship of ends and means." By using this standard, it proceeded to
determine whether the US law authorising the imports ban on shrimp, namely Section
609, was a measure "relating to" the conservation of sea turtles.
There were two types of certification under Section 609 through which countries
are permitted to export shrimp to the US. One demands that a country must have a
turtle-friendly fishing environment in the course of commercial shrimp trawl
harvesting.155 The second type requires an exporting country to adopt, essentially, a
regulatory program requiring the use of Turtles Escape Devices (TEDs) by shrimp
trawling vessels.156 In particular, the latter's requirement was measured by the
tribunal as a direct connection with the conservation objective due to the well-
recognised effectiveness of TEDs for the preservation of sea turtles.157 Further, the
Appellate Body, applying the principle of proportionality, maintained that the design
of the measure embodied in the US Section 609 generally "is not disproportionately
wide in its scope and reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and
conservation of sea turtle species."158 Overall, the tribunal decided:
The means are, in principle, reasonably related to the ends. The means and ends relationship
between Section 609 and the legitimate policy of conserving an exhaustible, and, in fact,
endangered species, is observably a close and real one, a relationship that is every bit as
substantial as that which we found in United States- Gasoline between the EPA baseline
establishment rules and the conservation of clean air in the United States.159
In the light of the above observation, it is clear that the WTO system has made
133 Id. One commentator even regarded that the "primarily aimed at" and "relating to" are not
synonymous, and the former test "seems to be an unwarranted amendment of Article XX by the GATT
Herring and Salmon panel." See Schoenbaum, "Reconciling trade and Environment", at 278.
154 The Appellate Body stated that "[g]iven that substantial relationship, the baseline establishment rules
cannot be regarded as merely incidentally or inadvertently aimed at the conservation of clean air in the
United States for the purposes of Article XX (g). Gasoline App., at 17 [emphasis added].
133 Shrimp App., at para. 139.
136 Id., at para. 140.
137 7<7.[emphasis added],
l3l! Id. at para. 141 [emphasis added].
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remarkable efforts to articulate a novel implication on the element of "relating to" in
Article XX (g). By introducing the new concept of "substantial relationship," the
influence of previous "primarily aimed at" test thus has faded, although the latter,
basically, has not been entirely discarded. Let alone, it is clear that the interpretative
approach taken in the Tuna cases for this test has not influenced the shrimp
decision.160 The new formula of interpretation literally is closer to the treaty language
of "relating to," and therefore proves more persuasive. Nevertheless, by incorporating
some supplemental elements, like proportionality and reasonableness, the application
of the "relating to" might be run restrictively in order to deter the abuse of paragraph
(g).
(ii) The content of exhaustible natural resources
The term of "exhaustible natural resources" in Article XX (g) has long been
given a relatively broad definition in the WTO/GATT regime. In effect, natural
resources, irrespective of living or non-living, including stocks of salmon, 161
dolphins, 152 gasoline 163 and even clean air, 164 have always been regarded as
exhaustible natural resources. Nonetheless, since the Tuna dispute, the broad
approach has never appeased the debate over whether the provision should cover
living resources. Actually, the issue continued to be a controversy in the recent
Shrimp/Turtle case. The previous tribunals' failure to craft substantial reasons in
support of the broad application accordingly warrants a necessity for further
clarification on this issue. The reasoning adopted by the Shrimp tribunal, mainly the
Appellate Body, thus, is worth reviewing.
In line with the Mexico's argument in the Tuna I case,165 the complaint parties in
the Shrimp case, maintained that the term "exhaustible natural resources" refers to
finite non-living resources such as minerals, which would be eventually depleted after
gradual exploitation. Those living creatures, like sea turtles, therefore, could not
constitute alleged natural resources within the meaning of paragraph (g) due to their
159 Id. [emphasis added].
160 Schoenbaum, "Shrimp-Turtle", at 37.
161 Herring and Salmon, at para. 4.4.
162 Tuna II, at para. 5.13.
163 Automobiles, at paras. 5.60-5.61.
164 Gasoline Panel, at para. 6.37; Gasoline App., at 15.
165 Tuna I, at para. 3.43.
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renewable character.166 Further, they argued that, if all natural resources fall within
the definition of exhaustible natural resources, the term, exhaustibility, would become
superfluous.167
The Appellate Body rejected their narrow view mainly on the ground that they
confused the concepts of exhaustibility and nonrenewability.168 The tribunal correctly
pointed out that exhaustible resources and renewable resources are not mutually
exclusive because empirical experiences show that living species, even with the
ability of reproduction, are not free from depletion, exhaustion and extinction.169
Moreover, it stressed the necessity of keeping the interpretation of the WTO
rules consistent with the contemporary environmental concern of international
community. In the first place, the Appellate Body highlighted the preamble of the
WTO Agreement, which has fully taken into account "the importance and legitimacy
of environmental protection as a goal of national and international policy."170 More
important, it relied on several international environmental agreements covering living
species in favour of its extensive view on the range of exhaustible natural resources.171
As a result, it concluded that:
We believe it is too late in the day to suppose that Article XX (g) of the GATT 1994 may be read
as referring only to the conservation of exhaustible mineral or other non-living natural
resources We hold that, in line with the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation,
measures to conserve exhaustible natural resources, whether living or non-living, may fall within
Article XX (g).172
Indeed, it is fairly reasonable to assert that living things should fall within the range
of exhaustible natural resources in light of the normal interpretation of treaty
language, especially within the framework of international environmental agreements.
(iii) Measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption
166 Shrimp Panel, at para. 3.237.
167 Id.
I6i( See McDonald, "Greening GATT", at n. 178.
169 Shrimp App., at para. 128 [emphasis added],
170 Id. at para. 129.
171 They include the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Convention on
Biological Diversity, Agenda 21 of the UNCED, and the Resolution on Assistance to Developing
Countries in conjunction with the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals. See Shrimp App., at para. 130.
172 Id. at para. 131.
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Apart from requiring measure inconsistent to meet the policy goal of conserving
exhaustible natural resources, paragraph (g) particularly adds the element of a parallel
restriction on domestic production or consumption. The requirement inserted in the
second clause of this exception has been generally regarded as a "logic and fair
precondition to the availability of an Article XX (g) exception because, without
equivalent domestic measures, parties could use Article XX (g) in a protectionist
manner."173 The legislative history of the GATT also shows that the aim of the
additional condition is set to guard the exception against abuse.174
Further, the second clause specifies the "link" between measures taken and the
domestic restrictions as "are made effective in conjunction with." In the Herring and
Salmon case, such connection was declared as "if it was primarily aimed at rendering
effective restrictions on domestic production or consumption." 175 The Panel,
unfortunately, had not provided a persuasive reason why such measure was imposed a
duty to facilitate the domestic restrictions.176 The subsequent panels, like the Tuna
cases, constantly reiterated the rigid interpretation, but in absence of further
elaboration on this language. In contrast to the Tuna I panel's silence on whether the
US's tuna embargo met the requirement in the meaning of Article XX (g),177 the Tuna
II panel merely maintained that the coercive nature of the tuna imports ban distanced
itself from "rendering effective restrictions on domestic production or
consumption."178
In the recent Gasoline case, the Appellate Body took a different stand from the
Herring and Salmon panel, interpreting the terms of treaty as plain as possible in a
manner that is concordant with their ordinary meaning. It thus maintained:
[t]he ordinary or natural meaning of "made effective" when used in connection with a measure —
a governmental act or regulation-may be seen to refer to such measure being "operative1, as "in
force", or as having "come into effect." Similarly, the phrase "in conjunction with" may be read
quite plainly as "together with" or "jointly with." Taken together, the second clause of Article
XX (g) appears to us to refer to governmental measures like the baseline establishment rules
being promulgated or brought into effect together with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption of natural resources. . . . [w]e believe that the clause. ... is appropriately read as a
173 McDonald, "Greening GATT", at 448. See also Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 787.
174 See International Trade Organisation: Hearing Before the Committee on Finance, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 135,412 (1947).
175 Herring and Salmon Panel, at para. 4.6.
176 See Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 787.
177 Tuna /, at para. 5.31.
178 Tuna //, at para. 5.27.
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requirement that the measure concerned impose restrictions, not just in respect of imported
gasoline but also with respect to domestic gasoline.1,'
As a result, the Appellate Body considered that the second clause of paragraph (g)
only requires even-handed treatment between restrictions on the imported product and
domestic production.IS0 By introducing the new concept of even-handedness, the
tribunal apparently reversed the "effects test" proposed by the previous jurisprudence
as an attempt to relieve an imposed measure of the burden to have effects upon
domestic restriction for resources conservation.IM
The infusion of this new consideration regarding the requirement has already
influenced subsequent dispute. In deciding whether the US shrimp embargo is a
measure operative in conjunction with domestic restrictions on shrimp harvesting, it
appeared that the "even-handedness" test was reaffirmed and that it has entirely
replaced the "effects" test. The Appellate Body observed that the restrictions on the
harvesting of imported shrimp based on Section 609 had brought into effect together
with corresponding restrictions on the US shrimp trawlers pursuant to the Endangered
Species Act.182 Since both policies were even-handed, it was concluded that the
measure of Section 609 met the specified condition ofArticle XX (g).183
The recent WTO rulings, namely in the Gasoline and Shrimp cases, seem to
suggest that the product banned or under restriction need not be identical to the
natural resources sought to be conserved184 as long as such restrictions are likely to
promote the goal of conserving exhaustible natural resources. Thus, within the
meaning of Article XX (g), a party may impose restrictions on imported gasoline to
conserve clean air. Likewise, shrimps are allowed to be banned to protect the sea
turtles threatened during the process of harvesting shrimps. The tolerance of the
process or protection method (PPM) type of trade measures obviously is another
indication of the WTO's flexible policy toward the interpretation on exceptional
clauses. Surely, some WTO members who have been resisting the justification of the
179 Gasoline App., at 20. [citations ommitted],
180 Id. [emphasis added],
181 Id. at 21. Apart from deviating the ordinary meaning of the treaty language, practically, the effects
test was rejected mainly because the difficulty to determine causation and a substantial time consumed
to allow "effects" to occur as well. See id.
182 Shrimp App., at para. 144.
183 Id. at para. 145.
184 The two rulings clearly rejected the Mexico contention in the Tuna I that the embargoed product
should be the same as the item to be conserved. See Tuna /, at paras. 3.47; 3.50.
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PPM measures would not welcome such decision. The serious concern has been
expressed that, by permitting the PPM-based trade barriers, a door will be open to
highly coercive measures through which economically powerful nations may
effectively force less powerful nations to adopt particular production policies.185 In
balancing the tolerance of the PPM, the trade regime must employ the test of "close
and real relationship between means and ends" as cautiously as possible on
subsequent disputes in order to reduce the risk of causing a loophole by the potential
abuse of the PPM measures.
Yet, while both cases heralded the permissibility of the PPM-based measures,
they also showed that the object under domestic restrictions, like domestic gasoline or
shrimp, was the same as the one subject to the restricted import. Arguably, it is hard
to predict whether the WTO would be willing to justify certain type of import
restrictions, like trade sanctions, which are normally imposed without simultaneous
domestic restrictions on the same products that are embargoed .
(e) The chapeau of Article XX
The provisional justification of a measure under a certain exception does not
necessarily guarantee its ultimate legality under Article XX. Such measure must also
satisfy the requirements in the introductory note of Article XX, the chapeau. The
chapeau prohibits the application of a measure in a manner that would constitute (a)
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail; or (b) a disguised restriction on international trade.
(i) The significance of the chapeau requirements
The drafting history of the GATT shows that the initially proposed chapeau
language by the US was "unqualified and unconditional."186 The addition of such
qualification was proposed by the United Kingdom as a device to prevent abuse of the
185 Perkins, "Shrimp Prohibition", at 119. Thailand assumed that the new approach "will result in an
explosive growth in the number of environment (perhaps labor) measures applied to PPMs and justified
pursuant to Article XX, ... is likely to have profound systemic implications for the future application
of the WTO rules and disciplines." See Environment: WTO Formally Adopts Shrimp-Turtle Ruling As
Thailand Fears Victory May be Pyrric, 15 lnt'1 Trade Rep. 1884 (BNA) (Nov. 11, 1998).
186 See Shrimp App., at para. 157. The chapeau of Article 32 of the United States Draft Charter for an
International Trade Organization read:
Nothing in Chapter IV of this Charter shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
member ofmeasures: . . .
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specified exceptions.187 Although, it is the right of a party to invoke an exception so
as to override its substantive obligations, some duties also should be fulfilled to
ensure that legal rights of other parties would not be unreasonably disregarded by
abusing or misusing such exceptions. The necessity of reaching such balance by
instituting substantial requirements in the chapeau, thus, was well-confirmed by the
WTO Appellate Body in the Gasoline case, which stated:
The chapeau is animated by the principle that while the exceptions ofArticle XX may be invoked
as a matter of legal right, they should not be so applied as to frustrate or defeat the legal
obligations of the holder of the right under the substantive rules of the General Agreement. If
those exceptions are not to be abused or misused, in other words, the measures falling within the
particular exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due regard both to the legal duties of the
party claiming the exception and the legal rights of other parties concerned.188
The significance of the chapeau requirements, notably the hindrance of the
undesirable consequence resulting from abusing or misusing the exceptions, was
elaborated in-depth in the recent Shrimp/Turtle case. The Appellate Body,
reaffirming its the previous observation in the Gasoline case, particularly stressed that
"Exercise by one Member of its right to invoke an exception, such as Article XX (g),
if abused or misused, will, to that extent, erode or render naught the substantive treaty
rights in, for example, Article XI: 1, of other Member."189 To further its argument, it
also pointed out:
To permit one Member to abuse or misuse its right to invoke an exception would be effectively to
allow that Member to degrade its own treaty obligations as well as to devalue the treaty rights of
other Members. If the abuse or misuse is sufficiently grave or extensive, the Member, in effect,
reduces its treaty obligation to a merely facultative one and dissolves its juridical character, and,
in so doing, negates altogether the treaty rights of other Members. The chapeau was installed at
the head of the list of "General Exceptions" in Article XX to prevent such far-reaching
190
consequences.
Moreover, the tribunal noted the real association of the mandate embodied in the
chapeau of Article XX with the principle ofgoodfaith, a general principle of law and
international law as well.191 It regarded the doctrine of abus de droit as an application
187 UN Doc. EPCT/ C.II/ 50, at 7, 9; E/PC/T/C.II/54/Rev. 1, at 36, 28 Nov. (1946).
188 Gasoline App., at 22.
189 Shrimp App., at para. 156.
190 Id.
191 Id. at para. 158.[emphasis added].
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of this general principle, which "prohibits the abusive exercise of a state's rights and
enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right impinges on the field covered by [a]
treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably."192
In contrast to the exceptional clauses in article XX, arguably, much less attention
had been paid to the interpretation and application of the chapeau language during the
past GATT rulings.193 In the light of the above two cases, the trend has been
effectively altered. In short, the considerable ink spent in the elaboration of the
chapeau principles by the new WTO dispute settlement body seems indicative of its
tendency to put more emphasis on the application of the chapeau.
(ii) Arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
a. Basic observation
First, by reading the express terms of the chapeau, it is clear that the provision
concerned focuses on whether the manner in which that measure is applied may
amount to such discrimination rather than the measure itselfor its content. In effect,
the clause demands that all the relevant circumstances surrounding the application of
the measure be taken into account. Several GATT/WTO rulings have confirmed such
finding.194 But, in the recent case, the basic understanding has been broadened to
cover the substantive aspect of the measure. In the Shrimp/Turtle case, the Appellate
Body regarded the measure as being in breach of the chapeau "when the detailed
operating provisions of the measure prescribe the arbitrary or unjustified activity, but
also where a measure, otherwise fair and just on its face, is actually applied in an
arbitrary or unjustifiable mannerIt declared, accordingly, that "The standards of
the chapeau, in our view, project both substantive and procedural requirements."196
The extensive perception toward the language of the chapeau, indeed, is a departure
from its plain meaning. Yet, such perception reveals again the tendency of the WTO
tribunals to rely increasingly on the chapeau requirements to curb the deliberate
invocation of the exceptions.
Second, the alleged "discrimination" prohibited by the chapeau has a different
192 Id. [citation omitted].
193 See Schoenbaum, "Reconciling Trade and Environment", at 274. Only few cases addressed the
chapeau's requirements. See United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, adopted
on 26 May 1983, BISD 30S/I07, at paras. 54-55[hereinafter/l«/cw!ot;ve]; Canada Tuna, at para. 4.8.
194 See Automotive, at para. 56; Gasoline App., at 20.
195 Shrimp App., at para. 160 [emphasis added].
196 Id.
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implication from the substantive obligations of the GATT specified in Article I and
III. Jackson has depicted such use of the chapcau as a "softer" form of the GATT
obligations.1'" The non-discrimination requirement is softened mainly in two spheres.
First, the context of the chapeau apparently provides that certain forms of
discrimination may be permissible as long as they are non-arbitrary or justifiable.
Second, there is no "like product" element in the context. It has been thus correctly
observed that "Rather than considering whether like products from different countries
have equal opportunities in the domestic market, Article XX examines whether
countries "where the same conditions prevail" are treated in an arbitrary or unjust
fashion."198
The distinctive feature between the non-discrimination principle in the chapeau
and that in the basic GATT rules has been succinctly addressed in the Gasoline case.
The Appellate Body maintained:
The enterprise of applying Article XX would clearly be an unprofitable one if it involved no more
than applying the standard used in finding that the baseline establishment rules were inconsistent
with Article 111:4. . . . The provisions of the chapeau cannot logically refer to the same
standard(s) by which a violation of a substantive rule has been determined to have occurred. To
proceed down that path would be both to empty the chapeau of its contents and to deprive the
exceptions in paragraphs (a) to (j) ofmeaning. Such recourse would also confuse the question of
whether inconsistency with a substantive rule existed, with the further and separate question
arising under the chapeau of Article XX as to whether that inconsistency was nevertheless
justified.199
Third, the question has been raised as to what is the geographic range of the term
"between countries where the same conditions prevail." The recent WTO practices
show that such scope of "countries" between which the discrimination may occur tend
to be as extensive as possible. In the Gasoline case, the Appellate Body accepted the
US's contention that the phrase refers to not only between different exporting
countries, but also between exporting countries and importing countries. 200 The
finding also prevails over the subsequent Shrimp/Turtle case.201
b."Unjustifiable discrimination" between countries where the same conditions
197 Jackson, World Trading System, at 234.
198 Chamovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 778-79.
199 Gasoline App., at 20. See also Shrimp App., at para. 150.
200 Gasoline App., at 21 .
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prevail
It has been generally observed that the terms, like "arbitrary, unjustifiable, or
disguised," used in the chapeau are not beyond ambiguity/0" Previous GATT dispute
settlements had not effectively contributed to the clarification of these terms.203 Thus,
the ill-defined text would allow tribunals to generate various interpretations,
notwithstanding by using wide or narrow approach. The Appellate Body's Gasoline
decision was considered as that it "provides an authoritative interpretation of the
chapeau." 204 In spite of such achievement, the tribunal did not give separate
interpretations for the three standards. Rather, it tended to apply those concepts
altogether on the ground that all of the chapeau's requirements are aimed at avoiding
abuse or misuse of the general exceptions. In the view of the tribunals, those
standards, to large extent, appear interchangeable. The Appellate Body defined the
interaction among the requirements as:
"Arbitrary discrimination", "unjustifiable discrimination" and "disguised restriction" on
international trade may, accordingly, be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to one another. It
is clear to us that "disguised restriction" includes disguised discrimination in international trade.
It is equally clear that concealed or unannounced restriction or discrimination in international
trade does not exhaust the meaning of "disguised restriction." We consider that "disguised
restriction", whatever else it covers, may properly be read as embracing restrictions amounting to
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in international trade taken under the guise of a measure
formally within the terms of an exception listed in Article XX. Put in a somewhat different
manner, the kinds of consideration pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular
measure amounts to "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination", may also be taken into account in
determining the presence of a "disguised restriction" on international trade. The fundamental
theme is to be found in the purpose and object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the
exceptions to substantive rules available in Article XX.205
Further, in the tribunal's mind, a measure inconsistent, even justified by certain
exceptional clause, could be in breach of conditions in the chapeau if other non¬
discriminatory options are still reasonable available to the acting party.206 In short,
201 Shrimp App., at para. 150.
202 See Jackson, GATT, at 744.
203 Id.
204 Schoenbaum, "Trade and Environment", at 275.
203 Gasoline App., at 25.
206 The Appellate Body maintained that the US could have avoided the discriminatory measures against
foreign refiners either by imposing statutory baselines on both domestic and foreign producers, or by
making individual baselines available to all. The excuses for not following the options, like
administrative difficulties and problems of verification and enforcement, were rejected by the Appellate
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arguably, the Appellate Body was inclined to attach the requirement of necessity to
the non-discrimination principle in the chapcau.
The consistency between extraterritorial application of trade measures for
environmental purposes and the chapeau's requirements was not seriously explored
until the recent Shrimp/Turtle judgement by the WTO Appellate Body. Before the
release of the decision, there had been no opportunity for the chapeau to be applied in
a similar dispute because the use of environmental trade measure, as judged in the
two Tuna cases, failed to satisfy any individual exceptions of Article XX.
Furthermore, in contrast to the Gasoline ruling examining the elements of the chapeau
jointly, as indicated above, the Shrimp/Turtle decision remarkably did produce a
separate assessment for above requirements. The following details first how an
environmental measure may amount to an unjustifiable discrimination.
The Appellate Body found that "unjustifiable discrimination" would occur in the
application of a trade restriction not only when exporting countries were under
different treatment, but also when the application of the measure did not pay due
regard to the particular situation of the countries being targeted.207 In terms of the
latter's instance, the tribunals maintained that the US Section 609 imposing shrimp
imports ban against several Asian countries, in the manner of its application,
constituted an unjustifiable discrimination for those Asian exporting countries.
Section 609, as observed, simply requires shrimp exporting countries to adopt
identical turtle-protection methods as those enforced in the US in order to be certified
for shrimp importation. The policy, in effect, operated without taking into account
other alternative conservative measures taken by an exporting country and different
conditions that may happen in those countries as well.208 On the other hand, apart
from the environmental standards shaped exclusively by the US administration, the
regime of certification also operate unilaterally regarding the grant, denial or
withdrawal of it.209 Hence the Appellate Body ruled that "The unilateral character of
the application of Section 609 heightens the disruptive and discriminatory influence
of the import prohibition and underscores its unjustifiability."2W
Body because those hurdles were not impossible to be overcome. Thus, the tribunal concluded that
"The resulting discrimination must have been foreseen, and was not merely inadvertent or
unavoidable." See Gasoline App., at 28.
207 Shrimp App., at para. 165.
208 Id, at paras. 163, 164.
209 Id. at para. 172.
210 A/.[emphasis added].
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Moreover, the Appellate Body found that the US measure also amounted to
"unjustifiable discrimination" between the shrimp exporting countries because,
apparently, countries under shrimp embargoes were subjected to differential treatment
in three aspects. First, unlike those countries with which the US has already
concluded a regional international agreement for protection and conservation of sea
turtles: The Inter-American Convention, the US failed to enter into any serious
negotiation with those embargoed nations in an attempt to reach agreements for
establishing consensual means.2" The tribunal, thus, found that "[t]he United States
negotiated seriously with some, but not with other Members (including the appellees),
that export shrimp to the United States. The effect is plainly discriminatory and, in
our view, unjustifiable."212
Second, different treatment occurred when the embargoed Asian exporting
countries were offered relatively shorter periods of adjustment of their fishing policy.
Fourteen countries in the wider Caribbean/western Atlantic region had enjoyed "a
"phase-in" period of three years during which their respective shrimp trawling sectors
could adjust to satisfy the requirement of using TEDs."213 By contrast, the other
countries, like those Asian nations, had only "four months" to implement the required
conservative measure.
Third, the US had made much effort in transferring TED technology to specific
countries, basically the fourteen countries mentioned above. But, there was no
evidence to indicate the same level of effort that had been made by the US for other
exporting countries mainly due to the limited "phase-in" periods.
In short, an environmental trade measure cannot be deemed as a justifiable
discrimination as long as the target party is barred from the equal treatment by the
acting State, even though the measure was justified under individual environmental
exception.
211 The Appellate Body noted that the requirement to pursue concerted and consensual actions normally
by concluding international agreements before the importation of import ban has been specified in
many national or international documents. For instance, the US Section 609(a), inter alia, directs its
administration to "initiate negotiations as soon as possible for the development of bilateral or
multilateral agreements with other nations for the protection and conservation of such species of sea
turtles. Further, as we have addressed in chapter six of the thesis, many international environmental
documents, namely Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 all advocate such mandate. The
Report of the Committee on Trade and Environment as a part of the Report of the General Council to
Ministers on the occasion of the Singapore Ministerial Conference also endorsed and supported the
requirement. See id. at paras. 167, 168.
212 Shrimp App., at para. 172.
213 Id. at para. 173.
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c."Arbitrary discrimination" between countries where the same conditions prevail
Like "unjustifiable discrimination," the concept of arbitrary discrimination was not
dealt with separately and seriously until the emergence of the Shrimp/Turtle dispute.
The Appellate Body found that the implementation of Section 609 also amounted to
an arbitrary discrimination. In its reasoning, the tribunal seemed to largely confine the
implication of the requirement to the issue of whether the US law was in conformity
with justice and fairness during the process of handing the certification.
First of all, it said the rigidity and inflexibility within the determination for issuing
a certification constituted an arbitrary discrimination.214 Moreover, a considerable
flaw also became evident in the certification processes. It was observed that the
process of certification was neither transparent nor predictable.215 The decision to
grant or to deny certification was made exclusively by the US officials without
offering an applicant country any opportunity to defend its policy. Countries whose
applications were denied did not receive notice of such denial or of the reasons. Nor
was there any review or appeal mechanism for that decision.216
In assessing the process of certification, the tribunal concluded that:
The certification processes followed by the United States thus appear to be singularly informal and
casual, and to be conducted in a manner such that these processes could result in the negation of
rights of Members. These appears to be no way that exporting Members can be certain whether the
terms of Section 609, in particular, the 1996 Guidelines, are being applied in a fair and just manner
217
by the appropriate governmental agencies of the United States.
Therefore, given the lacking of basic fairness and due process for those countries
whose applications were rejected, the Appellate Body ruled that the parties affected
were discriminated against, vis-a-vis those countries that were granted certification.218
(iii) Disguised restriction on international trade
The invocation of exceptional clauses may serve protectionist ends. Hence the
214 Id. at para. 177 [emphasis added].
215 Id. at para. 180 [emphasis added],
216 Id.
217 Id. at para. 181.
218 Id. Apart from the inconsistency of Section 609 with the non-arbitrary requirement in the chapeau of
Article XX, the application of the law also was regarded contrary to the spirit of Article X:3 of the
GATT 1994, which requires "minimum standards for transparency and procedural fairness in the
administration of trade regulations . . .". See id. at paras. 182, 183.
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element of prohibiting the "disguised restriction" on international trade within the
chapeau is designed to deter the abuse of those exceptions from protecting domestic
production.219 The GATT practices, however, indicate that this anti-protectionism
mandate has not been properly applied. Rather, so far, this rule has only performed a
limited function. The narrow application of "disguised restriction" was reflected in
the two GATT panel reports in 1980s. In the 1982 "US—prohibition of imports of
Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada," the Panel found that the import ban on
Canadian tuna was not a "disguised restriction on international trade" on the ground
that the measure "had been taken as a trade measure and publicly announced as
such." 220 Similarly, the Panel in the 1983 "United States—Imports of Certain
Automotive Spring Assemblies" denied the breach of the element by the US's
restriction mainly because the measure in question was "published in Federal
Register."22'
This approach, which merely defined the "disguised restriction" element as a
"transparency requirement," 222 not surprisingly, aroused the disagreement and
criticism from the GATT parties223 and scholars224 as well. In particular, disapproving
the reasoning of the 1982 US's tuna imports ban, some writers pointed out that a
"disguised restriction" should not only cover trade measure but also include non-trade
methods.225 They, nonetheless, noted that a narrow view of the element is perhaps
acceptable whenever a measure provisionally satisfies the exceptional paragraph (g),
since the provision has already required parallel domestic restrictions.226 It is always
essential, however, for a measure justified under other exceptions that do not specify
the same limitation as paragraph (g) to be subjected to a thorough examination by the
anti-protectionism device. Thus, a careful stand toward the application of the
"disguised restriction" still ought to be pursued.
The assessment on the consistency of trade restrictions aimed at influencing
environmental practice abroad with the "disguised restriction" requirement remains
219 See Charnovitz, "Environmental Exceptions", at 47-48.
220 Canada Tuna, at para. 4.8.
221 Automotive, at paras. 54-55.
222 See Charnovitz, "Environmental Exceptions", at 48.
223 See GATT, 35S/107-108; GATT Doc. C/M/155 at 13.
224 It has been contended that "Both panels appears to have misconstrued the "disguised restriction"
portion of the chapeau. . . . What at issue is whether trade restrictions ostensibly justified under one of
the Article XX exceptions are really imposed for protectionist reasons." See Schoenbuam, "Reconciling
Trade and Environment", at 274, n. 42.
223 Trebilcock and Howse, International Trade, at 344.
226 Id.
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important. The tribunals in the Shrimp/Turtle case, in spite of making considerable
efforts to elaborate the significance of non-discrimination elements in the chapcau,
missed the opportunity to clarify the meaning of "disguised restriction" for the
environmental measure in question. The omission probably resulted form the finding
that the US's shrimp import ban has already fulfilled the paragraph (g) of Article XX.
Nevertheless, in the foreseeable future, when a trade measure is justified under
Article XX (b), the implication of "disguised restriction" still needs to be explored in
order to effectively check any measures that is actually imposed to mask
protectionism under the guise of preserving environment.
(f) Concluding remarks
While the use of trade measures in pursuit of transboundary environmental goals
is largely violations of the basic WTO/GATT obligations in Article I or XI, their
ultimate justification essentially relies on the qualification of exceptional clauses
listed in Article XX, particularly, paragraph (b) and (g). Further, those measures,
even, on their face, falling within the scope of exceptional clause, either (b) or (g),
must stand the test of the chapeau requirements to ensure the eventual legality.
The traditional tendency of rebutting trade measures imposed to address
international environmental issue, evidenced in the treatment of PPM- style trade
restrictions by the previous two Tuna decisions, has been substantially reversed by the
latter WTO judgement. The Shrimp/Turtle judgement has showed a great willingness
of the WTO to allow environmental measures to be justified under certain exceptional
clause, mainly paragraph (g)—the conservation of natural resources. In contrast to the
Tuna/Dolphin decisions, the tribunal effectively lessened the strictness of construing
the elements of paragraph (g), adopting a more flexible approach. The modification
becomes evident, inter alia, in the possible acceptance of extraterritorial application
of environmental measures and the tolerance for a PPM measure where embargoed
products are not necessarily same as the objects to be conserved. As a result, the
WTO seems to approve, even not explicitly, the permissibility of using trade
measures to protect the environment beyond national border. 227 The result, as
Schoenbuam remarks, "showed a new understanding and sympathy for international
227 Mann, "Revolution and Result", at 32; Dunoff, "Border Patrol", at 25; Schoenbuam, "Shrimp-
Turtle", at 38-39.
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environmental law and the importance of environmental goals.22" Given the absence
of a proper interpretation of paragraph (b) in the recent trade-related environmental
dispute, it is uncertain whether, in the future, the tribunal will be ready to alter the
rigid less-restrictive test, which has long dominated the "necessity" requirement in
paragraph (b). If the test remains intact, it is possible that the parties taking the
measures will be encouraged to invoke paragraph (g) rather than (b) for vindicating
the measure inconsistent.
The inclination of the WTO to take an extensive view toward the application of
the environmental exceptions, however, does not imply that it would endorse the
unrestrained national use of environmental measures at any cost. Rather, by the
WTO's extraordinary elaboration on the chapeau's requirements listed in Article XX,
the chapeau has become a dynamic device to hinder the abuse and misuse of
exceptional clauses. Those undesirable characteristics embodied in the unilateral
environmental trade measure, such as unpredictability, non-transparency and
unilateralism, all have been considered inconsistency with the chapeau's mandates.
As a result, whenever an environmental exception is invoked, the WTO tribunals
would be reasonably likely to open the gate for such measures under certain
exceptional clauses, but simultaneously could take a rigid approach toward the
interpretation of the chapeau language. It is not necessarily accurate, therefore, to say
that any future invocation of an environmental trade measure definitely has a good
chance to survive the novel WTO/GATT jurisprudence.
On the other hand, as the WTO/GATT system has tolerated the PPM restrictions
under certain circumstances, it is uncertain to what extent the regime will tolerate the
imposition of environmental trade sanctions, which are distinct from PPMs to certain
degree and apply normally to unrelated products. Since the WTO/GATT has actually
not yet dealt with environmental sanctions, the Pelly-type sanctions imposed against
Taiwan offer an excellent chance to perceive and simulate how the WTO would judge
the measure.
C The Pelly sanctions and the WTO/GATT
A hypothetical case study, following the usual WTO/GATT proceeding order,
228 Schoenbuam, id. at 38. See also Dunoff, id. at 24.
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will be first asking whether the Pelly trade sanctions violated the primary obligations
provided in GATT 1994. If a breach of the WTO/GATT basic principles is found to
occur, then the study will proceed to discuss whether the trade embargo aimed at
preserving endangered rhinos and tiger might be saved by the general exceptions of
Article XX. Inspired by the previous GATT practices, the implication of Article XX
over the environmental trade sanctions shall be a focal point of the study. Moreover,
to reflect the current development of the WTO jurisprudence, of course, the case will
be assessed on the basis of the prevailing legal jurisprudence emanated from the
recent judgements.
1 Were the Pelly sanctions in violation of principal obligations of the GATT
rules?
It is true that the WTO/GATT regime has never dealt with the legality of
environmental sanction, like the Pelly actions.229 The previous GATT judgements
thus were unable to provide an effective reference for the assessment of such trade
measure. The Pelly sanctions, however, theoretically, could be contrary to several
basic principles of the GATT.
First of all, it might violate the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle specified in
Article I: 1 ofGATT 1994. As indicated, when the Pelly sanctions were implemented
in 1994, the US President banned the imports of certain wildlife products from
Taiwan, such as products of bird feather. Meanwhile, "the like product" from other
countries continued to be permitted to enter the US's market. As a result, Taiwan was
deprived of the advantage resulting from the importation of the like products to the
US. The plainly differentiated treatment inflicted on Taiwan thus could not be
consistent with the MFN principle.
The Pelly trade sanctions would also be in breach of Article XI: 1, which requires
the general elimination of quantitative restrictions, inter alia, forbidding the
restrictions on the importation of any product from any other members. The sanctions
required by the Pelly Amendment were strictly confined to the measures of the
imports ban. In effect, the imposition of the Pelly trade embargo constituted a direct
prohibition or restriction on the importation of wildlife products from Taiwan. The
trade sanctions were, therefore, contrary to Article XI: 1 and plainly cannot meet any
229 In the Tuna I case, the Mexico did raise the issue of the legality of the US Pelly Amendment under
the GATT rules. The GATT panel dismissed the complaint, simply because the Pelly trade embargo
was not in effect. See Tuna I, at paras. 5.20, 5.21.
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exceptional clauses provided in the second paragraph of the same article.2'0
A question may be raised as to the consistency of the Pelly sanctions with the
national treatment requirement in Article III of the GATT. The principle simply
prohibits the differing internal measures, like taxation and regulation, imposed on
foreign and domestic like products. Thus, the principle is not applicable to the
situation where pure imports ban is implemented, like the Pelly sanctions, which
involves no other internal measures.
2 The justification of the Pelly trade sanctions under Article XX
The analysis will be first placed on if the Pelly sanctions qualify individual
exceptions, namely paragraph (b) and/or (g).
(a) Article XX (g)
(i) The range of "exhaustible natural resources"
In line with the complainants in the Tuna and Shrimp cases, Taiwan may contend
Article XX (g) is not applicable to the Pelly sanctions, which were launched to
conserve the "living creatures"-- rhinos and tigers. The contention is based on the
proposition that the paragraph, inherently, should cover only non-living natural
resources rather than living things. Taiwan also may further point out that the
qualification of the exceptional clause for a Pelly action should be subjected to one
specified provision rather than multilateral standards embodied within paragraph (b)
and (g). Unfortunately, the country may find it difficult to persuade the WTO to take
such view due to the long-term practices of the GATT/WTO, which has repeatedly
confirmed that the range of natural resources in Article XX (g) does comprise living
things.
(ii) Is the US allowed to show its concern over species located beyond its
border by invoking a trade measure?
As indicated, the Shrimp decision suggested that the geographic scope of natural
resources provided in Article XX (g) is no longer been confined to the area under
national jurisdiction. But, it does not mean that an acting party is permitted to take
230 Article XI: 2 of GATT 1994 specifies three exceptions to the general principle of eliminating
quantitative restrictions. However, none of them can be applied to the trade sanctions for environmental
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any extraterritorial environmental trade measures without any limitation. To
vindicate the Pelly sanctions under the exception, the US must prove there is a
'sufficient nexus' between it and those endangered rhinos and tigers.
Not surprisingly, Taiwan may argue that no such 'nexus' can be found in this
case. First, unlike migratory marine species, such as dolphins or sea turtles, which
are subject to no specified jurisdiction, rhinos and tigers, as land-based species, fall
entirely the ambit of the sovereignty of producer States.231 It is clear that the US does
not exercise jurisdiction over such endangered species, which belong to the habitat
countries, like African nations, India or Russia. Taiwan, therefore, may claim that the
Pelly sanctions are not within the scope of Article XX (g) because of the absence of a
nexus between them.
Although there seems not a "sufficient nexus", as in the Shrimp case, between
those endangered species involved and the US, the US may claim a connection with
rhinos and tigers on the proposition that States have a "global environmental right" to
expect that endangered species will be protected.232 Also, the US may stress that the
preservation of endangered species which the Pelly sanctions were aimed to enforce
arguably appears a community interest or a common concern. Thus, the US may
claim a linkage with those species, even though the US does not exercise jurisdiction
over them. Overall, the US could say that the relation between the species and the US
is sufficient to guarantee the existence of such nexus, which links the species to all
countries in the world. Alternatively, the US may simply say that it is redundant to
formulate the alleged "nexus" test in this exceptional clause. Since rhinos and tigers
are "exhaustible natural resources", the US may straightforwardly argue that its trade
sanctions designed to protect those species surely met the element of "conservation of
natural resources" under Article XX (g).
The 'nexus' requirement, although not found in the wording of Article XX (g),
represents a delicate balance between the contention that exceptional clauses shall be
essentially designed for national interests and the proposition that the provision ought
to shoulder the responsibility to preserve the global environment. It seems impossible
for the WTO to scrap the new established criteria instantly. With respect to case of
purpose. See Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 776; McDorman, "Fish Import Embargoes", at 5IS¬
IS.
231 See Birnie and Boyle, International Law and Environment, at 443.
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the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan, if the WTO continues to refer to the approach
adopted in the Shrimp case, which tended to confine the 'nexus' to the exercise of
certain jurisdiction over natural resources, it probably would deny the existence of a
sufficient nexus between the species and the US. In addition, partly because the
inclusion of endangered species as "common heritage of mankind" has not yet won
the universal acknowledgement, the WTO may be unwilling to accept that the nexus
between the US and African rhinos and Indian tigers is 'sufficient', even if a certain
nexus might be present. However, once species protection has been well recognised
as a common obligation,233 it is not impossible that the WTO may expand the test of a
sufficient nexus beyond national jurisdiction and endorse trade measure imposed for
protecting a community interest, such as endangered species.
(iii) Were the Pelly sanctions "relating to" the conservation of rhinos and
tigers?
Apart from the above condition, the US has to further demonstrate that its trade
embargo against Taiwan met the condition regarding the "linkage" between the
measures imposed and the conservative goal it sought to pursue, namely the element
of "relating to". As the "primarily aimed at" test has been weakened by the Shrimp
adjudication, the tribunal, relying on the new standard, has to decide whether the
Pelly sanctions had a "substantial relationship" with the policy objective of
conserving endangered rhinos and tigers.
Based on the finding of the Shrimp case, Taiwan surely disagrees that there was
a "close and genuine" connection between the measure and the policy goal. In
contrast to the Shrimp embargo, a typical PPM measure, which was triggered by the
situation where the method of harvesting shrimp will affect the life of sea turtles, the
Pelly sanctions, Taiwan may argue, by nature, were a penalty against Taiwan's
insufficient environmental efforts.234 The sanctions simply targeted those unrelated
wildlife products. The environmental embargo thus could not constitute an alleged
"means" reasonably related to the "ends" of saving rhinos and tigers.
The US perhaps would admit the difference between a PPM-style trade
232 It has been argued that States are entitled to expect that endangered species will be protected due to
the status of those species as a global environmental resource. See Glennon, "Elephant", at 34-35 and
chapter two of the thesis.
233 See discussion in chapter two regarding the status of preserving species.
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restriction and the Pelly sanctions. Nonetheless, it could propose that the Pelly
sanctions were not merely a penalty, which, like the PPM method, were actually
devised to influence target countries to advance their environmental practices. Such
similarity, therefore, shall allow the Pelly sanctions to become a measure having a
substantial relationship with the goal of conserving rhinos and tigers.
The tribunal may note, on one hand, that the PPM and the Pelly sanctions do
perform a similar function. On the other hand, strictly speaking, it probably remains
difficult to convince the tribunal that there was a close and real connection between
the Pelly import ban on the products of bird feather from Taiwan and the goal of
saving unrelated rhinos and tigers.
(iv) Were the Pelly sanctions imposed in conjunction with domestic
restrictions on production or consumption?
Finally, the US would have to prove that its Pelly actions fulfill the requirement
that the measures were in force "jointly with parallel domestic restrictions on
production or consumption." Taiwan may argue that Article XX (g) inherently is not
applicable to the use of trade sanctions simply because the measures normally lack
domestic restrictions on production or consumption on the embargoed products. For
instance, in this dispute, while the importation of a number of wildlife products were
banned from Taiwan, it appeared that the US did not domestically prohibit the
production or consumption of those wildlife products, like bird feather and so on.
Further, Taiwan may point out that the Pelly environmental sanctions differed from
the Shrimp embargo, in which the US import ban on shrimp was implemented in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic harvesting of shrimp.
Instead of referring to the recent Shrimp adjudication, the US perhaps may
alternatively urge the adoption of even broader application of this parallel domestic
requirement. It could propose that the items under domestic restrictions might not
necessarily be the same as products embargoed. The proposal requests that an
environmental sanction qualify the requirement of parallel domestic restrictions as
long as domestic conservative measures over natural resources, such as prohibition on
consumption of those endangered species, are taken. Overall, relying on that its
234 Charnovitz, "Environmental Confronts GATT Rules", at 43. See also McDonald, "Greening GATT",
at 459.
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Endangered Species Act235 has soundly implemented the treaty obligation of
CITES,236 the US may argue that the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan were a measure
carried out in conjunction with domestic restrictions.
The Shrimp judgement did suggest that the alleged "domestic restrictions" may
be open for redefinition in order to accommodate the need to protect the environment.
Yet, it seems too early to say the WTO would instantly endorse the US's argument
regarding the interpretation of the requirement. If the WTO upholds a strict
interpretation on the 'parallel restrictions on domestic and imported products,' the US
will find it difficult to persuade the regime to accept its contention. By contrast, it
remains possible that the WTO might loose the requirement of 'domestic restrictions'
to the extent that an implementation of the restrictions on production or consumption
of natural resources is sufficient, even though no identical domestic restrictions on the
products being embargoed have been imposed. In doing so, the Pelly sanctions could
stand the test of the requirement.
(b) Article XX (b)
It is true the rhinos and tiger species that the Pelly sanctions were designed to
protect are covered by the policy goal of paragraph (b)— the protection of animal life.
Taiwan can hardly dispute this point. However, like the Tuna I and II disputes, the
question could be raised as to the geographic limitation of this provision. Arguably,
paragraph (b) has not yet been interpreted to include the living things beyond the
jurisdiction of country taking the measure. Thus, Taiwan could contend that the Pelly
sanctions did not satisfy paragraph (b) because those living things, like rhinos and
tigers, which the sanctions aimed to preserve, are not within the jurisdiction of the
US.
Given the flexible approach toward the geographic limitation on natural
resources taken by the recent WTO decision, paragraph (b), in the future, would be
increasingly likely to be interpreted to cover extraterritorial living creatures. In doing
so, under the paragraph, the US probably would be allowed to show its concern on the
"African" rhinos or "Indian" tiger by using trade measures. However, on the other
hand, the US probably must demonstrate that it also met the "sufficient nexus" test in
235 16 U.S.C. 1531-1543.
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order to ensure the linkage between itself and the objects to be preserved. Inspired by
the above examination on the consistency of the Pelly sanctions with paragraph (g), it
might be concluded by the WTO that the environmental embargo was not a measure
to protect animal life for the purpose of Article XX (b) because there was a scant
"sufficient nexus" between the species and the US.
Even if the US's Pelly sanctions could stand the test of the above requirements,
the crucial point rests on whether the US could succeed in convincing the WTO that
the trade embargo could fulfill the "necessity" condition within paragraph (b). By
honouring the less-restrictive-measure formula, Taiwan, certainly, would argue that
the Pelly sanctions were not a "necessary measure" to achieve the goal of protecting
endangered species. It could stress that, apart from trade sanctions, other alternatives
consistent with the GATT rules to save rhinos and tigers were still reasonably
available to the US. The US could have taken other non-coercive measures to help
Taiwan halt illegal trade in parts of rhinos and tiger. A more effective method by
which Taiwan could catch the tempo of global efforts to protect endangered species
thus appears to be by international cooperation and assistance, like transferring of
technology and know-how, rather than coercive trade embargoes. In addition, helping
Taiwan enter into CITES is a direct way through which Taiwan is able to access the
new approach of protecting endangered species. Unfortunately, the US did not
engage in those methods before imposing a trade sanction against Taiwan, despite the
fact that it started to provide Taiwan some sort of carrots after launching the
sanctions.
The US might defend the consistency of the trade measure with Article XX (b)
by urging the WTO to embrace an innovative concept of the necessity requirement.
The US may highlight the fact found by CITES that species of rhinos and tiger have
been threatened with extinction. Then, it may request the tribunal, as Charnovitz
speculated, to "take into account the irreversibility of species loss in determining the
necessity of a sanction."237 Further, it may argue that other non-trade measures, even
still available, are insufficient to prevent rhinos and tigers from the brink of
extinction. A drastic action, such as trade sanctions, therefore, must be taken. The
proposition that the urgency to save those species and the ineffectiveness of other
236 The implementation of the US's CITES obligations by the Endangered Species Act (ESA) see Patel,
"Endangered Species", at 173-78. Apart from the ESA, the Lacey Act is another significant US law
aimed to conserve wildlife through the regulation of commerce. See Patel, at 178-80.
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non-cocrcive measures guarantee the necessity of imposing trade sanctions,
undoubtedly, may win some sympathy from the WTO, because the regime has
become increasingly sensitive to the significance of protecting the global
environment. So, Charnovitz proposed that the "precautionary principle," one of the
noted environmental principles, if adopted, may provide a basis for the WTO tribunal
to make such judgement.2 ,8
Apart from the current conservative stand of the WTO toward the precautionary
principle,239 there might be some hurdles, however, which may dissuade the WTO
from endorsing the assumed stance. As observed, placing environmental emergencies
over normal trade rules would encourage countries to employ trade sanctions to
prevent species extinction.240 Moreover, such broad interpretation of the necessity
requirement could reduce the WTO regime to a situation where international
environmental norms are allowed to be enforced by a single party with powerful
economic might. As a result, the WTO regime would be in danger of usurping the
enforcement function that should have been fulfilled by other competent institutions.
Further, the WTO's tolerance of this alleged necessary measure may lead to the
infringement of the integrity of certain enforcement mechanisms in international
environmental regime.
Since the creation of the WTO's new dispute settlement mechanism, the least-
GATT-inconsistency test has remained intact. It is hard to predict under what
circumstance the rigid test may be challenged successfully and, thus, to what extent it
may be altered. The US's hesitance to invoke Article XX (b) in the Shrimp case
indicates that it is quite aware of the situation where the strictness embodied in the
237 Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 796. See also Weiss, "Trade and Environment", at 733.
238 Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 796. Evidenced in a number of treaties and State practice, the
precautionary action is a new important principle codified by the 1992 Rio Declaration in Principle 15,
which reads:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by State
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
However, the precise formulation of this principle varies in each document. See generally Sands,
Principles, at 209.
239 In the Hormones case, the Panel found that "even if the precautionary principle is considered
customary international law, it would not override explicit provisions of the WTO Agreements." EC
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat products, 18 Aug. 1997, WT/DS26/R/USA, at para. 8.157. In
line with the Panel stand, the Appellate Body concluded that the "principle, at least outside the field of
international environmental law, still awaits authoritative formulation" and that it "does not override"
the provisions of the Uruguay Round texts. EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat products, 16 Jan.
1998, WT/DS26/AB/R, at para. 123.
240 Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 796.
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necessity condition seems fairly difficult to be changed. In sum, the less-restrictive-
test could continue to obstruct the justification of a Pelly trade sanction under Article
XX (b) unless the WTO resolves to modify the dominant rule. Therefore, whenever
the US invokes an exceptional clause, Article XX (b) probably would stay in an
alternative position. Nonetheless, since the previous legal opinions on the
requirements of Article XX (g) have been modified by the recent judgements, the
future interpretation of the necessity element operating to defer to the Pelly type
sanctions cannot be ruled out.
(c) The chapeau's standards of Article XX
In the light of the above analysis, arguably, the Pelly measure was barely able to
satisfy the terms of either Article XX (b) or (g). However, for the sake of discussion,
it might be interesting to examine whether the measure could be justified under the
conditions specified in the chapeau, if, hypothetically, the Pelly sanctions would have
fallen within the ambit of those exceptional clauses.
(i) Were the Pelly sanctions a product of unjustifiable discrimination?
The decision on whether the imposition of the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan
amounted to unjustifiable discrimination primarily relies on whether the relevant facts
demonstrated that Taiwan v/as treated fairly and justly, as the trade embargo was
applied.
First of all, compared with other producing countiies of rhinos or tigers, Taiwan
may claim that its conduct, even lacking sufficient progress on the control of illegal
trade in rhinos and tigers, had not contributed to the direct decrease of the population
of those endangered species. Actually, a number of countries which contain rhinos
and tigers, such as Zambia and Russia, were urged by the CITES Standing Committee
to take further conservation actions. Taiwan thus may contend that those producer
nations should undertake a relatively heavier responsibility to deter the diminishing of
those species because they expediently control those animals. Instead of pressuring
those countries, the US merely selected a consumer country, Taiwan, as the target,
and thus simply overlooked the fact that there were other nations probably better
meriting the punishment. Secondly, Taiwan can point out that the US only decided to
sanction it, even though other consumer nations, like China, initially had been
certified under the Pelly Amendment. The sanctions therefore prejudice Taiwan
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because the evidence showed that the progress made by China was no better than that
of Taiwan.241
Moreover, inspired by the Shrimp judgement, Taiwan may argue that the US
failed to pay adequate regard to the particular situation of Taiwan. Clearly, due to the
political reasons, Taiwan has been unable to become a party to CITES,242 and thus has
been constantly barred from enjoying the privileges as those CITES members, such as
scientific and technical assistance243 regarding the preservation of rhinos and tigers.
Thus, Taiwan should be given more time to adjust its policy to the extent that
compatible with the current conservation trend. Unfortunately, no favourable
treatment was given to this country. While other CITES members that had been
requested to improve their conservative measures were not sanctioned, it appeared
unjustifiable for the US to only sanction a non-member of CITES, which technically
violated no rules of CITES.244
The US may justify its selection of Taiwan as a final target by claiming that its
decision was made to honour the decisions and recommendations of the Standing
Committee, which treated Taiwan differently from other nations. At its 30th meeting,
the Standing Committee did recommend that Parties consider implementing an import
ban against wildlife products from Taiwan and China. Further, the US may highlight
that, in contrast to other consumer States, such as South Korea and China, Taiwan
was particularly singled out for failure to meet the minimum requirements at the 31st
meeting of the Standing Committee. Accordingly, the US may argue that its Pelly
sanctions did not amount to unjustifiable discrimination.
Taiwan may not dispute this CITES context. But, it may claim that the
differential judgement made by the Standing Committee on the PRC and Taiwan to
some extent was a reflection of the unequal political positions of these two entities.
The PRC, a member of CITES, is in a better position to exert influence over the
CITES members and the CITES Standing Committee. In contrast to the PRC, Taiwan
served merely as an observer with a status equivalent to that of NGOs.245 Thus, it had
241 See chapter one of the thesis.
242 See chapter two of the thesis.
243 CITES, Art. XII, para. 2 (c). See also chapter five of the thesis.
244 Id.
245 See Yeh,"Country/Region Reports: Taiwan", at 440. See. The status of NGOs in international
environmental regimes see generally Birnie and Boyle, International Law and the Environment, at 86-
87; P. Sands, "The Environment, Community and International Law", at 393-94, 396-401, 412-17;
Burhenne, "The Role of NGOs", at 207-11.
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the right to participate in the sessions but not to vote.240 As observed, it was deprived
of an effective access to defending its interests and presenting its progress regarding
the preservation of rhinos and tigers in CITES's meetings.247
Whether the US's trade embargo constituted unjustifiable discrimination
arguably depends on how the WTO tribunal assesses the validity of the CITES
Standing Committee decisions. In short, the WTO might favour the US's position if it
fully respects such decisions. Otherwise, if the WTO is sympathetic to Taiwan's
position and make its own decision independently of the CITES's judgement, a
different finding could be made.
(ii) Did the Pelly sanctions constitute arbitrary discrimination?
Inspired by the Shrimp judgement on the interpretation of "non-arbitrary
discrimination," in this dispute, the tribunal ought to determine mainly whether the
process of applying the Pelly sanctions was in conformity with the principle of due
process of law.
In reviewing the US's certification process against China and Taiwan, Taiwan
may complain that the procedure fell short of transparency and due process. The
decision was made exclusively by the officials in the US Fish and Wildlife Service
without allowing either certified country to defend themselves. Further, the Pelly
Amendment does not prescribe the procedure of review or appeal for the certified
countries. In this regard, Taiwan as well as China may contend that they were
discriminated against those countries that were not under certification. Moreover, the
law also failed to provide Taiwan any mechanism by which it was able to make a
petition to the decision of sanction. Also, Taiwan may contend that it was
discriminated against compared to China, which was free from sanctions.
Therefore, Taiwan could remind the tribunal that the Pelly Amendment's denial
of any opportunity for certified or targeted countries to be heard or to participate in
the procedure of sanction, like the Section 609 authorising the shrimp embargo,
underlines its nature of arbitrary discrimination.
Overall, the exclusivity and the inherent arbitrariness rooted in the US Pelly
Amendment would not enable the Pelly sanctions to have a favorable chance to stand
246 CITES, Art. XI (7).
247 See Shih, "Multilateralism", at 122. See also Birnie and Boyle, International Law and the
Environment, at 87.
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(he test of the non-arbitrary discrimination requirement.
(iii) Were the Pclly sanctions a disguised trade restriction?
Taiwan cannot credibly claim that the Pclly sanctions qualified as a "disguised
trade restriction." The legislative history of the Pclly Amendment, as observed,
discloses no motivation to protect American domestic commercial interests.:4S Also,
there seems no evidence to suggest that the Pelly trade embargo was aimed at
protecting the domestic industry of US's wildlife.
Conclusion
It seems hard to decide the consistency of the Pelly action against Taiwan with
the WTO/GATT rules partly due to the fact that no such dispute has ever been
brought to this institution. Nonetheless, by hypothetically examining such case, it has
been demonstrated that, under the current WTO jurisprudence, the Pelly action has
some difficulty to be justified.
It is evident that the WTO has already begun to show its tolerance for a PPM
method after a long-term dismissal of such measures. Although the Pelly sanctions
24S Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 792.
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were launched with the lofty goal of saving the endangered species facing extinction,
there remain some hurdles to block the justification of the Pclly sanction under the
WTO/GATT mandates. For instance, the absence of a linkage between embargoed
products (bird feather) and natural resources to be conserved (rhinos and tigers) as
that of the PPM method perhaps would, at least presently, dissuade the tribunal from
justifying the action under Article XX (g). Moreover, because there is no sign that
the conventional formula regarding the "necessity" requirement in Article XX (b)
would be likely to be altered, any use of Pelly sanctions thus has even less chance to
qualify under this exception.
Even if the Pelly sanction could be justified under either exceptional clause, it
could meet even greater difficulty to survive the test of the chapeau's conditions. It
should be noted that the shrimp embargo was not vindicated under the chapeau, even
though it did satisfy Article XX (g). That decision implied that the tribunal tended to
interpret the introductory note as strictly as possible. The study of the Pelly sanctions
against Taiwan shows that, if a number of countries were deemed to be in violation of
international environmental agreements, the selection of only one country as a target
would be likely to constitute unjustifiable discrimination. Nevertheless, Taiwan may
find it difficult to claim successfully that the Pelly sanctions constituted unjustifiable
discrimination, if the WTO tribunal chooses to honour the decision made by the
CITES Standing Committee, which singled out Taiwan and particularly blamed it for
its insufficient progress. Otherwise, a different decision could be made, if the WTO
is more sympathetic to Taiwan's position. On the other hand, the fact that the Pelly
Amendment inherently operates without adequate due process of law could make any
action authorised by the law, such as the case of Taiwan, constitute arbitrary
discrimination.
As indicated, some inherent characteristics of a Pelly action prevent its measures
from being justified under the exceptional clause of GATT 1994. The case study of
the Taiwan situation in particular, however, indicates that the implementation of a
Pelly sanction perhaps could have won some sort of sympathy from the WTO
tribunals, if some circumstances had been altered. For instance, the geographic
location of natural resources is one of the factors used to determine whether the
measures qualify Article XX (g). A Pelly sanction may have a better chance of
meeting the requirement of the exceptional clause if it is aimed at preserving
endangered marine species, like whales, dolphins or sea turtles, rather than the land-
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based species. In effect, the US may rightly claim the existence of a sufficient nexus
between the species and itself on the ground that those marine species are not
subjected to a specified national jurisdiction, and the US may exercise jurisdiction
over them. Further, on the selection of a target, if the sanctions were taken entirely to
follow a non-discriminatory judgement of an international environmental regime, the
US would find it easier to establish that the sanctions did not amount to unjustifiable
discrimination.
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Bilateral Treaty—FCN Treaties
The significance of FCN treaties to the development of the US commercial
relations with other nations cannot be over-emphasised. During the formative years
of the US, the treaty "occupied a central foreign policy, [serving] both as a symbol of
peaceful relations and a protector of vital commercial interests."249 Then, greater
emphasis was placed on the establishment and promotion of private foreign
investment, as opposed to trade and shipping. The switch appears, as observed, "a
direct reflection of the increased foreign investment role of American business firms
after World War II."250
The FCN treaties do contain a variety of functions, mainly facilitating the mutual
commercial activities between the US and its trading partners.251 In spite of their
various commercial purposes, the trade provisions specified in the treaty appear the
most relevant applicable rules to the present study involved with the use of imports
ban authorised by the US Pelly Amendment. It is admitted that, after World War II,
the trade promotion aspects of the treaty had largely been replaced by the
WTO/GATT which becomes the central forum for negotiating tariff adjustment and
promoting trade objectives. Nevertheless, for Taiwan, currently a non-member of the
WTO, the treaty remains a feasible tool to challenge the Pelly sanctions.
A The rules of the FCN Treaties
1 Basic applicable provisions
A common provision of FCN treaties, based upon the principle of reciprocity, is
to require each contracting party to grant equal national treatment to citizens and
companies of the other contracting State in its territory as well as to provide them
with legal protection against non-commercial risks.252
Moreover, these treaties also institute the most-favoured-nation treatment that
forbids discriminatory measures between contracting parties and any third country. In
249 Youngquist, "United States Commercial Treaties", at 72.
250 Id.
251 Apart from trade, the FCN treaties normally cover the following matters: (a) rights of entry for
business and residence; (b) protection of individuals and companies; (c) rights and privileges of
individuals and companies with respect to: (1) practice of professions; (2) acquisition of property; (3)
patents; (4) taxes; (5) remittance of earning and capital; (6) competition of state-owned enterprises; (7)
expropriation or nationalization; (8) access to courts; (d) shipping; and (t) referral of disputes under the
treaty to the International Court of Justice. See Youngquist, id.
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terms of the applicable rules to the restrictions on the import or export of the like
product, this requirement appears the most relevant one. In effect, FCN treaties
generally prohibit the imposition of import or export control on any like article by
either party unless the same measures are applied to all third countries. For instance,
the FCN treaty between the US and the ROC (Taiwan) provides:
No prohibition or restriction of any kind shall be imposed by either High Contracting Party on the
importation, sale, distribution or use of any article the growth, produce or manufacture of the
other High Contracting, or on the exporting of any article destined for the territories of the other
High Contracting Party, unless the importation, sale, distribution or use of the like article the
growth, produce or manufacture of all third countries, or the exportation of the like article to all
■>53
third countries, respectively, is similarly prohibited or restricted."
As a result, the non-discriminatory treatment will effectively render a unilateral trade
embargo against certain parties inconsistent with the treaty obligation.254 It is because
all countries with whom an acting State has a commercial relationship scarcely would
have to be placed under the same trade ban while a decision of taking sanctions
against a particular country was made. The trade measure thus arguably could be
challenged successfully under the treaty obligation.
During the past few decades, the 1986 Nicaragua case255 proved to be the most
renowned judgement dealing with this issue. The focal point was whether the US's
act of interrupting the entire commercial and trade relationship with Nicaragua was in
contradiction of the FCN treaty. Nicaragua claimed a breach of the FCN obligations
by the trade embargo, not based on a specific provision of the treaty, but the general
object and purpose of the treaty.256 The ICJ admitted the sovereign right of a nation
to conduct trade affairs in the absence of a treaty commitment, or other specific legal
obligation. 257 It, however, found that the US comprehensive trade embargo
undermined the whole spirit of the treaty against Nicaragua. The Court ruled:
252 See Jackson, "Congruence or Conflict", at 1236.
253 The FCN treaty between the US and the ROC, Art. 16(3). Similar provision can be found in other
FCN treaties, like Art. 14(2) in the FCN treaty between the US and Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S.
1871 (1956); Art. 14 (2) in the FCN treaty between the US and Pakistan, 12 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. 4683
(1961).
254 See Muir, "Boycott", at 200.
255 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.A.), I.C.J. Rep. 1986, at
138 [hereinafter Nicaragua Case].
256 Id. at 135
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[wjhcrc there exists such a commitment, of the kind implied in a treaty of friendship and
commerce, such an abrupt act of termination of commercial intercourse as the general trade
embargo of 1 May 1985 will normally constitute a violation of the obligation not to defeat the
^sx
object and purpose of the treaty."'
But, Judge Oda, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed the Court's application of the
concept of the object and/or purpose of a treaty to the assessment of US trade
embargo on the ground that the undermining of the object and /or purpose of a treaty
itself would not be tantamount to a violation of the treaty obligations.259
Another significant provision of the FCN treaties that may be relevant to a trade
embargo requires the "freedom of commerce and navigation between the territories of
either party."260 Further, it provides:
The vessels of either Party shall have liberty, on equal terms with vessels of the other Party and
on equal terms with vessels of any third country, to come with their cargoes to all ports, places
and water of such other Party open to foreign commerce and navigation.261
Apart from the interruption of commercial relations with Nicaragua, the US also
prohibited Nicaraguan vessels from entering into US ports. The World Court
accordingly decided that the embargo constituted a measure contrary to that article.262
A question may be raised as to whether a mere trade ban without imposing a
simultaneous navigation embargo might be violative of such clause, which will be
discussed later.
2 Exemption of the treaty obligations
(a) Termination of the treaty
Some trade measures invoked by either party against the other may be exempted
from being bound by the treaty obligations, if the action fulfils specified
257 Id. at 138.
258 Id. On the other hand, the Court decided that other economic pressure imposed by the US against
Nicaragua did not defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, such as the 90 per cent cut in the sugar
import quota, the cessation of economic aid, the opposition to the grant of loans. See Id.
259 Oda, dissenting opinion, id. at 249-51.
260 See Art. 19 (!) of the FCN treaty between the US and Nicaragua. See also Art. 21 (1) of the FCN
treaty between the US and the ROC.
261 Art. 19 (3) of the FCN treaty between the US and Nicaragua. See also Art. 21 (3) of the FCN treaty
between the US and the ROC.
262 Nicaragua case, at 140, para. 279.
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requirements. Firstly, some FCN treaties provide for a right of termination by cither
party.263 Normally, the termination of a treaty will release the parties from any
obligation further to perform the treaty.264 Nevertheless, to enable merchants of either
party to accommodate the change of circumstance, the FCN treaty shall remain in
force until certain period of time from the date on which a notice of intention to
terminate shall have been given has expired. Usually, it requires one year for such
termination to take effect. For instance, the FCN treaty between the US and the ROC
(Taiwan) specifies:
Unless one year before the expiration of the aforesaid period of five years the Government of
either other High Contracting Party shall have given notice to the Government of the other High
Contracting Party of intention to terminate this Treaty upon the expiration of the aforesaid period,
the Treaty shall continue in force thereafter until one year from the date on which notice of
intention to terminate it shall have been given by either High Contracting Party.265
In practice, to reach the goal of using trade sanctions effectively, once the acting
party has decided to terminate the bilateral commercial relations, often it does not
hold the action until the treaty officially ends. For instance, the US trade sanctions
against Nicaragua were implemented on the 6th of May, 1985, five days after
notifying Nicaragua of the US's intention to abrogate the FCN treaty.266 It was
indisputable that the treaty would still govern the embargo. The World Court, thus,
correctly decided that the US remained bound by the treaty obligations because the
treaty had not been officially terminated, despite the US's notice of termination.267
(b) Exceptional clauses
Even without being terminated, FCN treaties generally provide certain
exceptional clauses that probably constitute a plausible legal ground on which trade
restrictions could be justified. The arrangement generally covers policy goals such as
national security and humanitarian and environmental concern.268 In practice, the
national security exception is often employed to justify the measures. When the
263 Article 54 (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides: The termination of a treaty
or the withdrawal of a party may take place in conformity with the provisions of the treaty.
264 The Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, Art. 70 (1) (a).
265 FCN treaty between the US and the ROC, Art. 30(3).
266 See US Exec. Order No. 12,513,50 Fed. Reg. 18, 629 f 1985).
267 Nicaragua case, at 140, para. 279.
268 See FCN Treaty between USA and ROC, Art. 26(l)(a/b)(c) (d); (2)(a)(b)(c)(d).
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contracting parties come into a hostility that may prove to endanger the interests of
cither party, the provision is quite likely to be applicable to the critical situation. In
contrast, if no evidence indicates that the continuance of trade intercourse will
damage the security of either party, hardly can the trade embargo be justified under
the circumstance. In the Nicaragua case, the US invokes the security clause to justify
the trade embargo against Nicaragua. The ICJ denies such claim on the ground that:
Since no evidence at all is available to show how Nicaragua policies had in fact become a threat
to "essential security interests" in May 1985, when those polices had been consistent, and
consistently criticized by the United States, for four years previously, the Court is unable to find
that the embargo was "necessary" to protect those interests. Accordingly, Article XXI affords no
defence for the United States in respect of any of actions here under consideration.269
As far as this study is concerned, environmental and health exceptions are the
most relevant. In the FCN treaty between the US and the ROC, each contracting
party is allowed to impose an environmental trade embargo in violation of
fundamental obligations of the FCN treaties if the measure meets the following
requirement:
Subject to the requirement that, under like circumstances and conditions, there
shall be no arbitraiy discrimination by either High Contracting Party against the
other High Contracting Party or against the nationals, corporations, associations,
vessels or commerce thereof, in favor of any third country or the nationals,
corporations, associations, vessels or commerce thereof, the provisions of this
Treaty shall not extend to prohibitions or restrictions:
(b) designed to protect human, animal, or plant life or health;270
The structure of the provision is quite similar to that of the GATT general
exceptional clause. So, the eventual justification of an environmental trade measure
under the FCN treaty must satisfy the criteria embodied in the introductory note and
individual exception as well. Yet, in spite of the structural similarity, obviously, the
content of the article in these two regimes remains different.
Where the topic of the conservation of natural resources has not been included,
269 See Nicaragua case, at 141, para. 282.
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the environmental exception of the Article merely covers the protection of living
things. Further, in contrast to the necessity requirement in Article XX (b) of GATT
1994, the FCN treaty simply requires "designed to" rather than "necessity" or
"relating to" for the linkage between the measure imposed and the policy goal.
According to its plain meaning, the term can be read as "intended for certain
purpose."271 Although the term may not have been authoritatively interpreted, the
device, compared with the GATT context, could effectively relieve the burden of the
party claiming the justification of the restrictions. The measure that is inconsistent
with the basic FCN principle therefore may have a better chance to survive the test of
the environmental exception as long as it fulfills the designed purpose. Nonetheless,
like Article XX (b) of GATT 1994, the issue of whether the measure under the FCN
treaty may be permitted to protect extraterritorial living things could be controversial.
Moreover, unlike GATT 1994, the opening paragraph of the exceptional clause
appears in a relatively simpler form. The headnote does not spell out many elements,
but only prohibits "arbitrary discrimination." Given the lack of an adequate
interpretation of the "arbitrary discrimination", it remains to be seen whether, in the
future, an international tribunal would tend to adopt identical criteria to that of the
WTO jurisprudence, which was largely confined to the sphere of "due process of
law."
B The assessment of the consistency of the Pelly sanctions with the FCN treaty
1 The continuation in force of the FCN treaty between the US and the ROC
(Taiwan)
In 1946, the Sino-US FCN treaties was concluded as a legal basis for the mutual
intercourse of commerce and navigation between the two countries. The treaty is
"designed to promote friendly intercourse between their respective territories through
provisions responsive to the spiritual, cultural, economic and commercial aspirations
of the people". 272 In 1978, the US President Carter decided to recognise the
government of the People's Republic China as the sole legal government of China
and accordingly terminated foreign relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan). In
spite of the termination of diplomatic relations between US and the ROC, it is
270 FCN treaty between the US and the ROC, Art. 26 (2) (b) [emphasis added].
271 Collins Cobuild, English Dictionary, at 445; The term has been defined as "contrived or taken to be
employed for a particular purpose." See Black Law Dictionary, at 447.
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interesting to note that neither of them intended to discontinue the treaties and
agreements binding them except the defense treaty. The US President's
Memorandum stated that:
Existing international agreements and arrangements in force between the United States and
Taiwan shall continue in force and shall be performed and enforced by departments and agencies
beginning January 1, 1979, in accordance with their terms and, as appropriate, through that
instrumentality.273
Further, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)274 passed by Congress explicitly reiterated
the US's resolution, stressing that:
the absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the application of the laws of
the United States with respect to Taiwan ... in the [same] manner that the laws of the United
275
States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979.
More specifically, the TRA requires
the continuation in force of all treaties and other international agreements . . . entered into by the
United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the
Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and in force between them on December 31, 1978,
unless and until terminated in accordance with law.276
Similarly, shortly after the promulgation of the TRA, the ROC government
announced a statement affirming the consensus.277
In terms of the FCN treaty, substantial evidence indicated the intention of parties
to continue to fulfill the treaty obligations. Following the President's Memorandum,
the US State Department has listed such FCN treaty annually in "Treaties in Force"
which has been honoured by the US since 1979. Furthermore, the Report on the TRA
of the House of Representatives expressly declared that "[T]he US-ROC Treaty of
272 See the preamble of the FCN Treaty between the US and the ROC.
273 President's Memorandum for All Departments and Agencies: Relations with the People on Taiwan,
repinted in 1979 US Code Cong. & Admin. News 75.
274 Pub, L. No. 94-83, 10 Apr. 1979, 22 U.S.C. 3300 etseq.
275 2 2 U.S.C. 3303 (a).
276 22 U.S.C. 3303 (c).
277 See Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, North America I, No. 06514, 13 Apr. 1979
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Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, which provides a legal foundation for
commercial relations between the United States and Taiwan, will continue without
interruption."278
Apart from the overwhelming evidence of both Executive and Legislative
Branches' intent to give full effect to the FCN Treaty, in particular, the judicial
decisions by both parties have all confirmed that the treaty remains valid and
enforceable.279 For example, in the Chinese TV Program case, a dispute arises
regarding whether a TV program authored by Taiwanese citizens can enjoy copyright
protection in the US. Section 104(b)(1) of the US Copyright Act makes an original
work eligible for copyright protection if
On the date of first publication, one or more of the authors is a national or domiciliary of the
United States, or is a national, domiciliary, or sovereign authority of a foreign nation that is a
280
party to a copyright treaty to which the United States is also a party.
Clearly, the FCN treaty between the US and the ROC empowers each party to grant
copyright protection to works authored by citizens of them.281
But, defendants contend that the treaty lapsed in 1979 when the US de-
recognised Taiwan. In short, the core issue of the dispute is whether the FCN treaty
remains valid, irrespective of the existence of diplomatic relations. The court
recognises that "on the question whether [a] treaty has even been terminated,
governmental action in respect to it must be regarded as of controlling importance."
282 Further, it concedes that the judiciary should refrain from determining whether a
treaty has lapsed, and instead should defer to the wishes of the elected branches of
government.283 Given the fact that both Congress and the Executive Branch agree that
the FCN treaty is to continue in effect, the court holds that the treaty remains a valid
278 H.R. Rep. No. 26, 96,h Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1979).
279 See New York Chinese TV Programs, INC. Vs U.E. Enterprises, INC., 954 F.2d 847 (2nd Cir.
1992)[hereinafter Chinese TVPrograms case]; American Encyclopedia Britannica, INC. Vs Tan Ch'ing
Publishing Co., Ltd., Civil Judgement of the Taiwan High Court, 79[1990]-shang-keng-I-tzu no. 128.
280 1 7 U.S.C. 104(b)(1).
281 Article IX of the FCN treaty requires both parties to guarantee the privileges of their own laws to
citizens of the other nation
in regard to copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade names, and other literary, artistic and industrial
property, upon compliance with the applicable laws and regulations, if any, respecting
registration and other formalities which are or may hereafter be enforced be the duly constituted
authorities . ..
282 Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 285 (1902) [emphasis added].
283 See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
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and enforceable treaty.
However, on the other hand, the defendants further question the constitutionality
of continuing to honour the FCN treaty by US governmental action. Firstly, because
a treaty is a contract between nations, they argue that the US's de-recognition of
Taiwan implies that Taiwan is no longer a 'nation', and, thus, any treaties between
them become void. The court refutes the argument on the ground that it confuses two
distinct concepts: nationhood and diplomatic recognition. It considers that an entity's
status as a nation is not affected by whether it receives diplomatic recognition from
other nations. Because Taiwan remains a nation, the court rules that the US may
continue to honor its treaties with Taiwan. Moreover, the court denies the linkage
between diplomatic recognition and the validity of a treaty by highlighting the cases
where several nations have treaties with the US despite the absence of diplomatic
relations.284
Secondly, defendants pointed out that the TRA has unconstitutionally amended
the FCN treaty. The treaty was signed by the 'Republic of China'. It is true that the
TRA changes the name of the party into the 'governing authorities on Taiwan
recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979'.285
Thus, because the TRA, a domestic legislation, was not enacted pursuant to the Treaty
Clause of the Constitution, defendants argue that the TRA constitutes an
unconstitutional amendment to the FCN treaty. The court, however, considers that
such change of name is simply to recognise the realities of a changed political
landscape and, thus, is not an amendment to that treaty, which should involve the
modification of substance of the treaty. In sum, the actions, the court concludes, of
both of these governmental branches to continue to honour the FCN treaty do not
violate the US Constitution.
Overall, the validity of the FCN treaty has never been affected by the severance
of their foreign relations, and the treaty would remain in force subject only to the
termination clause contained in the treaty. As the Pelly sanctions were imposed, the
US did not announce the termination of the FCN treaty. Thus, both countries remain
bound by the agreement.
284 The court notes that the US does not accord diplomatic recognition to nine nations: Albania, Angola,
Cambodia, Taiwan, Cuba, Iran, Libya, Vietnam, and North Korea and, with the exception of Angola
and North Korea, each of these nations has at least one treaty with the United States that is currently
honoured.
285 22 U.S.C. 3303(c).
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2 What basic rules of the FCN treaty were violated by the US trade sanctions?
Taiwan could assert that the Polly sanctions were in violation of Article 16(3) of
the FCN treaty, which prohibits any discriminatory measures against either party on
the importation or exportation of any article. When the ban on imports of certain
wildlife products from Taiwan was announced, clearly, no similar measures were
extended to other nations that exported the same products to the US. Thus, it seemed
quite obvious that the Pelly sanctions were inconsistent with the most-favored-nation
mandate concerning restrictions on the importation. The practice of US's sanctioning
of Taiwan discloses that any trade measures against a specified contracting party
without simultaneously targeting the other nations with the same measures should be
regarded as a breach of the requirement of the FCN treaties.
Surely, in contrast to the comprehensive trade embargo imposed by the US
against Nicaragua, hardly Taiwan may claim that the Pelly sanctions which only
involved certain imports ban on wildlife product undermined the general object and
purpose of the FCN treaty.
Moreover, it is interesting to explore whether the Pelly sanctions that only
prohibited the importation of certain wildlife products might be in contravention of
Article 21(1) specifying "freedom of commerce and Navigation." First, it should be
determined whether the rule is applicable to a pure imports ban without prohibition on
the entry of vessels from either party. The US could argue that the treaty language of
Article 21 (1) should be read altogether to extent that the provision is literally
confined to navigation activities.286 In addition, the context of paragraphs 2 and 3 of
the article that only refers to the aspects of vessels' activities further confirms the
finding. By contrast, favouring an extensive interpretation of the article, Taiwan may
claim that a pure import ban is still covered by the provision because the ban by
nature may impede the freedom of commerce regardless of their quality or quantity.
If a court was inclined to recognise the applicability of the provision to an import
ban, the US might nevertheless claim that the relatively moderate import ban against
Taiwan would not actually obstruct the alleged "freedom" of commercial relations
between the two countries. It may highlight the differential impact between a general
trade embargo and a trade ban on selective products. It seems evident that, unlike a
comprehensive termination of commercial intercourse that apparently would encroach
2X6 E.g. Judge Oda, in the Nicaragua case, remarked that article "is exclusively devoted to matters of
maritime commerce." Oda, dissenting opinion, Nicaragua case, at 251, para. 84.
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on the freedom of commerce, the Pelly imports ban merely accounted for a relatively
small amount of Taiwan's total exports to the US.2X7 As a result, the US may further
contend that the trade embargo was unable significantly to affect the free commerce
between the two countries since most of the bilateral trade relationship remained
intact. Overall, given the lack of substantial elaboration on the provision, the legality
of the Pelly trade embargo against Taiwan under the provision remains controversial.
3 Whether the Pelly sanctions could be justified under the FCN environmental
exceptional clause?
It is beyond doubt that the Pelly trade sanctions were imposed to signal the US's
serious concern about the life of the endangered rhinos and tigers. Taiwan would find
it difficult to deny that the wild life product embargo was not "designed to" reach the
goal of protecting those species. But, it still may argue that the exception does not
allow each party to use trade measures to save species located outside the national
jurisdiction of the parties. If the WTO decision in the Shrimp case were to be
followed, the US would have to prove that there is a substantial nexus between itself
and the natural resources in question. It is uncertain whether the US's claim that the
preservation of endangered species representing community interests is sufficient for
such a nexus will be accepted. On the other hand, Taiwan may point out that, unlike
the WTO/GATT governing multilateral trade relations, a FCN treaty operates
bilaterally and is concerned with the mutual interests of the parties. Thus, it appears
beyond the mandate of the agreement to allow any contracting party to invoke trade
restrictions in an attempt to protect species which are located out of the boundaries of
each parties, such as African rhinos and Indian tigers. The US may argue, in
response, that such a treaty would be much more likely to allow for US approaches to
the use of trade sanctions than the multilateral regime, especially when the former
precedes the latter in time.
If the dispute were submitted to the ICJ, surely the geographic limitation
regarding the exceptional clause would be a focus. It is uncertain whether the World
Court would rely on the approach adopted by the decision of the WTO or formulate a
new standard. Nevertheless, if it interprets the function of the treaty restrictively, it
perhaps would favour the position of Taiwan. Otherwise, if it were more willing to
287 It should be noted that the trade ban pursuant to the Pelly Amendment may operate to a full imports
ban subject to the President's discretion. See 22 U.S.C. 1978 (a) (4).
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defer to the global environmental concern, the WTO's formula could be its useful
reference.
Even if the Pelly sanctions do fall within the environmental exception, they must
also meet the requirement specified in the headnote of the provision. If the tribunal
accepts the interpretation and application of the standard of 'arbitrary discrimination'
released in the Shrimp case, it may accordingly decide that the Pelly sanctions were
'arbitrary discrimination' because of the finding that the imposition of the measure did
fall short of the due process of law.
Alternatively, the tribunal may simply turn to the plain meaning of the term,
which seemingly refers to a measure taken willfully and unreasonably.2SS The
arbitrariness of the discrimination is likely to become visible, especially on the
selection of a target, while plenty of other countries were also guilty of the alleged
misbehavior.289 It is recalled that both China and Taiwan were certified by the US
Secretary of the Interior at the same time for illegal trade in rhino and tiger parts.290
Surprisingly, Taiwan was solely targeted by the sanctions. Taiwan persistently
considered the decision of selective targeting unfair and unjust because it was
convinced that, under a similar situation, China should deserve equal treatment if the
US insisted on the implementation of such coercive sanctions. Accordingly, Taiwan
would claim the illegality of the Pelly action on the basis that it was driven by
arbitrary discrimination.
On the other hand, the US is likely to defend the non-arbitrary discrimination of
the Pelly sanctions by citing the resolutions of the CITES Standing Committee, which
evaluated the progress of each respective nation differently. In short, a competent
tribunal, such as the ICJ, may be expected to look at the overall context of relevant
decisions of the CITES Standing Committee in determining whether the Pelly
sanctions constituted arbitrary discrimination. In line with the previous discussion in
the WTO regime, the tribunal might be in favour of US's position, if it simply
accepted the CITES's differential judgement on Taiwan and China's progress. On the
other hand, if the tribunal, adopting the WTO's jurisprudence, chose to consider the
concept of arbitrary discrimination in the framework of'due process of law', the US's
Pelly action would perhaps be regarded inconsistent with the FCN treaty's
288 See Black's Law Dictionary, at 104-5.
289 See Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 792.
2'"' Letter from the Secretary of the Interior to the President, Sep. 7, 1993.
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Conclusion
With the advent of the WTO / GATT multilateral regime, the influence of FCN
treaties has been declining.21" The treaties, however, do limit either contracting party's
discretion on conducting trade affairs to a degree consistent with the non¬
discriminatory principle. The bilateral commercial agreement thus may serve as a
feasible and useful instrument under which a trade embargo could be challenged
successfully. For Taiwan, nonetheless, it is quite likely to secure the relief and
remedy offered by the bilateral treaty.
Under the general circumstance, a Pelly trade embargo imposed against any
parties with whom the US concluded the FCN treaties would normally violate the
most-favoured-nation requirement of the treaty. It is uncertain, however, in the
Taiwan case, whether the Pelly sanctions, triggered by the concern about wildlife
protection, could be justified under the exceptional clause of environmental
consideration. Overall, the legality of the Pelly sanctions under the FCN treaties
largely depends on whether the actions would be regarded as an arbitrarily
discriminatory action. Compared with its fate under the environmental exception of
GATT 1994, the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan had a better chance to meet the
requirement of the FCN treaty. The difficulty for the US to persuade a tribunal that
the decision to sanction Taiwan does not amount to "arbitrary discrimination"
required by the introductory note, however, remains.
Also, it is true that the shortage of useful precedents on similar cases increases
the difficulty of conducting such an assessment. Given the similarity in the structure
of environmental exceptions between the FCN treaties and GATT 1994, the relevant
WTO jurisprudence may provide some reference for the interpretation of the FCN
treaties' language. But, the competent dispute settlement body of the treaty regime,
the ICJ, could retain the discretion in formulating its own criteria without being
bound by the WTO ruling.
291 See Jackson, World Trading System, at 34.
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Chapter 5
The Impact ofInternational Environmental Law
Introduction
There appears to be no inherent conflict between international environment law
and unilateral environmental measures owing to their common aim of deterring the
degradation of the human environment. People favouring unilateral environmental
sanctions may regard such measures as an effective tool to enforce environmental
standards. The necessity to invoke unilateral actions may be significantly
contemplated, particularly while no international enforcement regimes are available
or workable. It is premature, however, to suggest that these environmental measures
be deemed legal simply because of their righteous motivation. As multilateral
approaches are increasingly of value in dealing with environmental challenges, the
global trend against unilateral trade measures taken for pursuing environmental
purposes has been intensified mainly as a result of the initiation and advocate of trade
regimes. Their efforts eventually led to the conclusion of the principle featuring
"trade and environment" at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED).1 More importantly, despite its soft-law character, the
principle that multilateral initiatives are to be preferred to unilateral ones has been
explicitly and substantially referred to the Shrimp/Turtle case in the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Predictably, the role of the principle could become
increasingly important so long as the unilateral use of such measures remains and its
legal status might be further illuminated by subsequent judicial decisions.
This chapter seeks to explore how the current international law of the
environment addresses unilateral environmental measures. The focal point is on
analysis of Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration of UNCED, which constitutes both a
general and primary rule governing the issue. In actuality, a substantial body of
documents and practices emerging before and after the enunciation of the principle
has endorsed the universal nature of the preference for multilateral over unilateral
action. The chapter first discloses the relevant developments that have contributed to
1 Adopted 14 June 1992, at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, UN Doc. A/CONE. 151/5Rev. 1 [hereinafter Rio Declaration],
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the formulation of the principle. The implications embodied in the 1991 GATT
Tuna/Dolphin case and the relevant GATT documents arguably herald the direction.
Thereafter, the legal content of the Rio Principle, and other instruments adopted at
UNCED containing identical elements will be examined. Further, subsequent
developments concerning the principle are analysed in order to prove its validity as
new disputes arise.
Finally, the chapter will proceed to explore whether the US's Pelly action against
Taiwan is consistent with the Rio Principle. It should be borne in mind that the main
focus of the study is whether the trade sanctions which presumably followed the
CITES's recommendation may secure an international consensus.
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A The formulation and implication of Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development
1 Pre-Rio development
(a) Environmental aspects of the 1991 GATT Tuna/Dolphin case
Unilateral trade measures invoked to pursue the change of environmental
practice of other nations did not attract earnest international concern until the recent
decade. The most noted dispute arose from the US's tuna imports restriction imposed
against Mexico in the early of 1990s for the latter's tuna fishing practice considered
incompatible with US standards for the reduction of incidental dolphin mortality.2
The dispute settlement panel of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
was given an excellent opportunity to judge the conduct of unilateral enforcement of
environmental standards. The GATT Panel seemingly not only dealt with the
consistency of the trade embargo with the US's obligation toward the GATT
provisions,3 but also, extraordinarily, displayed its deep concern and even opposition
to unilateral trade measures authorised not by international consensus but by national
legislation.
In this dispute, basically, the Panel classified the environmental trade embargo as
following:
(i) An ecological embargo
Since it is not uncommon that fish resources and dolphins are found together
around the sea areas,4 certain fishing practice will accordingly lead to the incidental
taking of dolphins. In the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (EPT),5 a particular
association between dolphins and tuna has become a unique situation.6 Many
countries in this area, including Mexico, have harvested tuna with purse-seine nets7 in
2 It has been estimated that the US's environmental trade measure "was the twenty-third time that the
United States had embargoed imports of tuna, starting with Spain in 1975." See United States
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 3 Sep. 1991, the Panel Report, DS 21/R, not adopted, para. 4.15.
[hereinafter Tuna /].
3 See chapter four of the thesis.
4 See S. P. Northridge, "World Review of Interactions between marine mammals and Fisheries",
consultant report published as FAO fisheries Technical paper No 251 Supplement 1, FIRM/T251
(Suppl. 1), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Rome, 1991).
5 The US law defines the EPT as the area of Pacific Ocean bounded by 40 degrees north latitude, 40
degrees south latitude, 160 degrees west longitude, and the coasts of North, Central and South
America. See Title 50, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 216.3 (1990).
5 The GATT Panel noted that "This type of association has not been observed in other areas of the
world." Tuna /, at para. 2.2.
7 As observed by the Panel: "The last three decades have seen the deployment of tuna fishing
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which dolphins are frequently trapped and killed.
To curb incidental dolphins mortality resulting from undesirable tuna-fishing
practice, the US's Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA)8 stipulates requirements
by which US domestic fisheries are obliged to abide. In addition, by denying access to
the US's market, the MMPA also mandates the prohibition of imports of certain
yellowfin tuna and certain yellowfin tuna products from nations whose tuna-fishing
policy in the EPT fail to meet the specific US requirements for dolphin conservation.
The eventual imposition of a trade embargo against tuna products from Mexico was a
clear indication of the US's intention to seek modification of other countries'
environmental policy. Obviously, such market power has been employed as a tool for
ecological considerations. Therefore, the US's embargo authorised by the MMPA
could be perceived to be primarily aimed at the conservation of dolphins rather than
the regulation of tuna products.9
(ii) A unilateral action to deal with transboundary environmental problems
The very nature of the US's tuna embargo against Mexico, in many ways,
appeared to be a unilateral measure to enforce the US's perspective on dolphin
conservation. The most particular feature of the action rests on the standards set by
the MMPA with which countries are pressured to comply. Pursuant to the MMPA,
the importation of yellowfin tuna and products therefrom harvested in a manner that
leads to the incidental killing of dolphins in excess of US standards10 shall be banned.
To access the US's market, the harvesting countries must prove through documentary
evidence that the fishing practices meet a series of standards. The legislation requires
a dolphin-protecting program that is comparable to that of the US. Thus, such a
regulatory regime must include the same prohibitions as are applicable under US
technology based on the "purse-seine" net in many areas of the world. A fishing vessel using this
technique locates a school of fish and sends out a motorboat (a "seine skiff') to hold one end of the
purse-seine net. The vessel motors around the perimeter of the school of fish, unfurling the net and
encircling the fish, and the seine skiff then attaches its end of the net to the fishing vessel. The fishing
vessel then purses the net by winching in a cable at the bottom edge of the net, and draws in the top
cables of the net to gather its entire contents." See id. at para. 2.1.
8 The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, P. L. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972), as amended,
notably by P. L. 100-711, 102 Stat. 4755 (1988) and most recently by P. L. 101 -627, at 104 Stat. 4467
(1990); codified in part at 16 U.S.C. 136Iff.
9 Cf Japan argued that "[i]t was unlikely that the MMPA embargo could be shown to be "primarily
aimed at the conservation of' dolphins because an embargo on all yellowfin tuna and tuna products
was not a dolphin conservation measure but a sanctions mechanism to force other countries to adopt
policies established unilaterally by the United States." Tuna /, at para. 4.19.
10 MMPA, section 101 (a) (2) (B).
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rules to US vessels." Also, it demands the average rate of ineidental taking of marine
mammals for their tuna fleets must not exceed 1.25 times the taking rate of US
vessels in the same period.12 During that period, the US law allows the incidental kill
of up to 20,500 dolphins a year by its own fleet.13
Although the US insisted that the standards for dolphin conservation be based on
"scientific information evaluated using recognized scientific approaches,"14 there is no
widely accepted evidence that may endorse that view.15 The US measures virtually
derive from its own judgement on the methods that are preferable for dolphin
protection. Accordingly, it may be concluded that the US implemented its own
standards by invoking economic leverage to force nations like Mexico to adopt
measures comparable to the US.
Another aspect which underlines the unilateral feature of the US's trade embargo
is that the US retains the discretion to determine whether countries have met that
standards.16 It feels free to choose the target being deemed as a violator without
international supervision. Thirdly, the penalty to be imposed is subject to US national
legislation.17
Overall, in contrast to other trade measures implemented purely for protecting
national interests, the US tuna/dolphin embargo proved a unilateral imposition of an
import ban aimed at solving transboundary environmental issue.
(iii) The prevalence of collective methods over unilateral actions for global
environmental challenge
In the Panel Report, reflecting the preferences expressed by a number of member
States,18 several rationales emerged to question the appropriateness of the US
unilateral embargo against Mexico for dolphin protection. The following arguments
" Id.
12 Id. The US regulations have specified a method of comparing incidental taking rates by calculating
the kill per set of the US tuna fleet as an unweighted average, then weighting this figure for each
harvesting country based on differences in mortality by type of dolphin and location of sets. See
"Regulation Governing the Importation of Tuna Taken in Association with Marine mammals" (interim
final rule), 54 Federal Register 9438 (7 March 1989).
13 Tuna I, at para. 3.37.
14 Id. at para. 3.46.
15 It had been observed by Japan that "the MMPA standard for incidental dolphin takings was set
unilaterally, and was not a scientific standards,. .." Id. at para. 4.18,
16 See Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 774.
17 Id.
18 A number of member States made written submission to the Panel. Most of them disclosed their
opposition to the US's unilateral actions, including Canada, European Economic Community (EEC),
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presented in the Panel marked this approach:
Firstly, it was advocated that the GATT regime should not tolerate the unilateral
imposition of national conservation objectives upon other member States without
their consent or participation in the development of the standard.19 Like the EEC's
comment, it had been pointed out:
[t]he EEC did not consider application of unilateral trade restrictions to be an adequate means to
limit incidental dolphin mortality, . . the EEC would not introduce trade measures because of a
third country's requirements nor on the basis of that country's unilaterally-defined standards.20
More radically, the term "eco-imperialism" has been used for describing such national
behaviour.21 Some countries even worry that:
Potentially, any nation could thereby justify unilaterally imposing its own social, economic or
employment standards as a criterion for accepting imports. Any influential contracting party
could effectively regulate the internal environment of others simply by erecting trade barriers
based on unilateral environmental policies.22
It is likely that such risk caused by the unilateral judgement on another nation's
environmental practice may accelerate especially whilst international consensus to
deal with the critical issue has not yet been established. In this case, it is obvious that
the GATT is reluctant to bear the consequences of justifying such unilateral
environment-oriented measures. If the US's measures were accepted, as the Panel
concluded:
[ejach contracting party could unilaterally determine the life or health protection policies from
which other contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the
General Agreement. The General Agreement would then no longer constitute a multilateral
framework for trade among all contracting parties but would provide legal security only in respect
of trade between a limited number of contracting parties with identical internal regulations.23
The GATT's wariness of unilateralism is an indication of its vigorous desire to
safeguard the merits of sovereign equality.24 In its concluding remarks, the Panel
simply declared: "[a] contracting party may not restrict imports of a product merely
Japan, Venezuela. See Tuna I, at paras. 4.8, 4.11, 4.19, and 4.27.
19 See generally Jackson, "Congruence or Conflict", at 1227-59.
20 Tuna /, at para. 4.11.
21 Jackson, "Congruence or Conflict", at 1241.
22 See Venezuela's submission to the Panel, Tuna /, at para. 4.27.
23 Id. at para. 5.27. See also id. at paras 5.32, 4.18.
24 See Kingsbury, "Tuna-Dolphin Controversy", at 18.
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because it originates in a country with environmental policies different from its
own."25 To verify the approach, Kittichaisarce, a Thailand official, further elaborated
that:
It is doubtful whether, in international law, the United States can assert the right to protect the life
or health of human and animals in international areas or within the territory of other states.
Compliance with domestic law of another state in spite of the fact that there is no international
legal obligation to do so is contrary to the notion ot'sovereign equality2b
Secondly, the application of unilaterally-set conservation standards will create
unpredictability for nations against which the trade restriction is imposed. As stated,
the MMPA linked the standards which Mexico had to meet during a particular period
to the standards for US fishermen during the same period. In effect, there is an
inherent risk that, as observed, "the United States might change the standard any time
at its own whim, by amending its own domestic law without having to consult other
nations."27 So, unsurprisingly, Thailand could assert that "the inherent lack of
predictability in the method for setting the incidental taking rate for Mexican
fishermen would not help Mexican vessels at all in the conservation of dolphin."28
Accordingly, the Panel pointed out that:
[t]he Mexican authorities could not know whether, at a given point of time, their conservation
policies conformed to the United States conservation standards. The Panel considered that a
limitation on trade based on such unpredictable conditions could not be regarded as being
primarily aimed at the conservation of dolphins.29
Thirdly, it had been proposed that the better method of solving international
environmental problems was to procure international consultation rather than invoke
unilateral actions.30 In the light of the need for international institutional efforts to
deal with dolphin conservation in the EPT, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission (IATTC) has functioned in dealing with this issue since the 1970s.31
Evidence suggests that its work together with national actions had generated some
25 Tuna /, at para. 6.2.
26 Kittichaisaree, "Trade Sanctions and Subsidies", at 306 [emphasis added],
27 Kittichaisaree, id. at 305; Kingsbury, "Tuna-Dolphin Controversy", at 19.
2S Tuna I, at para. 4.25.
29 Id. at para. 5.33; see also id. para. 5.28 [emphasis added].
30 E.g. see Thailand and Venezuela's submission to the Panel, id. at paras. 4.25, 4.27.
31 In 1976, the IATTC began to deal with the issue of reducing incidental dolphin mortality arising
from tuna-fishing. In June 1992, an "Agreement for Reduction of Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern
Pacific Ocean" was concluded among the States fishing in the ETP. The efforts and effectiveness of
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satisfactory results in reducing incidental dolphin mortality rate.'1* Furthermore, the
application of unilateral measures is likely to confuse countries who intend to abide
by international standards. In January 1991, the IATTC recommended that "tuna
fishermen, to preserve tuna stocks, concentrate their fishing on adult tuna, which
swim with dolphin."33 Also, it demanded that "tuna harvesters not attempt to avoid
catching dolphin completely but continue to fish adult tuna while using all possible
measures to avoid the incidental catch ofdolphins ."M Therefore, inevitably, there will
be potential conflicts between the IATTC and the US's MMPA. For instance,
countries that choose to comply with the IATTC standards may not be consistent with
the requirement of the MMPA. It had been complained that:
Compliance with the IATTC recommendation to fish adult tuna would necessarily entail some
incidental dolphin catch; non-United States harvesters were forced to choose between violating the
IATTC recommendations or ceasing to fish in the ETP. For countries like Venezuela, for which
the ETP was the only accessible year-round source of tuna and which were committed to the
international standards of the IATTC, an MMPA embargo was virtually guaranteed.35
Another reason why international cooperation is more welcome relies on its
effectiveness, while unilateral actions are perceived to achieve limited and
insufficient results. Both disputant countries, the US and Mexico, agree that the task
of protecting dolphins is a global conservation issue, since they are highly migratory
species that roam the high seas not subject to the jurisdiction of certain States.36
Mexico argued that such a task cannot be accomplished without taking into account
all the relevant elements affecting the effectiveness, such as the type of fishery,
species of dolphin, fishing method used or geographical area.37 The work of
conservation Mexico believed can barely be achieved merely by US unilateral action,
especially when the US tuna embargo is limited to dolphins of the EPT where
harvesting tuna with purse-seining net kills dolphins.38
the IATTC on dolphin conservation see Kingsbury, "Tuna-Dolphin Controversy", at 11-12 and n. 32.
31 See Kingsbury, id. at 11-12 and n. 32.
33 See Tuna I, at para. 4.26.
34 /(/.[emphasis added].
35 Id. at para. 4.28.
36 Id. at paras. 3.34, 3.36, 3.38, 3.49. 3.55.
37 Id. at paras. 3.34, 3.38.
3S Mexico insisted that:
[i]f the purpose of the MMPA was to protect dolphins, as the United States claimed, then that
legislation, in order to be compatible with the GATT and with its own objectives, should protect
all dolphins regardless of the type of fishery, species of dolphin, fishing method used or
geographical area, which was not the case under the speeial and selective provisions of the
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Despite this contrary view,3'' the US insisted that "those measures were limited to
the ETP because it was only there that the unique linkage between yellowfin tuna and
dolphins occurred, so it was only there that the danger to dolphins from commercial
tuna fishing existed."40 Eventually, the Panel was obviously more impressed with
Mexico's contention by stating:
[t]o pursue its dolphin protection objectives through measures consistent with General Agreement,
in particular through the negotiation of international cooperative arrangements, which would seem
to be desirable in view of the fact that dolphins roam the waters ofmany states and the high seas.41
To sum up, of course, it will always be controversial whether the GATT regime,
which, by nature, is designed to promote trade liberalisation, is the proper institution
to evaluate the legality of such conservation-oriented trade measures.42 The GATT's
basic stand toward unilateral methods employed to address global environmental
issues, however, has reflected the general resistance to unilateralism in the GATT
community43 as well as generated substantial impact on latter instruments sharing a
common concern regarding such issues.44
(b) 1992 GATT Secretariat annual report on trade and environment
In its 1992 annual report, the GATT Secretariat included a special section on trade
MMPA on which the embargo was based.
Id. at para. 3.38.
39 Referring to a 1991 report of the Food and Agriculture Organization on tuna-dolphin interactions,
Mexico claimed that geographical linkage between yellowfin tuna and dolphin occurred worldwide. Id.
para. 3.51. Also, according to the IATTC's report, "tuna fishing elsewhere may also threaten dolphins
and marine mammals." Id. at para. 4.29.
40 Id. at paras. 3.52, 3.54.
41 Id. at para. 5.28. The GATT believes its judgement on the dispute would facilitate the international
cooperation. It remarked that:
These considerations led the Panel to the view that the adoption of its report would affect neither
the rights of individual contracting parties to pursue their internal environmental policies and to
co-operate with one another in harmonizing such policies, nor the right of CONTRACTING
PARTIES acting jointly to address international environmental problems which can only be
resolved through measures in conflict with the present rules of the General Agreement.
See id. at para. 6.4.
42 See e.g. Kingsbury, "Tuna-Dolphin Controversy", at 11. In its submission to the Panel, Australia
contended that the GATT regime "had no competence to rule on the actual danger to health, morals or
the environment represented by specific goods or their method of production (although it could accept
expert evidence on such dangers)". See Tuna I, at para. 4.1.
43 See Kingsbury, "Tuna-Dolphin Controversy", at 18. However, as discussed in chapter four of the
thesis, the WTO/GATT, under certain circumstance, has begun to allow unilateral environmental
measures to be justified under individual exceptional clause, even though they might not be always
consistent with the chapeau requirements in Article XX of GATT 1994.
44 See infra discussion.
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and the environment.45 This study primarily aimed to elarify the interrelationship
between trade and the environment and highlight its policy toward the use of
environmental trade measures.
As to the defence of the contribution of trade to a better environment, the GATT
Secretariat first advocates that international trade regimes support environmental
protection by increasing the efficiency of resource use and by raising incomes, thus
making possible increased expenditures on the environment.46 Additionally, "the need
for multilateral cooperation"47 in the environmental field became one of the principal
themes in the report. To promote the necessity of multilateral cooperation in solving
environmental challenges, it remarked that most environmental issues "all share a
common need for multilateral cooperation, not only to minimize potential trade
friction, but especially to identify and implement workable and effective solutions to
regional and global environmental problems."48 Therefore, in this sense, "[t]he only
alternative to unilateral actions based on economic and political power is for countries
to cooperate in the design, implementation and enforcement of an appropriate
multilateral agreement for dealing with the problem at hand."49 Moreover, it was also
emphasised that multilateral cooperation may contribute to fairer remedies by
minimising "the risk of solutions being imposed by the larger or richer countries."50
The study recognises that promoting cooperation can be difficult, but,
nevertheless, demands that offering certain incentives may be beneficial to achieve
the objectives. It urged that the use of positive incentives coupled with peer pressure
45 1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, International Trade 90-91 21 (1992) [hereinafter 1992
GATT Secretariat Report],
46 See id. at 19. It has been stated that:
no evidence [suggests] that environmental quality deteriorates steadily with economic growth.
Rather, for most indicators, economic growth brings an initial phase of deterioration followed by
a subsequent phase of improvement. The turning point for the different pollutants vary, but in
most cases they come before a country reaches a per capital of [U.S.]$8,000.
See Grosman and Krueger, Economic Growth and the Environment abstract (National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 4634, 1994); Other studies regarding the contribution of
economic activities to environmental protection generally see generally Esty, Greening GATT, at 63-
64.
47 Actually, the obligation to cooperate in preserving the environmental has been regarded as one of the
fundamental principles in international environmental law. A numerous international agreements, State
practice, and judicial decisions all affirm its existence. See Boyle, "Principle of Co-operation", at 121-
22; Sands, International Environmental Law, at 197-98; Kiss, "Rio Declaration", at 57, n. 8. In the
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the requirement of cooperation becomes a
primary mandate in this declaration. See Rio Declaration, Principles 5, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 24, and 27.
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could be a preferable option for promoting multilateral cooperation.51 By contrast,
much doubt was cast on the imposition of negative incentives—"in particular, the use
of discriminatory trade restrictions on products unrelated to the environmental issue at
hand,"52 which is deemed as "[n]ot an effective way."53
Although the report was critical of trade restrictions for promoting environmental
objectives, it does not necessarily mean that all such measures are impermissible.
Actually, at least as regards GATT rules, it could never block the adoption of
environmental trade measures with "broad support in the world community."54
Conversely, with respect to unilateral measures, it persistently reaffirms the basic
stand taken in the 1991 Tuna/Dolphin case, which tended to reject unilateralism. The
report demonstrated its inclination by stating: "What the rules do constrain is attempts
by one or a small number of countries to influence environmental policies in other
countries not by persuasion, but by unilateral reduction in access to their markets."55
Again, it was argued that the unilateral imposition of national environmental
standards may undermine the predictability required by commercial activities,56
"since they prohibit making market access dependent on changes in the domestic
policies or practices of the exporting country."57 Fearing the method employed by
powerful States will undermine the principle of sovereign equality, it further declared
that "Countries are not clones of one another, and will not wish to become so—
certainly not under the threat of unilateral trade measures."58
Indeed, the GATT Secretariat report does not have any legal effect but is only a
policy guideline. Nevertheless, it endorses the significance of "multilateral
cooperation" in addressing global environmental challenges. Most importantly, it
strengthens the conviction of the tuna/dolphin judgement regarding the environmental
trade measures. It may be inferred from this study that the GATT regime's cautious
stand over unilateral environmental methods may be hard to be modified in the short
term. On the other hand, since a multilateral approach seems more compatible with
the GATT rules, trade measures for environmental purposes may be under less
51 The measures may include, for instance, financial assistance and transfers of environmentally-
friendly technology as well as action in the foreign aid, debt and market access areas.
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criticism as long as they obtain universal support.
2 The 1992 UNCED and Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development
(a) General background
Twenty years after the proclamation of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment,59 faced with the continuing deterioration of the environment and serious
degradation of the global ecological system, the international community found it
urgent to set up a new global forum to address the vital issue adequately.60 By a
resolution of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly,61 a decision had been made
to convene a United Nations Conference on Environment and Development to be held
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in June 1992.62
It is apparent that the concept of "sustainable development"63 has been firmly
recognised as the core theme of the 1992 UNCED,64 which requires an integration of
both mandates of environment and development. As a result, a number of legal
principles are essential to be elaborated and articulated to promote such goal. In the
UN Resolution that initiated the Conference, the elaboration of general rights and
obligations of States in the field of the environment was included as one of the
principal objectives of the Conference.65 Then, after the UNCED Preparatory
Committee (Precom)66 assigned the major substantive issues to two working groups,67
59 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, UN Doc.
A/CONF. 48/14 & Corr. 1 (1972).
60 See Mensah, "Role of the Developing Countries", at 34. See also the preamble of the UN GA Res.
44/228 of 22 December 1989 [hereinafter UN Res. 44/228].
61 UN Res. 44/228.
62 Id. at Part I, para. 1.
63 The concept of "sustainable development" was first articulated by the World Commission on
Environment and Development (WCED). The Commission urged that "there is now a need to
consolidate and extend relevant legal principles in a new charter to guide state behavior in the
transition to sustainable development." See WCED, Our Common Future 332-33 (1987). Furthermore,
it defined the concept as:
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without comprising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts:
the concept of need, in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding
priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state technology and social
organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs.
Id. at 43. The legal implication of sustainable development see generally Boyle and Freestone (eds.),
Sustainable Development; Lang (eds.), Sustainable Development.
64 The goal of achieving "sustainable and environmentally sound development" had been proclaimed as
the main task of UNCED, see UN Res. 44/228, at Part I, para. 3. Indeed, this concept had been
repeatedly emphaised by the UN Res. 44/228. See id. paras. 12, 15 (c) etc.
65 Id. Part I, para. 15 (d).
06 Prior to the 1992 UNCED, in addition to Organizational Session that had been held in New York in
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at its Second Session, the Committee decided to establish a Working Group III to deal
with legal, institutional and all related matters. One of the group's main tasks was to
examine the feasibility of elaborating principles on general rights and obligations in
the fields of environment and development, and to consider the incorporation of such
principles in the form of an instrument/charter/statement/declaration.68 It is true that
the Committee broadened the range of the originally proposed documents so as to
better encompass the issue of both the environment and development.69 The
modification, however, reflects the genuine expectation of Resolution 44/228 that
regarded the artful balance between environment protection and necessary
development as in the best interests of human society.70 With respect to the title of
the instrument, a number of representatives, including the UNCED Secretary-General
Maurice Strong favoured the style of "Earth Charter."71 But, ultimately, the title of the
"Rio Declaration on Environment and Development" was finalised after intense
debate.72
As to the specific issue of trade and the environment, it seems that this topic had
not yet formally reached the Precom until the final stages of negotiation.73 It is partly
because the awareness of the potential conflict between environmental protection and
trade rules had not yet been triggered until early 1990s, as we saw in the GATT
Tuna/Dolphin case.74 On the other hand, the content of the legal rules governing this
issue was largely formulated by other competent institutions instead of the Precom
itself. 75 The work notably by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) proved extremely influential upon the final text of the
principle of trade and environment in the Rio Declaration. The following proceeds to
March 1990, four sessions of Preparatory Committee (Nairobi, 6-31 Aug. 1990; Geneva, 18 Mar. to 5
Apr. and 12 Aug. to 4 Sept. 1991, and New York, 2 Mar. to 3 Apr. 1992) also had taken place. See id.
Part II, para. 1.
67 Working Group I will study items (a), (d), (e) and (f); Working Group II will work on items (b), (c)
and (g) of the issues listed in UN Res. 44/228, at Part I, para. 12.
68 The terms of reference of Working Group III see UN Doc. A/46/48 (1991); UN Doc. A/Conf.
151/PC/L. 31, Annex (1991).
69 See Sand, "Earth Summit", at 347.
70 The Resolution explicitly demands that the Conference address "environmental issues in the
developmental context." See UN Res. 44/228, at Part I, para. 15.
71 See Kovar, "Rio Declaration", at 122-23.
72 Id.[emphasis added],
73 Prior to PrepCom IV, evidence suggests that discussion regarding the elements for inclusion in the
declaration/charter has not yet addressed the issue of trade and environment. See UN Doc. A/CONF.
151/PC/WG 111/2(1991); A/CONF. 151/PC/78 (1991).
74 See chapter four of the thesis.
75 The influence by other institutions on specific issues of the UNCED, like nuclear safety, ecological
crimes see Sand, "Development of International Environmental Law", at 10-11.
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disclose the contribution by the organisation to the critical issue.
(b) The 1992 Cartagena Commitment of UNCTAD
To encourage universal participation in the preparation for UNCED, UN
Resolution 44/228 requests:
[t]he United Nations Environment Programme, as the main organ dealing with environmental
issues, and other organs, organisations and programmes of the United Nations system, as well as
other relevant intergovernmental organizations, to contribute fully to the preparations for the
Conference on the basis of guidelines and requirements to be established by the Preparatory
Committee.76
The UNCTAD established in 1964 as an intergovernment body of the UN was set up
to study and coordinate the common policy on the integrated treatment of
development and interrelated issues areas of trade, finance, technology, investment
and sustainable development.'7 Obviously, UNCTAD was relatively keen to respond
to the request of the UN Resolution concerning a collective contribution to the
preparation for the Rio Conference. On the eve of the 1992 UNCED, the eighth
session of UNCTAD was held in Cartagena, Colombia. In a message to UNCED, the
session pledged that it "attaches high priority to acceleration of development that is
environmentally sound and sustainable" and "enhance the well-being of today's
generations, while preserving the capacity of future generations to meet their own
needs."78 In the "Cartagena Commitment"79 adopted by the session, the Conference
reaffirmed, inter alia, "the importance it attributed to sustainable development and
identified it as one of the four priority areas."80 Thus, it established substantial
guidelines and work programmes in the areas of finance, trade, technology and
commodities.81
As to the tasks for the harmonisation of environment and trade, the Commitment
determined that:
UNCTAD, at both the intergovernmental and the Secretariat levels, taking into account the work
76 UN Res. 44/228, at Part II, para. 9.
77 See < http://www.unctad.ora/ >.
78 Message from the Eighth Session of UNTAD to the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED), reprinted in 22 EPL (1992), at 190.
79 A New Partnership for Development: The Cartagena Commitment, UN Conference on Trade and
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of other relevant fora, should undertake in-depth work on the clarification of the linkage between
trade and environment and the need for environmental protection to co-exist with liberal trade
policies and free market access and contribute to consensus building with regard to appropriate
principles and rules."2
More importantly, it made efforts to articulate specific "policy objectives" by
which the interaction between environment and trade could best be guided. Generally
speaking, it shares a common ground with the GATT regime's basic stand, built since
the emergence of the tuna/dolphin dispute. But, its formulation is embodied in a
relatively delicate and succinct expression. In the beginning, consistent with the
GATT Secretariat Report, it recognised that a free trade regime, especially paying due
regards to developing countries, combined with a sound environmental policy may
generate a positive impact on environmental protection.83
Furthermore, it spelled out several constraints on the implementation of trade-
related environmental policies. Since such trade measures under the guise of
protecting the environment may be abused, it first urged States to adopt
environmental measures that "deal with the root causes of environmental degradation,
thus preventing environmental issues from resulting in unnecessary restrictions to
trade."84 Then, it reaffirmed one of the GATT norms regulating the use of trade
measures by declaring "trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination or a disguised restriction
on international trade."85 As to unilateral actions of enforcement, inter alia, leading
to interruption of trade directly, the Commitment basically echoed the vision of the
previous GATT documents on trade and environment, which rejects unilateralism and
braces a multilateral approach. It proposed that:
Unilateral actions to deal with environment challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing
country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing transborder or global
environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on an international consensus.86
On the other hand, the Commitment articulated certain principles and rules that




85 Id. See also the GATT, Art. XX.
KId.
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enforcement of environmental policies. These principles include, inter alia:
a. The principles of non-discrimination;
b. The principle that the trade measure chosen should be the least trade-
restrictive necessary to achieve the objectives;
c. An obligation to ensure transparency in the use of trade measures related to
the environment and to provide adequate notification of national regulations;
d. The need to give consideration to the special conditions and developmental
requirements of developing countries as they move towards internationally
agreed environmental objectives.87
Actually, those principles have largely reflected the basic aspiration of trade regime,
namely the WTO/GATT.88
It may be inferred that the "Cartagena Commitment" of UNCTAD is the second
primary international document after the GATT regime, which aims to constrain the
deliberate use of environmental trade measures. The formulation of the document
further heralds an increasing resistance against unilateral trade restrictions for
environmental purpose. Not surprisingly, such an inclination toward addressing
environmental issue in the context of preserving market access will be fully
supported, especially by developing countries that constantly rely on exports to
sustain their economic growth.
(c) The conclusion of Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration
The introduction of this principle mainly reflects the expectation of the
representatives of nations that value the significance of reconciling the conflict
between trade and the environment. In particular, most delegates recognised the
importance of including this principle at a time when unilateral trade measures are
increasingly being employed by economically powerful States to influence the
environmental policy of other countries. During the process of negotiation, some
delegates, however, were still doubtful about the necessity of including such a
principle on the ground that the proposed text had already been reflected in other
institutions' documents, particularly the GATT's regime.89 But, countries of the South
87Id.
88 See chapter four of the thesis.
K'; Mensah, "Role of the Developing Countries", at 46.
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contended that this principle is self-explanatory;''0 they further argued that "if it is
already reflected in the GATT documents, then there should not be any problem
accepting its inclusion here."'" Though such principle, like other issues, was
defended mostly by developing countries,92 other developed nations, like the
European Community''3 also insisted upon the incorporation of this principle.94 It is
partly because they could also suffer from the implementation of unilateral
environmental measures.
The proposed text known as Principle 12 reads as:
States should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that
would lead to economic growth and sustainable development in all countries, to better address
the problems of environmental degradation. Trade policy measures for environmental purposes
should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges
outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures
addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based
on an international co«se«5us,.(emphasis added)
It is evident that this literature amply codifies the expression of the "Cartargena
Commitment" of UNCTAD with little change. The Rio text simply adds the first
clause to the original arrangement of the Commitment, which not only supports an
open international economic system, but also "tempers its support of the liberal
trading system by incorporating the goal of sustainable development as an element of
trade policy."95 Thereafter, the remaining formulations were actually taken verbatim
from the UNCTAD's work,96 while those detailed principles indicated above to ensure




92 The negotiation process of the preparations for the Rio Declaration mainly focused on the
reconciliation of the views between the G-77, the group of developing countries, and the States of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Eventually, the document largely
reflected the G-77 negotiating text. See Mann, "Rio Declaration", at 408. The principles on which
developing countries put much emphasis roughly include the right to development, common but
differentiated responsibility to the environment, trade restrictions and environment, and transfer of
technology. See Mensah, "Role of the Developing Countries", at 40-47; e.g. Mann, id. at 408-10.
93 By signing the Treaty on European Union signed in 1992, the European Community was
incorporated into the European Union.
94 See Kovar, "Rio Declaration", at 132.
95 See International Economy and the Environment, in 3 Yb. Int'l Envtl L. 342 (1992).
96 See also Sand, "Development of International Environment Law", at 11; The term "transboundary"
in the last sentence replaces "transborder" used in the Cartergena Commitment."
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The proposed Principle 12, along with the other principles, was finally reviewed
by a small group of seven industrialised and seven developing countries under the
direct chairmanship of Precom Chairman Tommy Koh.97 Then, the text was
concluded by the Precom IV and referred to the Rio Conference for further
negotiation and finalisation.9S Eventually, the draft Declaration on Environment and
Trade was adopted at Rio without modification. Nevertheless, some nations made
certain statements related to the principles, indicating differences in opinion." As to
Principle 12, since it was formulated to impose constraints on States' unilateral
environmental actions usually in the form of trade restrictions, not surprisingly, the
US that strongly defends the policy of unilateralism expressed its reservations
regarding the Principle. The interpretative statement by the US for Principle 12
recorded:
The United States understands that, in certain situations, trade measures may provide an effective
and appropriate means of addressing environmental concerns, including long-term sustainable
forest management concerns and environmental concerns outside national jurisdictions, subject
to certain disciplines.100
(d) The legal implications of Principle 12
The elements embodied in the Rio Declaration amount to twenty-seven principles
in total. Some of them are included merely to confirm or reflect the customary rules
of law.101 Meanwhile, the Rio Declaration was designed to reinforce new emerging
principles that have already been found in a considerable number of treaties and State
practice.102 On the other hand, it has been observed that some other principles,
probably at least half of them, are more akin to policy statements and guidelines than
of a legal character.103 But, in general sense, it should be noted that, as Boyle and
Freestone observe, many terms of the Rio Declaration "are capable of being and were
97 Kovar, "Rio Declaration", at 122.
98 Id.
"Id.
100 UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/26, Vol. IV., at 21. Apart from Principle 12, the US's reservation also
covers Principle 3, 7, and 23. See Kovar, "Rio Declaration", at 126, 129-30, and 137-38.
101 For instance, the sovereign right to exploit resources and obligation to safeguard environment in
Principle 2; the obligation to cooperate in good faith in Principle 7 and 27. See Kiss, "Rio Declaration",
at 56-58. Also, the obligations, such as the notification of emergencies, prior notification, and
consultation in cases of transboundary risk are included in the Rio Declaration. See Birney and Boyle,
Basic Documents, at 9.
102 Those principles comprise precautionary action, environment impact assessment, the polluter pays
principle. Birney and Boyle, id.
103 Kiss, "Rio Declaration", at 56, 62-63.
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intended potentially to be norm-creating or to lay down the parameters for further
development of the law."104
Strictly speaking, the elements of trade and environment arc characterised "as an
approach of policy containment."105 The classification might be perceived by the
following analyses that plainly put much emphasis on the origin and structure of
Principle 12. First of all, as indicated, the UNCTAD's formulation contributed greatly
to the text of the Principle. The original text in the "Cartagena Commitment" was
arranged initially in the form of policy objectives106 by which the potential conflict
between environmental protection and trade liberalisation might be reconciled. As a
result, Principle 12 carries more indications of policy guidelines. Moreover, the
language the principle adopted suggests that the drafters of the Declaration seemed to
agree that there was no hurry to determine whether unilateral environmental actions,
in spite of clear drawbacks, were legal or not, and, thus, called for avoidance, not
prohibition of unilateral measures. More importantly, it suggests a preferable
approach to deal with international environment problems. In short, seeking collective
efforts in an attempt to reach international consensus proves a better solution than
unilateral actions if certain environmental measures are inevitable. By the same
token, by reading the third and last clause of Principle 12 together, it has been
observed that such a context conveys a procedural message,107 which implies
"unilateralism. . . are unacceptable, while multilateral approaches and consensus are
strongly encouraged."108
Although Principle 12, by nature, is subject to policy orientation109, it does carry
a certain degree of legal implication. It is evident that the Principle is characterised by
the use of the word "should." The arrangement implies that, more or less, it tends to
impose constraints on States' conduct and to direct the way they should follow. As
Kiss noted, "Drafted in a more stringent form, these provisions could have legal
implications. Indeed, they include applications of the doctrine of abuse of rights, of
104 Boyle and Freestone, "Introduction", at 3.
105 Vaughan, "Trade and Environment", at 603; see also Kiss, "Rio Declaration", at 62-63.
106 The Cartagena Commitment [emphasis added].
107 See Kennedy, "Reforming U.S. Trade Policy", at 197. On the other hand, Kennedy notes that
Principle 12 also bears a substantive message. It means that "[w]hen trade measures are used in the
name of environmental protection, the means and the ends should be closely and causally linked." id.
108 Id.
""Some writers consider the expression of Principle 12 to be "in aspirational rather that obligatory
terms, suggesting a rather weaker commitment on these economic issues. . ." Boyle and Freestone,
"Introduction", at 4.
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the rule of non-intervention and of rule of good neighbourship."110
Moreover, Principle 12. by and large, reflects the view of the overwhelming
majority of States at UNCED, which opposes unilateral trade measures under the
guise of environmental protection."1 It is true that the device of the Principle can be
regarded as pro-trade and economic development112 as well as pro-developing
countries or nations that rely heavily on the benefits arising from trade activities."3
But, its eventual inclusion in the Rio Declaration was upheld not only by the South
States but also by the OECD members. Unlike other issues that ever split the
participants at UNCED,114 Principle 12 was one of the few principles that had ever
reached a universal consensus, notwithstanding the US's unique interpretative
statement. Though, arguably, the very legality of unilateral enforcement of
environmental standards cannot be determined by Principle 12, the way that it treats
unilateral methods seems to suggest that universal ani-unilateralism makes such a
method, if not impossible, at least difficult, to stand justification under various legal
regimes,115 particularly trade regimes.
110 See Kiss, "Rio Declaration", at 63.
111 See Kingsbury, "Tuna-Dolphin Controversy", at 18; see also Kittichaisaree, "Using Trade
Sanctions", at 308.
112 As Kennedy contended, "[t]he Rio Declaration provides a broad framework for harmonizing
environmental and trade concern. In the event that the two concerns conflict, the Rio Declaration gives
trade issues primacy over environmental concerns." See Kennedy, "Reforming US Trade Policy", at
196.
113 It has been observed that "Principle 12 is attractive to many developing countries because it adopts a
policy sequencing assumption which, put most simply, links the economic benefits of trade
liberalization with improvements in environmental protection." See Vaughan, "Trade and
Environment", at 603.
114 For instance, even the title for the document that contains the general rights and obligations adopted
by the UNCED was controversial. Most industrialised countries favoured the "Earth Charter", which
aims to be readable, understandable and accessible to everyone. By contrast, the G-77 regarded the title
as being unbalanced, which might unduly emphasises the environment at the expense of development.
So, they preferred a expression of UN resolution. See Kovar, "Rio Declaration", at 122-23; Mann, "Rio
Declaration", at 408-9. Additionally, the North and South had fundamentally different prospective
regarding the primary concept dominating the UNCED. The developed countries (North) support the
inclusion of principles of public participation, precautionary approach and polluter pays. On the other
hand, the developing countries (South) insisted that the right to development, poverty alleviation and
the recognition of common but differentiated responsibilities be incorporated in the documents of
UNCED. See e.g. Sand, "Development of International Environmental Law", at 8; Mensah, "Role of
the Developing Countries", at 33-52.
115 Cf. By strictly reading the text of Principle 12 regarding the legality of unilateral actions, some
authors argued that, under certain circumstance, such a measure may be permissible because the
principle does not explicitly proscribe the use of unilateral environmental measures. See Sands,
Principles, at 190, 717.; Blank, "Environmental Trade Measures", at 97-98. But Sands admits that "it is
not yet clear how the practice of states . . . will develop. .." and predicts that:
The challenge for the international community in coming years will be to determine the
circumstances in which, in the absence of international consensus on agreed environmental
standards, a state will be permitted, under the general rules of international law and the specific
rules of the GATT, to adopt unilateral environmental measures and apply them extraterritorially.
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Additionally, the introduction of Principle 12 appears to be a result of codifying
the emerging rules regarding the permissibility of environmental trade measures, if
the background under which the Principle was generated is carefully examined. As
observed, it mainly reflects the view of the GATT regime as well as that of the UN
organisations, particularly UNCTAD, which generally rejects unilateralism in favour
of collective efforts whenever a global environmental problem has to be solved.
Though it has been a short time since the rule was originally initiated in 1991, such
timely inclusion of this principle at UNCED demonstrates the urgency and necessity
of placing the issue in the forefront of the development of international environmental
law.
Overall, Principle 12 can be seen as a product of policy guidelines, but with a
particularly normative implication. Not in a form of official agreement, the Rio
Declaration is not a legally binding instrument. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out
that:
Like the Stockholm Declaration, the Rio Declaration is not formally binding, but its adoption by
a consensus of 176 states, after a prolonged negotiating process, and its normative character,
make it a particularly important example of the use of soft law instruments in the process of
codification and development of international law."6
Further, given some features embodied in the Declaration, such as obligatory
description, package-deal character and real consensus of developed and developing
States, Boyle and Freestone maintain that these factors "give the Rio Declaration
significant authority and influence in the articulation and development of
contemporary international law relating to the environment and sustainable
development."117 Therefore, Principle 12 is likely to generate a greater influence on
the development of feasible norms constraining the use of unilateral trade measures in
the future.
(e) Other UNCED documents that deal with the unilateral environmental
measures
Of course, the conclusion of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
See id. Indeed, the unilateral remedy may be justified under the regime of countermeasures. The draft
article of State Responsibility does recognise the right of State to resort to unilateral enforcement under
certain circumstances. Yet, the rule regarding the actions is still evolving, and the fate of the draft is
also uncertain. See discussion in chapter two of the thesis..
116 Birnie and Boyle, Basic Docuuments, at 9. See also Boyle, "Reflections on Treaties and Soft Law,"
at 904.
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Development was a prominent achievement at UNCED. In addition, the Rio
Conference also produced four other significant documents addressing the issue of
environment and development, namely Agenda 21,"s Forest Principles"9 and two
international framework conventions on climate change120 and biodiversity.121 Those
instruments, except the Biodiversity Convention, in one way or another, do contain
the provisions regulating trade-related environmental measures. As the topic is
arranged in a way to serve respective purpose in these UNCED documents, it appears
that the central mandate of Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration largely permeates
through these documents.
(i) Agenda 21
In the second session of the Precom, consensus was reached in demanding that
UNCED produce six major categories of result.122 One of them is "an agreed
programme of work by the international community addressing major environment
and development priorities for the initial period 1993-2000 and leading into the 21si
century,"123 which is known as Agenda 21. The instrument is designed to direct and
coordinate "sectoral and intersectoral activities at the global, national and regional
levels."124 Therefore, the style of Agenda 21 makes it in the very nature of a policy
guideline and statement rather than a legal agreement.125
The content of Agenda 21 that comprises forty chapters was divided into four
sections. They include: social and economic development (Chapter 1-8); natural
resources, fragile ecosystems and related human activities, byproducts of industrial
production (Chapter 9-22); major groups (Chapter 23-32); and means of
implementation (Chapter 33-40). Among them, there are two chapters mentioning the
relationship between trade and the environment, where the substance of Principle 12
of the Rio Declaration is further elabourated in a longer and more detailed form.
117 Boyle and Freestone, "Introduction", at 3-4.
118 Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED), 3-14 June 1992, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
1,9 UNCED, A/CONF. 151/26/Rev. vol. Ill, Annex III.
120 The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted June 1992, in force 24 Mar. 1994.
121 The UN Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted 5 June 1992; in force 29 Dec. 1993.
122 See the report to the second session of the Precom by Strong, Secretary General of the Conference,
UN A/CONF. 15 l/PC/14, paras. 49-58.
123 Id.
124 See Biggs, "Brazil Conference on the Environment" at 401.
125 Grubb et al, Earth Summit Agreements, at 97. It has been observed that "[mjany parts of the Agenda
21 text appear either as statements of the obvious, or as a simplistic policy 'wish list'." See id.
214
The Impact of International Environmental Law
Chapter 2—"International Cooperation to Aeeeleratc Sustainable Development in
Developing Countries and Related Domestie Policies" reaffirms that environment and
trade policies should be mutually supportive so as to fulfill the goal of sustainable
development.126 On concrete activities, para. 2.22 requires relevant international and
regional economic institutions, like the GATT and UNCTAD, in accordance with
their respective mandates and competence, to examine certain propositions and
principles.127 In fact, these items under scrutiny have been addressed in the relevant
GATT and UNCTAD documents as well as Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration.
In Chapter 39—"International Legal Instruments and Mechanism", the most
detailed and comprehensive language related to trade restrictions for environmental
purposes has been provided. It specifies:
To promote, through the gradual development of universally and multilaterally negotiated
agreements or instruments, international standards for the protection of the environment that take
into account the different situations and capabilities of countries. States recognise that
environmental policies should deal with the root causes of environmental degradation, thus
preventing environmental measures from resulting in unnecessary restrictions to trade. Trade
policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. Unilateral actions to
deal with environmental challenge outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be
avoided. Environmental measures addressing international environmental problems should, as far
as possible, be based on an international consensus. Domestic measures targeted to achieve
certain environmental objectives may need trade measures to render them effective. Should trade
policy measures be found necessary for the enforcement of environmental policies, certain
principles and rules should apply. These could include, inter alia, the principle of non¬
discrimination; the principle that the trade measure chosen should be the least trade-restrictive
necessary to achieve the objectives; an obligation to ensure transparency in the use of trade
measures related to the environment and to provide adequate notification of national regulations;
and the need to give consideration to the special conditions and development requirements of
developing countries as they move towards internationally agreed environmental objectives.128
Actually, such a text is far from novel. It literally adopts the formulation of the earlier
Cartagena Commitment of the UNCTAD. Meanwhile, the text of Principle 12 can be
fully located in these paragraphs with only minor change.129
126 See Agenda 21, Chapter 2, paras. 2.19, 2.20.
127 In total, twelve items are listed. See paras. 2.22 (a) to (1).
128 Agenda 21, para. 39.3(d).
IW The term, "international environmental problems" in the Agenda 21 text, is substituted by
"transboundary or global environmental problems" in the Rio Declaration.
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(ii) Forest Principles
Global forest conservation was one of the issues arousing heated debate during
the pre-Rio Summit. Particularly, there was intense disagreement among the North
and South concerning the form of the document governing the topic. Most developed
countries urged the formulation of a world forest treaty with substantially mandatory
force.130 In contrast, developing countries worried that a treaty regime may run the
risk of diminishing their sovereign rights over the control of national forest
resources,131 and insisted on adopting a form of non-binding principle regarding
forests.132 After acrimonious negotiations, the instrument of forest principles instead
of convention was adopted at UNCED.
The Rio Forest Principles, formally titled "Non-legally Binding Authoritative
Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation
and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests," contains fifteen specific
principles. Trade and the environment was also an element embodied in the
Principles. Basically, reflecting trade liberalisation, it proposes a system of open and
free trade by calling for non-discrimination, and reduction and removal of tariff
barriers.133 Meanwhile, for environment protection, it requires the integration of forest
conservation and sustainable development with economic, trade and other relevant
policies134 as well as the avoidance of policies and practices, including trade, leading
to forest degradation.135
Moreover, like Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration, the Forest Principles
essentially tend to reject unilateral measures, but have a slightly different
arrangement. It provides that "Unilateral measures, incompatible with international
obligations or agreements, to restrict and/or ban international trade in timber or other
forest products should be removed or avoided, in order to attain long-term sustainable
forest management."136 A careful examination of the text may reveal two messages.
130 At the summit of the G-7 countries held in Houston in June 1990, the idea of formulating a world
forest treaty had been firmly proposed. They called for the negotiation of such a treaty "as
expeditiously as possible", so that it could be signed in Rio de Janeiro during UNCED. See Johnson,
Earth Summit, at 103.
131 Id. see also Sand, "Development of International Environmental Law", at 9-10.
132 See Johnson, Earth Summit, at 103.
133 The Forest Principles, section 13 (a) and (b).
134 Id. (d).
135 Id. (e).
136 Id. section 14 [emphasis added].
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First of all, it seems to condition the permissibility of unilateral actions on
compatibility with international agreements or legal rules. It implies that unilateral
measures may be permitted as long as they prove compatible with international law.
In a sense, at least for the purpose of forest conservation, the Principles do open a
door for the use of unilateral trade restrictions, which still should be subjected to
international law. Nonetheless, it also creates a problem regarding the interpretation
of alleged "compatibility." For instance, as to the interrelationship of unilateral
remedy and multilateral environmental agreements, it is not clear to what extent the
mandate of compatibility should extend. Surely, unilateral actions authorised by the
treaty secure the compatibility in such sense. It remains uncertain, however, whether
measures recommended by the competent regime are consistent with that
international agreements. Although the text may help clarify the conditions which
constitute an acceptable unilateral action, the ambiguous language may cause further
confusion regarding the legality of the measures.
Secondly, as to the effect of an impermissible unilateral measure, it not only
called for avoidance but also the removal of any unilateral trade ban. Therefore, in
effect, an existing implemented measure if not compatible with international law
should be dismissed. Certainly, it imposes tougher constraints on the users of
unilateral measures to the extent that they are obliged to remove the means in force.
For countries against whom unilateral measures are applied, admittedly, the device
regards their interests properly. It is doubtful, however, whether the document may
provide them with effective relief due to its somewhat soft-law character.
Indeed, the text concerning regulating unilateral trade measures in the Forest
Principles adds some flavour to Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration. It also, however,
leaves several critical questions unresolved. Given its vague content and the absence
of empirical evidence, the device used in the Forest Principles still need further study.
(iii) The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
Acknowledging climate change resulted from the increase of greenhouse gases137
137 The gases that cause the greenhouse effect includes carbon dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons
and nitrous oxide. See the study by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Working
Group 1 (1990), at 5-37.
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and its adverse effects1'^ as a common concern of humankind, UN Resolution 44/228
explicitly listed the topic of "protection of the atmosphere by combating climate
change, . . as one of the major environmental/developmental issues set to be
addressed in the 1992 UNCED.LW The Precom then resolved to produce a specific
legal instrument on climate change. Eventually, there was considerable agreement as
to the adoption of an international framework convention on climate change at
UNCED as a first multilateral step aimed at solving the urgent problem.140
In the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), several principles guiding the Parties are provided in order to achieve the
objectives of the Convention. Not unpredictably, it adequately reflects the basic
principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which require
common but differentiated responsibility141 on one hand as well as precautionary
measures142 on the other. In addition, the issue of trade and environment also
becomes its focus. It mandates that:
The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system
that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly
developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change.
Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international
trade.143
Actually, the language merely repeats the first and second clause of Principle 12 of
the Rio Declaration and slightly changes certain wordings in order to accommodate
the particular needs of this convention. Unlike the UNCED instruments indicated
138 The greenhouse effect will raise global temperature, leading to the rise of sea level, the increase of
flood and drought, and the deterioration of desertification. See generally Taylor, Ecological Approach,
at 14-19.
139 UN Res. 44/228, at Part I, para. 12 (a).
140 Even there is a consensus to form a convention to address the climate change, it became contentious
about what structure of such treaty should be based. Some favoured a convention containing binding
commitments. Other with cautious mind proposed first a general legal framework, leaving any binding
measures to subsequent negotiations. See Grubb et al, Earth Summit, at 61-62. The latter proposal
finally prevailed over that of former. Since the treaty came into force, one Kyoto protocol has been
forged in 1997, which aims to set different level of standard on reducing emission of greenhouse gases
for several categories of States.
141 Id. Art. 3(1), (2). See also Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, which allow States to bear different
level of obligations in view of their different contributions to global environmental degradation.
142 Id. Art. 3 (3). See also Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. The principle is a relatively new
developing principle, which has been located in several treaties and State practices. See generally
Freestone and Hey, Precautionary Principle; O'riordan and Cameron, Interpreting Precautionary
Principle.
143 hi. Art. 3 (5).
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above, it docs not expressly mandate the avoidanee or removal of unilateral actions.
Despite such an omission, it seems far from clear whether the convention, in one way
or another, has the intention of embracing unilateral actions. Nonetheless, it should
be noted that the climate change convention was the document passed at UNCED as
the Rio Declaration. Arguably, there is no reason that the principle of the former will
be contrary to that of the latter. Accordingly, it is believed that the call for avoidance
of unilateral actions by the Rio Declaration should apply to the convention.
3 Post-Rio evolution
Since the UNCED documents were concluded, a number of practices and
decisions regarding unilateral environmental trade measures have emerged. It is
imperative to examine such developments during the post-Rio period in order to
ascertain how the principles governing environmental trade measures have evolved
and been applied in the contemporary world community.
(a) The European Union's approach
In its proposal submitted to the GATT Group on Environmental Measures and
International Trade in November 1992, the Commission of the European
Communities expressed its ideas on the permissibility of environmental trade
measures (ETMs).144 Like the European Community's opinion in the Tuna/Dolphin
case,145 the document continues to adopt a sceptical policy towards the unilateral use
of ETMs by insisting that "a country should not unilaterally restrict imports on the
basis of environmental damage. . ,"146 The document, on the other hand, also helps
clarify the concept of "international consensus", which warrants EMTs and also has
been sharply encouraged by Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration. Strictly speaking, it
tends to confine the concept to the existence of a pertinent "multilateral
environmental agreement (MEA)."
Indeed, there are certain provisions of ETMs specified in the context of MEAs,
such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)147, the
144 Directorate-General for External Relations, European Commission, The GATT and Trade
Provisions of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (13 Nov. 1992) [hereinafter EC Document],
145 Tuna I, at para 4.1 1.
146 EC Document, at 2.
147 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3 Mar. 1973, in
force 1 July 1975, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
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Basel Convention,148 and the Montreal Protoeol.149 Unlike the usual unilateral
measures, such trade restrictions on endangered species, hazardous waste, and ozone-
depleting substances are commonly deemed to be an indispensable means to achieve
individual environmental purposes. Not surprisingly, the EC document will claim
that "it appears that in all cases the rationale for trade measures has been to ensure the
effective implementation of commitments to protect the environment." 150 In
particular, the EC has not yet been ready to endorse certain ETMs employed as a tool
to enforce compliance with environmental standards, which have been, in most case,
trade sanctions.151 As a matter of fact, such coercive measures "based on the need to
force countries to sign an agreement or to punish 'free-rider' behaviour"132 usually
underline a distinguishing feature of unilateral actions. Thus, probably, such
character of the measures makes the EC hesitate to accept unilateral ETMs.
It may be concluded that the EC's rigid interpretation of "international
consensus" will eventually exclude certain unilateral measures bearing a strong
connection with MEAs, such as measures aiming to enforce international
environmental law, from the permissible catalog of ETMs.
(b) The adjustment of the US's policy
Even though the US's tuna embargo against Mexico was decided by the 1991
GATT Panel as GATT-illegal, there is no sign that the US will relinquish the policy
of using unilateral ETMs to achieve certain environmental purposes.153 As mentioned,
Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration, in spite of being adopted by consensus, as shown
above, still sparked the US's statement of reservation. Nevertheless, in other ways,
this statement is also indicative of its willingness to modify the policy of
unilateralism to the extent that the ETMs should be "subject to certain disciplines."154
Afterwards, the US Clinton administration began to review and adjust its policy
in order to alleviate the adverse impact caused by the unilateral measure, such as
148 The Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste, 22 Mar. 1989, in force
24 May 1992.
149 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 Sept. 1987, in force, 1 Jan.
1991.
150 EC Document, at 4.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Kingsbury, "Tuna-Dolphin Controversy", at 19.
154 Id
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unpredictability and arbitrariness.155 As a result, in 1994, in his testimony before the
Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism, Undersecretary of State
for Global Affairs Timothy Wirth identified four general categories in which "the
consideration of trade measures may be appropriate":156
1. when trade measures are required by an international environmental treaty to which
the United States is a party;
2. when the environmental effect of an activity is partially within US jurisdiction;
3. when a plant or animal species is endangered or threatened, or where a particular
practice will likely cause a species to become endangered or threatened;
4. when the effectiveness of an international environmental or conservation
agreement is being diminished.
Instead ofmerely enforcing the national environmental standards, the new policy
largely demonstrates the US's intention to bring its environmental trade measures
closer to international level. Undoubtedly, the first situation proves entirely
consistent with the primary requirement of Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration and the
EC's approach that largely justify the use of ETMs on the test of multilateral
consensus. As to the second category, it should be less contentious because normally
a State is allowed to enforce its law within its jurisdiction.
The third and fourth category actually drawn from its national legislation, such
as the Pelly Amendment,157 to a great extent, show US's persistent ambition of
enforcing international standards by invoking trade measures. Certainly, it is a lofty
goal to preserve endangered species and safeguard the integrity of a MEA. But, it is
unclear whether such practice may win universally international support or can be
deemed compatible with the relevant UNCED documents. The environmental
standards it aims to enforce may be similar to that of international competent
institutions. But, in practice, generally, it is US's discretion to decide the exact
occurrence of an alleged violation or offense, and then may impose trade sanctions
against targets it deliberately chooses.158 Most importantly, as to the enforcement
manner, the US's trade measures, usually, imposed in the form of coercive sanctions,
are likely to contradict a MEA that prefers non-coercive means, like public persuasion
155 See id. at 19-20.
156 See Administration Unveils New Policy on Sanctions for Environmental Harm, 11 International
Trade Reporter (BNA) No. 6, 221 (Feb. 9, 1994).
'"The Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act, 22 U.S.C. Sec. 1978, at (a) (1) (2).
15,1 See chapter one of the thesis.
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or condemnation, to ensure compliance.
Overall, unlike the 1991 tuna embargo,159 the new US policy not only reflects its
constant national environmental policy but also tends to embrace international
coneerns. Notwithstanding such positive modifications, it is worth observing if the
international community would accept such measures that normally fall short of
adequate international supervision.
(c) The Shrimp/Turtle case
In 1996, pursuant to Section 609 of Public Law 101-162160, the US prohibited the
importation of shrimp and shrimp products from India, Malaysia, Pakistan and
Thailand because their fishing technology of taking shrimp was found harmful to
species of sea turtles. Like the MMPA, the law requires that the exporting countries
must show that they have adopted a regulatory programme governing the incidental
taking of sea turtles in the course of shrimp harvesting that is comparable to that of
the US in order to access the US's market.161 However, unlike the previous tuna
embargo launched for dolphins' protection, the sea turtles that the US aims to preserve
have been listed by CITES as species threatened with extinction.162 The shrimp
embargo, therefore, can be seen as an exercise of the new US policy disclosed in
1994. Also, the action demonstrates again that the US will continue the policy of
using economic power to influence other nations' environmental conduct.
Under the request of those members who suffered the US's environmental trade
restrictions, the dispute was referred to the new international trade regime, the WTO.
Remarkably, the Panel of the WTO163 clearly made considerable efforts to reach a
more balanced verdict on the case which required to take into account environmental
factors by referring to the relevant rules of international environmental law. In effect,
such an approach probably may, in one way or another, appease people who have
159 Clearly, the 1991 US embargo against Mexico had little connection with international concern,
which is not compatible with the four categories of the Clinton administration. As observed, "The
dolphins, while migratory around the Eastern Tropical Pacific, are not even partially within the US
Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ); the dolphins in question are not endangered or threatened enough to
be listed by CITES; and no other international agreement on dolphin conservation has yet been
negotiated." See Blank, "Environmental Trade Measures", at 105, n. 209.
160 Codified at 16 USC 1537 note, amending the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 1531 et
seq.[hereinafter Section 609],
161 Id.
",2 See Appendix I to CITES.
163 See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, the Panel Report, 15
May 1998, WT/DS58/R [hereinafter Shrimp Panel Report].
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been persistently accusing the trade regime of lacking sufficient environmental
consideration in judging ETM disputes.164
Adopting significant vision, the WTO ruling first verified the proposition that
trade regime and environmental law should be mutually supported. Furthermore,
from the prospect of international trade law, the Panel regarded that the US's shrimp
embargo constitutes a measure conditioning access to its market for a given product
on the adoption of certain conservation policies by the exporting parties. 165
Accordingly, US's embargo was considered to have an effect threatening the security
and predictability of the multilateral trading system.166 More importantly, to rebut the
US's claim that the WTO should justify such measures simply imposed for achieving
the lofty aim of preserving endangered species,167 the Panel alternatively relied
heavily on the Rio Declaration, particularly Principle 12 to sustain its reasoning
against unilateral ETMs. In all, by the Panel's endeavours, Principle 12 was
interpreted and applied in the following manner.
Even though the Panel noted that the significance of conserving and protecting
natural resource has been explicitly specified in the WTO Preamble,168 it was not
persuaded that the US's unilateral actions were an ideal measure to tackle issues of a
global character. Conversely, it contended that Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration
primarily stressing "the need for international cooperation and for avoiding unilateral
measures" was consistent with the WTO Preamble.169 It pointed out that:
[t]he diversity of the environmental and development situations underlined by the Preamble can
best be taken into account through international cooperation. The Preamble also implies that
attempts to generalise standards of environmental protection would require multilateral
discussion, especially when, as here, developing countries are involved.170
Indeed, the Panel generally agreed with the US that sea turtles are a shared
global resource.171 But, it considered that "the notion of 'shared' resource implies a
IM Since the release of 1991 GATT Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, the GATT/WTO has been under
critisim for its decision neglecting environmental protection. See generally McDonald, "Greening
GATT", at 405, n. 32; Esty, Greening GATT, at 52-54.
165 Shrimp Panel Report, at paras. 7.26, 7.48.
166 Id. at paras. 7.44, 7.45, 7.60, 7.61.
167 Id. at para. 7.52.
168 Id.
169 Id. [emphasis added].
170 Id. [emphasis added],
171 Id. at para.7.53.
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common interest in the resource concerned."172 Thus, the Panel held that "[i]t would
be better addressed through the negotiation of international agreements than by
measures taken by one Member. . ."I73 and that "the United States should have entered
into international cooperation with the aim of developing internationally accepted
conservation methods, including with the complainants."174
In response to the US's doubt about whether a State is required to "seek
negotiation of an international agreement instead of, or before adopting unilateral
measures," the Panel stated that:
The nature of the measures that the United States was seeking to obtain from the exporting
countries concerned and the principles recalled in several international environmental
agreements imply that a country seeking to promote environmental concerns of such a nature
should engage into international negotiations.'75
In the light of the ruling that significantly favours international cooperation, it may be
inferred that the obligation of a State to negotiate "multilaterally defined criteria" or
suitable agreement has to be fulfilled before a competent international regime
governing the critical issue has been formed.
Ultimately, the Panel emphasised once more the primacy of multilateral efforts
over unilateral measures, which has been required in the Tuna/Dolphin decision and
Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration. In its conclusion, the Panel announced that:
General international law and international environmental law clearly favour the use of
negotiated instruments rather than unilateral measures when addressing transboundary or global
environmental problems, particularly when developing countries are concerned. Hence a
negotiated solution is clearly to be preferred, both from a WTO and an international
environmental law prospective.176
Regarding the eventual legality of unilateral measures, like Principle 12 of the Rio
Declaration, the Panel had no intention of taking a definite stand on the issue. Rather,
at least for the US's shrimp embargo, it simply decided:
[o]ur findings regarding Article XX do not imply that recourse to unilateral measures is always
excluded, particularly after serious attempts have been made to negotiate; nor do they imply
172 Id. [emphasis added].
173 Id.
174 Id. The Panel also refers to Art. 5 of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, which urges
international cooperation to confirm its approach. See id.
175 Id. at para. 7.54.
176 Id. at para. 7.61 [emphasis added].
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that, in any given case, they would he permitted. Nevertheless, in the present case, even though
the situation of turtles is a serious one, we consider that the United States adopted measures
which, irrespective of their environmental purpose, were clearly a threat to the multilateral
trading system and were applied without any serious attempt to reach, beforehand, a negotiated
solutionf
The message seems to suggest that, as far as international environmental law is
concerned, the WTO ruling was inclined to condition the initial permissibility of
unilateral measures on the exhaustion of pursuing a negotiated solution, especially
when a competent international regime has not yet functioned. In other words, to
ensure the permissibility of a unilateral measure at the first stage, an acting State has
to prove that a serious attempt to reach a negotiated solution has been exhausted. But,
it should be noted that the fulfillment of this test does not necessarily guarantee the
eventual justification of such measures under specific legal regimes, like the WTO.
As to the current Shrimp/Turtle case, the Appellate Body of the WTO has
reversed certain legal findings of the Panel.178 Nevertheless, in line with the Panel,
using almost identical language, the Appellate Body endorsed the necessity of
engaging multilaterally concerted and cooperative efforts to conserve sea turtles on
the ground that the transboundary character of sea turtles and a significant number of
other international instruments and declarations warrant such mandate.179 It is true
that, apart from invoking other instruments, the Appellate Body particularly
highlighted the significance of Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration in an attempt to
verify its view.180 Although the Appellate Body did not explicitly confirm the finding
in the Panel Report regarding the permissibility of unilateral measures, such finding
was not reversed by the Appellate Body. Hence, there is no ground to claim that both
of them did not share the same view regarding the issue.
Overall, the implications of Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration have been
greatly illuminated by the WTO's efforts. The judgements suggest that the rule is no
longer a pure "policy guideline", but has become a distinguished reference which may
be cited to help resolve disputes. As a result, its legal status has been significantly
promoted. Moreover, the WTO jurisprudence indicates that an environmental rule,
177 Id. [emphasis added],
l7l< United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, the Appellate Body
Report, 12 October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R. See also chapter four of the thesis.
179 Id. at para. 168.
I,w Id.
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such as Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration, which is originally advocated by trade-
related regimes, is able to move forward to help solve disputes referred to the trade
regime.
4 Concluding Remarks
It is clear that contemporary international environmental law has addressed
unilateral measures directly mainly by concluding the UNCED documents,
particularly Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration. Certainly, it is quite a new rule and
will continue to evolve into maturity. Another feature underlining the principle is that
its formulation was largely attributed to the effort of trade regime and other related
organisations. Nevertheless, its being overwhelmingly enforced at UNCED has
proved its universality.
Generally speaking, international environmental law has not yet forbidden the use
of unilateral ETMs, but only calls for avoidance. Nevertheless, more importantly, the
priority ofmultilateral efforts over unilateral actions required in Principle 12 has been
explicitly and loudly announced. The ultimate legality of unilateral measures seems
unlikely to be assessed thoroughly only by applying those environmental documents,
even though they provide a partial solution. Practices have shown that such task may
be left to respective legal regimes, such as the WTO.
The WTO decisions suggest that the non-legally binding character of Principle 12
of the Rio Declaration does not prevent it from constituting a useful tool to
supplement the judgements that is required to take into account the environment
protection. Hence, the Principle no longer remains a purely soft law, but has already
been hardened by the relevant tribunals. Overall, the good news for unilateral
measures users is that the content of the Principle does leave some room to argue the
permissibility of such actions. In contrast, the bad news is that those measures may
be constantly challenged by some legal regimes that choose to rely on the rule as a
basis to denounce the measures.
The modern interpretation of Principle 12 shows that States are required to pursue
negotiated solutions based on an international consensus before resorting to unilateral
measures. It is unknown how the international regimes will respond to a situation
where unilateral measures are implemented during which a competent international
organisation has already operated in dealing with the critical issue. Further, it remains
uncertain whether the Principle should be interpreted to oblige States not to take
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measures inconsistent with the existing competent regime. Also, it is not clear
whether unilateral actions following a recommendation of international
environmental institutions might be considered to be consistent with Principle 12. The
Pclly sanctions against Taiwan may offer an opportunity to examine the issue.
B The determination of the legality of the Pclly sanctions against Taiwan under
Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration
In contrast to the Tuna or Shrimp case, the US's trade sanctions against Taiwan
were implemented when an MEA, namely CITES, was governing the problem of
illegal trade in endangered species of rhinoceros and tigers. On that occasion, there
were two parallel mechanisms both at international and national levels functioning.
By applying Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration to the current dispute, initially, it is
rational to demand that CITES operation prevails over unilateral actions. In this
regard, theoretically, the US should be required to honour CITES and refrain from
applying measures in a manner that conflicts with the existing international regime.
Yet, as we have seen, the US's trade restrictions against Taiwan were
implemented shortly after the CITES Standing Committee openly censured Taiwan
and called for the prohibition of trade with Taiwan in wildlife species. It was a case
that environmental trade sanctions were invoked to further observance of the CITES
mandate. Hence, such a linkage between CITES and the Pelly actions indicates that
the latter were not a product of strict unilateralism.
This section analyses whether the US Pelly sanctions can be justified under the
Rio Principle. It becomes imperative to assess whether the Pelly sanctions following
the CITES's recommendation would secure the basis of "international consensus,"
which, as indicated above, may warrant the use of ETM. Because such a concept has
not yet been properly defined, it leaves certain room to argue its implication.
Theoretically, two schools of thought could emerge in helping clarify whether the
Pelly sanctions constitute an international consensus in the context of CITES's
operation. Before exploring the possible approaches, it is relevant to first examine the
CITES's enforcement framework in order to discover the interaction between
unilateral enforcement measures and CITES.
I CITES enforcement framework
(a) National enforcement
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Like most MEAs, CITES is largely a non self-executing treaty. m The
implementation of the CITES provisions relies mainly on national enforcement.1" As
a result, CITES requires Parties to take appropriate measures to enforce the
agreement.11,3 The work normally comprises the enacting and enforcement of
desirable legislation. In terms of the administrative framework, parties are required to
establish Management and Scientific Authorities11(4 to govern the permit issuing.
Moreover, in order to effectively deter illegal trade in endangered species, CITES
also demands the inclusion of penalties against violation and confiscation of illegal
specimens in national measures.1" Overall, as Sand concludes, "The enactment of
national laws for this purpose, and the empowerment of suitable national
administrative agencies to enforce them is thus a crucial first step in 'making CITES
work'."186
CITES aims to set up a minimum standard with which Parties are required to
comply.187 Hence it does not prevent Parties from implementing stricter or additional
regulations than those of CITES, which may provide further protection for species.'88
Regarding species included in Appendices I, II and III, it allows States to adopt
stricter domestic measures regarding the conditions for trade, taking, possession or
transport of specimens of protected species, or the complete prohibition thereof.189
Furthermore, it recognises the right of Parties to restrict or prohibit trade in species
not listed in those Appendices.190 On the one hand, the CITES arrangement respecting
the implementation of stricter national legislation is designed to generate a more
satisfactory result. On the other hand, the provisions have echoed lots of State
practices since the beginning of twentieth century.191
181 Self-executing treaties may be implemented at national level directly. By contrast, non self-
executing treaties cannot run nationally without the stipulation of relevant national legislation. It has
been observed that most provisions of CITES are non self-executing treaties. See generally Birnie,
"Endangered Species", at 242-43; Patel, "Endangered Species", at 167-68.
182 In particular, the treaty recognises that "States are and should be the best protectors of their own
wild fauna and flora." See CITES Preamble.
183 CITES, Art.VIII, para. 1.
184 Id. Art. IX, para. 1.
185 Id. Art. VIII, para. 1 (a) (b).
186 Sand, "CITES", at 47. See also Wassermann, "Washington Wildlife Convention", at 366.
187 Favre, Endangered Species, at 300.
188 Id.
189 CITES, Art. XIV, para. 1 (a).
190 Id. para. 1 (b).
191 The States' practice on implementing unilateral trade ban on certain species that presumably need to
be preserved see Charnovitz, "Free Trade", at 496-97 and accompanying notes. More radically,
Venezuela and Brazil are examples of countries even prohibiting the export of almost all wildlife. See
Fitzgerald, Wildlife Trade, at 323; Lyster, Wildlife Law, at 275.
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The provisions of CITES, indicated above, permitting States to impose a trade
ban on species beyond the range of CITES's categories may cast a doubt upon
whether such text implies that Parties may take unilateral trade sanctions against
targets that fail to comply with CITES's requirements. Birnie claims that the device
may "remedy the lack of any provision in CITES for specific procedures or penalties
to sanction violations of the convention by Parties or Third States."192 Charnovitz
disagrees, contending that: "The purpose of this provision was to make clear that
CITES did not preclude the protection of a species not on a CITES list. It was not
meant to authorise unilateral or multilateral action against those who disregard
treaties."193 Accordingly, it appears far from certain whether the provision is drafted
to entitle States to impose a trade ban on a product of species as a means to penalise
violation. In this regard, in spite of the CITES practice that usually urges the
application of this article as a basis for collective sanctions,'94 a careful examination
of the CITES text does suggest that the provision is still insufficient to serve as a legal
ground for unilateral or collective enforcement actions.
(b) Institutional supervision and enforcement
It is a general criticism that CITES's lack of a centralised enforcement
mechanism contributes to its occasional inability to ensure compliance.195 It has been
strongly proclaimed, however, unlike certain MEAs, CITES is by no means a
"sleeping treaty."196 CITES creates several bodies at international level responsible
for supervising the implementation of the Convention, including a Secretariat, a
Conference of the Parties (COP) and certain committees.
The Secretariat is an extraordinarily active body in this institution, performing
many functions. It is responsible for organising meetings of the COP. It also
undertakes the task of gathering, studying and distributing information of trade in
species for all parties.197 The information is vital for assessing the effectiveness of
CITES operation. In addition, the Secretariat plays a dynamic role in facilitating the
192 Birnie, "Endangered Species", at 244.
193 Charnovitz, "Pelly Amendment", at 799.
194 See Sand, "CITES", at 38-39.
195 Southworth III, "GATT and the Environment", at 1004-5. See also Patel, "Endangered Species", at
204-5; Cheung, "Tiger and Rhinoceros", at 129. Actually, ineffective enforcement is far from a unique
problem facing most MEAs due to the absence of a centralised enforcement regime. See Southworth
III, id. at 1011; Patel, id. at 186.
196 Lyster, Wildlife Law, at 277.
197 CITES, Art. XII, para. 2.
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implementation of the treaty. To help Parties fulfill their obligations under CITES, the
Seeretariat provides scientific and technical assistance to Parties.1"8 More importantly,
in exercising supervisory function, it may monitor national enforcement by reviewing
the reports presented by the Parties.1"" If the information received convinces the
Secretariat that an ineffective implementation arises, it would alert national
Management Authorities to the facts of infraction so as to induce the remedial actions
by the Parties.200 The mechanism is described as "[t]he only leverage for external
compliance control". 201 In practice, the Secretariat has performed this task
aggressively.202
Despite the fact that such diplomatic pressure may be legitimately applied by the
Secretariat,203 institutionally, this agency is not entrusted with the authority to promote
compliance by mandating a collective penalty. But, empirical experience indicates
that the Scretariat has not refrained from making recommendations204 in a manner that
calls for coercive trade sanctions against certain offences. For instance, in 1986, due
to Macau's failure to control illegal trade in rhinoceros horn and African elephant
ivory, the Secretariat requested that all parties ban wildlife imports from Macau.205
Shortly afterwards, the Secretariat instructed its members to end the embargo
following Macau's enforcement of stricter regulations.206
In contrast to the Secretariat, which serves as so-called "institutional
continuity," 207 the COP is convened on a regular basis. Although, normally, the
meeting is held biennially,208 Lyster stresses the significance of a regular meeting for
the effectiveness of the MEA by contending that "[s]imply by requiring its Parties to
meet regularly to review its implementation, a treaty can ensure that it stays at the
198 Id. para. 2 (c). For instance, personnel training and seminars have been exercised under the auspice
of the Secretariat.
199 Id. para. 2 (d). Parties are required to submit periodic reports on their implementation of CITES.
The content includes an annual report and a biennial report. The detail see article VIII, para. 7 (a), (b).
Reporting requirement is one of the most frequently used supervisory techniques in the majority of
MEAs, such as 1974 Paris Convention, the Base! Convention, etc. See Birnie and Boyle, International
Law and Environment, at 166-67.
200 CITES, art. XIII.
201 Sand, "CITES", at 49.
202 See Lyster, Wildlife Law, at 271.
203 The Secretariat's lobbying ability on seeking compliance see Hill, "Endangered Specie", at 273-74.
204 Under Art. XII, para. 2 (h), the Secretariat may make recommendations for the implementation of
the aims and provisions of the present Convention,. . .
205 See McFadden, "Asian Compliance", at 324.
206 Id.
207 See Birnie and Boyle, International Law and Environment, at 165.
208 CITES, Art. XI. As of i 997, ten COPs have been held.
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forefront of its Parties' attention."209
Indeed, the COP is a decision-making institution in CITES. As circumstances
change over the level of endangerment for certain species, the COP is entitled to
adopt amendments to those Appendices by adding, removing, downlisting or uplisting
species in the lists.210 It is also responsible for supervising national enforcement by
reviewing and considering any reports submitted by the Secretariat or any Party.2"
Moreover, as the COP may make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of
the Convention, coercive measures have ever been recommended. For instance, in
response to Bolivia's persistent failure to control the re-export of wildlife taken
illegally in other countries, the Fifth CITES COP held at Buenos Aires in 1985
resolved to proscribe all wildlife shipments from Bolivia within ninety days unless
Bolivia began to observe CITES's obligation.212 But, it should be noted that the COP's
recommendations of coercive measures are generally considered legally non-
binding.213 In practice, based on this conviction, some countries rejected compliance
with the COP's resolutions.214
Since CITES came into force, it had been complained that a meeting of the COP
held every two years for the length of only two weeks is insufficient to deal with the
complex issues facing CITES.215 Hence CITES has established a number of
committees to supplement the functions of the COP between ordinary meetings of the
Parties.216 Unlike other CITES committees with considerable technical functions, the
tasks of the Standing Committee are largely administrative.217 Its membership
comprises six regional representatives218 elected by the COP, plus the Depositary
Government (Switzerland), the past host Party and the next host Party.
Undoubtedly, the Standing Committee is another prime agency supervising the
209 Lyster, Wildlife Law, at 12.
210 CITES, Art. XI, para. 3 (b).
211 Id. Art. XI, para. 3 (d).
212 CITES Conf. Res. 5.2 (1985). Later, in November 1985, the Standing Committee recommended the
suspension of the embargo. CITES Secretariat, Notification to the Parties of 17 December 1985. See
also Fuller et al., "Wildlife Trade", at 298-304; Fouere, "Emerging Trend", at 38.
213 See generally Werksman, "Conference of Parties", at 55-68; Sand, "CITES", at 35 and n. 41;
Crawford, "CITES", at 565.
214 See Sand, id. n. 41.
215 Favre, Endangered Species, at 275.
216 These committees include the Standing Committee, the Animals Committee, the Plants Committee,
the Identification Manual Committee and the Nomenclature Committee. See CITES Conf. 6.1,
Establishment of Committees and Annex 1.
217
Lyster, Wildlife Law, at 274-75; Favre, Endangered Species, at 275, 278, 279, 406-8.
218 The six major geographic regions are Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, South and Central
America and the Caribbean and Oceania. Conf. 6.1, Annex 1.
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implementation of the treaty mainly through the close oversight of the Secretariat,21"
especially when the COP is unable to function continuously. Therefore, Lyster
depiets the Committee as the "Inner Cabinet" of CITES.220 While the COP is entitled
to make provision to help the Seeretariat carry out its duties,221 the Standing
Committee representing the Parties between meetings of the COP shall provide
general policy and general operational direction to the Secretariat concerning the
implementation of the Convention.222 Moreover, the Standing Committee also may
assist the Secretariat to fulfill its functions by delivering advice and guidance.223 In
particular, on behalf of the COP, it carries out interim activities as may be
necessary.224
Regarding the infraction of the treaty obligation, recent practices indicate that the
Standing Committee has been actively involved in enforcing the treaty by urging
wildlife trade embargo against violators. In most cases, such enforcement actions
actually proceeded in collaboration with the operation of the Secretariat.22S For
instance, after receiving the report of the Secretariat concerning Thailand's lack of
adequate domestic legislation to implement CITES, on 22 April 1991, the Standing
Committee recommended that all wildlife trade with Thailand be banned. 226
Similarly, Italy's failure to fulfill its obligation under CITES triggered a resolution of
the Standing Committee calling for adoption of stricter measures against it.227 But, in
this case, Austria, Switzerland and the United States declined to implement this
recommendation.228 More recently, as indicated above, pertaining to the endangered
species of rhinos and tiger, the Standing Committee also urged the prohibition of
wildlife trade mainly against some consuming nations that were blamed for
insufficient implementation. Yet, the US was the only State that implemented the
219 See Lyster, Wildlife Law, at 275.
220 Id. at 274-75.
221 CITES, Art. XI, para. 3 (a).
222 CITES, Conf. 6.1, Annex I.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Birnie, "Endangered Species", at 258; Favre, "CITES", at 911.
226 See CITES Secretariat Notification No. 636 (22 April 1991). After the Standing Committee's
reviewing the adoption of new legislation by Thailand, on April 2 1992, a recommendation was made
by the Secretariat that the trade ban be lifted. See CITES Secretariat Notification No. 673.
227 See CITES Secretariat Notification No. 675 (30 June 1992). As Italy improved its implementation
of CITES, the Standing Committee reversed its recommendation. See CITES Secretariat Notification
No. 722 (19 February 1993).
22il See Sand, "CITES", at n. 57.
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CITES recommendation against Taiwan.
It is clear that the absence of an effective and centralised enforcement
mechanism within CITES does not prevent it from recommending coercive trade
measures to remedy infraction. Such practice reflects that these CITES bodies are
inclined to play a quasi-judicial role in detecting the offence and proposing a penalty,
even if this operation lacks an institutional basis. In short, regardless of potential
effectiveness, it should be noted, however, that this sort of enforcement method
appears to fall short of binding effect and is subject to inconsistent and sporadic
implementation of resolutions. Further, the proposition of using trade sanctions, in
one way or another, perhaps may be deemed as a departure from the principal
mandate of CITES, which largely requires international cooperation.230
On rhinos and tigers case, whether the recommendation of urging trade embargo
against Taiwan may provide a solid legal basis for individual sanctions, therefore,
remains highly contentious. The following presents two possible approaches with
respect to the consistency between the Pelly sanctions on Taiwan and Principle 12 of
the Rio Declaration.
2 Possible approaches
(a) The strict interpretation of international consensus
Not surprisingly, Taiwan may favour a cautious approach toward the application
of the requirement of "measures under international consensus." In a sense, the term
should be confined to an enforcement action following a binding decision of a MEA
regarding the use of coercive enforcement measures, including trade sanctions. In
other words, individual sanctions against violators may not be justified unless they are
launched pursuant to a binding and legitimate decision of a competent institution of a
MEA. Taiwan may highlight the following rationale to bolster this view.
First of all, unlike other non-coercive environmental measures,23' the use of trade
sanctions, by nature, is a coercive and punitive method to force compliance. Taiwan
may argue that such an enforcement mechanism serving to judge national conduct
should operate under a relatively attentive regulation rather than a loose, soft-law
229 Crawford, "CITES", at 565. See also chapter one of the thesis.
230 See CITES Preamble.
231 Esty lists several measures aimed to affect environmental behaviour, which include trade sanctions,
import restrictions, tax measures, labeling requirements, diplomatic warnings, informal consultations,
educational programs, technology transfer and financial assistance. See Esty, Greening GATT, at 132.
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recommendation. Accordingly, international consensus regarding environmental
sanctions would require that such a measure be taken pursuant to the decision of a
competent body vested with explicit enforcement power, such as sanctions
mechanism. Actually, the sanctions mechanism embodied in the Security Council of
the United Nations has already provided a vivid example.232
Moreover, strict application of Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration is able to
reduce controversy and promote effectiveness for environmental trade measures.
Since a recommendation by a MEA calling for coercive measures is not legally
binding, a nation following the resolution may still retain the option on the duration
and latitude of its action. In this regard, even though the MEA subsequently resolves
to lift the sanctions, an acting State may have discretion on whether the sanctions will
be terminated according to its own judgement. As a result, such imposition of
sanctions without effective supervision will run the risk of putting international order
into chaos. Thus, not surprisingly, even writers advocating the need for coercive
trade measures also concede the potential abuse caused by the unbridled individual
sanctions.
On the other hand, the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan should be seen as
incompatible with the implications of Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration partly
because of the failure of the US to seek multilateral solutions before resorting to
unilateral measures. As indicated, an enforcement mechanism with sanctions power
has not yet been established in the CITES regime. Inferred from the Shrimp/Turtle
case on the elaboration of Principle 12, it may be held that the US should first have
made serious attempts to propose the amendment of CITES so as to create a sanctions
mechanism rather than relying on the CITES non-binding recommendation to warrant
its individual action. In fact, there was no indication that the US had ever fulfilled the
requirement before resorting to unilateral sanctions.
Overall, under the strict reading of Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration, the US's
Pelly sanctions, even with certain linkage with a CITES recommendation, were
insufficient to reach the status of an international consensus.
(b) The broad interpretation of international consensus
Alternatively, an alleged "international consensus" may be perceived from a
232 The UN Charter, Art. 39 and 41.
233 Southworth III, "GATT and Environment", at 101 I.
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different perspective. The principle might be interpreted to be as flexible as possible
to justify an action recommended by MEAs, even though the MEA's resolution is
subject to non-binding nature.
First of all, as far as the wording of Principle 12 is concerned, it may be pointed
out that no convincing evidence upholds that measures based on "international
consensus" must be confined to those officially authorised by MEAs. Thus, Blank
contends that "[Pjrinciple 12 does not require a binding agreement, only a level of
international consensus."2'4 As a result, the use of trade sanctions, even without
explicit authorisation by MEAs, may secure certain sorts of the status of international
consensus.
Secondly, the effort to circumscribe measures of international consensus to those
trade sanctions well-authorised in MEAs, so far, may be unrealistic. Ideally, the
development of strong and effective enforcement mechanisms is a better and more
accountable solution to cope with non-compliance.233 But, the hurdle of formulating
an enforcement regime embodying the sanctions prerogative in most MEAs
remains.236 Therefore, it may be upheld that the "advice" of MEAs,237 even without
binding force, should be enough to exonerate unilateral trade sanctions simply aiming
to enforce such a recommendation.
Furthermore, certain implementation of environmental sanctions, although
imposed unilaterally, is not a pure form of unilateralism but carries many features of
multilateralism. Esty articulates the term "multilateral unilateralism" in describing
this category of environmental measures.238 The circumstances, he proposes, include
unilateral actions employed in support of internationally agreed standards as well as
those measures invoked in response to global or transboundary environmental
harms.239 He further points out that multilateral unilateralism should be guaranteed
especially if multilateral efforts do not succeed.240 Hence, unilateral trade measures
shall be permissible if taken within a "multilateral legal structure."241 Therefore, in
234 Blank, "Environmental Trade Measures", at 98.
235 See Jenkins, "Trade Sanctions", at 225-26.. It also has been observed that the effective operation of
a collective enforcement mechanism may reduce the necessity of invoking unilateral actions to deal
with international environmental problems. See id.
236 See generally Esty, Greening GATT, at 144, 150; see also Jenkins, "Trade Sanctions", at 227;
Blank, "Environmental Trade Measures", at 98.
237 Jenkins, id. at 227.
23s See Esty, Greening GATT, at 140-41.
237 Id. at 139.
240 Id. at 150.
241 Id. at 141.
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Esty's view, the Pelly praetice mainly aimed at forcing Taiwan to comply with
CITES's mandate offers an example ofmultilateral unilateralism.242
In sum, in the light of the above contention, the flexible interpretation of an
international consensus may allow unilateral measures that have genuine connection
with multilateral legal structure to be permissible under the Rio Principle.
Nevertheless, even if a non-binding recommendation of an MEA may secure the
status of an alleged international consensus, in Taiwan's case, it merits examination
whether the US's trade sanctions against Taiwan were really based on such
"international consensus". Taiwan could not dispute the text of the decision at the 30th
meeting of the Standing Committee, which urged parties to consider banning wildlife
products from Taiwan and China. But, Taiwan could point out that, in contrast to the
previous meeting, no clear recommendation on a trade embargo against Taiwan has
been made at the 31st meeting of the Standing Committee. Rather, Taiwan was
required to demonstrate clear progress before the next meeting of CITES COP.
Therefore, the US's action, Taiwan may argue, deliberately ignored the more recent
CITES's decision and only followed the old one. It should therefore not be regarded
as being supported by international consensus.
By contrast, the US may contend that, at its 31st meeting, the Standing
Committee did not withdraw its previous recommendation (30th meeting, September
1993) urging nations to consider prohibiting trade in vildli fe speci rans vith Taiwan
and China.243 Therefore, the previous recommendation would remain valid and still
operative. Also, it may contend that COP Resolution ( CONF. 6.10) has not been
revoked. It recommended the parties to "use all appropriate means (including
economic, political and diplomatic) to exert pressure on countries continuing to allow
trade in rhinoceros horn." In addition, the US may point out that CITES seemed not
ready to express its opposition to such sanctions, because the US action was reported
by the Secretariat to the 1994 COP with no trace of criticism.244 It may also stress
that the use of trade sanctions might well have been considered as the very factor
which might ensure that ""further clear progress" would be achieved by the next
242 Id. at 150-51.
243 Crawford, "Rhinoceros and Tiger", at 565.
244 The Ninth Conference of the Parties, Report of the Secretariat, Interpretation and Implementation of
the Convention: Trade in Rhinoceros Specimens, Doc. 9.28, at 4 (1994).
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COP.245 Further, due to the faet that Taiwan was the only country that was blamed for
falling short of meeting the CITES's minimum requirements, the US could argue that
its action, which was designed to enforce observance with CITES standards, was
consistent with the spirit of international consensus.
A prudent tribunal is perhaps expected to evaluate the overall decisions made by
the CITES Standing Committee in deciding whether the Pelly sanctions were
compatible with the Rio principle. It must detect the real implications embodied in
those recommendations regarding the enforcement actions against Taiwan. If it
assumes that CITES may, in one way or the other, tolerate the US's individual actions
and appreciate the result brought by the sanctions. It probably may favour the US's
position. Otherwise, it might pay sympathy to Taiwan's contention, adopting a rigid
interpretation of the CITES decisions.
245 The Decisions of the Standing Committee on Trade in Rhinoceros Horn and tiger Specimens,
Geneva, Mar. 1994, at para. 8.
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Conclusion
The practice of the US Pellv sanctions against Taiwan was an indication of the
US's tendency to bring its national law to bear on international concerns. Under the
guise of enforcing a MEA, a Pelly sanction's association with the multilateral
approach of CITES may, to some degree, appease, though not totally eliminate, the
critic on the US's deliberate use of trade measures. Nonetheless, the fact that such
Pelly sanctions are likely to run, in most cases, without proper supervisory control by
multilateral mechanisms will repeatedly arouse scepticism about their legality.
Indeed, the US Pelly action against Taiwan creates a difficult task for the
international community to decide whether it was legally permissible, particularly
under the context of the Rio Declaration. The eventual determination on the Pelly
sanctions' consistency with Principle 12 depends on the interpretation and application
of the term "measures based on international consensus." Since relevant practices and
decisions concerning the implication of the term have not yet been fully shaped, this
will inevitably leave some room to argue its real meaning.
If the worry about the abuse of unilateral economic means prevails, a
conservative stand may be adopted to reject the consistency of the Pelly sanctions
with Principle 12, despite the former's certain linkage with a MEA. By contrast, if the
value brought by unilateral measures to the advance of international environmental
protection is significantly appreciated, it could not be ruled out that the Pelly
sanctions may have secured the end sought by Principle 12.
On the other hand, it should be noted that the Pelly Amendment is not required
to be limited to the operation of MEAs. In effect, its response to the global species'
degradation may turn out not necessarily to be linked to the verification of any
international agreements. Accordingly, the use of Pelly sanctions might be challenged




"Let he who is without sin cast the first stone. "
John 8:7
The sovereign right of a State to regulate its own commercial transactions
continues to be firmly rooted in international law. Nevertheless, the prerogative of a
nation to select its trading partners remains subject to certain constraints enunciated in
international customary law, treaty and even soft law, largely because the
implementation of a trade embargo with a specific purpose may run the risk of
infringing international law. It may infringe general principles, such as rules relating
to countermeasures, or to non-intervention. It may also infringe rules deriving from
special regimes, such as international trade law or international environmental law.
As to the preservation of the international environment, it is admitted that trade
sanctions can be a useful tool in promoting environmental awareness, and,
occasionally in effecting actual environmental change. Their effectiveness, however,
appears to be unpredictable and subject to various circumstances. Consequently, it is
not competent to justify unilateral enforcement action by reference to the valuable
result brought by the action, as in the case of the US's Pelly sanctions.
It is believed that this study has provided some useful references in assessing the
legality of imposing trade measures for environmental purposes. It is always
essential to seek out the relevant facts of the dispute before looking at the crucial issue
of lawfulness. Likewise, in determining the lawfulness of the US Pelly sanctions
against Taiwan, some empirical evidence has been presented to indicate that their
legality could not be fully assessed merely by reviewing the text of the Pelly
Amendment alone. Rather, the task hinges on the evaluation of all the relevant facts
surrounding the actions.
Having disclosed the relevant facts surrounding the use of the Pelly sanctions
and explored the applicable norms on this dispute, we may conclude the issue of the
legality of the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan as follows:
Firstly, concerning the regime of countermeasures, a prior violation of
international law by an alleged offending State is a prerequisite for justifying
unilateral enforcement actions. But, even where a breach of international
environmental law does occur, it is necessary to explore further whether the breached
norm constitutes an enforceable law. It has been demonstrated that, under the
present jurisprudence, not all of environmental offences can be enforced by a State
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that actually suffers no direct damage.
Particularly, in relation to international wildlife law on species protection, it is far
from certain whether the norm has become an enforceable law. This is principally
because the concept of 'collective interests' in the 1LC draft article on State
responsibility remains unsettled, as does the erga onines doctrine over such
environmental obligations. In the Taiwan's case, it is not clear whether the Pelly
sanctions can be considered to be a legal countermeasure, mainly due to the
uncertainty regarding the violation of customary international law by Taiwan's rhinos
and tiger conservation policy.
Secondly, regarding non-intervention doctrine, the Nicaragua case established
that the law on non-intervention should be interpreted to prevent the imposition of
economic embargoes by economically powerful States against relatively weak ones,
whereby they amount to the coercive overpowering of the target State's sovereignty.
The ICJ held, probably correctly, that the American sanctions against Nicaragua did
not violate customary law of non-intervention. But, the decision does not necessarily
imply that any use of economic measures would not constitute illegal intervention
under any circumstances. In the case of the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan, it is
submitted that the crucial element of coercion was present. The basis of this
conclusion is the unique character of the overall relations between the US and Taiwan.
In sum, if a tribunal only focuses on the material economic loss inflicted on Taiwan as
a primary base for such a judgement, it may not consider the Pelly sanctions to be
coercive. It is submitted, however, that the matter should be considered not only on
narrowly economic grounds but also on the basis of the overall relations between the
two countries. When considered in this broader framework, the coercive character of
the Pelly sanctions in the Taiwan case becomes apparent.
Thirdly, the specific regime of international trade law is also highly relevant to
any assessment of the legality of unilateral economic sanctions. This body of law
stresses the principle of non-discrimination and of the prohibition against quantitative
restrictions on trade (such as a trade embargo). The discussion has proceeded on the
basis of the norms of the GATT/WTO and of the FCN treaties which are most
relevant to the study.
Inferred from the Tuna and the Shrimp decisions, it is clear that the WTO has
showed a broad tolerance towards PPM measures. But, it has also set out certain
limitations to curb the abuse of the measure. Therefore, it seems too soon to predict
that the WTO may embrace environmental trade sanctions in the short term. Because
Taiwan is not a member of the WTO, the US did not violate the GATT/WTO rules in
imposing the Pelly sanctions. But, our hypothetical study shows that the enforcement
action would have breached the WTO/GATT rules, had it been a member.
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The Polly sanctions against Taiwan arguably violated the MFN provision and the
prohibition against quantitative restrictions. The strict interpretation on the 'necessity'
requirement adopted the WTO tribunal probably means that most use of trade
sanctions would be deemed inconsistent with exceptional clause (b) in Article XX of
GATT 1994 concerning living species protection. Such trade measures, however,
have a better chance of meeting the requirement of paragraph (g) dealing with
preservation of natural resources. For instance, the catalogue of living species, either
land-based species or transboundary marine species, may be treated differently in the
GATT's environmental exceptional clause. A trade measure invoked to protect marine
species, thus, has a better chance to survive the exception (g). Nevertheless, in
Taiwan's case, the absence of a close and real connection between the unrelated
products targeted by the Pelly sanctions, such as bird feather, and the policy goal
which was to preserve rhinos and tigers is the main reason that the action could not
satisfy Article XX (g).
Even if a trade sanction, like the Pelly action, could fall within the range of these
exceptional clauses, it still has to stand the test of the chapeau's mandate, which is
usually interpreted more narrowly. It is true that the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan
were imposed in the wake of a decision by the CITES Standing Committee. Thus, the
US had, perhaps, a better chance to convince the WTO that the Pelly sanctions were
not imposed in a manner which constituted unjustifiable discrimination. It should be
noted, however, that the decision made by the Standing Committee on Taiwan was
reached without any substantial opportunity on Taiwan's part to put its case fully to
the CITES parties. Thus, it remains possible that the WTO tribunal would hold the
US's Pelly action to have been discriminatory notwithstanding the CITES Committee
decision. In addition, under the present WTO jurisprudence, the sanctions would be
seen as arbitrary discrimination due to the lack of due process of law in the
implementation of the Pelly Amendment.
It is indisputable that the FCN treaty between the US and the ROC (Taiwan) is
the most feasible regime under which Taiwan may seek a proper remedy. Like the
GATT rules, the FCN treaty allows trade restrictions for the protection of animal
life—but subject to the crucial requirement that any such measures may not constitute
'arbitrary discrimination' (Article 26 (2)(b)). The sanctions may presumably survive
the test of the environmental exceptional clause provided in the treaty. But, the US
would have substantially the same difficulty in establishing that its action was not
arbitrary discrimination as it would under the WTO norms.
Finally, contemporary international environmental law requires international
consensus to be sought before resorting to unilateral measures. This is a soft-law
requirement embodied in Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration. However, it fails to
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clarity whether or not, or under what circumstances, the unilateral action may be
prohibited or justified. Rather, the principle, at face value, merely makes a policy
direction, requesting the "avoidance" of unilateral action. In fact, Principle 12 was
not drafted with the intention to decide the legality of unilateral enforcement measures
for environmental purposes, but rather to reaffirm the priority of seeking international
cooperation and negotiation, which has become a principal mandate of international
environmental law. Interestingly, however, the principle has been hardened by the
decision of an international tribunal, like the WTO, to the extent that it seems to be an
obligation of States to pursue concerted action by, inter alia, concluding bilateral,
regional or multilateral agreements before engaging in unilateral action.
On the issue of the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan, whether the trade embargo
acts purely unilaterally or in conjunction with international regime, such as CITES
will, to some extent, affect the determination as to its consistency with Principle 12.
It is true that such measure is not a pure product of unilateralism due to the connection
between the action and CITES's recommendation. But, it remains uncertain whether
such connection may be sufficient to guarantee the international consensus required in
the principle.
In the light of the above observation, under certain circumstances, the legality of
the Pelly sanctions against Taiwan is quite uncertain, partly because some applicable
rules have not yet matured and no relevant precedent has been established.
The study shows that, to some extent, the assessment on the lawfulness of an
individual action authorised by the Pelly Amendment cannot be properly concluded
without carefully examining various factors involved in the action. As a result, the
task might vary according to different circumstances. Accordingly, the legitimacy of a
Pelly sanction would be determined on a case by case basis. Overall, this study cannot
be said to conclude that the imposition of a Pelly sanction would be unlawful under
any circumstances. It can only be concluded that their legality is questionable in the
specific case of application to Taiwan, given the particular circumstances.
On the other hand, it should be noted that this presumed conclusion—that the US
Pelly sanctions against Taiwan breached certain rules of international law—should not
obscure the significance and necessity of protecting endangered species, which is
definitely a critical issue facing the international community. It seems possible that
the greater the consensus in favour of a legal duty of preserving species, the stronger
the argument in favour of the permissibility of Pelly-type environmental sanctions.
Nevertheless, at the present stage, the more ideal solution perhaps is to formulate
an accountable regime to address the compliance with international environmental
standards. It has been observed that the result of urging the WTO to accept certain
types of unilateral environmental measures seems not always to be desirable, even
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though the institution has recently shown its willingness to embrace international
environmental norms.1 Further, it is doubtful whether the WTO is a suitable regime
for shouldering the task in determining the permissibility of environmental trade
measures. It seems that the enforcement action undertaken by the CITES Standing
Committee in recommending wildlife trade embargo is not always effective and does
not necessarily lead to a satisfactory outcome partly due to the non-binding character
of its recommendation and to the absence of an institutional sanction mechanism.
Thus, in all events, the best solution is to forge a strong multilateral enforcement
mechanism with institutional sanctions power. An alternative solution recommended
by some commentators is to create an international environmental organisation,2
analogous to the WTO, which may effectively supervise individual actions and solve
disputes triggered by the measures. Overall, it is believed that, as effective
multilateral enforcement instruments improve in effectiveness, the tolerance of
unilateral action by the international community will accordingly diminish.
1 See generally Dunoff, "Border Patrol", at 27.
2 Some author proposes the establishment of a "Global Environment Organisation". See Esty,
Greening GATT, at 78-98. See also Charnovitz, "Harmonisation", at 283-85; Ayling, "International
Environmental Organisation", at 243-69.
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22 USC Sec. 1978
TITLE 22 - FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
INTERCOURSE
CHAPTER 25 - PROTECTION OF VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS AND IN
TERRITORIAL WATERS OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Sec. 1978. Restriction on importation of fishery or wildlife products from
countries which violate international fishery or endangered or threatened
species programs.
(a) Certification to President
(1) When the Secretary of Commerce determines that nationals of a foreign
country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations in a manner
or under circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of an international
fishery conservation program, the Secretary of Commerce shall certify such
fact to the President.
(2) When the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary of the Interior finds
that nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are engaging in
trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness of any international
program for endangered or threatened species, the Secretary making such
finding shall certify such fact to the President.
(3) In administering this subsection, the Secretary of Commerce or the
Secretary of the Interior, as appropriate, shall -
(A) periodically monitor the activities of foreign nationals that may affect
the international programs referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2);
(B) promptly investigate any activity by.foreign nationals that, in the
opinion of the Secretary, may be cause for certification under paragraph
(1) or (2); and
(C) promptly conclude; and reach a decision with respect to; any
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(4) Upon receipt of any certification made under paragraph (1) or (2), the
President may direct the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the bringing or
the importation into the United States of any products from the offending
country for any duration as the President determines appropriate and to the
extent that such prohibition is sanctioned by the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade.
(b) Notification to Congress
Within sixty days following certification by the Secretary of Commerce or the
Secretary of the Interior, the President shall notify the Congress of any action
taken by him pursuant to such certification. In the event the President fails to
direct the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the importation of fish
products or wildlife products of the offending country, or if such prohibition
does not cover all fish products or wildlife products of the offending country,
the President shall inform the Congress of the reasons therefor.
(c) Importation of fish products from offending country
prohibited
It shall be unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States knowingly to bring or import into, or cause to be imported into, the
United States any products prohibited by the Secretary of the Treasury
pursuant to this section.
(d) Periodic review by Secretary of Commerce or Secretary of
the Interior; termination of certification; notice
After making a certification to the President under subsection (a) of this
section, the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary of the Interior, as the
case may be, shall periodically review the activities of the nationals of the
offending country to determine if the reasons for which the certification was
made no longer prevail. Upon determining that such reasons no longer
prevail, the Secretary concerned shall terminate the certification and publish
notice thereof, together with a statement of the facts on which such
determination is based, in the Federal Register.
(e) Penalties; forfeiture; customs laws
(1) Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be fined not more
than $10,000 for the first violation, and not more than $25,000 for each
subsequent violation.
(2) All products brought or imported into the United States in violation of this
section, or the monetary value thereof, may be forfeited.
(3) All provisions of law relating to the seizure, judicial forfeiture, and
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such cargo or the proceeds from the sale thereof, and the remission or
mitigation of such forfeitures shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred,
or alleged to have been incurred, under the provisions of this section, insofar
as such provisions of law are applicable and not inconsistent with this section.
(f) Enforcement
(1) Enforcement of the provisions of this section prohibiting the bringing or
importation of products into the United States shall be the responsibility of
the Secretary of the Treasury.
(2) The judges of the United States district courts, and United States
magistrate judges may, within their respective jurisdictions, upon proper oath
or affirmation showing probable cause, issue such warrants or other process
as may be required for enforcement of this chapter and regulations issued
thereunder.
(3) Any person authorized to carry out enforcement activities hereunder shall
have the power to execute any warrant or process issued by any officer or
court of competent jurisdiction for the enforcement of this section.
(4) Such person so authorized shall have the power -
(A) with or without a warrant or other process, to arrest any persons
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States committing in his
presence or view a violation of this section or the regulations issued
thereunder;
(B) with or without a warrant or other process, to search any vessel or
other conveyance subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and, if
as a result of such search he has reasonable cause to believe that such
vessel or other conveyance or any person on board is engaging in
operations in violation of this section or the regulations issued
thereunder, then to arrest such person.
(5) Such person so authorized, may seize, whenever and wherever
lawfully found, all products brought or imported into the United States in
violation of this section or the regulations issued thereunder. Products so
seized may be disposed of pursuant to the order of a court of competent
jurisdiction, or, if perishable, in a manner prescribed by regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury after consultation with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services.
(g) Regulations
The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the
Secretary of the Interior are each authorized to prescribe such regulations as
he determines necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.
(h) Definitions
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As used in this section -
(1) The term "person" means any individual, partnership, corporation, or
association.
(2) The term "United States" means the several States, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa,
Guam, the Virgin Islands, and every other territory and possession of the
United States.
(3) The term "international fishery conservation program" means any ban,
restriction, regulation, or other measure in effect pursuant to a bilateral or
multilateral agreement which is in force with respect to the United States, the
purpose of which is to conserve or protect the living resources of the sea,
including marine mammals.
(4) The term "international program for endangered or threatened species"
means any ban, restriction, regulation, or other measure in effect, p Subsec.
(f). Pub. L. 95-376, Sec. 2(6), inserted references to the Secretary of
Commerce and the Secretary of the Interior. Subsec. (g)(3). Pub. L. 95-376,
Sec. 2(7)(A), (B), substituted "in effect" for "in force", and "which is in force
with respect to the United States" for "to which the United States is a
signatory party". Subsec. (g)(5) to (7). Pub. L. 95-376, Sec. 2(7)(C), added
pars. (5) to (7).
Change of Name
"United States magistrate judges" substituted for "United States magistrates"
in subsec. (f)(2) pursuant to section 321 of Pub. L. 101-650, set out as a
note under section 631 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
Previously "United States magistrates" substituted for "United States
commissioners" pursuant to Pub. L. 90-578. See chapter 43 (Sec. 631 et
seq.) of Title 28. "Secretary of Health and Human Services" substituted for
"Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare" in subsec. (f)(5) pursuant to
section 509(b) of Pub. L. 96-88, which is classified to section 3508(b) of Title
20, Education.
Section Referred to in Other Sections
This section is referred to in title 16 sections 1371, 1821, 1826, 1826a, 4242.
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The Episode of the Implementation of the Pelly Amendment
Date of
certification





1978 Whale Chile, Peru, and
South Korea
No
1985 Whale Soviet Union No
1986 Whale Norway No
1988 Whale Japan No
1989 Driftnet Fishing Taiwan No
1989 Driftnet Fishing South Korea No
1990 Whale Norway No
1991 Sea Turtles Japan No
1991 Driftnet Fishing South Korea No
1991 Driftnet Fishing Taiwan No
1992 Whale Norway No
1993 Whale Norway No
1993 Rhinos and Tiger China and Taiwan China: No
Taiwan: Yes
1995 Whale Japan No
1996 Whale Canada No





Multilateral and Unilateral's response to rhinos and tiger crisis
CITES The US Pelly Action
June, 1992 28Ih Standing Committee:
• rhinos only
• education; substitute
• give support to countries lacking
enforcement means
Nov., 1992 The Secretary of the Interior was brought
attention by environmental groups
regarding Taiwan, China, South Korea
and Yemen's alleged offense
March, 1993 29th Standing Committee:
• rhinos only
• reiterate COP 6.10
Sep., 1993 30th Standing Committee:
• noting the progress made by certain
States
• South Korea's entry to CITES
• China and Taiwan had not
sufficiently comply with COP. 6.10.;
recommended parties to consider
using wildlife trade embargo against
them.
• set minimum criteria to be enforced
• encourage international co-operation
The Secretary of the Interior certified
China and Taiwan.
President Clinton decided to postponed
the sanctions until next meeting of the
CITES.
March, 1994 31st Standing Committee:
• China met the basic requirement
• Taiwan had not implemented the
criteria adequately; recommended
clear progress must be demonstrated
within eight month
• noting further actions need to be
undertaken by several nations
•
April, 1994 President announced the imposition of the
Pelly sanctions against Taiwan
Nov., 1994 9th COP in US:
• no recommendation of using trade
embargo against certain countries
June, 1995 President lifted the sanctions upon Taiwan
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